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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between equity valuation and four value drivers 
- revenue growth, volatility, profit margin and competitive advantage. It is motivated 
by evidence that the predominant valuation techniques of equity analysts are not 
associated with improved portfolio performance. Prior research suggests that equity 
analysts devote considerable resources into forecasting near-term earnings, but derive 
target prices from those earnings in an almost arbitrary fashion. In contrast, the 
valuation techniques in the commercial world are increasing in sophistication. Around 
30 percent of large corporations in the United States and Australia use real options 
analysis for project evaluation, according to recent surveys. Thus, the research 
question is whether sophisticated equity valuation, based on rigorous economic 
assumptions, is useful for investment decision-making. 
Chapter 2 examines whether equity portfolios formed using Decision-tree or 
Discounted Cash Flow valuation models earn positive abnormal returns. These 
valuation models incorporate the assumption that abnormal returns on reinvested 
earnings are eroded over time. I form long-short portfolios on the basis of value 
relative to price at 30 April of each year from 1987-2004, by selecting stocks ranked 
in the top and bottom deciles, top and bottom quintiles and the top 30 percent versus 
the bottom 30 percent. I report annual excess retums of around 7 percent and a 
significant improvement in Sharpe ratios. Despite a strong relationship between 
value/price, size and market-to-book equity, this outperformance remains after 
controlling for these factors. Further, abnormal retums were most consistently earned 
by portfolios formed from a sub-sample of small growth stocks. The resuUs are 
consistent with the following explanation for the outperformance of value stocks -
investors extrapolate past earnings and revenue growth for an unreasonably long 
competitive advantage period. The implication for portfolio managers is that there is 
merit to fundamental valuation techniques, provided they incorporate the assumption 
that firms' competitive advantage is unlikely to be sustained into perpetuity. 
IV 
Chapter 3 measures the relationship between IPO underpricing and the proportion of 
equity value attributable to the firm's embedded options, referred to as Real option%. 
In estimating this proportion, I compute Discounted Cash Flow and Decision-tree 
valuations under the assumption that revenue growth, volatility of growth and profit 
margin revert to long-term sustainable levels over the firm's competitive advantage 
period. Consistent with information asymmetry theories of underpricing, there is a 
significantly positive association between initial retums and Real option%. The 
results are consistent with the value of embedded options being priced at a 10 percent 
discount to market value, in addition to any strategic underpricing. In contrast, the 
evidence suggests that information asymmetry does not prevent the Discounted Cash 
Flow component of equity value being fully incorporated into offer price. 
Chapter 4 provides corroborating evidence that Real option% is a measure of the 
proportion of equity value comprised of embedded options. First, I show that Real 
option% is positively correlated with /?cS:D-intensity and that around 30 percent of the 
variation in Real option% can be explained by TJc&D-intensity. Second, I show that 
Real option% and /?c&D-intensity have comparable association with the volatility of 
stock retums. Third, I estimate the market value of embedded options on a per share 
basis. When the market value of embedded options is estimated using capitalised 
R&D, the confidence interval around this value is comparable to that implied by Real 
option% under an assumed competitive advantage period of 20 or 30 years. When this 
confidence interval is estimated using 7?c&Z)/Sales, it is comparable to that implied by 
Real option% under an assumed competitive advantage period of 10 years. Finally, I 
show that quintile portfolios formed on the basis of Real option% have comparable 
investment performance to those formed on the basis of 7?cS:Z)-intensity. Sharpe ratios 
for the top and bottom quintiles formed on Real option% were 0.40 and 0.41, 
respectively. Furthermore, Sharpe ratios of 0.34 and 0.38 were obtained for those 
same quintiles for portfolios formed on the basis of R&D/Sales. In sum, this analysis 
provides support for Real option% as a valid economic constmct - the proportion of 
equity value comprised of embedded options. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis consists of three papers which examine the relationship between equity 
valuation and four value drivers - revenue growth, volatility, profit margin and 
competitive advantage. 1 derive equity valuation models which are more robust than 
those used by equity analysts in practice, but whose parameters can be estimated with 
little more data than already generated by those analysts. The thesis is motivated by 
evidence that the predominant valuation techniques of equity analysts are not 
associated with improved portfolio performance. Prior research suggests that equity 
analysts devote considerable resources to forecasting near-term eamings, but derive 
target prices from those earnings in an almost arbitrary fashion. In contrast, the 
valuation practices of industrial firms show an increasing level of sophistication. 
Around 30 percent of large corporations in the United States and Australia use real 
options analysis for project evaluation, according to recent surveys. Thus, the research 
question is whether equity valuation, based on rigorous economic assumptions, is 
useful for investment decision-making. 
I evaluate this research question in three settings. First, I examine the performance of 
stock portfolios formed on the basis of two equity valuation techniques - Discounted 
Cash Flow and Decision-tree valuations. The predominant underlying assumption is 
that firms' competitive advantage is unlikely to be sustained indefinitely. This implies 
that long-mn expected retums on reinvested eamings are equal to the cost of capital. 
In the Discounted Cash Flow model, I implement this assumption by ensuring that 
revenue growth and profit margins revert to long-term expected values over an 
assumed competitive advantage period (CAP). In the Decision-tree model, I 
incorporate an estimate of the value of management's option to alter reinvestment 
policy, in response to signals regarding expected fixture growth. I implement this 
assumption by simulating eamings over the competitive advantage period and 
computing the mean valuation which results from those simulations. 
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Second, I examine whether the proportion of equity value consisting of embedded 
options {Real option%) can explain the underpricing of initial public offers (IPOs). If 
there is greater uncertainty over the value of embedded options, relative to the value 
of expected cash flows, information asymmetry theories predict a positive association 
between Real option% and IPO underpricing. 
Third, I examine the validity of Real option% as an economic constmct, by measuring 
its association with research and development {R&D) expenditure. I then examine the 
association between Real option%, R&D expenditure and stock prices, retums and 
volatility. The three studies are summarised below. 
1. Valuation of high-growth equities 
This study examines the relative ability of a. Decision-tree valuation model and a 
Discounted Cash Flow valuation model to identify stocks which subsequently eam 
abnormal retums. Both models rely on the assumption that revenue growth and profit 
margins are expected to revert to long-term values which are consistent with normal 
retum on investment over an assumed competitive advantage period. The Decision-
tree model allows investors to value the firms' growth and abandonment options, 
created by management's ability to respond to high- and low-growth environments by 
altering investment policy. In addition, the models are equally applicable to profitable 
and loss-making firms, given that they include separate estimates of revenue growth 
and profit margin. This contrasts with textbook valuation models which typically rely 
on an estimate of eamings growth. 
The modelling techniques allow investors to quantify the proportion of equity value 
not captured by the present value of expected future cash flows. This is especially 
important for stocks characterised by high growth, a high level of innovation and 
significant probability of failure. Firms with these characteristics are likely to have 
above-average values of their abandonment option. Further, their higher volatility of 
revenue growth means that their growth options have above-average value. This 
occurs because investment policy is expected to change in response to feedback 
regarding the firm's growth prospects. This argument finds support in the corporate 
finance literature on the diversification discount. While there is conflicting evidence 
as to whether the average diversified firm trades at a discount, there is agreement that 
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losses in value occur because of relative over-investment in low growth segments, 
compared to high-growth segments (Villalonga, 2004; Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
This study is motivated by the emerging use of real options valuation in corporate 
finance practice (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Tmong, Partington and Peat, 2005) and 
its contrasting minimal use by equity analysts who largely rely on multiples-based 
valuation (Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005; Demirakos, Strong and Walker, 2004; 
Block, 1999; and Bradshaw, 2002). The overwhelming use of eamings multiples by 
analysts to justify recommendations or target prices can be justified if they lead to 
subsequent outperformance. However, there is no evidence that this is the case 
(Bradshaw, 2004; Asquith et al). 
Furthermore, there is growing theoretical and empirical evidence that market prices 
exceed Discounted Cash Flow valuations and this difference can be attributed to 
option value (Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996; Schwartz and Moon, 2000 and 2001; 
Bemardo and Chowdry, 2002; Quigg, 1993). A preliminary examination of the 
theoretical and empirical valuations of my sample support this contention. Median 
Discounted Cash Flow/price ratios are considerably less than one (0.49 - 0.54) but are 
comparable to those computed by Bradshaw (2004). In contrast median Decision-tree 
values are in the range 0.70-1.04 for 10 of 11 industry sectors, when the assumed 
competitive advantage period is 30 years. 
Application of the models resulted in significantly positive excess retums. I formed 
long-short portfolios by selecting stocks ranked according to value relative to price on 
30 April each year from 1987-2004. For the full sample, long-short portfolios formed 
from the top and bottom deciles of this ranking eamed excess retums of around 7 
percent a year. However, performance was largely insensitive to the valuation method 
used or the assumed competitive advantage period (10, 20 or 30 years). This occurred 
because 60 percent of stocks were ranked in the same decile for all six valuations 
performed. Outperformance was most consistent for long-short portfolios formed 
from a sub-sample of small, high market-to-book stocks, and there is no evidence of 
outperformance amongst long-short portfolios formed from large, high market-to-
book. This is consistent with the explanation of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) for the value-glamour anomaly, that investors extrapolate past eamings growth 
for an unreasonably long competitive advantage period. The models used in my study 
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prevent this from occurring, but achieve their most consistent performance amongst a 
sub-sample in which this extrapolative bias is most likely to be present. 
Excess retums remained even after controlluig for three definitions of risk - portfolio 
volatility, Fama-French factors and default risk. Portfolios of stocks with high 
value/price ratios had significantly higher Sharpe ratios than portfolios with lower 
value/price ratios; and long-short portfolios had significantly positive intercept terms 
in four-factor regressions. Default risk is a concem, given that the valuation models 
typically identified small, low market-to-book stocks as undervalued and there is a 
strong association between size and credit ratings. However, the magnitude of the 
excess retums eamed by long-short portfolios is significantly higher than the default 
risk premium required by debtholders. 
An additional contribution of this study is that it enhances our understanding of 
sharemarket activity firom 1998-2001, which was characterised by unusually high 
eamings multiples, a substantial increase in equity raisings and later claims that 
analyst research was tainted by the need to maintain corporate and investment 
banking relationships. The fall-out from this period included an $875 million 
settlement by ten broking houses with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD). But while there is substantial evidence that analyst 
research lacked objectivity for particular market segments, it is questionable whether 
this can be blamed for inflated equity prices in what is typically referred to as the 
'tech bubble'. 
For the sample analysed in my study, analysts' expectations for revenue growth or 
profit margms were not unusually high during this period, even for the Technology 
sector, nor was there unusual dispersion of those expectations. In contrast, the 
dispersion of fundamental value/price ratios increased significantly during this period. 
The result was that long-short portfolios formed as a result of those fundamental 
values typically eamed negative retums during 1998-1999, the boom years for growth 
stocks. However, these losses were more than recovered during the subsequent two 
years. This evidence is inconsistent with the argument that analyst hype was a major 
contributor to inflated equity prices. But it is consistent with the argument that the 
sudden rise in equity prices was due to short sale restrictions (Ofek and Richardson, 
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2003), which would allow market prices to divert sufficiently from fimdamentals for 
actively-managed funds to prosper. 
2. IPO underpricing and the value of embedded options 
This study explains the underpricing of IPOs as a function of the proportion of equity 
value consisting of embedded options, which I label Real option%. Investors in firms 
whose value consists largely of real options face above-average information 
asymmetry, which is expected to result in lower offer prices and higher retums on the 
first day of trade in the secondary market. This underpricing is in addition to any 
retums which result from underwriter or issuer incentives, which I term 'strategic 
underpricing.' 
Recent evidence suggests that IPO underpricing is a strategic decision of underwriters 
and issuers (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002 and 2003; Aggarwal, Pumanandam and 
Wu, 2005; Houston, James and Karceski, 2004). However, there is also evidence that 
technology IPOs during recent years were consistently underpriced, even after 
controlling for strategic underpricing (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm; Loughran and Ritter, 
2004). If there is above-average information asymmetry present in the float of a 
technology stock, we cannot entirely dismiss information asymmetry as a partial 
explanation for underpricing (Rock, 1986; Beneviste and Spindt, 1989; Koh and 
Walter, 1989; Beatty and Ritter 1986). 
In this paper, I argue that an mcrease in the proportion of value comprised of real 
options increases the relative information advantage of sophisticated investors. They 
will be relatively better informed about the probability of technological success, given 
the information conveyed directly by management and indirectly by analysts, and will 
be better placed to value the stock, given this information set. Applying this argument 
to the informed/uninformed dichotomy, for stocks in which a higher proportion of 
value is comprised of real options there will be a larger percentage of uninformed 
investors. Then, according to the winner's curse model of Rock (1986), it follows that 
there should be a positive relationship between underpricing and the proportion of 
value comprised of real options. 
I also argue that Real option% is positively associated with information asymmetry 
between issuers and investors. The value of embedded options results from the 
optimal exercise of growth and abandonment options by management, in response to 
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new information. Even with increased disclosure to investors, an information gap is 
likely to remain, because of the proprietary nature of these options. Under this 
argument, the information asymmetry model of Beneviste and Spindt (1989) predicts 
a positive relationship between underpricing and Real option%. 
A preliminary analysis of the data provides evidence that initial market prices of IPOs 
incorporate the value of embedded options. Their price-eamings ratios are positively 
associated with the cost of equity capital and the volatility of revenue growth. 
Furthermore, I show that the positive association between Real option% and volatility 
within the IPO sample can only be the result of volatility being priced by the equity 
market. In this study, the assumed competitive advantage period is selected to 
minimise the difference between Decision-tree valuations and market prices. I then 
estimate DCF values under the same estimated CAP and compute Real option%. If 
volatility is not positively valued by the equity market, this will result in under-
estimating the CAP of high-volatility firms and over-estimating the CAP of low-
volatility firms. CAP is positively associated with Real option%, so this would result 
in high-volatility firms having a low Real option% and low volatility firms having a 
high Real option%. This is not what we observe, which is a positive relationship 
between volatility and Real option%. 
The results support the hypothesised relationship between underpricing and Real 
option%. The analysis suggests that, in the absence of any strategic underpricing, the 
value of embedded options are discounted by 10 percent. But the Discounted Cash 
Flow component is fully priced in the IPO. For an IPO with mean Real option% of 47 
percent, this result predicts a 5 percent discount to market value. This discount is 
consistent with information asymmetry explanations for underpricing. However, 
strategic underpricing remains the dominant explanation for below-market offer prices 
as shown by the explanatory power of price revisions. Investment bankers leave 
money on the table by only partially adjusting offer prices from the mid-point of the 
filing range, despite their knowledge of investor demand gained during the book-
building phase. 
There are two implications of this paper. For investment bankers and issuers, it 
implies that IPO proceeds can be enhanced with efforts to ensure their clients are 
well-informed about the value of the firm's strategic options. This implication is 
consistent with the evidence of Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) who find that 
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increased disclosure in the pre-IPO period is associated with lower underpricing. 
Issuers would also benefit from the use of simulation techniques for estimating the 
value of embedded options, the results of which can be used to ensure investors are 
fully-informed. Underwriters have an incentive to engage in this activity. The 
potential increased proceeds for the mean IPO are $ 11 million. This equates to 
increased underwriter fees of $ 1 million, assuming the typical underwriter fee of 7 
percent. 
For academics. Real option% quantifies information asymmetry in a way which has 
direct economic meaning. Proxies used in prior literature, such as share allocations to 
retail investors, the volatility of stock retums, or issue size, provide usefiil support for 
information asymmetry arguments. But their relationship with IPO underpricing is not 
necessarily linear, as assumed in the typical analysis performed. Nor is there any 
estimation technique to determine the point at which information asymmetry is 
reduced. For example, at what point do we consider a client to be a sophisticated 
investor? What is the threshold issue size at which information asymmetry is no 
longer material? In contrast, I show there is an approximate linear relationship 
between IPO underpricing and Real option%, and quantify this relationship using 
linear regression. 
3. Research & development expenditure and the value of embedded 
options 
In Chapters 2 and 3,1 interpret the difference between the Decision-tree and 
Discounted Cash Flow valuations as the estimated value of embedded options. My 
contention is that this valuation is useful for decision-making by equity analysts, 
portfolio managers, investment bankers and equity issuers. I refer to the variable Real 
option% as the percentage of total equity value attributable to embedded options. The 
economic rationale for this interpretation is that volatility of the revenue stream gives 
rise to growth and abandonment options, which management can exercise by altering 
reinvestment policy. 
In this study, I provide corroborating evidence to support this economic interpretation 
of Real option% . First, I show that Real option% is positively correlated with 
research and development {R&D) expenditure, which can be interpreted as the 
purchase of an option to proceed to commercialisation. There is a significant positive 
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association between Real option% and R&D/Sales, i?cfeZ)/Eamings and 
^cS:D/Dividends, and about 30 percent of the variation in Real option% can be 
explained by R&DISBXQS. Furthermore, of the 41 industries represented, 6 were jointly 
ranked in the top 10 by both 7?<&Z)/Sales and Real option% and 13 were jointly ranked 
in the top 20. The sample used in my study has comparable 7?<$:D-intensity to that 
analysed by Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001). 
Second, I show that Real option% is positively associated with the volatility of stock 
retums. I replicate the linear regression analysis of Chan et al (2001) who find a 
positive association between R&D/Sales and retums volatility. I find a comparable 
relationship between Real option% and retums volatility and report higher 
explanatory power. This result is consistent with the modelling of Schwartz and Moon 
(2000) who predict a positive association between the volatility of revenue growth 
and stock price volatility. 
Third, I show that the market value of embedded options is comparable to the market 
value of investments in R&D. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Abrahams and Sidhu 
(1998) estimate a linear relationship between share price and capitalised R&D. I 
repeat this analysis after replacing the dependent variable with an estimate of the 
option component of equity value, expressed on a dollars per share basis. \fCAP is 
assumed to be 10 years, market value of embedded options is comparable to the 
market value of annual R&D expenditure. If CAP is assumed to be 20 or 30 years, the 
market value of embedded options is comparable to the market value of capitalised 
R&D. 
Finally, I examine whether there is a relationship between Real option% and the level 
of subsequent stock retums. Chan et al (2001) were able to find limited evidence of a 
positive association between /?c§;D-intensity and stock retums. This evidence was 
confined to firms whose recent share market retums were poor, and therefore had high 
ratios of ^c&D/market value. 
Whether we should expect iJc&D-intensive stocks (or stocks with high Real option%) 
to eam above-average retums is unclear. If the above-average volatility of R&D-
intensive firms is due to a risk factor that is priced by the equity market, we should 
expect these stocks to eam higher average retums. However, /f<$:D-intensive stocks 
can also be characterised as glamour stocks, given their relatively high market-to-
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book equity ratios and high eamings growth. Given that glamour stocks typically eam 
lower retums than value stocks, we could observe /?cS;Z)-intensive stocks earning low 
average retums. 
The resuhs confirm that portfolios formed on the basis of Real option% have 
comparable performance to those formed on the basis of/?cS:D-intensity. Stocks 
ranked in the top quintile by /?cS:D-intensity had average annual retums of 12.9 
percent, which was 2.6 percent higher than those in the bottom quintile. For stocks 
ranked according to Real option%, there was a comparable difference in performance 
of 2.4 percent. However, these differences in retums were not statistically significant. 
In addition, the higher volatility of returns in top quintile portfolios meant that their 
Sharpe ratios were slightly lower than those in the bottom quintile. 
In conclusion, the association of stock prices, retums and volatility with Real option% 
and i?<$:D-intensity is consistent with the interpretation of Real option% as a measure 
of option value. 
9 
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Chapter 2 
Valuation of high-growth equities 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines the relative ability of a Decision-tree valuation model and a Discounted 
Cash Flow model to identify mispriced equities. The models rely on the assumptions that 
revenue growth and profit margin are expected to revert to long-term values, consistent with 
normal return on investment over an assumed competitive advantage period. The Decision-
tree valuation model allows investors to value the growth and abandonment options of firms, 
who can respond to high- and low-growth environments by altering investment policy. In 
addition, the models are equally applicable to profitable and loss-making firms, given that 
they include separate estimates of revenue growth and profit margin. This contrasts with 
textbook valuation models which typically rely on an estimate of eamings growth. 
The modelling techniques allow investors to quantify the proportion of equity value not 
captured by the present value of expected future cash flows. This is especially important for 
the high-growth, high-volatility Technology and Healthcare sectors. Firms in these sectors are 
characterised by high growth, a high level of innovation and significant probability of failure. 
These firms are expected to have a significantly higher frequency of losses than firms in other 
industries. Hence, the value of the firms' abandonment option is likely to be greater. Further, 
the heightened volatility of revenue and margin growth means that their growth options also 
have above-average value, given that investment policy is expected to change in response to 
feedback regarding the firm's growth prospects. 
This issue is relevant for equity analysts and portfolio managers who still largely rely on 
multiples-based valuation and Discounted Cash Flows. These valuation techniques dominate 
current practice despite the lack of evidence that the use of eamings multiples enhances 
performance and an emerging view that DCF valuations underestimate the value of assets 
with embedded options. It is particularly important because technology stocks comprise a 
significant percentage of the market capitalization of listed stocks. Of the S&P500, 83 stocks 
with a combined market capitalisation of US$1.4 trillion are classified as Information 
Technology stocks under the FTSE Global Industry Classification System (GICS®), which is 
16 percent of the index. The S«&P/ASX 300 has 16 stocks classified as Information 
Technology with a market capitalisation of A$2.3 billion, 0.4 percent of the index. 
11 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Application of the models resulted in significantly positive excess retums after controlling for 
factors associated with equity retums - market risk, size, the book-to-market ratio and 
momentum. 1 formed long-short portfolios by selecting stocks ranked according to value 
relative to price on 30 April each year fi-om 1987-2004. For the ftill sample, long-short 
portfolios formed from the top and bottom deciles of this ranking eamed excess monthly 
retums of up to 0.6 percent and excess annual retums of up to 8.2 percent. For portfolios 
formed on the basis of the top and bottom quintiles of stocks, excess monthly retums were up 
to 0.3 percent and excess annual retums reached 4.6 percent. Outperformance was most 
consistent for long-short portfolios formed from a sub-sample of small high market-to-book 
stocks, and there is no evidence of outperformance amongst portfolios formed from large high 
market-to-book stocks. This is consistent with the explanation of Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) for the value-glamour anomaly, that investors extrapolate past earnings growth 
for an unreasonably long competitive advantage period. 
Excess retums remained even after controlling for three definitions of risk - portfolio 
volatiUty, Fama-French factors and default risk. Portfolios of stocks with high value/price 
ratios had significantly higher Sharpe ratios than portfolios with lower value/price ratios; and 
long-short portfolios had significantiy positive intercept terms in four-factor regressions. 
Default risk is a concem, given that the valuation models typically identified small, low 
market-to-book stocks as undervalued and there is a strong association between size and 
credit ratings. However, the magnitude of the excess retums eamed by long-short portfolios is 
significantly higher than the default risk premium required by debtholders. 
In addition, the study enhances our understanding of sharemarket activity from 1998-2001, 
which was characterised by unusually high earnings multiples, a substantial increase in equity 
raisings and later claims that analyst research was tainted by the need to maintain corporate 
and investment banking relationships. The fall-out from this period included an $875 million 
settlement by ten broking houses with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD). But while there is substantial evidence that analyst research lacked objectivity for 
particular market segments, it is questionable whether this can be blamed for inflated equity 
prices in what is typically referred to as the 'tech bubble'. 
For the sample analysed in this study, analysts' expectations for revenue growth and profit 
margins were not unusually high during this period, even for the Technology sector, nor was 
there unusual dispersion of those expectations. In contrast, the dispersion of fixndamental 
value/price ratios increased significantly during this period. The result was that long-short 
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portfolios formed as a result of those fundamental values typically eamed negative retums 
during 1998-1999, the boom years for growth stocks. However, these losses were more than 
recovered during the two subsequent years. This evidence is inconsistent with the argument 
that analyst hype was a major contributor to inflated equity prices. But it is consistent with the 
argument that the sudden rise in equity prices was due to short sale restrictions (Ofek and 
Richardson, 2003), which would allow market prices to divert sufficiently from fundamentals 
for actively-managed funds to prosper. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the evidence on valuation techniques in 
practice and the evidence that a material component of asset prices can be attributed to firms' 
embedded options. Section 3 presents the DCF and Decision-tree valuation techniques. 
Section 4 describes the sample and the association between market prices and theoretical 
values. Section 5 analyses the performance of investment portfolios formed on the basis of 
value relative to price and conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Empirical evidence on real options valuation 
This study is motivated by the emerging use of real options valuation in corporate finance 
practice, its minimal use by equity analysts, and expanding evidence that market prices 
typically exceed the Discounted Cash Flow valuation of assets. It appears that equity analysts 
are overwhelmingly concemed with eamings forecasts, but perform valuations based on those 
forecasts in an almost arbitrary fashion. The glaring contrast of valuation methods used by 
these two groups suggests the need for further research into the usefiilness of fiindamental 
analysis for making investment decisions. This also motivates the estimation techniques and 
performance evaluation methods I use in this study. I use estimation techniques which can be 
implemented in practice, and evaluate their usefiilness from the context of a portfolio 
manager. 
The real options valuation of a project can be considered the value which includes 
management's options to change the size or scope of that project. By constmction, it will 
exceed the Discounted Cash Flow value of that project. The valuation difference occurs 
because the DCF value is the present value of a series of expected cash flows. In contrast, a 
real options valuation computes project value as the expectation of the values associated with 
all possible cash flows. This difference is illustrated in Exhibit 2.1, for the simplest 
formulation where eamings can continue as a perpetual stream of either high or low cash 
flows. 
13 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Exhibit 2.1 
Illustration of Real Options versus Discounted Cash Flow valuation 
Discounted cash flow valuation 
Present value of 
expected eamings 
High eamings 
stream 
Expected 
eamings 
= Probability of 
high eamings x 
High eamings 
stream 
+ (1- Probability of 
high eamings) x 
Low eamings 
stream 
Real options valuation 
Present value of 
expected future value 
Value, contingent 
upon high eamings 
state 
Expected value 
= Probability of high 
eamings x Value 
contingent upon the 
high eamings state 
+ (1 - Probability of 
high eamings) x 
Value contingent 
upon the low 
earnings state 
Low eamings 
stream 
Value, contingent 
upon the low 
eamings state 
In the case where management can make strategic decisions in response to new information, 
the exercise of these options can increase the value of the project. In the situation represented 
above, this information is the level of the cash flow stream. Management's options could 
include an abandonment option, such as the sale or shutdown of the project, or a growth 
option, such as expanding production. In Section 3, the case envisaged is a series of options to 
either increase or decrease investment, in response to revenue growth which is above or below 
expectations. 
2.1 Valuation techniques in practice 
In corporate finance practice, the standard Discounted Cash Flow approach to valuation is 
gradually being supplemented with real options valuation. Graham and Harvey (2001) report 
that 27 percent of US corporations use real options analysis, based on a survey of 392 Chief 
Financial Officers. There is evidence of similar adoption in Australia, with Tmong, Partington 
and Peat (2005) reporting that 32 percent of large, listed companies use real options analysis 
for valuation. These studies also report that net present value calculations are used in almost 
every major investment decision. 
The predominant use in corporate finance of DCF valuation and increasing use of real options 
analysis stands in marked contrast to the valuation practice of equity analysts. The evidence 
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suggests their valuations and recommendations are largely determined by eamings analysis 
and estimation of eamings multiples. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) analysed 1,126 analyst 
reports of the top-rated US analysts according to Institutionallnvestor. They found that 99 
percent of recommendations were justified on the basis of an eamings multiple, compared to 
just 13 percent for DCF methods. Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) analysed 104 
research reports on 26 UK stocks in the beverages, electronics and pharmaceuticals sectors. 
They report that just 39 percent of reports included a DCF valuation, less than half the 89 
percent which used eamings multiples. 
This is consistent with the earlier evidence of Block (1999) and Bradshaw (2002). Block 
found that 46 percent of surveyed analysts never used present value techniques, even amongst 
sub-samples of MBA graduates and CFA Charterholders, groups specifically trained in DCF 
techniques. The results of Bradshaw (2002) show that at least 74 percent of target prices are 
the result of multiples analysis. In addition, at least 13 percent of target prices are derived 
without any reference to current price, and justified on the basis of growth, eamings surprise 
and industry-specific operating statistics. This is interesting as the empirical evidence of a 
positive association between eamings surprise and retums would support a short-term trading 
recommendation, rather than a target price usually made in relation to a 12-month holding 
period. 
The overwhelming use of eamings multiples by analysts to justify recommendations or target 
prices can be justified if they lead to subsequent outperformance. However, there is evidence 
that analysts pay considerably more attention to forecasting eamings, than to the appropriate 
valuation based on those eamings. Previs, Bricker, Robinson and Young (1994) performed a 
content analysis of 479 analyst reports and fmd that discussion of income statement items 
dominate the analysis, with valuation a secondary consideration. Bradshaw (2002) finds that 
target prices are correlated with eamings and growth expectations. But there is no evidence 
that trading on the basis of target prices or recommendations results in superior investment 
performance (Bradshaw, 2004; Asquith et al, 2005). Instead, Bradshaw presents evidence that 
a residual income valuation based on those eamings forecasts is associated with subsequent 
abnormal retums. 
This evidence establishes a prima facie case for the use of fundamental valuation techniques 
in making investment decisions, provided the valuation is performed appropriately. The DCF 
techniques used in corporate finance receive scant attention by the analyst community, despite 
the evidence that their preferred technique, multiples-based valuations, are not associated with 
subsequent outperformance. My primary motivation is to measure any outperformance 
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associated with (1) a DCF model which incorporates assumptions regarding growth and 
margins which are boimded by economic theory; and (2) a Decision-tree model which 
incorporates an estimate of the value of embedded options. 
An additional motivation for this research is the continued debate in the literature about 
whether the underperformance of growth stocks is attributable to their lower risk, or investors 
extrapolating past revenue growth for an unsustainable period, and consequently overpricing 
these stocks. The valuation models used in this study assume that growth and profit margins 
revert to long-term expected values over a period referred to as the competitive advantage 
period (CAP). This is consistent with the argument that firms' competitive advantage is 
eroded over time, such that the expected long-mn retum on investment is equal to the cost of 
capital. The resulting portfolios are heavily weighted towards low market-to-book stocks, but 
this weighting is systematically reduced with an increase in the assumed competitive 
advantage period. This provides support for the contention that the outperformance of value 
stocks is due to investors under-estimating the rate at which competition erodes growth, rather 
than the result of some unspecified risk factor. 
The relationship between retums, the market-to-book ratio and firm size is discussed in the 
results section. The remainder of Section 2 is devoted to empirical and theoretical evidence on 
real options valuation, which has been estimated in two ways: (1) indirectly, by inferring their 
value from market prices; and (2) directly, using an option pricing model. 
2.2 Indirect valuation: Inferring option values from market prices 
Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) attribute a material portion of equity value to the 
equityholders' abandonment option. They document a median 11.5 percent difference 
between equity market value and the present value of cash flows for 7,102 firm years from 
1984-1990. This premium is significantly associated with two estimates of liquidation value -
book value and a variable they refer to as "excess exit value." Excess exit value is an estimate 
of the percentage difference between the expected exit value of equity and the present value 
of cash flows, where expected exit value = cash + 0.72 x receivables + 0.55 x inventory + 
0.54 X fixed assets - payables - total debt. The coefficients on receivables, inventory and 
fixed assets were obtained by regressing exit value on noninventory current assets, inventories 
and fixed assets, all scaled by book value, for 157 asset sales. 
From a series of regressions the authors report an association between the market 
value/present value premium and variables which should be associated with higher values for 
the abandonment option. They find a positive association between this premium and the 
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ability to redeploy assets, the probability of financial distress and the alignment of manager 
and shareholder interests. Hence, they conclude that the premium of market price over present 
value is the market's estimate of the abandonment option. 
However, the evidence from this indirect valuation cannot necessarily be interpreted as the 
value of the abandonment option, but rather the combined value of the firm's growth options 
and abandonment option. The proxies argued to be correlated with abandonment option value 
could also be correlated with the value of growth options. For example, firms with growth 
options are likely to have a relatively lower proportion of fixed assets and more intangible 
assets, and have a higher probability of financial distress if the level of growth is correlated 
with volatility. 
In addition, Berger et al (1996) document that abandonment option value is highly sensitive to 
estimates of the terminal growth rate and the time at which the firm is assumed to enter its 
terminal growth state. However, the relationship between excess exit value and abandonment 
option value is insensitive to these parameters. This evidence is contrary to the theoretical 
implication that the more likely an abandonment option is to be exercised, the higher its value. 
Specifically, the abandonment option is less likely to be exercised the higher the terminal 
growth rate and the longer the period of extraordinary growth. Therefore, the strength of the 
relationship between excess exit value and abandonment option value should decline as these 
parameters are increased. 
The present study extends on the contribution of Berger et al (1996) by directly estimating 
firms' option values using simulation techniques. 
2.3 Direct valuation using an option pricing model 
Recent literature has applied real options valuation to a variety of settings. For example, 
Schwartz and Moon (2000 and 2001) develop a real options valuation model for intemet 
stocks, which forms the foundation for the Decision-tree model used in my study. In their first 
paper, Schwartz and Moon (2000) develop a valuation model in continuous time and apply a 
discrete-time version of the model to value Amazon.com using 100,000 simulations. They 
conclude that "even when the chance that a company may go bankmpt is real, if the initial 
growth rates are sufficiently high and if there is enough volatility in this growth over time, 
valuations can be what would otherwise appear to be unbelievably high (p.74)." They extend 
their modelling in Schwartz and Moon (2001), allowing for stochastic costs and future 
financing, as well as incorporating capital expenditure and depreciation. They then apply this 
version of the model to a valuation of eBay. Option pricing theory has also been used to 
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model strategies for investment in technological innovations (Grenadier and Weiss, 1997) and 
to explain the firm life cycle (Bemardo and Chowdry, 2002). 
Schwartz and Moon (2001) also modelled the relationship between volatility of expected sales 
growth and stock price volatility. They report that the model could value Amazon.com at its 
then market price of $76,125 if the standard deviation of expected sales growth equals 6 
percent. However, this assumption implied price volatility of 182 percent, twice Amazon's 
historic volatility. This provides an indication of the likely dispersion between theoretical 
valuations and market prices. For the record, the share price ofAmazon.com fell to $5.97 on 
28 September 2001, but recovered to reach $59.91 on 16 October 2003. 
There will be a material difference between theoretical valuations and market prices in any 
large-sample equity valuation study which relies on analyst forecast information. Regardless 
of the model used, the valuation is likely to rely on parameter estimates which, by 
constmction, are significantly more stable than equity prices. While changes in share prices 
are an indication of changes in market expectations, these expectations are not immediately 
incorporated into databases of eamings forecasts and interest rates, nor are changes in 
systematic risk immediately reflected in computed beta estimates. So while the price of a 
stock can be used to infer market-wide expectations of underlying parameters, valuations 
based on a database of underlying parameters are liable to differ significantly from market 
prices. This will occur even if market prices immediately incorporate all price-sensitive 
information. The appropriate question for portfolio managers is, "Can the theoretical 
valuation be used to form investment portfolios which eam positive risk-adjusted retums?" 
This question motivates the research method I adopt, which involves forming investment 
portfolios on the basis of value relative to price. The use of this research method provides 
estimates of abnormal retums which are closest to those which portfolio managers could 
actually achieve. This is important in assessing whether the results are economically 
significant. 
Despite the theoretical development of real options valuation models, there is little empirical 
evidence of their usefuhiess in making investment decisions. One example of an empirical 
study is the paper by Quigg (1993), in which a real options valuation model for land is 
evaluated. The author estimates the intrinsic and option value of 2,700 undeveloped properties 
in Seattle, which were sold from 1976-79. The study reports an average option premium of 6 
percent, ranging from 1-30 percent for sub-samples, and implied annual standard deviation of 
prices of 19-28 percent. Using the option premium to explain sale prices in addition to 
intrinsic value yields additional explanatory power of about 2 percent. However, there is no 
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large-sample evidence which measures the impact of incorporating volatility into theoretical 
equity valuations. This is an important contribution of my research, 
3 Metliodology 
For a sample of stocks drawn from the S&P500 and NASDAQ Composite indices, I identify 
mispricing using a DCF valuation model and a Decision-tree valuation model. I consider a 
stock to be relatively undervalued the higher its value/price ratio compared to other stocks; 
and relatively overvalued the lower its value/price ratio. This direct approach to valuation 
requires me to estimate the distribution of fiiture cash flows to equityholders, which I estimate 
using consensus eamings and sales forecasts, combined with historical data. In this section I 
outline these two valuation models, parameter estimation techniques and provide valuation 
examples using data from Microsoft. In Section 4 I describe the sample and the method used 
to test whether these valuation methods identify mispriced stocks, and present the results in 
Section 5. 
A common criticism of DCF and multiples-based valuation techniques is that they cannot be 
applied to loss-making firms. This criticism was especially apparent during 2000-2001 when 
there were unusually high stock retums to loss-making fmns. The valuation models presented 
here are not subject to this criticism, because they are equally applicable to profitable and 
loss-making firms. In forecasting future cash flows, I forecast revenue growth and the net 
profit margin, under the assumptions that both these parameters revert to long-term values 
that are consistent with economic theory. Specifically, I assume that revenue growth reverts to 
the product of the reinvestment rate and the required retum to equityholders. This is consistent 
with the assumption that competition eventually reduces the expected abnormal retums on 
investment to zero. Further, I assume that the profit margin - the ratio of net profit to sales -
will revert to a long-term sustainable level, which is also consistent with competition eroding 
abnormal profit margins. The justification for the profit margin assumption is discussed in 
more detail later. The discounted cash flow model is outlined in Sub-section 3.1 
The additional information provided by the Decision-tree valuation model is the result of 
volatile revenue growth. In the Decision-tree valuation model, I simulate 1000 paths of 
revenue and eamings, adapting stochastic processes described in Schwartz and Moon (2001), 
and compute the valuation implied by each path. What I then refer to as the Decision-tree 
valuation is the mean of these 1000 valuations. These valuations are expected to exceed the 
Discounted Cash Flow valuations, because they incorporate the exercise of growth and 
abandonment options. The DCF valuation ignores the value that can be created via the firm's 
ability to change its reinvestment policy in response to new information. In other words, DCF 
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valuation assumes that growth is independent of the investments made with reinvested 
eamings. If management invests additional capital in projects generating high eamings growth 
and reduces investment in low growth projects, the improved capital allocation amongst 
business units or products will result in realised growth exceeding expectations. 
Throughout, I specifically refer to the Decision-tree valuation model rather than a real options 
valuation model. But I also refer to the difference between the DCF and Decision-tree values 
as the value of embedded options. In a setting in which parameter estimates could be made 
with a great deal of certainty, I would estimate real options valuations. But this involves 
estimating the market price of revenue growth, in order to simulate risk-neutral cash flows. 
This introduces an additional parameter to the valuation model, with an expected large 
standard error. Thus, I used Decision-tree valuations on the basis that there is likely to be less 
uncertainty associated with discounting nominal cash flows at a constant risk-adjusted 
discount rate, than discounting risk-neutral cash flows at the risk-free rate. This occurs 
because the lower discount rate used in real options valuation magnifies the impact on value 
of mis-estimating the market price of revenue growth. As is always the case in applying 
valuation techniques to a large sample of stocks, I have made a judgment as to which path-
dependent valuation technique will introduce the most uncertainty into the valuation process -
that which is technically inferior or that which is most affected by noisy parameter estimates. 
The argument that improved capital allocation amongst high- and low-growth segments is 
valuable finds support in the corporate finance literature on the diversification discount. 
Recent research questions whether diversified firms really do trade at a discount to their 
break-up value, estimated using valuation multiples for comparable single-segment firms 
(Villalonga, 2004). But this research upholds an important explanation for the discounted 
value of certain firms, namely that a discount is applied to firms which overinvest in low-
growth segments relative to high growth segments (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Ahn and Denis, 
2004). 
In contrast, the Decision-tree valuation model assumes that the firm invests additional fiinds 
in new projects subsequent to a period of strong eamings growth, consistent with the 
deployment of additional capital to high growth markets. Conversely, lower amounts of 
capital are allocated to low growth investments. Hence, the Decision-tree valuation model 
assumes a dynamic investment policy, in contrast to the implementation of a typical DCF 
model which assumes expected cash flows are the result of one static set of investments. Note 
that it is not the theory of present value analysis that causes under-estimation of value, but 
rather its implementation. That is, the expected cash flows incorporated into a DCF valuation 
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should theoretically be the outcome of all possible investments, weighted according to their 
probability of occurrence. While this can be achieved via Monte Carlo simulation, this does 
not typically occur in practice. The Decision-tree valuation model is outlined in Sub-section 
3.2. 
The two equity valuation models can be summarised as follows: 
1. The Discounted Cash Flow valuation {DCF) assumes that sales growth and the net profit 
margin revert to their long-term expected values over a period termed the competitive 
advantage period. The DCF valuation is described in detail in Sub-section 3.1. 
2. The Decision-tree valuation {DTV) is the mean of 1000 valuations which result from the 
simulation of sales growth over the competitive advantage period. Hence, it incorporates 
additional value attributed to management's ability to reinvest additional income in high-
growth states and reduce investment in low growth states. It also incorporates a profit 
margin which is positively correlated with revenue growth, but which also includes a 
random component. The Decision-tree valuation is described in detail in Sub-section 3.2. 
Implementing the models requires the analyst to estimate 17 parameters, including 11 for the 
DCF valuation and an additional six for the Decision-tree valuation. In comparison to the 
valuation models presented in textbooks on investments, this appears to be a substantial 
increase on the number of parameters required for equity valuation. But it should be noted 
that all 11 parameters required for the DCF valuation are already required for any method of 
DCF valuation. The only reason that these may not appear in a valuation equation is that 
implicit assumptions are embedded in the model. Further, the additional six assumptions 
required for the Decision-tree valuation model are also already implicitly being made by 
investors and analysts. Those implementing DCF valuations are implicitly assuming that 
investment policy is independent of the distribution of future eamings, so that eamings above 
and below expectations have a symmetric impact on value. These points are considered in 
more detail in Sub-section 3.4. 
3.1 Discounted cash flow valuation 
I employ the following three-stage DCF model, where the three stages comprise an explicit 
forecast period ofn years, a period of F years in which revenue growth and profit margins 
revert to long-term sustainable levels, followed by sustainable eamings growth into 
perpetuity. I refer to the period ofn + F years as the competitive advantage period {CAP). 
During the sustainable growth period, reinvestments are assumed to eam just the cost of 
equity capital, making the dividend decision during this stage irrelevant to the value of the 
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Stock. Note that this reinvestment assumption means that reinvested eamings eam a return 
commensurate with their risk. If these investments also involve debt financing, the total 
investment by the debt- and equityholders is expected to eam a retum equal to the weighted-
average cost of capital. The model is presented below as Exhibit 2.2, followed by its 
derivation. 
Exhibit 2.2 
Discounted Cash Flow valuation summary 
DCF valuation 
The DCF valuation is the present value of expected future dividends, where dividends are the product 
of sales per share (5), profit margin (m) and the dividend payout ratio (p), but cannot be negative. The 
three terms of the model correspond to the explicit forecast period (« years), the remainder of the 
competitive advantage period ( J years), and the sustainable growth period (after year n + T). 
Max 
^^^ _fMax{p,m^S,,0) ^"^ 
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reference to established firms 
m^ = e m._^ + 
= e'"^'-"' 
(l-e-")w 
(m„ -m)-\-m 
Revenue growtii 
Revenue growth (g) declines asymptotically to a 
long-term sustainable rate (g), estimated as the 
product of the reinvestment rate (l -p) and the 
cost of equity capital (r^). 
Variable definitions 
DCF = discounted cash flow valuation of equity per share at time 0; 
Ej = forecast eamings in year /; 
Pi = dividend payout ratio in year /; 
p = dividend payout ratio from years n + I onwards; 
gi = continuously-compounded sales growth in year /; 
g„ = continuously-compounded sales growth in year n (initial growth); 
g = long-term sustainable growth rate in sales; 
m, = net profit margin (earnings/sales) in year i; 
m„ = net profit margin in year n (initial margin); 
m = long-term sustainable net profit margin; 
S„ = estimated sales per share in year n; 
r^ = continuously-compounded cost of equity capital; and 
K = speed of adjustment parameter for sales growth and profit margin. 
Profit margin 
Profit margin (ni) declines asymptotically to a 
o -term sustainable level (m"), estimated with 
rF»f(»rPTir»p ic\ pcf5iKlichf*H f i r « 
Incorporating the equations for revenue growth and profit margin into the valuation equation, 
the DCF valuation can be expressed as follows. Line one is the present value of expected 
dividends during the explicit forecast period, line two is the present value of expected 
dividends during the remainder of the competitive advantage period and line three is the 
present value of expected dividends during the sustainable growth period. 
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„,,_.[m-He-'^ <'-''>(m„ -m)]exp g ( r - l )+ fe„ - g ) T e-^^^'" 
+ PS„Z /=«+! 
i=n+l e" 
exp 
+ mS„ 
gT + {g„-g)le-''^'-''^ 
r.e 
r,(«+r-i) 
(2.1) 
3.1.1 Model derivation 
The model is derived from the dividend discount model of equity valuation, under the 
assumptions that both sales growth and profit margin will revert to long-term sustainable 
levels by the end of the competitive advantage period. It fiirther assumes that the dividend 
payout ratio remains constant at some level p from years n+\ to n + T-1. Beyond this point, 
the assumption regarding dividend policy does not influence value, because additional 
investments are expected to eam just their cost of capital in perpetuity. In other words, the 
ir+r 
_ s^ -
S me''"*^ 
terminal value of —^  is independent of the firm's reinvestment policy. 
According to standard finance theory, the DCF value of equity {DCF) is the present value of 
expected fliture dividends, as presented below: 
C^f = Z^ = E^+Z4+E4 (2.2) 
,=1 e ,=1 Q ' ,=„+! e i=n+r e 
where: 
Di = expected dividend per share in year /; 
re = the continuously-compounded cost of equity capital; 
n = the number of years of the explicit forecast period; and 
n + T = the number of years of the competitive advantage period. 
Dividends can be expressed as the product of expected eamings per share {E) and the 
dividend payout ratio {p), and eamings per share can be expressed as the product of sales and 
the net profit margin, implying that: 
n 
=z p.m^S, 
(2.3) 
;=i 
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Further, sales in year / (5,) can be expressed as the product of sales in the previous period {Si. 
i) and e '^ where gi is the continuously-compounded sales growth in period /: 
C^f = i ^ / Z ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^^^%^ (2.4) 
i=l " i=n+l ^ i=n+T C ' 
Now I incorporate assumptions which restrict the potential values for profit margin and sales 
growth. The relationship between these assumptions, revenue growth and margin growth is 
analysed in more detail in the section below. The paper can be read without reference to the 
discussion in that section. First, I incorporate the assumption that in the sustainable growth 
period (1) the retum on equity on new investments just equals the cost of equity capital; and 
(2) the firm has exhausted all opportunities to achieve economies of scale, implying that fixed 
costs rise at a constant percentage of sales. 
The impact of the first assumption is that, in the sustainable growth period, eamings growth is 
equal to the product of the reinvestment rate {\-p) and the required retum to equityholders 
re, a constant. The impact of the second assumption is that long-term sales growth is equal to 
long-term eamings growth, because eamings growth no longer benefits from operating 
leverage. Under the assumption that initial revenue growth (at the end of the explicit forecast) 
is expected to revert asymptotically to its long-term sustainable level over the subsequent T 
years, we have the following: 
gi =e-'^g,_, +[\-e'^)g=e-^^-"\g^ _ ^ ) + g = ,-('-«)[^^ _ ( l _ ^ y j + ( l_^) ,^ (2.5) 
The other impact of the second assumption, that the firm has exhausted all economies of 
scale, is that there is no expected growth in the profit margin in the sustainable growth period. 
The impact of the first assumption is that, by the end of the competitive advantage period, 
expected margin growth is zero. Margin growth can then be modelled under the assumption 
that the initial margin (m„) is expected to revert to its long-term sustainable level {m) over 
the competitive advantage period. 
This involves the joint assumption that asset tumover and leverage revert to long-term 
sustainable levels. Theoretically, firms within the same industry could eam comparable 
retiims on new equity investment, but with different margins, asset tumover and leverage, as 
shown by a typical DuPont ROE breakdown {ROE = Margin X Turnover x Leverage). 
However, there is no reason to expect this to occur in equilibrium. First, there is a theoretical 
optimal capital stmcture for these firms, based on the volatility of their operational cash 
flows. Second, the abnormal retums to target shareholders from takeovers suggest that assets 
are transferred to users who can operating them most efficiently. Asset tumover is typically 
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considered a measure of efficiency, so we have reason to believe there is a long-term 
sustainable asset tumover for the industry. This leads to the assumption that industry profit 
margins will converge to long-term sustainable levels. 
If the process by which the expected profit margin reverts to a long-term expected value is the 
same as that which applies to revenue growth, we have the following: 
,. =e""m,_, +(l-e"")m =e-" '^-")(An„ -m) + m (2.6) m 
Incorporating these expressions for sales growth and profit margin into the valuation, the 
equation becomes: 
n+r-i 
DCF = f P ^ . •f'P,m,S.e^'\ f PjnS_e-'' 
1=1 ^ i=«+l c? i=n+T C 
where: 
g, =e"'^ g,-. ^^-e-'')g=e-^^^-"\g„ -gYg^e-^^^-\g^ -{^-PW{\-p\ 
m,. = e"*'/n,._, + (l - e"*")« = e~''^'~"\m^ -m) + m 
Finally, the combined impact of assuming constant growth in perpetuity and normal retums 
on equity investment, means that the terminal value can be computed. At the end of year {n + 
n+T-I 
F - 1), the firm reinvests a percentage (1 - p ) of its eamings m^S„e""*' . Eamings growth can 
be expressed as the product of the reinvestment rate {I -p) and the retum on equity on new 
investments {ROE). The assumption of the model is that, by the end of the competitive 
advantage period, investments eam just the cost of capital {re). I fixrther assume that, in the 
sustainable growth period, fixed costs are a constant percentage of sales, which implies that 
sales growth equals eamings growth. Under these assumptions, the following holds: 
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Z 
i=n+T 
pmS e'-"'' ' pmS„e""^' 
e^ \r-g\e k-g] ;7L'-.(«+^-') 
pmS„e""*' 
pmS„e-"*' 
~ rJ«+r-i) 
pr,e'' 
I., 
_ mS^e'-'*' 
~ rin+T-\) 
Hence, the valuation takes the following form, which appears above as Equation 2.1: 
1=1 C i=«+l t ; I gC 
where: 
m,. = e'''m._^ + (l - e ^ " ^ = e"''^ '~"^ (m„ - m ) + m 
The exhibit below summarises the assumptions used in the DCF valuations, and how these are 
incorporated into the model. In the text which follows, 1 justify these assumptions by 
modelling the relationship between sales growth, eamings growth and margin growth, as 
implied by the overriding assumption that long-mn expected retums on investment just equal 
the cost of capital. 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
3.1.2 Assumptions underlying the DCF valuation 
The estimate of long-term growth in sales per share (g ) relies on two assumptions which are 
drawn from economic theory. First, the long-term retiim on equity {ROE) on new investments 
is equal to the required retum to equityholders (r^) (which is equivalent to assuming that total 
retums to debt- and equityholders equal the weighted average cost of capital). This is 
consistent with economic theory which contends that competition will erode expected 
abnormal reUims, where barriers to entry cannot be sustained indefinitely. Second, fixed costs 
will approximate a constant percentage of sales when the firm is in a mature state. This is 
consistent with economic theory which suggests that firms can achieve economies of scale 
only to a certain level. For example, fixed costs like head office expenses, replacement capital 
expenditure and wages provide operating leverage, such that growth in sales leads to 
disproportionate growth in eamings. Financial leverage provides a fixed cost in the form of 
interest payments which has the same effect. For unexpected sales growth, operating and 
financial leverage have the same impact on eamings growth relative to sales growth. But in 
the case of expected sales growth, they have little impact. This argument is outlined via the 
following example. I then provide an algebraic model of long-term growth which equates 
long-term sales and eamings growth to the product of the reinvestment rate and the required 
retum to equityholders. 
Consider the case of an all-equity financed firm worth $100 million, expected sales are $200 
million, while expected earnings are $10 million, due to $90 million of fixed costs and $100 
million of variable costs. The firm pays no tax. Say the firm reinvests 50 percent of eamings 
in new projects which generate sales per dollar invested consistent with existing assets. Sales 
are expected to rise to $210 million, providing sales growth of 5 percent. In the case where the 
firm is not in its perpetual growth state, and does not need to incur additional fixed costs, 
earnings rise by 50 percent to $15 million. This occurs because the asset tumover 
(sales/assets) remains constant at 2 times, resulting in sales of $210 million; variable 
costs/sales remains constant at 50 percent, resulting in variable costs of $105 million; total 
costs are now $195 million resulting in eamings of $15 million. In sum, in the case where 
there is no growth in fixed costs with an increase in the size of the firm, earnings per share 
grow at a faster rate than sales per share. 
Contrast this with the case in which the new project has the same proportion of fixed and 
variable costs as the existing assets. In this case, fixed costs rise by 5 percent to $94.5 million, 
which flows through to eamings of just $10.5 million, a rise of just 5 percent. Hence, in the 
case where fixed costs rise at the same rate as variable costs, eamings grow at the same rate as 
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sales. These two cases are summarised in Exhibit 2.4, followed by a derivation of the 
relationship between sales growth, eamings growth and fixed costs for the general case. 
Exhibit 2.4 
Example of the relationship between fixed costs, revenue growth and earnings growth 
Sales 
Fixed cx)sts 
Variable costs 
Total costs 
Earnings 
Equity = Assets (start) 
Sales/Assets 
Reinvestment rate 
Reinvested earnings 
Sales growth 
Earnings growth 
YearO 
200 
90 
100 
190 
10 
100 
2 
50% 
5 
Yearl 
(No growth in fixed costs) 
210 
90 
105 
195 
15 
105 
2 
5% 
50% 
Year l 
(Fixed costs increase 
with sales) 
210 
94.5 
105 
199.5 
10.5 
105 
2 
5% 
5% 
The relationship between sales growth, eamings growth and growth in fixed costs can be 
derived for the general case. In a discrete setting, say we define eamings in year / as follows: 
NPA T;. = [Sales, (l - r ) - ^ S - 1^ (2.10) 
where: 
NPATi = net profit after tax in year /; 
Fi = fixed costs in year /; 
Salesi = sales in year /; 
Y = variable costs as a proportion of sales; and 
T = the corporate tax rate. 
Eamings growth in year / can then be expressed as: 
,e ^ J [SalesX\-r)-F][\-T] \ 
" \[Sales,_X\-r)-F,_,l\-T]\ gi 
\\^aies,_M-rl-F.,U-r\\ 
^J SalesXl-r)-Fi ' 
[Sales i_Xl-r)-fi^ 
where: 
gi^ - eamings growth in year /, 
Factorising the numerator and denominator of the equation, we can express eamings as the 
sum of revenue growth and margin growth: 
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F 
gl = In 
= ln 
(1-;-)- ^Sales, 
('-ry%iesi_^^ 
+ ln 
^^-r)-%ales: 
= ln Sales, 
Sales,_^ 
+ ln [SaleSi_X\-r)-Fi 
Sales i-l 
(2.12) 
In 
Sales, 
Sales i-l 
+ ln 
Sales, 
E: 
' - 1 / 
Sales / I 
= gi +gi 
where: 
gf = eamings growth in year /; 
g / = sales growth in year /; and 
gi"" = margin growth in year /. 
Furthermore, the following equations show the following relationship between eamings 
growth, revenue growth and the growth in fixed costs. Where revenue growth exceeds the 
growth in fixed costs, as occurs when economies of scale are present, margin growth will be 
positive, so eamings growth exceeds revenue growth. In contrast, where revenue growth is 
less than the growth in fixed costs, as occurs, say when the firm signs a long-term lease or 
makes significant capital expenditure in a low-growth market, margin growth will be 
negative, so eamings growth is less than revenue growth. 
The second line of the above series of equations states: 
g! = In 
Sales: 
Sales / - I 
+ ln 
(1-r)- F Sales; 
(1-r)- F i - l -Sales, i - l 
(2.13) 
From this equation, we can represent eamings growth as a function of the growth in revenue 
and fixed costs, as follows: 
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g- = g; + hi 
( i - r ) - ^ - ^ Sales,^e^ 
(i-r)- / - I Sales, _i (2.14) 
=g;+in 
where: 
gr 
(i-r)—^^ 
Sales. 
^ • gUr-^;) 
(-1 
(i-r)- i - l Sales, _^ 
= growth in fixed costs. 
The above equation presents the general case, where fixed costs can increase to any degree 
with an increase in the scale of the firm's operations. 
At one extreme, sales growth is accompanied by no growth in fixed costs. In this instance, 
eamings growth is given by the following equation, which implies that the higher the fixed 
costs relative to sales, the stronger the relationship between eamings growth and revenue 
growth: 
g:=g:+\n 
( 1 -
(1 
y)-
-y) 
•' i - l 
Sales, ,e^' 
^ - 1 
Sales,_^ 
(2.15) 
In the situation where fixed costs grow at the same rate as sales, there is no change in 
operating margin, so that eamings growth equates to revenue growth, as the following shows: 
«•=&'+In 
{i-y)-T^' Sales, _i y{gf -gi) 
(i-rh ^ Sales. i - l 
= g;+ln 
=gi 
[i-r)- F i-l Sales i-l 
(1-r)- ^-' Sales,^y 
(2.16) 
The relationship between sales growth and eamings growth, according to the above equations 
is summarised in the exhibit below. 
31 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Exhibit 2.5 
Modelling the relationship between fixed costs, revenue growth and margin growth 
General case Fixed cwsts remain constant Fixed costs 
increase in 
proportion to 
sales 
g:=g:+g: 
=g;+in 
Sales, 
F" J<if-^i) 
i-l 
(i-r)-T4^ Sales,_y 
g:=g:+gr 
= g;+ln 
ii-r)- F, i - l 
SaleSi_ie^' 
( i - r ) - ^ ' 
Sales, i-l 
= ln = ln 
gj=g:+gr 
=g:+g: 
Now, the relevant question is which set of assumptions apply to the firm in the perpetual 
growth state. My assumption is that, at the end of the competitive advantage period, fixed 
costs rise in proportion to sales, which is equivalent to the statement common to 
microeconomics texts "in the long mn, all costs are variable". Importantly, this assumption 
only applies during the sustainable growth period. During the competitive advantage period, 
eamings growth still benefits from operating leverage, consistent with the general case 
presented in the exhibit above. This is implemented via the margin assimiption. Recall that 1 
estimate eamings per share as the product of sales and the profit margin: 
E, = S,m, (2.17) 
Sales per share in period / is the product of the previous year's sales and an exponential 
growth factor assuming revenue growth of g,'', which implies that: 
E, = S,_,m,e^' (2.18) 
We can then express eamings per share growth as the sum of revenue growth and growth in 
the profit margin, derived as follows: 
^-i^m,e^ 
Ei-i E,_, 
" ^ - ^ ^ 
Ei-i m,_, 
( V \ 
(2.19) 
In 
\Ei-ij 
= ln m i-e^' 
m i - l 
gi=g:+gr 
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where: 
g,^  = eamings per share growth in year /; 
g[ = sales per share growth in year /; and 
gr'" = margin growth in year /. 
The assumption underlying the valuations in this paper is that changes in margins are 
deterministic, and revert to long-term estimated values over the competitive advantage period. 
It is possible to introduce uncertainty into the estimated profit margin. However, this adds one 
more parameter which requires estimation, which increases the noise underlying equity values 
and makes it more difficult to evaluate the merits of the analysis for portfolio management. In 
the situation assumed here, that changes in the profit margin are deterministic, we can make 
the fiirther substitution that: 
m, = e~''m,_y +(l- e" fn 
which implies that: 
g:=g:+g? 
= g;+ln 6-" + ( l -e - ' ) m 
m,_, 
(2.20) 
Hence, in the case where the firm has reached its steady state (so m,_y =m), growth in 
eamings and sales are equal. In the case where the margin is increasing, consistent with the 
firm achieving economies of scale, eamings growth exceeds sales growth; and where the 
margin is being eroded through competition, eamings growth is less than sales growth. This is 
equivalent to the case where the firm cams what analysts typically refer to as "low-quality 
growth" where revenue growth is achieved at the expense of lower retums on investment. 
3.1.4 Example: Discounted Cash Flow valuation of Microsoft 
At this point, it is worthwhile to illustrate how the DCF model is implemented. I perform a 
Z)CF valuation of Microsoft, as well as a Decision-tree valuation, which I suimnarise later. 
This illustration shows that implementing a rigorous DCF valuation technique requires littie 
additional resources and could easily replace the use of arbitrary price-eamings multiples in 
practice. Again, if price-eamings valuations were associated with superior investment 
performance, this would be urmecessary. But the evidence cited in Section 2 showed this was 
not the case, so there is justification for analysts to invest in more sophisticated models. 
At 14 June 2005, Datastream reported that Microsoft was priced at $25.31 and had consensus 
eamings forecasts of $1.29, 1.40 and 1.60 per share over the next three years, from its 
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previous initial eamings of $1.26. The consensus sales forecasts were $3.67, 3.98 and 4.39 per 
share, compared to the last reported sales of $3.39 per share. This data, from an explicit 
forecast period of three years and one year of historical data, provides four estimates of 
Microsoft's profit margin and three estimates of sales growth. The average margin over this 
period is 36.15 percent, while the average sales growth is 8.66 percent. Two consensus 
dividend forecasts are available, $3.31 in forecast year 1, including a special dividend of 
$3.00, and $0.32 in forecast year 2, while dividends of $0.16 were paid in the last financial 
year. This data implies an average dividend payout ratio of 97.33 percent, over the explicit 
forecast period and last year of historical data. However, applying the constraint that the 
payout ratio cannot exceed one for the purposes of estimating/?, the average becomes/? = 
45.13 percent. 
Further, Datastream reports than Microsoft has an equity beta of 1.28 and that the yield on 10-
year Govemment bonds is 4.37 percent. If we assume a market risk premium of 6 percent, the 
discrete period cost of equity capital for Microsoft, according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) is 12.05 percent, and the continuously-compounded rate is 11.38 percent. 
Note that, for convenience, I have used the Datastream beta estimate rather than the beta 
estimate computed under the method described in Sub-section 3.1.2. 
From the 173 technology firms in the dataset at 30 April 2004,1 estimate the long-term profit 
margin for Microsoft at 8.60 percent. This is the mean estimate of the average profit margin 
over time for technology firms with a reporting history of at least five years. For the purposes 
of the example, I have assumed a competitive advantage period of 30 years, which implies 
that the speed of adjustment parameter is 0.2588 K = '• = 0.2588 . 
V 27 ) 
In sum, fi-om the publicly-available information on eamings and dividends, and from the 
assumption that the competitive advantage period is 30 years, we have the following 
parameters to estimate the DCF value for Microsoft: 
Exhibit 2.6 
Assumptions underlying the Discounted Cash Flow valuation of Microsoft 
Parameter Symbol 0 1 2 3 Initial Long-
term 
Earnings margin m 0.3719 0.3514 0.3538 0.3687 0.3615 0.0860 
Sales growth gf 0.0801 0.0821 0.0976 0.0866 0.0661 
Dividend payout ratio p 0.1270 2.5659 0.2270 0.4513 0.4513 0.4513 
Costofequity re 0.1138 0.1138 0.1138 0.1138 0.1138 
Earnings per share £ 1.29 1.41 1.62 
Dividends per share D 0.16 3.31 0.32 1.58 
Speed of adjustment K 0.2588 
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The DCF valuation implied by these parameter estimates is $6.91, which is 73 percent below 
the market price of $25.31, Clearly, the market price incorporates higher growth in cash flows 
than forecast by the model, most likely due to the assumption of a higher long-term profit 
margin and reinvestment rate. However, even if we maintain the profit margin at the initial 
level of 36.15 percent and assume a dividend payout ratio of 25 percent, the DCF valuation 
reaches just $13.31, still 47 percent below the share price. 
The eamings per share growth underlying these two valuations is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In 
the case where the long-term margin is estimated at 8.6 percent and the initial dividend payout 
ratio is estimated at 45.13 percent, EPS growth in year 4 is sharply negative. This occurs 
because the rapidly declining profit margin more than offsets the forecast 8.12 percent 
expected sales growth. However, by the end of year 13, EPS growth is again positive, because 
of the less rapid decline in the profit margin. In contrast, in the case where the profit margin is 
maintained at 36.15 percent, EPS growth is positive throughout and equal to sales growth for 
year 5 onwards. The difference in year 4 is due to the fact that the profit margin in year 3 of 
36.87 percent exceeds the initial profit margin estimate of 36.15 percent. 
The figure also illustrates that EPS growth asymptotically approaches the product of the 
reinvestment rate and the required retum on equity. In the first case, the reinvestment rate of 
54.87 percent and required retum on equity of 11.38 percent imply long-term EPS growth of 
6.24 percent. This reaches 8.53 percent for the second case, which assumes a reinvestment 
rate of 75 percent. Hence, the figure illustrates the two most important economic assumptions 
underlying the valuations in this paper: (1) that the expected long-mn retum on equity on new 
investments asymptotically reaches the cost of equity capital over the competitive advantage 
period; and (2) it reaches this expected long-mn value via an expected profit margin which 
reaches its sustainable level over the same period. 
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Figure 2.1 
EPS growth underlying the illustrative DCF valuation of Microsoft 
Figure 2.1 presents the expected growth in eamings per share for Microsoft under two sets of assumptions. First, over 
forecast years 4 to 30,1 assume that the profit margin declines from an initial value of 36.15 percent to a long-term expected 
value of 8.60 percent, and the dividend payout ratio remains constant at 45.13 percent. I assume that sales growth declines 
from an initial value of 8.66 percent to a long-term estimate of 8.53 percent. Second, 1 assume that the profit margin and 
dividend payout ratio both remain constant, at 36.15 and 25.00 percent, respectively, and that sales growth declines to a long-
term estimate of 6.24 percent. 
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Continuing with the valuation example, the upper value of $13.31 suggests it is likely that a 
significant proportion of Microsoft equity value is comprised of something other than the 
present value of expected future dividends. This is even more apparent when we consider the 
assumptions required in order for the discounted cash flow valuation to reach the share price 
of $25.31. For example, we could make an adjustment to the long-term growth rate in sales, 
and maintain the long-term profit margin at 36.15 percent. In this case, to reach a valuation of 
$25.31, we require long-term sales growth of 12.98 percent. At a reinvestment rate of 75 
percent, this is consistent with an assumed retum on equity on new investments of 17.31 
percent, nearly 6 percent above the requu-ed retum to equityholders. The valuations listed 
above and their underlying assumptions are summarised in the exhibit below. 
Exhibit 2.7 
DCF valuations of Microsoft and underlying assumptions 
Valuation 
$6.91 
13.31 
25.31 
Implied 
pnce-
eamings 
ratio 
5.4 
10.3 
19.6 
Dividend 
payout 
ratio 
45.13% 
25.00 
25.00 
Initial 
profit 
margin 
36.15% 
36.15 
36.15 
Long-term 
profit 
margin 
8.60% 
36.15 
36.15 
Initial 
growth 
8.66% 
8.66 
8.66 
Long-term 
sales and 
EPS 
growth 
6.24% 
8.53 
12.98 
ROE 
consistent 
with long-
term EPS 
growth 
11.38% 
11.38 
17.31 
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The EPS growth required to sustain a DCF valuation equal to the current share price is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Compared to the explicit forecast period (years 1 to 3) long-term EPS 
growth of 12.98 percent does not appear all that unreasonable. However, recall that this 
growth is required to be sustained in perpetuity, and requires significant abnormal retum on 
equity investments made by Microsoft (that is, 6 percent above the cost of equity). While 
Microsoft is one firm whose historical investments have eamed retums which greatly 
exceeded required retums, the issue is whether the market is pricing Microsoft under the 
assumption that expected retums are maintained at this high level; or whether expected retums 
are somewhat lower, but there is some value in the option to alter investment policy 
depending on the state of the market. 
Figure 22 
EPS growtli underlying the illustrative DCF valuation of Microsoft, calibrated to a value of $25 J l 
Figure 22 presents the expected growth in eamings per share for Microsoft under three sets of assumptions. The first two sets 
of assumptions are the same as those underlying Figure 2.1. The third set of assumptions are consistent with a DCF valuation 
of $2531. First, over fcvecast years 4 to 30,1 assume that the profit margin declines from an initial value of 36.15 percent to 
a long-term expected value of 8.60 percent, and the dividend payout ratio remains constant at 45.13 percent. I assume that 
sales growth declines from an initial value of 8.66 percent to a long-term estimate of 8.53 percent. Second, I assume that the 
profit margin and dividend payout ratio both remain constant, at 36.15 and 25.00 percent, respectively, and that sales growth 
declines to a long-term estimate of 6.24 percent. Third, I maintain the same profit margin and dividend payout ratio as in 
assumption set 2, but assume that sales growth rises to a long-term estimate of 12.98 percent. 
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The Microsoft example illustrates a further important point regarding the parameter 
estimation techniques used in this large sample study, and the interpretation of the results. I do 
not contend that the parameter estimation techniques described in this paper are appropriate 
for the valuation of an individual stock. For example, the equity valuation conducted prior to 
an IPO or a proposed takeover should rely on company-specific estimates of the initial and 
long-term margins, dividend policy and the cost of equity capital. In the Microsoft case, the 
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expected long-term margin is likely to fall somewhere in the range of 8.60 - 36.15 percent 
assumed above. It is equally possible that the expected long-term retum on equity may exceed 
the cost of equity capital, if the investor has reason to believe that barriers to entry are 
unusually high in the industry in question. 
However, the estimation techniques used in the analysis are appropriate for determining the 
usefiilness of the proposed models for portfolio formation. The models will be useful for 
portfolio formation if, on average, market prices adjust to the intrinsic value estimates 
generated by the models. If, in reality this is the case, it is reasonable to expect that portfolios 
formed along intrinsic value lines will achieve outperformance. 
In sum, the Microsoft example is illustrative of the empirical evidence that market prices 
exceed discounted cash flow valuations. At a forecast price-eamings ratio of 19.6 times, its 
discounted cash flow valuation only reaches the share price under the assumptions that the 
firm can sustain high margins on its current and future investments, and that the returns on 
those new investments are substantially above the cost of equity capital. In Sub-section 3.2,1 
describe the Decision-tree valuation model, which encompasses the value of dynamic 
reinvestment, and illustrate this model with another Microsoft valuation. Using a Decision-
tree valuation model, the share price of $25.31 can be justified under more realistic 
assumptions that the ROE on reinvested eamings is 11-14 percent. 
3.2 Decision-tree valuation 
The Decision-tree valuation model is a modified version of that proposed by Schwartz and 
Moon (2001), which extends on the original model presented in Schwartz and Moon (2000), 
Their model incorporates six state variables in the valuation. Three of these are stochastic 
(revenue, revenue growth and variable costs) while three are path-dependent and deterministic 
(cash, tax losses carried forward, and property, plant and equipment). Underlying their model 
is the mean reversion of financial statement items and changes in those items as the firm 
matures and eventually achieves a steady state. Specifically, the model assumes that revenue 
growth, the volatility of that revenue growth and variable costs as a percentage of revenue 
revert to normal levels over a period of time. 
In their paper, the model is derived in continuous-time, but converted to a discrete-time 
version in order to illustrate its use with valuations ofAmazon.com and Ebay. Applying the 
model also required additional assumptions relating to capital expenditure, fixed costs and an 
EBIT multiple to estimate the terminal value. 
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In my analysis, I compute a Decision-tree valuation of each stock, according to the model 
summarised in Exhibit 2.9. The valuation is the mean of 1000 discounted cash flow 
valuations, where revenue growth is subject to uncertainty over its expected path, as well as 
deviations from this expected path. Discounting is performed using the same constant cost of 
equity capital as incorporated in the DCF valuation. Hence, these are not real options 
valuations, in which the value of cash flows derived from risk-neutral revenue growth are 
discounted using the risk-free rate. 
The decision to perform Decision-tree valuations, as opposed to real options valuations, was 
made to minimise the standard error associated with estimating theoretical equity values. 
Essentially, the Decision-tree valuation model assumes that the systematic risk of equity is 
independent of the volatility of revenue growth. A real options valuation model assumes that 
the systematic risk of equity is positively correlated with the volatility of revenue growth. So 
estimating risk-neutral cash flows requires simulated cash flows to be discounted by a risk-
adjustment factor (k) related to the volatility of revenue growth. Schwartz and Moon (2000, 
2001) provide a procedure for estimating this parameter. But this procedure requires an 
explicit assumption relating to the relationship between changes in equity value and changes 
in revenue, which is even more problematic. Further, while Schwartz and Moon (2000, 2001) 
model the relationship between equity value, revenue growth and the risk-adjustment factor, 
their examples rely on an arbitrary estimate for this factor. Hence, they have made the same 
trade-off between increasing the standard error of valuations and estimating additional 
parameters using market data. This point is further explored in Sub-section 3.3.2. 
Each simulated Decision-tree valuation incorporates uncertainty over expected revenue 
growth, uncertainty over unexpected revenue growth, and uncertainty over the net profit 
margin. The model for the Decision-tree valuation is illustrated in Exhibits 6 and 7 below. 
The equations presented in Exhibit 2.9 are derived in Sub-section 3.2.1 and the techniques 
used to estimate the parameters in addition to the DCF model, are detailed in Sub-section 3.4. 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Exhibit 2.9 
Decision-tree valuation summary 
Decision-tree valuation 
The DCF valuation is the present value of expected future dividends, where dividends are the product 
of sales per share (5), profit margin (w) and the dividend payout ratio (p), but cannot be negative. The 
three terms of the model correspond to the explicit forecast period (« years), the remainder of the 
competitive advantage period (T years), and the terminal growth period (after year n + T). The 
Decision-tree valuation is the mean estimate of ^ D C F valuations, where A=1000 in the study. 
Max pm,S„e""*' ,0 
^^^ , ^fMax(p,m,S„f)) ^'^^^ 
• + • 
1=1 e' i=n+l c 
mS„e""*^ 
^e("+r-i) 
re^ 
Revenue growth 
Revenue growth (g) is the sum of expected 
growth (jl) and unexpected growth {052)- The 
standard deviation of unexpected growth declines 
asymptotically to a long-term estimate ( C T ) . 
gi =/^i+(^iS2 
<J,=e-''(7,_,+i^-e-''"^ 
Expected revenue growth is also uncertain. Its 
mean estimate and standard deviation both decline 
asymptotically to long-term estimates ( fU and 0, 
respectively). 
Profit margin 
Profit margin (m) is a weighted average of the 
margin on expected sales (m^) and the margin on 
unexpected sales {m), plus a random component. 
The forecast margin declines asymptotically to its 
long-term estimate {m ) and the random 
component is normally distributed with mean zero 
and standard deviation S. 
m, = mf (e^'"^')+ m(l -e*"'"^' j-i- Ss^ 
I =e'''m,_i + ( l - e ' ' ' ) w m 
= e-''^'-"\m„-m) + m 
Mi = e Mi-
Vi=e~ rji-i 
+ ( — - ' ) : 
-2K 
w+ 2K 
-TJ,S / " l 
Variable definitions 
DCF = the discounted cash flow valuation of equity under simulation] of k simulations; 
DTV - the Decision-tree value of equity; 
Ei = estimated eamings in year /; 
S„ = estimated sales per share in year «; 
Pi, p = dividend payout ratio in year /; and dividend payout ratio from year n + 1 onwards; 
Pj,p = expected revenue growth in period / and its long-term sustainable level; 
- 2 K-
-TJ, = standard deviation of expected revenue growth in period /; 
V 2 K 
(T,,a = standard deviation of revenue growth in period / and long-term sustainable level; 
Si> gn, g = simulated sales growth in period /; continuously-compounded sales growth in year n (initial 
growth); and long-term sustainable growth rate in sales. 
nii, mf, m , m = simulated net profit margin in period /; forecast net profit margin in period /, 
assuming reversion to the long-term margin; long-term net profit margin; and net profit margin on 
unexpected sales growth; 
d = standard deviation of the random component of profit margin, due to uncertainty over costs; 
£/. ^2. £3 = standard normal variates. 
re = continuously-compounded cost of equity capital 
K = speed of adjustment parameter for sales growth and profit margin. 
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3.2.1 Model derivation 
In this section, I derive the equations presented in Exhibit 2.9. The model derivation is split 
into the components relating to simulated sales growth and net profit margin. 
Estimation of sales growth 
In the DCF model, revenue growth was deterministic, and reverted to a long-term sustainable 
level over T years, from the end of the explicit forecast period (years 1 to n) to the start of the 
sustainable growth period (year « + 7). In the Decision-tree model, revenue growth in each 
year (g,) is the sum of expected revenue growth (w,) and an unexpected component (a,e;). In 
addition, there is uncertainty over expected revenue growth in each year. The derivation of 
revenue growth is as follows. 
Incorporating the continuous-time modelling of Schwartz and Moon (2000) I assume 
innovations in revenue to be normally distributed with mean p.(t) and standard deviation a(t), 
which are themselves stochastic variables. This can be expressed as: 
R{t) 
where: 
= jj{t)dt + o-{t)dzi (2.21) 
R(t) = revenue at time t; 
p(t) = expected revenue growth at time t; 
a(t) = standard deviation of revenue growth at time t; and 
dz] = a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
I assume that expected revenue growth, or drift, (p) is determined by mean reversion and a 
random element. It mean reverts to a constant rate jU at rate K, but randomness is introduced 
by the normally distributed random variable rj(t), which itself reverts to a long-term rate of ff 
These assumptions are incorporated into the equations presented below. 
dju{t) = K\JI- ju{t)]dt -F 77(0^ 2^ (2.22) 
dc7{t) = K[a-a{t)}it (2.23) 
dj]{t) = K[?f-Tj{t)}it (2.24) 
where: 
ju = long-term expected revenue growth; 
a = long-term standard deviation of revenue growth; 
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rj(t) = the standard deviation of expected revenue growth in period t; 
rf = long-term standard deviation of expected revenue growth; 
K = the speed of adjustment parameter (the same as in the DCF model); and 
dz2 = a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
The discrete-time version of the above processes is presented below, assuming the increment 
of time (Ar) equals 1 year. It is consistent with Schwartz and Moon (2000, 2001), with two 
exceptions. First, risk-neutral eamings growth is not computed, in order to reduce the number 
of parameters requiring estimation. As mentioned above, 1 perform sensitivity analysis on the 
results after estimating risk-neutral eamings growth. Second, Schwartz and Moon allow for 
correlation between dzj and dz2, where 1 assume that the correlation between these variables is 
zero. Again, this assumption is made to simplify the model for application to a large sample 
of stocks. a„ and //„, represent initial values for these volatility parameters at the end of the 
explicit forecast period. Variables £/ and e^  are standard normal variates. Note that 1 represent 
years with the sub-script /, for consistency with the earlier modelling. 
S, = S,_,e'' (2.25) 
[\-e-)Ti + . ^ ^ i l , s , (2.26) 
where: 
g,=M,+c7,Sy (2.27) 
^ . = e " V i + ( l - ^ " ' ^ ^ (2-28) 
a, = e - V , _ , + ( l - e ' ^ P (2.29) 
I than make the further assumption that the volatility of expected revenue growth declines to a 
long-term estimate of zero, implying that: 
7 7 - ^ - ^ 1 (2-30) 
This assumption, which was also made by Schwartz and Moon (2000) can be justified on 
economic grounds. Recall that this is the volatility of expected revenue growth, not the 
volatility of realised revenue growth, and the model is being used to value equity investments 
based on an information set available today. The assumption that 7 = 0 implies that 
uncertainty over the drift term diminishes over time. This is what we would expect of mature 
industries, even if there is volatility in year-to-year revenue growth. 
Estimation of the net profit margin 
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In the DCF model, the forecast net profit margin in each year was deterministic, and reverted 
to a long-term expected value of m . In the Decision-tree valuation model, the profit margin 
in a given year (m,) is influenced by two other factors: (1) the difference between expected 
and unexpected revenue; and (2) uncertainty over costs. The profit margin on the unexpected 
component of revenue growth is likely to be greater than the margin on the expected 
component. This occurs because there are likely to be fewer costs associated with earning the 
unexpected revenue. For example, if demand for motor vehicles was 10 percent above 
expectations, there is likely to be an increase in wages costs (especially overtime) but the 
profit margin would likely still increase, because other costs like depreciation and managers' 
salaries are fixed. For software firms, this impact is likely to be even greater, given that there 
is likely to be littie increase in costs in response to unexpected demand for software. This can 
be modelled as follows. 
Say we disaggregate sales into an expected component and an unexpected component as 
follows: 
S,=S,_,e'' =S,_,e'' +S,_,(e'' -e^'] (2.31) 
The eamings generated by each of these sales components is the product of a profit margin 
and sales. If we label the margin on expected sales as mf and the margin on unexpected sales 
as m , eamings can be expressed as follows: 
E, = m/5,_,e^' + m5,._, (e'' - e"') (2.32) 
Dividing both sides of the equation by sales in year /, we have an expression for profit margin 
which is a weighted sum of the margin on expected and unexpected sales: 
m/^*, ,e« mS,,{e'' -e''-) 
m, = ' ^-' + ^ ^ ^ (2.33) 
If me make the fiirther substitution that S, = S,_ye^' we have the following equation: 
m/5, ,e^' mS,Xe''-e'''] 
m,. = ——-^ + — - ^ '-
S,_,e'' S,_,e'' (2.34) 
= mfe^''^' -I- m(l - e^'"^') 
This equation shows that the profit margin is a weighted average of the profit margin on 
expected eamings and the profit margin on unexpected eamings, where the weights are 
determined by the difference between expected and realised revenue growth. 
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This is the profit margin we would observe in the absence of any cost variance. In other 
words, if sales were above expectations, but the increased costs associated with those sales 
were the same as forecast, we would observe the weighted margin from this equation. If we 
then assume there is a random component to the realised margin, with mean zero and standard 
deviation of 5, we have the following equation for profit margin: 
m, = mfe"'-^' -\- m(l - e"''"')+ Ss, (2.35) 
where: 
m, { =e-''^'-"\m„-m) + m (2.36) 
(assuming that, for consistency with the DCF valuation model, the margin on expected sales 
asymptotically reverts to a long-term expected value, m ) . 
3.2.2 Example: Decision-tree valuation of Microsoft 
As was the case for the DCF valuation model, I illustrate the Decision-tree valuation model 
with a valuation for Microsoft. Recall the set of assumptions used in the DCF valuation of 
Microsoft - cost of equity {re) = 11.38 percent, initial profit margin {m„) = 36.15 percent, 
long-term profit margin (m ) = 8.60 percent, dividend payout ratio {p) = 45.13 percent, initial 
sales growth {g„) = 8.66 percent, long-term sales growth (g) = 6.24 percent, explicit forecast 
period {n) = 3 years, and competitive advantage period (« + 7) = 30 years. These assumptions 
were consistent with a DCF valuation of $6.91. Under the assumption that the profit margin 
remains constant at 36.15 percent, the valuation increased to $13.31 percent, and only reached 
the share price of $25.31 under the assumption that long-term sales growth is 12.98 percent. 
Now incorporate some assumptions relating to the uncertainty over revenue growth and 
margins. These are broadly comparable to the assumptions used for Technology stocks in the 
full sample. First, assume that the volatility of expected sales growth {a„) is 20 percent and is 
expected to remain at this level for the purposes of the example, so that a = 20 percent. 
Second, assume that the initial volatility of the unexpected component of sales growth {r]„) is 
equal to 0.10, which is expected to revert to zero in the long-term. Third, assume that the 
margin on unexpected revenue growth (m ) is 1.5 times the long-term margin, so is equal to 
12.90 percent in the low margin case, and 54,23 percent in the high-margin case. Finally, 
assume that the standard deviation of the uncertain component of margin (that is, the volatility 
in margin due to uncertainty over costs; <5) is 50 percent of the long-term margin, so is equal 
to 4.30 percent in the low-margin case and 18.08 percent in the high-margin case. 
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Under the original set of assumptions - that the expected long-term profit margin is 8.60 
percent and the dividend payout ratio is 45.13 percent - the valuation rises 16 percent to 
$8.01. This valuation is the mean estimate of value from 1000 simulated paths of sales, 
eamings and dividend growth. This is consistent with embedded options comprising 14 
percent of share value, where the DCF value is $6.91 and embedded options adding another 
$1.10 of value. Under the second set of assumptions - that the expected long-term profit 
margin remains at 36.15 percent and the dividend payout ratio is 25 percent - share value 
rises to $18.68, a 40 percent increase from the DCF value of $13.31. In this instance, 
embedded options comprise 29 percent of share value. 
The impact of the volatility assumption on estimated share price is illustrated in Figure 2.3, 
which shows the distribution of estimated share values under the second set of assumptions, 
where margin is maintained at 36.15 percent and the dividend payout ratio is 25 percent. The 
figure shows the skewed distribution of estimated share value, which is a function of the 
asymmetric impact on eamings per share of embedded options. In the situations where there is 
an unexpected increase in eamings growth, the firm re-invests additional funds in high-growth 
projects. For example, the Microsoft valuation at the 95'** percentile of the distribution is 
$46.67, which is consistent with a price-eamings ratio of 36,2, This is largely the result of 
simulated sales growth of 54,9 percent in forecast year 17, compared to an original estimate of 
8,5 percent for this example in that year. Combined with a simulated margin of 66,2 percent, 
this resuhed in eamings per share of $29,30, which was over 5 times the DCF forecast of 
$5.27 for that year. 
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Figure 2 J 
Distribution of the simulated Decision-tree valuations for the Microsoft illustration 
Figure 2.3 presents the distribution of 1000 simulated Decision-tree valuations for Microsoft under the following 
assumptions, which are consistent with a mean valuation estimate of $19.11.1 assume that the dividend payout ratio remains 
constant at 25.00 percent and that expected sales growth declines to a long-term estimate of 8.S3 percent. In addition, I 
assume that expected sales growth in each period is normally distributed with standard deviation r\, which declines from an 
initial value in year 3 of 10 percent to a long-term estimate of zero by year 30; and that unexpected sales growth in each year 
is normally distributed with standard deviation o, which remains constant at 20 percent. In relation to the profit margin, I 
assume that the expected profit margin remains constant at 36.15 percent, the margin on unexpected sales growth (positive or 
negative) is 54.23 percent (1.5 times the expected profit margin) and that the random component of the profit margin is 
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation of 18.08 percent (half the expected profit margin). 
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An important assumption of this model is that a portion of these unexpected eamings are 
remvested back in the Hrm, which is consistent with the firm exercising a growth option in 
response to feedback (that is, high growth) that its current business segments are worthy of 
additional investment. In this example, assuming a reinvestment rate of 75 percent means that 
$18.02 per share was reinvested in excess of what was expected. And since the firm is in a 
state where these investments are expected to be positive-NPV projects, this is a rational 
exercise of an option. 
The contrasting state in which the firm exercises an option to abandon a business segment, or 
at least scale down its operations, is the case where it receives feedback that its projects are 
not successful (that is, a low growth state). The 5* percentile of the distiibution above is a 
share value of $6.57, which is largely the result of a 68 percent fall in earnings per share in 
year 21, from $2.31 to $0.74. This resulted in eamings per share being 90 percent below 
expectations. This also means that reinvested eamings is $5.00 per share lower than expected, 
which is a rational response to feedback that the current investment portfolio is 
underperforming. 
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These argimients are fiirther illustrated in Figure 2.4, which displays the growth in expected 
EPS over 30 years in four cases. These are the four combinations of the low- and high-margin 
assiunptions, and including and excluding volatility of sales growth and margins. The clear 
bars present the same EPS growth data that appears in Figure 2.1, while the shaded bars 
present the mean annual growth over 30 years in average EPS fi-om 1000 simulated sales and 
EPS paths. The horizontal Imes illusti^ ate the average growth in EPS in the four cases. In the 
low-margin cases, mean growth in average EPS increases fi-om 1.9 percent to 3.9 percent, hi 
the high-margin case, growth in average EPS increases from 8.5 percent to 10.5 percent. 
These differences result firom the greater dollar amoimt of reinvestment in high growth states, 
and a lower dollar amount of reinvestment in low growth states. 
Figure 2.4 
Growth in average EPS underlying illustrative DCF and Decision-tree valuations of Microsoft 
Figure 2.4 presents the growth in average eamings per share for Microsoft under four sets of assumptions. Two sets of 
assumptions, underlying the data presented in the clear bars, are the same as those underlying Figure 2.1: (1) profit margin is 
expected to decline from 36.15 percent to 8.60 percent and dividend payout ratio is 45.13 percent; and (2) profit margin 
remains constant at 36.15 percent and dividend payout ratio is 25 percent. The other two sets of assumptions, underlying the 
data presented in the shaded bars, incorporate the assumptions that expected growth in EPS is normally distributed with 
standard deviation T], which declines from an initial value in year 3 of 10 percent to a long-term estimate of zero by year 30; 
and that unexpected sales growth in each year is normally distributed with standard deviation a, which remains constant at 20 
percent. 
15% 
10% 
I 5% 
Mean over 30 
vears 
3.9% 
1.9% 
a 
v> 
c 
0% 
-5% 
-10% 
-15% 
n Long-term margin = 8.60%; payout = 45%; no volatility 
• Long-term margin = 8.60%; payout = 45%; volatiltiy = 20% 
D Long-term margin = 36.15%; payout = 25%; no volatility 
• Long-term margin = 36.15%; payout = 25%; volatility = 20% 
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Finally, it is worthwhile investigating the set of assumptions consistent with a valuation of 
$25.31 for Microsoft. First, say we hold the margin constant at 36.15 percent assume that 
expected sales growth reverts to 8.53 percent over 30 years, consistent witii expected equity 
retums on reinvested eamings reverting to a normal level over time. In this case, volatility of 
sales growth equal to 27 percent is required to reach this value. This is not an unreasonable 
estimate, given the descriptive statistics on volatility presented in Table 2.1, and discussed 
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later. Altematively, holding the volatility of sales growth constant at 20 percent, the share 
price of $25.31 can be justified with the assumption that long-term sales growth is 10.5 
percent. This is consistent with new investment retum on equity remaining at 14.0 percent, 
still 2.6 percent above the cost of capital, but a more reasonable assumption than the 17.3 
percent required under the DCF valuation. 
The following exhibit summarises the illustrative valuations for Microsoft, with highlighted 
rows indicating the assumption sets which are consistent with valuations equal to the current 
share price of $25.31. This data provides an indication of the magnitude of assumptions 
required to justify this market price. For instance, the share price is consistent with the 
following sets of assumptions: 
• long-term ROE on new investments is equal to 14.0 percent, and 32 percent of equity 
value comprised of the value of embedded options, proxied by the volatility assumption of 
20 percent (row 3); 
• long-term ROE on new investments is equal to 17.3 percent and no value in the market 
price for embedded options (row 4); 
long-term ROE on new investments is equal to 11.4 percent (the cost of equity capital), 
and 47 percent of equity value comprised of the value of embedded options, proxied by 
the volatility assumption of 27 percent (row 6). 
Exhibit 2.10 
Microsoft valuations under alternative assumptions and valuation models 
Row 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
DCF valuation 
Va! 
$6.91 
13.31 
17.32 
25.31 
$6.91 
13.31 
17.32 
25.31 
P/E 
5.4 
10.3 
13.4 
19,6 
5.4 
10.3 
13.4 
19.6 
Decision-tree va! 
Val 
$8.01 
18.68 
25.31 
38.87 
9.34 
25.31 
35.65 
56.75 
P/E 
6.2 
14.5 
19.6 
30.1 
7.2 
19.6 
27.6 
44.0 
Vol-
atility 
20% 
20 
20 
20 
27 
27 
27 
27 
Div 
payout 
45.1% 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
45.1 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
Margin 
Initial 
36.2% 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
LT 
8.6% 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
8.6 
36.2 
36.2 
36.2 
Sales growth 
Initial 
8.66% 
8.66 
8.66 
8.66 
8.66 
8.66 
8.66 
8.66 
LT 
6.2% 
8.5 
10.5 
13.0 
6.2 
8.5 
10.5 
13.0 
LT 
ROE 
11.4% 
11.4 
14.0 
17.3 
11.4 
11.4 
14.0 
17.3 
In sum, the Microsoft example is illustrative of two important concepts underlying the DCF 
and Decision-tree valuation models. First, for a discounted cash flow valuation to justify a 
price-eamings ratio of 19.6 for a large, mature technology stock, requires an assumption that 
it can sustain investment retums well in excess of its cost of capital in perpetuity. The 
assumption of the DCF model examined here is that return on investment is expected to revert 
to a normal level over the competitive advantage period. Second, a price-eamings ratio of 
19.6 can be justified at a more reasonable ROE assumption, if the volatility of sales growth is 
sufficiently high. The greater the volatility of growth, the greater the ability of management to 
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alter investment decisions in response to signals of growth. This is operationalised in the 
model through the assumption that the dividend payout ratio is constant, meaning that there is 
a direct relationship between the magnitude of reinvestment and the growth signal. 
3.3 Comparison to the Schwartz and Moon (2000,2001) models 
It is usefiil to compare the DCF and Decisions-tree valuation models with the real options 
valuation model presented in Schwartz and Moon (2000). Their model also involves the 
simulation of expected eamings for an assumed competitive advantage period. In the terminal 
state, value is estimated by multiplying eamings by an assumed multiple, and this value is 
discounted to present value terms. As with the Decision-tree model, their estimate of equity 
value is the mean estimate of simulated equity values. In Sub-section 3.3.1,1 compare the 
assumptions underlying the estimate of eamings, which are deterministic for the DCF model 
and stochastic for the Decision-tree model. In Sub-section 3.3.2,1 compare the way in which 
equity value is estimated. In making this comparison, my intention is two-fold. First, I argue 
that the assumptions relating to the derivation of earnings are appropriate for practitioners to 
implement, given firm-specific parameter estimates. Second, I argue that Decision-tree 
valuation can be justified, despite the use of a constant risk-adjusted discount rate, given the 
estimation error underlying the adjustment required to estimate risk-neutral cash flows. 
The differences between the modelling used in this paper and those used by Schwartz and 
Moon (2000, 2001) are summarised in Exhibit 2.11. Note that I use terminology and symbols 
which are comparable to those used throughout this thesis, which are not necessarily the same 
as those used by Schwartz and Moon. 
Note that these differences in modelling do not suggest that one model is "better" or "worse" 
than the other, they simply rely on a different set of assumptions, and any valuation model 
should be used only in cases where its assumptions are appropriate. Further, the primary 
contribution of Schwartz and Moon is the modelling of the real options valuation, using the 
stochastic processes upon which my paper relies. The intent of my research is to evaluate 
whether investors can eam abnormal retums from portfolios formed on the basis of these 
processes, in addition to the assumptions underlying the DCF model 
50 
«3 
o 
u 
u I •s 3 
Q 
O O 
r» 
cT 
o 
o 
n 
C8 
O 
I 
a 
Sec 
2 'S 
>< J. 
e 
s 
s 
e 
.a 
« 
a 
S 
e 
U 
r» 
o 
o 
e 
e 
s 
s 
n 
iS 
l a 
.a 
u 
«3 
S ^ 
2_ > U O LZL 
•a g S 
-I-
1 I 
i 
.£: 
Ol 
"3 
U3 
o 
u 
•a 
•a 
c 
•tj «i 
1 3 cs 
3 
U 
r ?* t^ ^ -E: 
u 
Xl 
• ^ % 
o 
o 
fl 
e 
es 
9 
o 
• > 
13 
^1 
u 0< JO irt 
a >;^  
:S & 
c o 
O t-i 
3 " 
H u 
, S .S3 
1) *j 
s S 1^ 
Co 
IS 5." 
_ 6« _ 
CO 
s~ ^ 
4WI 
I I 
o 
u 
;3 
3 
g 
3 
.3 
D 
Co 
^ 
<0 
-I-
f N 
M ob 
> 
b 
I 
II 
I 
-H 
T 
b" 
Id 
^ 
+ 
^ <u 
I ^ 9 6 5 
3 
u 
cd 
O 
E 
3 1/1 
u 3 
O 
3 u 
u 
U 
5 I 
2 o 
S 3 
s g 
.2 fl -» 
•3 
I 
u 
> 
u 
o 
§ 
o 
u 
a I 
(L> 
H 
T3 
u 
3 
J 3 
S 3 
c<J JO ii 
c -o 
IS 
b~ 
+ 
too 
-I-
^ 
+ 
<^  
V 
I 
5a 
u 
u 
i i 13 
•c O 
U 
CiO I 
Q. 
p 
u 
X3 
R fl 
S 6 
I ° 
i "3 2 1 1 
u 
u 
a ffl-
e 
' f l 
O u 
"I U 
**= 
tn 'C 
I 
+ 
S.! 
I 
-1-
^ 3 Co  
"3 p 
tn u 
t<q 
K 
5W 
>^ 
>ri 
u 
> 
•o . 
bO 3 
" " O I 
o 
•3 O 
S 2 
+ 
'? X 
4^ Cd *- _ -^  <li 
+ 
c S 
^ 
"^i^ 
I 
5a 
., '^.^ 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Apart from the distinction between a real options and Decision-tree valuation model, which as 
discussed in the derivation of the Decision-tree model, I highlight the following differences in 
modelling. 
Schwartz and Moon (2000) model the after-tax cash flow to an all-equity financed firm as 
follows. Note that the symbols and terminology used in their paper differ from those 
presented above, but the underlying equation is the same. The equation below refers to the 
case where capital expenditiire equals depreciation. In their 2001 paper, Schwartz and Moon 
allow for this expansion case. 
NPAT, =[Sales,(l-r)-Fli-T] (2-37) 
Expressing the above equation on a per share basis we have: 
E^=[sX\-r)-FPS]ll-T] (2.38) 
where: 
FPSi = fixed costs per share in year /. 
They model sales growth in the same way as that described above, such that: 
S,=S,^,e" (2.39) 
g,=e-'g,_,+(\-e-'^ (2.40) 
Hence, the first difference in assumptions is the way sales growth is transferred to eamings 
growth. In the Schwartz and Moon model, fixed costs remain constant, so that eamings 
growth always exceeds sales growth, due to operating leverage. Economically, this model can 
only apply to growth firms, in which revenue growth is always high-quality. In my model, the 
relationship between eamings growth and revenue growth depends upon whether the profit 
margin is above or below the long-term sustainable margin. 
The other differences in assumptions relate to the techniques used to estimate the models' 
parameters. In the Schwartz and Moon model, the proportion of variable costs and the amount 
of fixed costs are estimated according to analysts fiiture projections, which is consistent with 
my use of EPS forecasts to estimate the initial margin. However, it is likely that EPS forecasts 
are more reliable than estimates of fixed and variable costs that can be obtained fi^om analyst 
reports. This is due to the importance investors and companies place on the ability of 
companies to meet EPS forecasts, evidenced by the sharemarket reaction to positive and 
negative EPS surprise. Further, I use an economic justification for the use of long-run revenue 
growth as equal to the product of the reinvestment rate and the cost of equity capital, as 
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discussed in Sub-section 3.1.2. Finally, in computing the terminal value, I rely on the 
assumption that reinvested eamings will eam just their cost of capital, such that the terminal 
value is the next year's expected eamings divided by the cost of capital. Schwartz and Moon 
rely upon an arbitrary estimate. 
In sum, the differences between the assumptions underlying the DCF model presented above, 
and those relied upon by Schwartz and Moon, are as follows: 
• In the sustainable growth period, fixed costs rise at a constant proportion of sales, 
implying that the profit margin is expected to remain constant. Schwartz and Moon 
assume that fixed costs remain constant in dollar terms, implying that profit margin 
continues to increase. 
• In estimating the parameters of the DCF model, I rely on consensus EPS and Sales 
figures, while Schwartz and Moon suggest also estimating the proportion of fixed and 
variable costs. 
• The long-term growth underlying the DCF model relies upon the economic justification 
that long-term eamings growth is the product of the reinvestment rate and the cost of 
equity capital, and that expected long-term revenue growth equals expected long-term 
eamings growth. Schwartz and Moon do not suggest an estimation procedure. 
• The terminal value computation is expected earnings at the end of the competitive 
advantage divided by the cost of equity capital, consistent with the assumption that 
expected ROE will equal the cost of equity in this state. Schwartz and Moon do not 
suggest an appropriate estimation procedure for the multiple to be applied to terminal year 
eamings. 
3.4 Parameter estimation 
Implementing the model described in Section 3 requires estimation of a large number of 
parameters via methods that can be applied to a sample of firms over a number of years. 
These are not necessarily the techniques that would be applied for valuing a particular firm, 
say, in preparation for an IPO. In that case, firm-specific estimates of expected revenue 
growth, its expected volatility and so on, would be implemented. As discussed in several 
places above, in implementing any valuation model, the analyst makes a trade-off between the 
information gleaned from performing a more detailed analysis, and the uncertainty which is 
introduced via noisy parameter estimates. Hence, what I describe below are the techniques I 
have used to test the appropriateness of the Decision-tree valuation model for forming 
investment purposes. With a less noisy, firm-specific information set, investors should be 
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expected to yield further benefits from explicitiy accounting for the value of embedded 
options. 
In this section, 1 outline the estimation procedure for the parameters required by the DCF and 
Decision-tree valuation models. Throughout, I have used an explicit forecast period of 3 
years, implying that n = 3.1 have made three assumptions regarding the competitive 
advantage period, which are that n + r = 10, 20 or 30 years. 
3.4.1 Dividend payout ratio (pi andp) 
The dividend payout ratio used from the end of the explicit forecast period to the end of the 
CAP (the period of T - 1 years starting in year 4) is the average of the estimated dividend 
payout ratio for years 0 to 3.1 also constrained the payout ratio in each year in the range of 
zero to one, to mitigate against the impact of special dividends or data errors, such as negative 
dividends, impacting on the results. Expressed as an equation this is: 
^ ^ Max[Min{p, ,l),0] ^ ^ Max[Min{p, ,l),0] 
j=o n-\-\ i=o 4 
In forecast years 1 to 3, the dividend payout ratio is computed as the ratio of forecast 
dividends per share to forecast eamings per share, where the mean IBES consensus forecasts 
are available. In the instance where the dividend forecast is not available, but estimates of the 
book value per share were available, I estimate the dividend as the difference between the 
eamings per share in that year less the change in book value per share. There were cases 
where missing data meant that the dividend payout ratio could not be computed in a given 
year, but could be computed for at least one year from years 0 to 4. In these cases, I use/? in 
place of Pi. I still constrain pi to have a lower bound of zero, but remove the constraint that the 
maximum value equals one. In other words, dividends in an individual year can exceed 
eamings, but the maximum payout ratio used to estimate the longer-term payout ratio ip) 
cannot exceed 100 percent. 
Hence, the computation of the dividend payout ratio in the explicit forecast period can be 
summarised according to the following equations: 
p, = Min D, A ... ( E,-[BVE, - BVE,_^) or p, = Min ,0 (2.42) 
where: 
BVEi = book value of equity per share in year /. 
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3.4.2 Profit margin (mi, m„, m ,m and d) 
The initial profit margin {m„) is the average of the estimated profit margin for years 0 to 3 (m, 
where z = 0 to 3), where each year is constrained to have a maximum value of one. A value 
greater than one is consistent with eamings exceeding sales, which can only be the result of an 
unusual item affecting eamings or data errors. The profit margin in each individual year (w,) 
is the ratio of sales per share to eamings per share. Expressed in equations, the initial profit 
margin and the profit margin in years 0 to 3 is: 
^ Max{m, ,l) ^ Max{m, ,l) 
m =1^  
i =0 n + l =Z^  (2.43) (=0 
where: 
m, = — 
5.. 
The long-term profit margin (m ) is time-period and industry-specific. For each firm with at 
least five years of eamings history, I compute its average profit margin using the available 
historical data. The intent is to estimate an industry-wide profit margin for mature firms, 
which is the reasoning behind the five-year data requirement. The exception to the five-year 
requirement is for the 1987 and 1988 sub-samples. As data is only available from 1985 
onwards, I estimate the long-term profit margin for those sub-samples using three- and four-
year windows only. 1 also constrain the long-term margin estimate to be positive. Any other 
assumption would imply that mature firms in the industry are expected to be loss-making in 
the long-term. Expressed as an equation, the long-term profit margin is estimated using the 
historical eamings and sales for all firms in the same IBES industry sector as: 
'NPAT,j 
m = Max 
" ,^ 1 Sales, J 
y=i 
n 
•,o (2.44) 
where: 
NPATij= the net profit in year / for firmy; 
Salesij = sales in year i for firmy; 
k = the number of years of available data for firm /; and 
n = the number of firms in the industry. 
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The Decision-tree valuation model also requires an assumption for the profit margin on 
unexpected sales (m) and the volatility of profit margin due to cost variances (S). To estimate 
the margin on unexpected sales 1 performed the following four-step estimation procedure. 
First, I computed the change in eamings relative to the change in sales for each firm, year, 
according to the following equation: 
Margin on sales growth, = NPAT,-NPAT,_, ^2.45) 
Sales, - Sales,_^ 
This provides an estimate of the profit margin on the change in sales from the previous year, 
under the assumption that profit margin on base year sales was unchanged. Second, I 
excluded observations in which eamings and sales moved in opposite directions. In this case, 
the estimated margin on sales growth would be negative, which would lead to the assumption 
that firms would incur losses simply to generate higher sales. Third, 1 estimated the mean 
margin on sales growth for firms within the same IBES Sector in the same year. Finally, I 
capped this estimate at 0.5 on the basis that this is approximately two standard deviations 
above the typical initial margin. (A firm which can eam a margin on unexpected sales which 
is two standard deviations above the margin for the typical firm would have unusually high 
operating leverage). 
For each firm-year, 1 use its industry sector average as the assumed margin on unexpected 
sales for all subsequent years. This ensures that the valuations are only performed using data 
that is available prior to portfolio formation. 
The last parameter relating to margins that requires estimation is the random component (S). I 
assume this takes a value which is 0.5 times the firm's long-term margin estimate (which is 
time-period and industry-specific). Under the assumption that profit margin is normally 
distributed, this assumption implies that, in steady state, the probability of incurring a loss is 
about 2 percent. This is reasonable, considering that 7 percent of sample firms had negative 
eamings in the last actual reported year, and the sample is drawn from large firms. And the 
figure of 2 percent refers to losses incurred when actual sales are as forecast, not due to a 
sudden drop in revenue. In other words, this assumption appears reasonable, considering that 
there is a low probability that a large firm, with steady-state revenue growth, will incur losses 
purely because of a sudden rise in costs. 
3.4.3 Sales per share (Si and S„) and growth in sales per share (gi, g„ and g) 
Sales per share during the explicit forecast period and for the final year of historical data {Si 
where / = 0 to 3) is simply the ratio of actual sales {So) or the IBES consensus sales forecast 
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{Si to S3) divided by the actual or forecast shares on issue, provided by IBES. Growth in sales 
per share in individual years (g,) is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales per 
share in the current and previous periods. Initial growth in sales per share {g„) is the average 
of the estimated sales growth from years 0 to 3. Expressed in equations, we have: 
_ Sales, 
Shares, 
gi = In 
'S,^ 
\^i-U 
!=0 « T 1 /=0 
(2.47) 
(2.48) 
where: 
Si = actual or consensus forecast sales per share in year / where / = 0 to 3; 
Sharesi= actual or consensus forecast shares on issue in year / where / = 0 to 3; 
gi = estimated growth in sales per share in year /; 
g„ = initial growth in sales per share. 
I estimate the long-term growth in sales per share ( g ) according to the equation below: 
g = {\-p)r, (2.49) 
where: 
p = the dividend payout ratio, estimated according to the procedure previously 
documented; and 
re = the continuously-compounded cost of equity capital. 
3.4.4 Parameters relating to the uncertainty of revenue growth {a,a,Tj) 
I estimate the initial volatility of revenue growth {0) as the standard deviation of revenue 
growth for each individual stock, for all years in which historical data is available, prior to 
portfolio formation. I then make estimate a time period- and industry-specific long-term 
volatility of revenue growth ( a ) , by using data only for firms with at least five years of 
revenue growth. As with the estimated long-term margin, the exception to this requirement is 
valuations performed on 1997 and 1998 stocks. For these stocks, the long-term volatility of 
revenue growth was estimated using firms with just three and four years of growth 
observations. 
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Finally, 1 assume that the initial standard deviation of expected revenue growth (7^) is equal to 
0.10 for all firm-years. 1 make this assumption with reference to the mean estimate of initial 
revenue growth (g„) for all firm years, which is primarily driven by analyst consensus 
forecasts. This mean estimate is 7.6 percent. For a firm with expected eamings growth of 
0.076, //„ = 0.10 and a competitive advantage period of 30 years, this is equivalent to a 20 
percent probability of negative expected revenue growth. 
The use of a constant here raises the question as to whether a firm-specific, or time period-
and industry-specific estimate could not be used, as was the case with estimating other 
parameters. The answer is that there is insufficient theory or evidence to show that this 
parameter would be different amongst firms or industries, or to estimate the magnitude of 
those differences. In the case of profit margin and parameters relating to the volatility of 
revenue growth (cr ,^ ; as opposed to the volatility of expected revenue growth, rf) I relied on 
economic arguments about long-term industry margins and volatility, and was able to measure 
these parameters using a large historical dataset. But estimating the parameter;/ on a firm-
specific, or time period- and industry-specific basis is likely to induce greater estimation error, 
than simply using a market-wide estimate. 
3.4.5 Cost of equity capital (re) 
I estimate the cost of equity capital using the capital asset pricing model, which states that the 
required retum to equityholders is the sum of the risk-free rate (r/) , plus the product of the 
firm's equity beta {fie) and the market risk premium {rm - rj): 
f-e=rf+/3e(^rr,-ff) ( 2 . 5 0 ) 
I estimate the risk-free rate as the yield on ten-year US Treasury bonds and the market risk 
premium at 6 percent. On average, the retum to US equities has exceeded the average retum 
to US Treasuries by over 7 percent from 1900-2002 (Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2003) and 
8 percent from 1921 - 1996 (Jorion and Goetzmann, 1999). But these estimates exceed the 
average equity premium reported for global portfolios in those papers, and is substantially 
above the premium reported in other markets. Given the possibility that the performance of 
US equities was unusually strong during the 20'^ century, I use the more conservative figure 
of 6 percent in computing the required retum to equityholders. 
In estimating each firm's equity beta, 1 perform adjustments to the standard OLS regression 
technique relied upon in practice. This is to reduce the impact on unusually high or low equity 
betas, resulting from unusual trading. For each firm-year, and using data available prior to 
formation, 1 compute the ordinary least squares equity beta (OLS beta). The largest dataset of 
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returns used includes all available monthly retums from January 1985 to December 2005. The 
beta calculation is the covariance of monthly retums on the stock and retums on the S&P500, 
divided by the variance of monthly retums on the S&P500. 
POLS ~ 
COV{r„rJ (2.51) 
A long time-series of monthly retums was used in the computation of the equity beta, given 
the evidence in Gray, Hall, Bowman, Brailsford, Faff, Gmndy, Officer and Smith (2005). 
They find that the ability of the capital asset pricing model to forecast equity retums is 
enhanced when a long time series of data is used, compared to the standard estimation 
window of 48 or 60 months of returns. The retums set used for my beta calculations also 
implies that the number of retums observations used in computing equity beta estimates 
differs according to firm-year. However, there is no reason to believe that equity betas 
estimated using a different number of retums months will be systematically biased. What is 
clear, is that estimates made using a longer series of retums reduces the standard error of 
those estimates. 
I then estimate the equity beta by applying two constraints to the OLS beta. First, I make an 
adjustment first suggested by Blume (1971) and which is standard practice in beta estimates 
provided by Bloomberg. This adjustment takes the following form, which mitigates against 
the influence of extreme beta estimates, which are most likely to result from unusual trading 
in the stock, rather than very high or low systematic risk: 
"adjusted -5 T PoLS (2.52) 
Again, the justification for this adjustment is the evidence of Gray et al, 2005. Their 
additional finding was that a Blume-type adjustment to the OLS beta estimate further 
enhances the ability of the capital asset pricing model to predict equity retums. Finally, I 
constrain the equity beta estimate to the range of 0 to 4, to further mitigate against the 
influence of negative or extremely high beta estimates. These constraints imply that the equity 
beta of each firm is estimated according to the following formula: 
J^oLs =Max< Min 3 3 al ,0 (2.53) 
These constraints on the estimate of beta are especially important, considering the purpose for 
which the beta estimate is being computed. The DCF and Decision-tree valuations are used to 
form investment portfolios, to determine whether they are useful from a portfolio 
59 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
management perspective. The cost of equity is the discount rate applied to forecast cash flows 
and determines the growth of those cash flows over the CAP. For a firm with a high dividend 
payout ratio, too low a discount rate will overstate value, resulting in an increased probability 
of the models suggesting the stock is relatively cheap. For the same firm, too high a discount 
rate has the opposite effect. But for a firm a low dividend payout ratio, the impact on value is 
dampened somewhat. Too low a discount rate increases the present value of a given set of 
forecast dividends, but reduces the magnitude of those forecasts, by reducing growth. In 
contrast, too high a discount rate flows through to inflated sales growth, but the resulting cash 
flows are reduced in present value terms. 
3.4.6 Speed of adjustment parameter (K) 
Two variables in the DCF valuation model converge asymptotically to long-term expected 
values: (1) the revenue growth rate (g) converges to g ; and (2) the profit margin (m) 
converges to (m ) . The speed of adjustment parameter {K) is estimated as a function of T via 
the result that the half-life of these variables equals (Schwartz and Moon, 2001). If we 
K 
assume that the variables should revert to within 0.1 percent of normal levels at the end of the 
CAP (broadly consistent with the assumptions used by Bradshaw (2002) as shown below), the 
equation for the speed of adjustment parameter becomes: 
^ ^ - l n ( a ^ (2.54) 
T 
My valuation estimates rely on an assumption that the competitive advantage period takes on 
values of 10, 20 or 30 years. A competitive advantage period in this range can be justified 
with reference to Bradshaw (2004). He used two versions of the residual income model to 
make estimates of intrinsic value. The first version was based on the same economic theory 
which underpins my valuations, that competitive pressures mean that long-term abnormal 
retums are expected to equal zero. Under the assumption that residual income is expected to 
revert to a long-term estimate of zero, he assumed that: 
Residual income, = coy. Residual income,_, (2.55) 
where: 
CO = is referred to as the fade-rate; and 
/ = year /. 
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He made industry-specific estimates of this parameter with a linear regression of current 
period residual income on prior period residual income. His estimates for co range from 0.51 
to 0.80 and average 0.68. 
If year n is the end of the explicit forecast period (five years in Bradshaw's case), then we can 
express the above equation as follows: 
Residual income, = 0}'~" x Residual income^ (2.56) 
Rather than estimate residual income, I estimate revenue growth and profit margin under the 
assumption that abnormal growth and profitability are expected to revert to zero over time. In 
my modelling, the parameter K determines the rate of mean-reversion, according to the 
following equations: 
^' ^ , w \ (2.57) (2.58) 
m,-m=e-'^*'-"'(m„-m) 
So, Bradshaw's fade-rate parameter {oj) is conceptually equivalent to e" in my modelling. 
And his range of parameter estimates is equivalent to an assumption that K is in the range of 
0.22 to 0.67. Solving Equation 2.54 for T with these estimates for K implies estimates for T 
from 10 to 31 years. Adding Bradshaw's five-year explicit forecast period implies estimates 
for the competitive advantage period of around 15 to 36 years. 
4 Preliminary analysis 
One objective of this study is to establish the merits of Decision-tree valuation in forming 
investment portfolios of stocks with high expected revenue growth, but with significant 
uncertainty over their future prospects. But implementing Decision-tree valuations is 
computationally more complex than DCF valuations, and would therefore be pursued only if 
there is a reasonable chance that it will result in portfolio outperformance. Hence, in this 
section, I provide preliminary evidence, consistent with the literature cited in Section 2, that 
market prices exceed DCF valuations by an economically significant margin. This evidence is 
presented in Sub-section 4.2. 
In Sub-section 4.3,1 examine the association between theoretical values and market prices. I 
also assess the sensitivity of model valuations to increases in the competitive advantage 
period, volatility of revenue growth and the cost of equity capital, and compare value/price 
ratios to those computed by Bradshaw (2002). 
I reiterate that my objective is not to fit a theoretical model to the data, but to assess the merits 
of fundamental equity investment. However, if there is no association between market prices 
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and model valuations, it is unlikely that equity analysts will be persuaded to move away from 
a price-eamings approach. The research on analyst valuation techniques suggests that 
selecting the appropriate price-eamings ratio to use in setting target prices is based on 
heuristic decision-mles, rather than any formal model. 
One potential explanation for this behaviour is that textbook models used to determine the 
appropriate ratio result in target prices materially below share prices. For example, under the 
constant growth dividend discount model, if reinvested eamings eam a retiim equal to the cost 
of capital, then the theoretical price-eamings multiple is the inverse of the cost of capital. If 
analysts relied on this theory, target prices would be based on price-eamings ratios of around 
8 times for the period under study, as the mean cost of equity capital was 12.2 percent. This 
mle is unlikely to be implemented by analysts who observe market price-eamings ratios 
which average 22 times. The mean price-eamings ratio of 22 can be justified if the assumed 
ROE on reinvested eamings is around 15 percent (3 percent above the cost of capital). But 
there is no economic theory which suggests that firms are able to persistently achieve these 
above-normal retums. 
Basically, my concem is that analysts are unlikely to utilise the results of a formal valuation 
model if theoretical valuations deviate materially from market prices, and this difference is 
persistent across time periods and industries. In my study, the median value/price ratio 
estimated under Decision-tree values reaches 0.85, assuming a competitive advantage period 
of 30 years. And it ranges from 0.84 - 1.03 for six of the 11 IBES industry sectors. So, while 
portfolio performance is similar, regardless of whether DCF or Decision-tree valuations are 
performed, this increases the chance that analysts will adopt a more formal model for setting 
target prices. Furthermore, measurement error would be diminished in the analyst setting, 
because analysts can make firm-specific judgements regarding parameter estimates. 
4.1 Sample 
The sample consists of 9427 firm-years over an 18-year period from 1987 to 2004. It is drawn 
from 1049 separate stocks that formed part of the NASDAQ Composite Index or the S&P500 
as at 30 April 2004. The number of sample firms increases from 270 in 1987 to its peak of 
942 in 2003. Datastream and Compustat, via Research Insight, were the source of all 
accounting, share price and index data. Consensus eamings and sales forecasts were obtained 
from IBES via Datastream. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1, partitioned 
according to cohort year and IBES industry sector. 
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An obvious constraint on sample size is the requirement that IBES consensus forecasts are 
available. Given that IBES consensus forecasts are typically only available for large, heavily-
traded firms, this limits the external validity of the sample. However, its intemal validity is 
likely to be enhanced. That is, the pricing of small thinly-traded securities is more likely to be 
affected by unusual tradmg, due to factors like short-selling restrictions or the actions of large 
stakeholders. 
The sample used in Barron, Byard, Kile and Riedl (2002) shows just how small a percentage 
of firms and firm-years have significant analyst following and are likely to have reliable data. 
They documented an association between intangible assets of high-technology firms and the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts. The sample consisted of 451 firms with IBES forecast data 
drawn from 1986-1998, which enabled production of a data set of 1,103 firm-years. 49 
percent of sample fums were from four industries, as defined by 2-digit SIC codes. These 
industries and the number of firms in the sample from the industry were Industrial Machinery 
(70), Chemicals and Allied Products (52), Electronic Equipment (50) and Business Services 
(including Software) (50). 
The key parameters affecting the valuations are the initial and long-term revenue growth (g„ 
and g ) , the initial and long-term profit margin {m„ and m ) , the cost of equity capital {re) and 
the initial and long-term volatility of revenue growth (a and a ) . The pooled data at the top of 
Table 2.1 shows that initial expectations for revenue growth and profit margin are highly 
variable across firm-years. The mean estimate of initial revenue growth is 7.6 percent, but has 
a standard deviation of 15.1 percent. The mean estimate for the initial margin is also 7.6 
percent and has a standard deviation of 19.7 percent. 
The most interesting feature of Panel A is the variation of initial revenue growth and profit 
margin expectations over time. In 1996, expectations for revenue growth peaked at 11.2 
percent, and steadily declined to 4.1 percent by 2002. Average margin expectations followed 
the same pattem over time, peaking at 10.4 percent in 1997, but steadily declining to 3.7 
percent by 2003. In contrast, the mean price-eamings and market-to-book equity ratios 
increased over this time period, peaking in 2002 and 2004, respectively. This evidence 
contradicts any assertion that the sudden rise and decline of equity values was due to inflated 
eamings forecasts prepared by analysts. There seems little question that the equities research 
and investment banking divisions of securities firms lacked independence, given that 10 
brokerage houses were willing to enter into an $875 million settlement with the SEC. But 
there is no evidence that analyst expectations for profitability, taken as a whole, were 
responsible for inflated equity prices. For the broader market at least, analyst eamings 
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forecasts due not support the assertion of Oxley (2002) who commented that, in relation to 
preferred clients involved in the flipping of IPOs, "their profits were gained at the expense of 
the average investor, whose only option was to buy the shares at the inflated aftermarket 
price." 
However, the increase in mean price-eamings and market-to-book ratios does coincide with a 
sustained decline in interest rates. They are also associated with the changing nahire of the 
sample over time, which is characterised by an increase in dispersion of profit margin. In 
2003, the sample standard deviation of the initial margin peaked at 31.7 percent, which was 
8.6 times the sample mean estimate of initial margin in that year (3.7 percent). The changing 
nature of the sample can also explain the gradual increase in the volatility of revenue growth. 
The mean estimate of initial volatility peaks at 24.1 percent in 2003. This was 5.9 times the 
mean estimate of revenue growth in that year (4.1 percent). 
This increase in the volatility of revenue growth can be largely attributed to the Technology, 
Healthcare and Energy sectors, which comprise 30 percent of the sample. They had mean 
initial volatility estimates of 24.8, 19.8 and 26.9 percent, respectively. These sectors can also 
account for the increase in price-eamings and market-to-book ratios over time. Technology 
stocks had a mean price-eamings ratio of 34.3 times and a mean market-to-book ratio of 5.2 
times. 
In sum, the sample is drawn from a period of declining revenue growth and profitability, 
which coincided with a period of declining interest rates and rising equity prices. The 
volatility of initial revenue growth increased during this time due to the increased prominence 
of industries characterised by volatile revenue growth and profitability. 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for 1049 US stocks contained in the S&P500 and NASDAQ indices from 1987 to 
2004. The cost of equity capital (re) is estimated according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model [r^ = r,-+ p (r„, - r^)], where the 
risk-free rate is the yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds, obtained from Datastream; the market risk premium {r,„ - r^ is 
estimated at 6 percent; and the equity beta is estimated according to the procedure documented in Sub-section 3.4. The 
market-to-book equity ratio (M/S) is the ratio of the market price to the book value of equity per share. The price-eamings 
ratio (P/E) is the ratio of the market price to the IBES consensus earnings per share forecast. The market capitalisation 
(MktCap) is the product of the share price and the number of shares on issue as reported by IBES, for consistency with the 
IBES consensus eamings forecast. The initial and long-term growth rates in sales (g„ and g ), profit margins (m„ and Tn ) 
and volatility of sales growth (ff„ and (T ) are also estimated according to procedures documented in Sub-section 3.4. The 
risk-free rate, share price and eamings per share forecast are at 30 April each year. The variables which rely on financial 
statement data (sales growth, profit margin and volatility of sales growth) use the most recent financial statement information 
available prior to 31 December of the previous year. Panel A presents descriptive statistics by cohort year and Panel B 
presents the same statistics by IBES industry sector. 
Panel A 
Year 
Pooled 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Means 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
.• Descriptive statistics by cohort year 
n tf 
summary 
9427 
by year 
270 
280 
289 
312 
326 
340 
342 
362 
378 
390 
583 
630 
684 
739 
776 
859 
942 
925 
524 
384 
242 
Medians by year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
^ 
6.1 
5.7 
1.5 
8.2 
8.9 
9.0 
9.0 
8.0 
7.6 
6.0 
7.0 
7.1 
6.6 
6.7 
5.7 
5.4 
6.2 
5.3 
5.1 
3.9 
4.5 
6.7 
6.7 
1.6 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
P 
12.2 
12.1 
2.6 
14.4 
15.1 
15.3 
15.4 
14.5 
14.1 
12.5 
13.3 
13.2 
12.7 
12.3 
11.2 
11.4 
12.1 
11.3 
11.1 
10.2 
10.8 
12.8 
12.6 
1.7 
14.3 
15.2 
15.4 
15.5 
14.5 
14.1 
12.5 
13.3 
13.3 
12.9 
12.5 
11.4 
11.4 
12.1 
11.0 
10.7 
9.6 
10.3 
12.8 
12.7 
1.8 
1.0 
1.0 
0.5 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.1 
0.1 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
0.9 
0.9 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
1.0 
1.0 
0.1 
M/B 
4.1 
2.5 
18.2 
2.8 
2.3 
2.4 
2.7 
2.9 
3.5 
3.5 
3.3 
3.7 
4.1 
4.4 
5.1 
5.1 
4.6 
4.2 
4.4 
3.3 
5.7 
3.8 
3.6 
1.0 
2.3 
1.9 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.3 
2.8 
2.7 
2.7 
3.1 
2.7 
3.5 
3.0 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.0 
2.7 
2.5 
2.6 
0.4 
P/E 
22.2 
16.2 
42.6 
15.9 
12.2 
12.2 
13.3 
15.9 
18.1 
17.8 
16.6 
16.0 
18.0 
19.1 
23.9 
26,0 
23.7 
25.6 
33.5 
26.1 
26.5 
20.0 
18.0 
5.9 
14.7 
11.5 
11.6 
11.9 
14.2 
15.8 
15.5 
14.8 
13.9 
15.9 
16.1 
20.0 
19.0 
15.2 
17.4 
20.2 
16.6 
19.1 
15.7 
15.6 
2.7 
Cap 
9.3 
2.7 
25.8 
4.4 
3.8 
4.2 
4.5 
5.2 
5.8 
6.2 
6.2 
7.1 
9.1 
7.9 
10.7 
12.9 
13.9 
12.7 
10.8 
8.8 
11.1 
8.1 
7.5 
3.3 
2.2 
2.0 
2.2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.6 
3.2 
3.2 
3.4 
4.3 
2.8 
3.5 
3.3 
2.6 
2.9 
2.2 
1,7 
2,9 
2.7 
2.7 
0.7 
7.6 
7.1 
15.1 
5.8 
10.2 
13.0 
10.8 
8.9 
4.2 
6.4 
5.7 
10.7 
11.2 
9.0 
9.4 
8.1 
8.2 
7.9 
4,1 
4,1 
7.7 
8.1 
8.1 
2.6 
7.4 
10.5 
12.5 
9.1 
8.4 
4.0 
5.3 
5.2 
9.3 
9.9 
8.4 
8.3 
7.4 
7.1 
6.8 
3.6 
4.1 
7.3 
7.5 
7.4 
2.4 
g 
9.2 
9.3 
3.8 
9.0 
9,7 
10.2 
10.4 
9.5 
9.0 
8.0 
8.9 
9,2 
9,0 
9,5 
8.8 
9.0 
9.7 
9.4 
9.3 
8.6 
8.8 
9.2 
9.1 
0.6 
9.1 
9.9 
10,3 
10,2 
9,3 
8,9 
8.3 
8,9 
9,2 
9.0 
9.6 
9.1 
9.5 
10.4 
9.6 
9.5 
8.4 
8.7 
9.3 
9.2 
0.6 
m. 
7.6 
7.1 
19.7 
7.9 
8.0 
7.8 
7.9 
7.7 
8.6 
9.2 
10,3 
9,8 
9,5 
10,4 
8,7 
8,3 
8.6 
7.6 
5,1 
3,7 
5,6 
8.0 
8.2 
1,7 
6,8 
6,5 
6,9 
6,7 
6.6 
7,6 
7.8 
8.8 
8.8 
8.8 
8.5 
7.7 
7.0 
7.2 
6,9 
6,3 
5,8 
6,6 
7.3 
7.0 
0.9 
m 
6,9 
6,4 
2,0 
6,8 
6,8 
6,7 
6.9 
7.1 
7.3 
7.3 
7.3 
7,3 
7,4 
7,1 
7,2 
6,8 
6.8 
6,6 
6,8 
6,7 
6,7 
7.0 
6.9 
0.3 
6.4 
6.4 
6.4 
6.6 
6.6 
6.7 
6.5 
6.4 
6.4 
6.8 
6.5 
6.5 
5.6 
5,7 
5.5 
5.4 
5.4 
5.2 
6.2 
6.4 
0.5 
a„ 
17.7 
12.5 
18,2 
10,8 
12.6 
12.8 
13.0 
12.8 
13.0 
12.9 
13.2 
13.4 
14,0 
14.3 
15.5 
18,2 
18,6 
20,7 
22,6 
24.1 
23.8 
15.9 
13.7 
4,3 
6.0 
8.5 
9,0 
9,4 
9.7 
10.4 
10.3 
10.2 
10.6 
10.5 
10.2 
11.7 
12.4 
12.9 
14.4 
16.3 
17.6 
18.3 
11.6 
10.5 
3.2 
a 
18.8 
17.3 
7.1 
11.4 
12.9 
13.6 
13.1 
12.9 
13.2 
13.1 
13.5 
13.5 
14.0 
15.4 
16.8 
17.6 
18.6 
20.7 
25.2 
26,8 
27,4 
16.6 
13.8 
5.1 
11.7 
13.0 
13.5 
13.3 
13.2 
13.3 
13.3 
13.7 
13.4 
14.2 
16.1 
16.7 
17.0 
16.8 
18.8 
26.1 
25.6 
27.0 
16.5 
13.9 
4.9 
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics by cohort year (continued) 
Year « r, 
Standard deviations bv year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— — 
— 
— 
r. 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
2.4 
2.5 
3.0 
2.7 
1.8 
1.5 
0.5 
P 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.8 
0.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.1 
M « 
1.7 
1.3 
1.5 
4.4 
2.7 
5.7 
2.9 
2.4 
4.6 
4.9 
15.3 
7.1 
8.5 
6.2 
7.2 
11.8 
6.6 
53.3 
8.2 
5.3 
11.8 
P/E MktCap 
9.8 
5.2 
4.9 
12.9 
7.7 
13.1 
9.3 
8.4 
10.2 
9.6 
18.5 
21.4 
44.4 
34.3 
51.7 
94.4 
53.7 
47.3 
25.4 
13.0 
24.2 
8.4 
6.7 
7.0 
7.7 
9.2 
10.1 
9.6 
9.6 
11.4 
14.6 
18.3 
24.4 
33.6 
43,4 
36,1 
29,3 
25,3 
29.2 
18.6 
13.0 
11.7 
g. 
21,4 
13,6 
13.4 
12.5 
10.3 
14,9 
13,3 
14,9 
14.0 
16.6 
15,6 
15,1 
16.2 
14.8 
16.1 
15.0 
14.1 
14.0 
14,8 
14.9 
2.2 
g 
4,1 
4,4 
4.2 
4,4 
4,2 
4,4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.7 
3.4 
3.2 
3.0 
3.6 
3.7 
3.6 
4.0 
4.0 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
0.4 
m. 
5.7 
5.6 
4.8 
5.8 
5.8 
6.2 
6.4 
7.6 
6.7 
20.9 
13.0 
19.0 
13.1 
16.1 
23.0 
30.7 
31.7 
23.8 
13.7 
10.3 
9.1 
m 
1.9 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.9 
1,8 
1.7 
1.8 
2.0 
1.9 
1,9 
2,1 
2,0 
2,1 
2,0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.9 
1.9 
0.1 
ff. 
14.3 
12.5 
11.5 
10,6 
9,8 
9.3 
9.1 
9.3 
12.3 
12.3 
15.2 
14.2 
22.1 
18,7 
22.4 
21.9 
22.5 
20.4 
14.9 
13.4 
5.1 
a 
4,6 
4.5 
4.1 
3.8 
3.6 
3.3 
2.9 
2.7 
2,8 
3.0 
3,4 
4.3 
44 
5.1 
4.6 
5,4 
5.5 
5.5 
4.1 
4.2 
0.91 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
Year 
Pooled summary 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
n 
9427 
by IBES industry 
r, 
6.1 
5,7 
1,5 
Means bv IBES industry sector 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumernon-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
680 
901 
514 
868 
1662 
499 
1090 
1145 
1208 
148 
712 
857 
868 
414 
6,3 
6.0 
6.1 
6.3 
5.9 
6.0 
6.3 
5.7 
6.0 
6.6 
6.5 
6.2 
6.1 
0.3 
Medians by IBES industry sector 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Standard deviation 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
... 
— 
._ 
— 
— 
... 
... 
... 
— 
~ 
... 
... 
— 
— 
6.2 
5.7 
5.7 
6.0 
5.4 
5.7 
6.2 
5.4 
5.7 
6.6 
6.2 
5.9 
5,7 
0.4 
r. 
12,2 
12,1 
2,6 
12.3 
12.0 
12.3 
12.1 
12.3 
11.3 
12.4 
11.7 
13.5 
12.9 
10.7 
12.1 
12.3 
0.7 
12.2 
11.8 
12.3 
12.2 
12.1 
11.1 
12.3 
11.5 
13.2 
13.1 
10.6 
12.0 
12,2 
0.8 
by IBES industry sector 
... 
— 
... 
— 
... 
— 
~ 
~ 
— 
... 
— 
— 
... 
— 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1,5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
0.1 
2,3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.4 
2.7 
2.5 
2.3 
2.6 
2.8 
1,9 
2,0 
2,4 
2.4 
0.3 
' sector 
P 
1,0 
1,0 
0,5 
1,0 
1,0 
1,0 
1.0 
1.1 
0.8 
1.0 
1.0 
1.4 
1.1 
0.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.2 
1.1 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
1.1 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
1,3 
1,1 
0,5 
1,0 
1,0 
0,2 
0,4 
0.4 
0,4 
0.4 
0,5 
0,5 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
0.2 
0.3 
0,4 
0.4 
0.1 
M/B 
4,1 
2,5 
18,2 
2,9 
3.0 
3.4 
6.0 
5.4 
2.4 
2.7 
5.3 
5,2 
2,1 
1,9 
3,7 
3,0 
1.5 
2.1 
2.5 
2.1 
3.6 
2.9 
2,1 
2,1 
3,5 
3.4 
1.9 
1.7 
2.5 
2.1 
0.7 
5.4 
2.6 
9.1 
11.7 
41.1 
1.3 
2.0 
7.9 
6.4 
1.0 
1.1 
8.2 
5.4 
11.5 
P/E 
22.2 
16.2 
42.6 
19.5 
19.6 
15.0 
18.2 
25.0 
23.9 
13.7 
30.1 
34.3 
14.9 
14.7 
20.8 
19,5 
6,8 
16.2 
15.5 
13.3 
16.4 
18.2 
17.9 
12.4 
20.5 
24.0 
13.5 
12.3 
16,4 
16,2 
3.6 
19,4 
39,6 
9,0 
14,1 
58,6 
21,1 
6.1 
59.4 
55.6 
6.5 
43.1 
30.2 
21,1 
21,5 
Mkt 
Cap 
9,3 
2,7 
25,8 
5,0 
9,1 
3,7 
10.6 
6.6 
10.4 
12.7 
10.1 
12.7 
7.1 
9.3 
8.8 
9.3 
2.9 
2.6 
2.2 
1.7 
3.4 
1,7 
3.0 
5.3 
1.2 
2.0 
5.5 
5.0 
3.0 
2.6 
1,6 
8,4 
34.8 
7.0 
21.6 
18.2 
31.9 
24.9 
26.8 
39.5 
5.8 
16.7 
21.4 
21.6 
11.4 
gn 
7,6 
7,1 
15,1 
5,1 
6.4 
5.9 
7.2 
8.9 
5.9 
3.4 
12.9 
12.1 
5.2 
2.4 
6.9 
5.9 
3.3 
4.6 
5.4 
5.3 
6.3 
8.5 
6.4 
5.2 
10.9 
10.5 
5.8 
3.1 
6.5 
5.8 
2.4 
12.2 
13.6 
12.1 
10.2 
12.6 
21.5 
17.1 
17.1 
15.3 
10.8 
15.1 
14.3 
13.6 
3.3 
g 
9.2 
9.3 
3.8 
8.1 
8.9 
9.0 
8.1 
10.3 
7.4 
8.4 
10.1 
12.6 
9.4 
4.3 
8.8 
8.9 
2.0 
8.3 
9.0 
9.3 
7.8 
10,2 
7,9 
8,3 
9.9 
12.6 
9.5 
3.6 
8.8 
9.0 
2.2 
3.4 
3.0 
3,2 
3.2 
3.2 
4.2 
3.1 
3.2 
3.4 
2.9 
3.1 
3.3 
3,2 
0,4 
m„ 
7,6 
7,1 
19,7 
6.9 
5.7 
5.2 
8,1 
5,2 
5,7 
16,8 
2,1 
9,2 
6.7 
10,3 
7,5 
6,7 
3,8 
6,2 
5,8 
4.8 
7.0 
4.7 
6.5 
13.0 
9.4 
8.1 
6.3 
10.5 
7.5 
6.5 
2.6 
4.9 
8.0 
5.4 
6.1 
8.2 
37.2 
13.1 
44.0 
11.1 
4.3 
4.8 
13,4 
8,0 
13,8 
m 
6.9 
6.4 
2.0 
5.6 
5.1 
5.1 
6.5 
5.5 
5.7 
9.2 
6.6 
8.7 
6.7 
10.8 
6.8 
6.5 
1.9 
5.6 
5.1 
5.1 
6.5 
5.2 
5.0 
9.9 
6.5 
9.0 
6.8 
10.7 
6.9 
6.5 
2.1 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.6 
0.6 
1.2 
1.4 
1.3 
0.6 
0.3 
0.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
a. 
17.7 
12.5 
18.2 
15.4 
18.2 
13.6 
13.7 
16.5 
26.9 
16.6 
24.8 
19.8 
10.8 
12.4 
17.1 
16.5 
5.0 
11.3 
13.7 
11.5 
10.7 
9.6 
23.3 
12.4 
17.0 
16.0 
10.9 
7.8 
13.1 
11.5 
4.3 
16.7 
15.6 
8.9 
11.7 
21.2 
16,5 
13,2 
26.9 
16.9 
4.8 
13.8 
15 1 
15.6 
.«5Q 
a 
18.8 
17,3 
7.1 
14.9 
18.3 
14.8 
14.6 
19.4 
26.7 
16.6 
26.9 
20.7 
11.5 
12.6 
17.9 
16.6 
5.2 
12.7 
18.1 
13.0 
11,9 
18,8 
26,4 
14,3 
28.9 
17.0 
11.0 
8.4 
16.4 
14.3 
6.4 
3.8 
2.8 
3.5 
3,7 
5,9 
4.7 
3.8 
8,5 
6.7 
1.9 
6,5 
4 7 
3,8 
on 
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4.2 Preliminary evidence that embedded options are valued by the market 
This section presents preliminary evidence that an economically meaningfiil proportion of 
equity value is comprised of embedded options. 1 measure the association between equity 
prices and the present value of a perpetuity stream of sustainable eamings, estimated as the 
product of sustainable margin and sales per share with both variables scaled by book value. 
The evidence is consistent with high-growth, high-volatility sectors trading at a price-to-book 
ratio which incorporates a growth premium. But these sectors also have a higher proportion of 
their market-to-book ratio which is not explained by the present value of sustainable eamings. 
Further, this unexplained portion of the market-to-book ratio is positively associated with the 
volatility of revenue growth, which is what we would expect to observe if embedded options 
are valued by the market. In sum, there is prima facie evidence that market prices incorporate 
some estimate of options value. 
The estimation procedure relies upon the premise that market prices contain information 
about the appropriate competitive advantage period, with higher prices signalling that the 
market expects the firm to report abnormal revenue growth or margins for a longer period of 
time. Using linear regression, 1 estimate the DCF and embedded option components of equity 
value, as a multiple of book value of equity per share, on a time-period and industry-specific 
basis. 
This technique is consistent with that used to simultaneously estimate growth and the cost of 
equity capital of US-listed firms from 1981-1998 (Easton, Taylor, Shroff and Sougiannis, 
2002). In their regression, the price-book ratio was the independent variable and the 
dependent variable was the firm's aggregate four-year eamings, presented as: 
^ = r . + r , ^ + ^ . . (2-59) 
where: 
XjcT = aggregate four year cum-dividend eamings for firmy; 
Bj = book value per share for firmy; and 
Pj,o = share price of firmy. 
Easton et al (2002) interpret yo as the expected four-year growth in residual income and yo + 
yi as the expected four-year rate of retum. In other words, they interpret the intercept term as 
the component of the four-year retum attributable to growth and the coefficient on the price-
book ratio as the component of retum attributable to eamings from existing assets. But the 
Easton et al model assumes that share price makes no allowance for the value of embedded 
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options. If embedded options are valuable, then the intercept term can be interpreted as the 
sum of the expected four year growth in residual income plus the expected retum from the 
exercise of embedded options. The model above is fiuther limited by the need for ciunulative 
four-year earnings to be positive. Negative eamings make this equation nonsensical. 
In the model presented below, the price-book ratio is a component of the dependent variable. 
The independent variable represents the present value of eamings after the explicit forecast 
period under the assumption that the firm has already achieved steady state. I interpret the 
intercept term as the market-implied value of embedded options, as a multiple of book value; 
and the beta coefficient as a multiple of book value which is contingent upon revenue growth 
and the competitive advantage period. 
The values of both these estimates have clear economic meaning for market participants 
making an assessment of whether the market is mispriced. For example, if the value of 
embedded options in an industry is unreasonably high, perhaps in comparison to historical 
data, this suggests that the market is overly-optimistic about the prospects of successful 
expansion plans or commercialisation of new products. In another example, investors could 
determine the set of revenue growth and CAP parameters which would be required to justify a 
given multiple. The reasonableness of these estimates could be evaluated with reference to 
historical data. The regression model is derived as follows. 
1 assume that the value of equity is the sum of the present value of expected dividends, plus 
some option value, where the present value of expected dividends is estimated using Equation 
2.1. This implies that: 
Equity value = Option value -i- DCF value 
= Option value 
, f PimjSi (2.60) 
„.r-, ¥ + e-'^'~"\m„ - m)]cxv\g{T -1) + (g„ - g)"t'e^f'-) 
i=n+[ 
/=n+i e ' 
n+T 
exp 
+ mS.— 
gT + {g„-g)i:e-^^^-"^ 
i=n+[ 
The last two terms of the equation can be factorised using the factor — . This factor 
represents the present value of perpetual cash flows in the case where the firm reaches its 
steady state by the end of the explicit forecast period. After factorising the last two terms of 
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the above equation and subtracting the present value of expected dividends from the explicit 
forecast period from both sides of the equation, we have (2.61): 
Equity value - ^  J. ' = Option value 
n+r-i 
=1 e 
mS„e^ 
re-
l + e -«f(;-n) 
/ ^
_ 1 
m 
exp 
+T-] 
I ' 
/ = «+] 
g{T-2) + {g„-g)Ye-''^^-"^-rXi-n) 
+ exp ( g - r J r - l ) + ( g „ - g ) S e - ( ' - " 
n+T 
i=n+l 
The equation above expresses equity value per share as the sum of the value of expected 
dividends during the explicit forecast period, the value of expected dividends after the explicit 
ftiS e^ 
forecast period (as a multiple of — ) and an estimated option value. I then divide both 
sides of the equation by the book value of equity per share. Dividing this equation by book 
value of equity per share allows me to estimate the market-implied value of embedded options 
as a multiple of book value per share. I selected book value of equity per share as the 
appropriate scaling factor, because it represents an estimate of the historical cost of the firm's 
existing equity. The use of a scaling factor from the income statements assumes that the value 
of embedded options is associated with some current level of sales or eamings. But sales and 
eamings are the current payoffs from previous investments. It is more likely that option value 
is associated with the amount of equity previously invested in the firm, which is the cost of 
purchasing the embedded options. Thus, the equation is (2.62): 
P r i c e - t ^ i ^ ^ 
~^ e'''' _ Option value 
Book value Book value 
mS„e^ 
+ • 
r„e' 
Book value 
n+T-l 
PT 
i=n+\ 
-t-exp 
\ + e -K(i-n] exp g ( r - 2 ) + ( g „ - g ) Z e- r(i-n) . ( / -« ) 
{g-rjT-l) + {g„-g)"te-^^'-"^ 
I then mn the following regression on data for each year and IBES industry group in order to 
estimate two parameters - the option value per dollar of book value, and a multiple of 
mS e^ 
7 ^ , which is a fiinction of growth, profit margin, the cost of equity, and the remainder of 
r^e' 
the competitive advantage period. The regression model is: 
" Pijm, ,5 . 
P r i ce , -Y^^ ' ^ " •'' 
Book value, 
^jS.,/' 
= a + P ^ej^ 
jn 
Book value. 
(2.63) 
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where: 
Price, = share price of firmy; and 
Book value, = book value of equity per share for firmy. 
The observations are weighted by market capitalisation in order to mitigate against the impact 
of firms with very low reported book values, and correspondingly very high price-to-book 
ratios, which are more likely to be in error. This is done because the impact on the regression 
of very low versus very high book values is asymmetric. A firm with an unusually low 
reported book value has more potential to become a significant observation when the 
regression line is fitted, given that it has the potential to lie a material distance away from the 
other points. Further, when these observations were given equal weight in the regression, this 
influence was apparent via significant increases in the intercept term and reduced explanatory 
power. Thus, the weighting scheme mitigates against the argument that equity prices 
incorporate some value for embedded options. 
An altemative is to weight fums by their book value of equity. But the result of this weighting 
by book value is to place greater weight on firms whose value is comprised by a higher 
proportion of tangible assets. This is not the intention of the weighting scheme, which is 
simply to reduce the impact of influential observations with an above-average risk of 
misstatement. The assumption employed is that this risk is reduced the larger the size of the 
firm. As with the unweighted case, when the regression was performed after weighting by 
book value of equity, intercepts typically increased and explanatory power was reduced. This 
is consistent with the price-to-book ratio having a closer relationship with the value of 
sustainable eamings for larger firms, compared to smaller firms. 
The results of this regression model, mn on a time-period and industry-specific basis, are 
presented in Table 2.2.1 interpret the intercept term as an estimate of option value per dollar 
of book value, and ,5 as a factor which encompasses the market's expectations for margin 
growth, revenue growth, the cost of equity capital, reinvestment policy and the competitive 
advantage period. Figure 2.5, Panel A presents the mean annual coefficients by industry for 
the regressions in which the adjusted-R^ is at least 10 percent. Note that in the case of 
weighted least squares regression, this statistic is not bounded in the range of 0 to 1. So we 
cannot interpret this statistic as the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the independent variables. However, this cutoff is simply used to limit the 
conclusions drawn from regressions whose explanatory power is particularly poor. The radius 
of the points in the figure is equal to the standard error of the coefficients, which provides a 
visual representation of the uncertainty surrounding these estimates. 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Figure 2.5 
Estimated option value and market-implied valuation multiples by IBES industry sector 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the mean annual intercept terms and beta coefficients from the regression analysis summarised in Table 
2.2. In computing these means, I exclude regressions in which the adjusted-R^ is less than 10 percent. Mean intercept terms 
are presented on the horizontal axis and mean beta coefficients are presented on the vertical axis. The radius of the points is 
equal to the standard error of the beta coefficient. Panel B presents comparable results from regression analysis in which the 
intercept term was constrained to equal zero. Values along the horizontal axis are equal to zero. The chart is displayed in this 
format so that the y-axis data can be directly compared to the chart above. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-
2004, which represents 1049 individual firms. 
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Theoretically, the beta coefficient is primarily a function of growth expectations, while the 
intercept term is an estimate of the option value per dollar of book value. A comparison of 
Figure 2.5, Panel A with the industry descriptive statistics suggests that the coefficients do 
capture these economic constructs. I grouped the sample into four clusters, based on the 
industry mean estimates for initial revenue growth and the initial volatility of revenue-growth. 
These clusters were: 
1. High-growth, high volatility sectors - Technology and Healthcare; 
2. High-growth, low-volatility sectors - Consumer services and consumer non-durables; 
3. Low-growth, high volatility sectors - Capital goods, Energy and Finance; and 
4. Low-growth, low volatility sectors - Consumer durables. Transport, Basic industries and 
Utilities. 
I then compared the mean intercept terms and beta coefficients from the regression analysis 
amongst these clusters, weighted by firm-year. The results, presented in Table 2.3, suggest 
there is an association between expected revenue growth and the beta coefficient, as well as 
an association between volatility of revenue growth and the intercept term. The mean beta 
coefficient for the high-growth firms is 1.4, compared to the mean of 0.4 for the low-growth 
firms; and the mean intercept term for the high-volatility firms of 2.6 is greater than the mean 
intercept term of 2.1 for the low volatility firms. In addition, high-growth firms also have high 
intercept terms, as the level of growth and its expected volatility are positively correlated. 
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Table 2.3 
Revenue growth and volatility parameters compared to estimated option value per dollar of book value 
and the multiple of the present value of sustainable earnings 
1 partitioned the 11 IBES industry sectors into two roughly equal-sized groups according to their firm-year weighted initial 
growth estimates. Then, 1 partitioned each of those two groups into two roughly equal-sized groups based on their initial 
volatility estimates. Hence, there are four approximately equal-sized groups partitioned according to growth and volatility. 
For each group, I computed the firm-year weighted intercept term and beta coefficients from the annual results of the 
regression model presented as Equation 2.63. These results only include those cases in which the adjusted-R^ was at least 10 
percent. These results are presented in columns 7-8. In column 9, 1 present the results of the same analysis in which the 
intercept term was constrained to equal zero. The data is comprised of 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, attributable to 1049 
individual firms. 
Industry cluster 
1. High-growth, high-volatility 
(Technology, Healthcare) 
2. High-growth, low volatility 
(Consumer services, consumer non-dur) 
3. Low-growth, high volatility 
(Capital goods, Energy, Finance) 
4. Low-growth, low volatility 
(Consumer dur, Transport, Basic, Utilities) 
High-growth 
Low-growth 
High-volatility 
Low-volatlllty 
N 
2353 
2530 
2490 
2054 
4883 
4544 
4843 
4584 
Initial 
growth 
12.5 
8.3 
5.0 
4.4 
10.3 
4.7 
8.6 
6.5 
Long-
term 
growth 
11.4 
9.5 
8.4 
7.1 
10.4 
7.8 
9.8 
8.5 
Initial 
vol 
22.2 
15.5 
19.2 
13.6 
18,8 
16.7 
20.7 
14.7 
Long-
term vol 
23.7 
17.8 
19.2 
13.8 
20.6 
16.8 
21.4 
16.0 
Inter-
cept 
3.3 
2,7 
1,9 
1.5 
3.0 
1.7 
2.6 
2.1 
Beta 
1.3 
1.5 
0.1 
0.7 
1.4 
0.4 
0.7 
1.1 
Beta 
(lnt=0) 
3.0 
2.1 
1.9 
1.5 
2.5 
1.7 
2.4 
1.8 
I repeated this analysis after suppressing the intercept term in the regression. This allows a 
comparison of beta coefficients under the assumption that the market places zero value on 
embedded options, which is the assumption underlying DCF valuation models. I performed 
this analysis because of the low explanatory power of several of the regressions, as well as the 
number of cases in which the estimated beta coefficient was significantly less than one. It 
seems unreasonable to think that the market would value sustainable eamings at less than 
their value into perpetuity. So, perhaps the intercept terms from the original analysis do not 
capture any option value, and are simply the result of a poorly-fitted regression model. These 
beta coefficients are presented in Panel B of Figure 2.5. Their firm-year weighted means are 
presented in the final column of Table 2.3. 
We observe a similar association between growth prospects and the beta coefficient when the 
intercept is constrained to equal zero. High-growth industries have a mean estimate of 2.5, 
compared to 1.7 for low-growth industries. But we also see a positive association between the 
beta coefficient and the volatility of revenue growth. If stocks are priced entirely as the 
present value of expected fiiture cash flows, we would not expect to see this association. If the 
volatility of revenue growth is positively associated with the cost of equity capital, we would 
expect to see the opposite resuh - more volatile stocks would trade on lower multiples. 
In sum, there is evidence to support the premise that stock prices incorporate some option 
value, in addition to their discounted cash flow valuations. Market-to-book equity ratios are 
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positively associated with the present value of a perpetuity stream of sustainable eamings, and 
this association is strongest for high-growth industries. But the unexplained component of the 
market-to-book equity ratio is associated with the volatility of revenue growth. Further, when 
this unexplained term is constrained to equal zero, there in a positive association between the 
market-to-book equity ratio and the initial volatility of revenue growth. 
This is contrary to what would be expected if value was entirely due to the present value of 
expected future cash flows. In that case, volatility would have a non-negative impact on the 
cost of capital, so there would be a zero or inverse relationship between volatility and the 
market-to-book ratio. However, in a real options framework, volatility has a positive impact 
on value, which is consistent with the data. 
4.3 Relationship between valuations and market prices 
Before evaluating portfolio performance, I discuss the relationship between model prices and 
market prices, particularly the impact of industry differences and the assumption of the 
competitive advantage period. As discussed in Section 2, there is every reason to expect 
market prices to diverge significantly from model prices. Parameter estimates which can be 
used to justify share prices at a given point in time will be highly volatile. But parameter 
estimates made independently of share price will, by construction, be relatively more stable. 
For example, the IBES consensus forecast that we observe at any point in time is an average 
of estimates which are entered into the database over some preceding period. So the initial 
estimates for revenue growth and margin are akin to a moving average of unobservable point-
in-time forecasts. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to assess the impact of changing parameter estimates on model 
valuations, and determine ranges of estimates which justify share prices. This provides an 
indication of whether, in practice, parameter estimates can be made with enough certainty to 
be relied upon. Tables 2.4 to 2.7 present the results of a detailed analysis of the association 
between market prices and valuations. The analysis is presented for the pooled sample, by 
cohort year and by IBES industry sector. I discuss the salient features of this data with 
reference to both the level and dispersion of model prices. I also discuss the estimated 
percentage of equity value attributed to real options, which I refer to as Real option%. 
Model prices from my study can be compared with those of Bradshaw (2004). He performed 
residual income valuations on 4421 firms using information available at the start of each 
month from 1994-1998. This resulted in 46,209 valuations. Recall that my sample consists of 
9,427 valuations on 1049 firms, using information available at 30 April each year from 1987-
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2004. 2343 of these valuations are drawn from the period which overlaps with Bradshaw. He 
computed residual income valuations under two altemative assumptions. First, he assumed 
that residual income declines to zero according to an industry-specific fade-rate. This is 
analogous to my assumption that revenue growth and margins revert to long-term expected 
values over time. In addition, his assumed rate of decline in residual income approximates my 
assumption that the competitive advantage period is in the range of 10-30 years. His second 
version of the residual income model assumed that residual income at the end of the explicit 
forecast period was maintained into perpetuity. This is equivalent to the assumption that, in 
the terminal state, the firm is able to eam above-average retums into perpetuity. 
Comparing the value/price estimates for 1994-1998, we see that Bradshaw's median 
value/price ratio of 0.59 is broadly comparable to my median estimates from the DCF 
valuations of 0.47 - 0.54. The difference can be largely attributable to my higher median cost 
of equity assumption (13 percent versus 11 percent). However, my estimates exhibit more 
dispersion. This is to be expected, given that my valuations incorporate the mean reversion of 
two parameter estimates. This means that the standard error associated with an intrinsic value 
estimate will aggregate the error in individual parameter estimates. 
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Table 2.4 
Valuation relative to price 
This table compares value/price ratios from my study with those of Bradshaw (2004). He performed residual income 
valuations on 44^1 firms using information available at the start of each month from 1994-1998. This resulted in 46,209 
valuations. My sample consists of 9,427 valuations on 1049 firms, using information available at 30 April each year from 
1987-7004 2343 of these valuations are drawn from the period which overlaps with Bradshaw. Bradshaw computed residual 
income valuations under two alternative assumptions: (1) residual income declines to zero; and (2) residual income at the 
end of the explicit forecast period is maintained into perpetuity. The first section of the table summarises Bradshaw's 
findings The second and third sections summarise my value/price ratios under two valuation models {DCF and Decision-
tree) and three assumptions regarding the competitive advantage period (10, 20 or 30 years). I present data for the full 
sample as well as for the sub-sample from 1994-1998, the time period to which Bradshaw's valuations relate. The fmal two 
sections of the table summarise my value/price ratios according to IBES industries, under the assumption that the competitive 
advantage period is 30 years. 
Bradshaw (2004): 1994-1998 
Residual Income value/price (residual Income declines to zero) 
Residual income/price (perpetual growth) 
Cost of equity 
Market capitalisation ($m) 
Book-to-market ratio 
Hall (2005): 1994-1998 
DCF/price (CAP=10) 
OCF/price (CAP=20) 
DCF/price (CAP=30) 
DTV/price(CAP=10) 
DTV/price (CAP=20) 
DTV/price (CAP=30) 
Cost of equity 
Market capitalisation ($m) 
Book-to-market ratio 
Hall (2005): 1987-2004 
DCF/price (CAP=10) 
DCF/price (CAP=20) 
DCF/price (CAP=30) 
DTV/price (CAP=10) 
DTV/price (CAP=20) 
DTV/price (CAP=30) 
Cost of equity 
Market capitalisation 
Book-to-market ratio 
Hall (2005) 
Hall (2005): 1987-2004 DCF/price (CAP=30) 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-durables 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Hall (2005): 1987-2004 DTV/price (CAP=30) 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-durables 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
0.67 
0.96 
0.11 
3,763 
0.46 
0.71 
0.80 
0.93 
0.77 
1,00 
1,45 
0,12 
8,477 
0.40 
0.78 
0.84 
0.94 
0.89 
1.22 
1.99 
0.12 
9,250 
0.48 
0.85 
0.90 
1.15 
0.89 
1.08 
0.98 
0.82 
0.80 
0,83 
0,96 
Standard 
deviation 
0.48 
0.73 
0.04 
10,125 
0.28 
0.83 
1.05 
1.55 
0.93 
1.48 
3.07 
0,02 
17,811 
0,29 
1,01 
1.16 
1,61 
1,17 
1,88 
5.43 
0.03 
25,814 
0.39 
1.31 
1,28 
1.84 
1.14 
1,76 
2,08 
1.17 
1.67 
1.51 
0.96 
Median 
0.59 
0.77 
0.11 
874 
0.41 
0.47 
0,50 
0.54 
0.51 
0.60 
0.71 
0.13 
3,378 
0,34 
0,49 
0,52 
0.54 
0.55 
0.67 
0.85 
0.12 
2,727 
0.39 
0.53 
0.50 
0.73 
0.55 
0,58 
0,40 
0.49 
0,36 
0,44 
0.59 
1,44 
1,68 
1,69 
1.34 
2.40 
2.93 
1.19 
3.24 
1.85 
1,24 
1,98 
3.59 
3.27 
2.77 
1.96 
7,81 
7,54 
1,88 
7,98 
4,00 
1,28 
5,63 
0,70 
0,79 
1.00 
0,73 
1.03 
0.97 
0,65 
0.89 
0.84 
0.73 
1.04 
Now consider Bradshaw's valuations under the assumption that residual income at the end of 
the explicit forecast period continues into perpetuity. In this instance, the median value/price 
ratio reaches 0.77 and the mean estimate is 0.96. Therefore, in the event that firms can make 
investments which perpetually eam above their cost of capital, the median value/price ratio 
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increases by 31 percent. Co-incidentally, this is exactly the same increase in the median 
value/price ratio that occurs when I estimate Decision-tree valuations instead of DCF 
valuations, under an assumed CAP of 30 years. In this instance the median value/price ratio 
increases from 0.54 to 0.71. There are four altemative explanations for this result: 
1. Equity investors incorporate some estimate of value for embedded options, therefore 
pricing stocks at a premium to their DCF value. 
2. The economic argument that long-term expected returns on investment equal the cost of 
capital is wrong, and firms are able to persistently eam abnormal retums. This is contrary 
to the evidence of Bradshaw (2004) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) who document 
the diminishing residual income of listed firms over time. 
3. The equity market persistently over-estimates the growth prospects of listed firms. At first 
glance this appears consistent with the outperformance of value stocks relative to growth 
stocks. However, DCF valuations do not approach market prices, even for value stocks. If 
market prices consistently exceeded DCF valuations because of investors extrapolating 
past growth too far into the fiiture, we would observe Z)CF valuations of value stocks 
approaching market prices. 
4. The cost of equity capital is significantly lower than the values assumed in deriving the 
valuations presented above. This argument was made by Fama and French (2002) and 
Claus and Thomas (2001) with reference to actual growth rates and those expected by 
equity analysts, and finds theoretical support from Mehra and Prescott (1985). The two 
empirical papers made estimates of the equity risk premium in the range of 3-4 percent. 
For comparison purposes, I computed the default risk premium on the Lehman Brothers 
BB-rated bond index, relative to 10-year US Treasuries. Using annual redemption yields 
from April 1990 to April 2004,1 estimated this spread at 3.16 percent. Now say we 
compute expected retums, rather than the yield differential, by allowing for a default rate 
of 1.21 percent and a recovery rate of 39.05 percent (Elton, Gmber, Agrawal and Mann, 
2001). In this instance, the expected retum differential is 2.31 percent. It seems 
implausible that equity investors now require a risk premium only marginally above BB-
rated bonds, when compared to historical data. 
The evidence presented in Table 2.4 cannot directly counter explanations 2-4 above. But it 
does provide additional support for research into valuation techniques which estimate the 
value of embedded options. 
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In Tables 2.5 and 2.6,1 present fiirther detailed statistics on DCF valuations relative to price 
{DCF/P) and Decision-tree valuations relative to price {DTV/P). Both DCF and Decision-tree 
valuations can reach extreme levels at the upper and lower end so I am primarily concemed 
with median ratios. Referring to Panel C of Table 2.6, we see there is little indushy difference 
in the median DTV/price ratio. Six IBES industry sectors have a median DTV/price ratio in 
the range of 0.80-1.04 (Consumer durables, Consumer services. Energy, Healthcare, 
Technology and Utilities). Another four IBES industry sectors have median DTV/price ratios 
from 0.70-0.79 (Basic industries, Capital goods. Consumer non-durables and Transport). 
However, the median DCF/price ratio shows significant dispersion amongst industry sectors. 
Across the 11 sectors, the standard deviation of the median value/price ratios is similar (0.15 
for DCF/price and 0.14 for DTV/price). But, when compared to the mean estimates of 0.55 
and 0.85, we see that the coefficient of variation is 0.27 for DCF valuations and 0.17 for 
Decision-tree valuations. Interestingly, the three sectors with the lowest DCF/price ratios 
were classified as high-volatility sectors in the analysis presented in Sub-section 4.2 
(Healthcare, Energy and Technology). These sectors had median Decision-tree value/price 
ratios in the range of 0.84-0.97. This provides support for theory underlying real options 
analysis, that volatility is positively associated with value. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 also present four other statistics which provide usefiil information 
regarding the impact of using Decision-tree valuations in practice. In column 8 I provide 
descriptive statistics on Real option%, which is equal to the proportion of the Decision-tree 
valuation which exceeds the DCF valuation. I interpret this variable to be the percentage of 
equity value attributable to real options. In the study presented in Chapter 3 I use this variable 
to explain IPO underpricing, arguing that it is a proxy for information asymmetry amongst 
investors, and between issuers and investors. The median estimate for Real option% increases 
from 11 to 32 percent as the competitive advantage period increases from 10 to 30 years. 
In columns 9-14 I provide additional descriptive statistics relating to the dispersion of model 
valuations relative to market prices. I compute the squared percentage error {SPE) and the 
absolute percentage error {APE) as follows: 
SPE = 
\ 
Value - Priced 
Price 
2 
(2.64) APE = Value - Price 
Price 
(2.65) 
In computing the summary statistics relating to the squared percentage error I compute the 
square root of these statistics, so their magnitude can be compared to those relating to the 
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absolute percentage error. For example, I compute the square root of the mean squared 
percentage error as: 
SMSPE^,\f[^^^i^^^^^^^ 
\ t rV Price } 
for n firms in the particular sub-sample. 
I also computed the percentage of valuations which were within 30 percent of share price. 
Summary statistics referring to this calculation are presented in the final two columns. In 
Table 2.7,1 present this information on a year-by-year basis for the Technology and 
Healthcare sectors. 
A number of conclusions can be reached. First, increasing the assumed competitive advantage 
period increases the dispersion of value relative to price. But this increase is confined to the 
more extreme observations. For the Decision-tree valuation model, the median absolute 
percentage error is 56-58 percent for all three assumptions and slightly lower than the 59-60 
percent reported for DCF valuations. Second, the assumed competitive advantage period 
which provides a close match between theoretical value and price varies across time periods 
and industries. I do not draw broad conclusions from this data as it is not my intention to fit 
model valuations to market prices. However, it is interesting to observe the following for the 
Technology and Healthcare sectors: 
• In April 1999, the median absolute percentage error for the Technology sector was 57 
percent when a Decision-tree valuation was performed, and that valuation assumed a 
competitive advantage period of 30 years. A DCF valuation, or a shorter assumed 
competitive advantage period, would have increased the median percentage error to 72 
percent. 
• In April 2003, the median absolute percentage error for the Healthcare sector was 97 
percent under the same valuation assumptions, but would have been reduced to 64 percent 
with a decrease in the assumed CAP to 20 years. 
In the modelling which underlies the Chapter 3 analysis, I estimate Real option% under the 
CAP assumption which minimises the difference between market prices of IPOs and 
Decision-tree values. For the purposes of this Chapter, I simply note there are likely to be 
significant differences in the appropriate CAP to be used in practice, given the sensitivity of 
valuation to this assumption. 
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Table 2.5 
Model fit analysis by cohort year 
Table 2.5 summaries the relationship between Discounted Cash Flow, Decision-tree valuations and market prices as at 30 
April of each year. Columns 2-4 of each panel summarise prices, DCF valuations and Decision-tree valuations. Columns 5-7 
summarise the relationship between these valuations, via computations of Z)CF value relative to price (DCF/P), Decision-tree 
value relative to price (DTV/P) and Real option% (1 - DCF value/DrF), Columns 8-13 present statistics which summarise 
the variance between model valuations and market prices. For the two valuation methods (DCF and DTV) I compute the 
squared percentage error (SPE), the absolute percentage error (APE) and the percentage of valuations within 30 percent of the 
market price. The definitions of these statistics are presented in Sub-section 4.3. Panels A, B and C present the analysis under 
the assumptions that the competitive advantage period is 10, 20 or 30 years, respectively. 
Panel A: Competitive advantage period = 10 years 
Cohort year N 
Pooled summary 
Mean(sum n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means bv year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
9427 
— 
270 
280 
289 
312 
326 
340 
342 
362 
378 
390 
583 
630 
684 
739 
776 
859 
942 
925 
524 
384 
242 
Medians bv vear 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
P 
21.81 
17.50 
16.90 
12.12 
10.99 
12.11 
11.85 
13.03 
14.70 
16.52 
16.53 
17.76 
21.98 
20.49 
27.00 
26.61 
26.31 
26.63 
25.99 
20.93 
28.72 
19.46 
19.13 
6.26 
9.90 
8,82 
10,15 
9.25 
10.88 
12,25 
13.36 
14,12 
16.30 
19.51 
18.44 
23.48 
22.31 
21.33 
23.79 
22.10 
17.06 
24.90 
16.55 
16.68 
5.61 
DCF 
14.05 
8.51 
23.77 
8.68 
8.80 
10.57 
9.72 
10.31 
8.66 
11.08 
10.11 
12.87 
14.99 
12.55 
15.69 
15.67 
14.64 
16.69 
14.92 
17.12 
17.83 
12.83 
12.71 
3.16 
4.70 
5.54 
6.23 
5.79 
6.31 
5.68 
7.45 
6.79 
8.91 
10.08 
8.20 
10.03 
8.91 
8.84 
9.78 
9.09 
10.32 
11.23 
7,99 
8,52 
1,97 
DTV 
15,99 
9.57 
28.25 
9.09 
9.43 
11.33 
10.32 
10.90 
9.12 
11.69 
10.62 
13.58 
16.00 
13.50 
17.18 
17.22 
16.19 
19.16 
18.12 
21.14 
22.12 
14,26 
13,54 
4.23 
4.88 
5.91 
6.57 
5.99 
6.57 
5.89 
7.81 
7.24 
9.15 
10.56 
8.68 
11.02 
9.82 
9.77 
11.01 
10.94 
13.10 
13.94 
8.83 
8.92 
2.63 
DCF/P 
0.78 
0.49 
1.01 
0.74 
0.81 
0.84 
0.83 
0.79 
0.64 
0.68 
0.62 
Oil 
0.72 
0.74 
0.70 
0.77 
0.80 
0.96 
0.71 
1.03 
0.67 
0.77 
0.77 
0.10 
0.52 
0.64 
0.65 
0.67 
0.61 
0.46 
0,51 
0,45 
0.56 
0,54 
0,45 
0.43 
0.42 
0.44 
0.45 
0.42 
0.59 
0.45 
0.51 
0.51 
0.09 
DTV/P 
0.89 
0.55 
1.17 
0.77 
0.86 
0.90 
0.87 
0.83 
0.67 
0,72 
0,65 
0,82 
0.77 
0,81 
0,77 
0,87 
0,89 
1,10 
0.87 
1.30 
0.84 
0.85 
0,84 
0,15 
0,53 
0,66 
0,69 
0.72 
0,63 
0.49 
0.53 
0.48 
0.59 
0.56 
0.49 
0.47 
0.47 
0.49 
0.52 
0.50 
0.72 
0.55 
0.56 
0.53 
0.09 
RO% 
11 
9 
9 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
7 
9 
10 
11 
13 
19 
21 
21 
9 
6 
6 
3 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
9 
11 
17 
18 
20 
8 
5 
5 
SPE 
DCF 
103 
60 
261 
98 
63 
79 
63 
73 
72 
68 
67 
94 
79 
99 
90 
114 
102 
176 
99 
128 
75 
91 
85 
28 
56 
46 
44 
45 
50 
59 
53 
58 
51 
54 
63 
65 
66 
68 
68 
67 
62 
62 
58 
59 
8 
DTV 
117 
58 
298 
103 
66 
84 
66 
76 
74 
70 
67 
100 
83 
108 
101 
127 
114 
198 
117 
165 
88 
100 
94 
35 
56 
45 
42 
44 
50 
58 
51 
56 
49 
55 
62 
63 
64 
67 
65 
63 
61 
58 
56 
57 
8 
APE 
DCF 
68 
60 
77 
62 
50 
51 
50 
54 
59 
55 
58 
60 
58 
69 
67 
75 
75 
91 
72 
81 
63 
64 
61 
12 
56 
46 
44 
45 
50 
59 
53 
58 
51 
54 
63 
65 
66 
68 
68 
67 
62 
62 
58 
59 
8 
DTV 
71 
58 
93 
63 
50 
52 
51 
54 
58 
55 
57 
60 
59 
70 
68 
78 
79 
97 
75 
94 
65 
66 
61 
14 
56 
45 
42 
44 
50 
58 
51 
56 
49 
55 
62 
63 
64 
67 
65 
63 
61 
58 
56 
57 
8 
% in 30% ofp 
DCF 
20 
— 
— 
25 
29 
33 
32 
30 
18 
20 
19 
26 
27 
19 
19 
18 
17 
15 
16 
21 
17 
22 
19 
6 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
DTV 
22 
— 
~ 
26 
30 
34 
31 
30 
19 
21 
19 
27 
27 
19 
21 
18 
18 
17 
19 
22 
21 
23 
21 
5 
... 
_ 
_. 
... 
— 
— 
~ 
... 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
-
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Panel A: Competitive advantage period = 10 years (continued) 
Cohortyear 
Standard deviations 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
A^  P 
bv vear 
— 9.27 
— 8.69 
— 9.14 
— 8.92 
— 9,29 
— 10,23 
— 11,38 
— 10,81 
~ 10.73 
— 13.10 
— 13.44 
— 17.09 
— 19.34 
— 21.16 
— 18.79 
— 18.40 
— 16.04 
— 19.39 
— 13.62 
— 12.24 
— 4.39 
DCF 
14.84 
9.48 
13.39 
11,22 
12.15 
8.70 
13.06 
11.57 
13.75 
18.59 
15.13 
19.50 
28.32 
33.12 
30.25 
23,28 
34.13 
27.14 
18.76 
14.99 
8.44 
DTV 
15.83 
10.36 
14.50 
12.12 
13.08 
9.23 
13.86 
12.05 
14.54 
20.15 
16.35 
22.11 
31.06 
36.39 
35.40 
30.73 
43.03 
34.38 
21.40 
16.09 
10.74 
DCF/P 
0.94 
0.60 
0.78 
0.61 
0.70 
0.62 
0.60 
0,55 
0.92 
0.74 
0.95 
0.85 
1.12 
1.00 
1.76 
0.95 
1.28 
0.68 
0.87 
0.85 
0.30 
DTV/P 
1.01 
0.64 
0.83 
0.65 
0.74 
0.66 
0.65 
0.58 
0.98 
0.80 
1.06 
0.98 
1.26 
1.13 
1.98 
1.16 
1.62 
0.86 
0.98 
0.98 
0.37 
R0% 
4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
7 
9 
9 
8 
5 
4 
2 
SPE 
DCF 
245 
91 
188 
94 
131 
126 
109 
87 
224 
150 
217 
169 
253 
171 
444 
198 
252 
106 
181 
170 
87 
DTV 
264 
99 
201 
103 
138 
135 
120 
93 
243 
165 
252 
213 
288 
203 
494 
246 
326 
148 
207 
202 
100 
APE 
DCF 
76 
38 
61 
39 
50 
41 
40 
34 
73 
53 
71 
61 
86 
69 
151 
68 
100 
41 
64 
61 
28 
DTV 
82 
43 
66 
43 
53 
45 
44 
37 
80 
59 
82 
74 
100 
82 
173 
90 
135 
59 
75 
70 
35 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF DTV 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
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Panel B: Competitive advantage period = 20 years 
Cohortyear 
Pooled summarv 
Mean (sum for n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means bv vear 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Medians bv vear 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
Standard deviations 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
N 
9427 
270 
280 
289 
312 
326 
340 
342 
362 
378 
390 
583 
630 
684 
739 
776 
859 
942 
925 
524 
384 
242 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
_ . 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
bv veai 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
P 
21,81 
17,50 
16,90 
12.12 
10.99 
12.11 
11.85 
13.03 
14.70 
16.52 
16.53 
17.76 
21.98 
20.49 
27.00 
26.61 
26.31 
26.63 
25.99 
20.93 
28.72 
19.46 
19.13 
6.26 
9.90 
8.82 
10.15 
9.25 
10.88 
12.25 
13.36 
14.12 
16.30 
19.51 
18,44 
23,48 
22.31 
21.33 
23.79 
22.10 
17.06 
24.90 
16.55 
16.68 
5.61 
9.27 
8.69 
9.14 
8.92 
9.29 
10.23 
11.38 
10.81 
10.73 
13.10 
13.44 
17.09 
19.34 
21.16 
18.79 
18.40 
16.04 
19.39 
13.62 
12.24 
4.39 
DCF 
15.06 
8.96 
27.00 
10.24 
9,86 
12.20 
10.68 
11.08 
8.87 
11,43 
10,44 
14.07 
16.97 
13.63 
17.55 
17.29 
15.70 
18.78 
15.05 
17.35 
18.45 
13.87 
13.85 
3.34 
4.85 
6.06 
6.69 
6.37 
6.55 
5.87 
7.71 
7.06 
9.45 
11.36 
8.51 
10.58 
9.71 
9.61 
10.36 
9.13 
10.61 
11.97 
8.47 
8.82 
2.13 
24.37 
11.55 
17,14 
12,97 
13.83 
9.40 
13.34 
11.51 
14.82 
22.60 
16,89 
25,65 
36,30 
34,50 
40,22 
24.61 
35.35 
26.68 
21.76 
19.87 
9.76 
DTV 
21.61 
11.81 
47.82 
11,87 
11.66 
14,57 
12,53 
12.98 
10.13 
13.11 
11.87 
16.38 
20.44 
16.70 
22,75 
23.29 
20,83 
29.51 
25.70 
30.43 
31.86 
18.70 
16.54 
7,14 
5,27 
6,84 
7,94 
7,12 
7.11 
6.42 
8.74 
8.00 
10.22 
12.81 
10,13 
12,89 
12,28 
11.97 
14,18 
14.24 
17.46 
20,45 
10.78 
10.17 
4.10 
32.62 
14.57 
21.38 
16.63 
17.48 
11.23 
16.04 
13.20 
18.03 
29.99 
22.18 
38,28 
51.90 
46.28 
85.83 
58.68 
66.27 
50.12 
33.93 
26.08 
21.53 
DCF/P 
0.84 
0.52 
1.16 
0.88 
0.91 
0.99 
0.93 
0.85 
0.68 
0.72 
0.66 
0.88 
0.84 
0.82 
0.78 
0.85 
0.86 
1.06 
0.72 
1.03 
0.69 
0.84 
0.85 
0.12 
0.53 
0.69 
0.70 
0.69 
0.65 
0.45 
0.54 
0.47 
0.61 
0.58 
0.47 
0.45 
0.46 
0.45 
0.48 
0.42 
0.59 
0.47 
0.54 
0.53 
0.10 
1.51 
0.79 
1.10 
0.79 
0.83 
0.73 
0.63 
0.63 
1.28 
0.95 
1.18 
1.03 
1.31 
1.13 
2.07 
0.94 
1.28 
0.69 
1.05 
1.03 
0.36 
DTV/P 
1.22 
0.67 
1.88 
1.02 
1.06 
1.18 
1,09 
0.99 
0.78 
0.84 
0.77 
1.03 
1,02 
1.04 
1.05 
1.23 
1.19 
1.60 
1.27 
1.92 
1,25 
1.13 
1,06 
0,28 
0.57 
0.77 
0.84 
0.80 
0.72 
0.52 
0.62 
0.52 
0.69 
0.67 
0.58 
0.56 
0.57 
0.59 
0.67 
0.67 
1.00 
0.79 
0.68 
0,67 
0,13 
1,90 
0.98 
1.38 
0.98 
1,01 
0,88 
0,80 
0,76 
1.59 
1.27 
1.71 
1.60 
2,12 
1,73 
3,20 
1,93 
2,61 
1,40 
1.55 
1.55 
0.65 
RO% 
24 
20 
18 
9 
12 
13 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
17 
20 
22 
23 
28 
38 
42 
42 
19 
13 
11 
8 
11 
12 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
12 
13 
17 
19 
21 
21 
26 
38 
39 
42 
18 
12 
11 
8 
9 
10 
8 
8 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
14 
15 
15 
17 
17 
16 
11 
9 
4 
SPE 
DCF 
117 
59 
320 
151 
79 
110 
80 
84 
80 
69 
71 
128 
97 
119 
105 
132 
113 
207 
98 
127 
76 
107 
102 
34 
56 
45 
43 
47 
50 
60 
52 
57 
48 
55 
63 
64 
65 
68 
66 
67 
62 
60 
57 
59 
8 
427 
136 
277 
142 
170 
143 
115 
109 
402 
198 
329 
212 
311 
207 
516 
191 
244 
113 
236 
203 
119 
DTV 
190 
56 
511 
190 
98 
139 
98 
100 
90 
82 
79 
159 
127 
171 
160 
213 
174 
325 
195 
276 
142 
157 
150 
67 
55 
46 
41 
50 
49 
57 
49 
53 
46 
54 
60 
61 
62 
67 
63 
60 
60 
53 
55 
55 
7 
527 
178 
343 
186 
207 
176 
157 
140 
498 
277 
557 
396 
502 
381 
790 
475 
570 
295 
370 
362 
183 
APE 
DCF 
71 
59 
94 
74 
55 
59 
56 
56 
62 
55 
58 
63 
63 
72 
70 
79 
79 
98 
72 
81 
62 
67 
63 
12 
56 
45 
43 
47 
50 
60 
52 
57 
48 
55 
63 
64 
65 
68 
66 
67 
62 
60 
57 
59 
8 
132 
57 
94 
56 
62 
50 
43 
41 
112 
73 
95 
78 
106 
82 
182 
67 
98 
44 
82 
76 
36 
DTV 
90 
56 
167 
82 
62 
68 
64 
61 
63 
57 
59 
69 
72 
82 
83 
102 
97 
131 
97 
138 
82 
82 
77 
24 
55 
46 
41 
50 
49 
57 
49 
53 
46 
54 
60 
61 
62 
67 
63 
60 
60 
53 
55 
55 
7 
172 
76 
122 
75 
79 
65 
58 
53 
143 
105 
150 
136 
187 
145 
298 
169 
240 
116 
133 
129 
65 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF 
21 
— 
— 
23 
33 
35 
28 
30 
18 
20 
22 
29 
28 
19 
21 
19 
20 
17 
16 
20 
19 
23 
21 
6 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
_ 
_ 
_ . 
._ 
_ . 
_ 
— 
DTV\ 
24 
—_ 
25 
31 
34 
29 
32 
23 
26 
25 
31 
27 
21 
22 
20 
19 
21 
20 
23 
26 
25 
25 
5 
_. 
— 
, 
__, 
— 
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Panel C: Competitive advantage period = 30 years 
Cohortyear 
Pooled summarv 
Mean (sum for n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means bv vear 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Medians bv vear 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
N 
9427 
— 
— 
270 
280 
289 
312 
326 
340 
342 
362 
378 
390 
583 
630 
684 
739 
776 
859 
942 
925 
524 
384 
242 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
-_-
— 
— 
— 
Standard deviations bv vea 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Median 
StDev 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
P 
21,81 
17,50 
16,90 
12.12 
10.99 
12.11 
11.85 
13.03 
14.70 
16.52 
16.53 
17.76 
21.98 
20.49 
27.00 
26.61 
26.31 
26.63 
25.99 
20.93 
28.72 
19,46 
19,13 
6,26 
9,90 
8,82 
10,15 
9,25 
10,88 
12,25 
13,36 
14,12 
16,30 
19.51 
18.44 
23.48 
22.31 
21.33 
23,79 
22,10 
17.06 
24.90 
16.55 
16.68 
5.61 
r 
9.27 
8.69 
9,14 
8.92 
9.29 
10.23 
11,38 
10,81 
10,73 
13.10 
13.44 
17.09 
19.34 
21.16 
18.79 
18.40 
16.04 
19.39 
13.62 
12.24 
4.39 
DCF 
16.60 
9.35 
36.19 
12.62 
11,20 
14,13 
11,74 
11,88 
9.22 
11.85 
10.83 
15.62 
19.68 
15.15 
20.41 
19.68 
17.18 
22.96 
15.65 
17.81 
19.24 
15.38 
15.38 
3.96 
5.14 
6.48 
7.48 
6.69 
6.69 
5.92 
7.97 
7.24 
9,70 
12,37 
9.26 
11,45 
10.38 
9.84 
11.02 
9.02 
10.56 
12.69 
8.88 
9.14 
2.28 
41.50 
16.04 
23,34 
15.66 
16.15 
11.45 
13,96 
11,73 
18,05 
29.35 
20.83 
38.13 
50.24 
36.51 
73.41 
29.38 
36.86 
27.04 
28.31 
25.19 
15.98 
DTV 
34.82 
15.03 
157.3 
17.17 
15.36 
19.72 
15.94 
16.00 
11.83 
15.44 
13.80 
21.09 
29.06 
23.10 
35.13 
39,03 
31,03 
60,73 
47.76 
52.69 
50.57 
28.64 
22.10 
15.50 
6.21 
7.57 
9.60 
7.98 
8.16 
6.93 
9.97 
9.28 
11,68 
15,87 
12,05 
16,30 
15.71 
15.48 
18.38 
20.48 
24.72 
30.11 
13.69 
11.87 
6,59 
68,05 
24,78 
35,39 
25.59 
25.54 
16.37 
20.87 
15.28 
27.82 
57.18 
41.41 
93.45 
172.3 
72.04 
331.5 
280.1 
197.3 
86.64 
88.43 
49.30 
94.61 
DCF/P 
0.94 
0.54 
1.61 
1.12 
1.04 
1.19 
1.07 
0.92 
0.75 
0,76 
0,72 
1,03 
1,02 
0,95 
0,91 
0,98 
0,96 
1,24 
0,75 
1,06 
0,72 
0,96 
0,96 
0,16 
0.52 
0.71 
0.77 
0.71 
0.66 
0,46 
0.57 
0.47 
0.62 
0.62 
0,50 
0.47 
0.48 
0.48 
0.49 
0.42 
0.58 
0.49 
0.56 
0.52 
0.10 
2.64 
1.15 
1.70 
1.17 
1.07 
1.05 
0.73 
0.80 
2.08 
1.42 
1.72 
1.41 
1.71 
1.45 
3,07 
1.10 
1,37 
0,75 
1,47 
1.41 
0.63 
DTV/P 
1.99 
0.85 
5.43 
1.58 
1,40 
1,68 
1,44 
1.24 
1.01 
1.03 
0.95 
1.44 
1.52 
1.51 
1.65 
2.19 
1.94 
2.96 
2.39 
3.46 
2.17 
1.75 
1.58 
0.67 
0,60 
0.90 
0.98 
0.91 
0.80 
0.58 
0.70 
0.59 
0.82 
0.81 
0.67 
0.70 
0.72 
0.76 
0.90 
0.89 
1.43 
1.18 
0.83 
0.81 
0.21 
4.52 
1.69 
2.66 
1.77 
1.54 
1.61 
1.18 
1.18 
3.18 
2.62 
3.47 
3.56 
7,12 
4,54 
9.36 
7.61 
8.01 
3.62 
3.85 
3.47 
2.55 
R0% 
36 
32 
22 
16 
20 
22 
20 
21 
20 
20 
21 
21 
22 
27 
32 
34 
36 
42 
53 
57 
58 
30 
22 
14 
16 
19 
21 
20 
20 
19 
20 
21 
21 
22 
28 
31 
34 
34 
41 
55 
57 
59 
30 
22 
14 
12 
13 
13 
12 
11 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
15 
16 
18 
20 
19 
20 
19 
19 
15 
13 
3 
SPE 
DCF 
161 
60 
580 
263 
115 
171 
117 
107 
108 
77 
85 
207 
142 
172 
141 
171 
145 
308 
113 
138 
80 
148 
139 
62 
57 
46 
44 
50 
49 
59 
50 
58 
47 
55 
64 
63 
65 
68 
66 
69 
62 
61 
57 
59 
8 
748 
231 
439 
263 
248 
243 
138 
180 
764 
311 
576 
316 
449 
341 
978 
266 
270 
139 
383 
290 
237 
DTV 
552 
58 
2284 
454 
173 
274 
182 
155 
161 
117 
118 
321 
267 
350 
362 
721 
464 
956 
773 
838 
381 
393 
336 
262 
55 
47 
46 
49 
47 
57 
47 
52 
46 
55 
59 
59 
64 
67 
66 
63 
69 
56 
56 
56 
8 
1276 
358 
688 
430 
362 
402 
256 
291 
1151 
614 
1310 
1091 
2571 
1459 
2984 
3222 
2859 
1132 
1248 
1111 
998 
APE 
DCF 
79 
60 
93 
96 
65 
73 
68 
61 
69 
57 
61 
73 
76 
81 
79 
88 
86 
114 
75 
85 
63 
76 
74 
14 
57 
46 
44 
50 
49 
59 
50 
58 
47 
55 
64 
63 
65 
68 
66 
69 
62 
61 
57 
59 
8 
245 
94 
155 
96 
88 
84 
52 
59 
194 
120 
151 
117 
147 
116 
286 
85 
108 
50 
125 
112 
64 
DTV 
154 
58 
530 
132 
87 
107 
91 
77 
78 
66 
68 
98 
111 
118 
130 
184 
159 
253 
192 
277 
152 
132 
114 
61 
55 
47 
46 
49 
47 
57 
47 
52 
46 
55 
59 
59 
64 
67 
66 
63 
69 
56 
56 
56 
8 
436 
149 
253 
157 
135 
141 
97 
97 
306 
243 
330 
338 
698 
436 
922 
750 
791 
349 
368 
318 
258 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF 
22 
— 
— 
21 
32 
31 
27 
31 
16 
24 
22 
29 
27 
21 
22 
20 
19 
18 
17 
20 
20 
23 
21 
5 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
DTV 
24 
— 
— 
23 
31 
32 
28 
34 
25 
30 
25 
29 
27 
20 
20 
21 
19 
21 
22 
23 
27 
25 
25 
5 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
.. . 
— 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Table 2.6 
Model fit analysis by IBES industry sector 
Table 2.6 summaries the relationship between Discounted Cash Flow, Decision-tree valuations and market prices as at 30 
April of each IBES industry sector. Columns 2-4 of each panel summarise prices, DCF valuations and Decision-tree 
valuations. Columns 5-7 summarise the relationship between these valuations, via computations of DCF value relative to 
price (DCF/P), Decision-tree value relative to price (DTV/P) and Real option% (1 - DCF va.hxdDTV). Columns 8-13 present 
statistics which summarise the variance between model valuations and market prices. For the two valuation methods (DCF 
and DTV) I compute the squared percentage error (SPE), the absolute percentage error (APE) and the percentage of 
valuations within 30 percent of the market price. The definitions of these statistics are presented in Sub-section 4.3. Panels A, 
B and C present the analysis under the assumptions that the competitive advantage period is 10, 20 or 30 years, respectively. 
Panel A: Competitive advantage period = 10 years 
Industry sector 
Pooled summarv 
Mean (sum for n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means by year 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Medians by year 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Standard deviations 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
N 
9427 
— 
— 
680 
901 
514 
868 
1662 
499 
1090 
1145 
1208 
148 
712 
857 
868 
414 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
„ . 
byyea 
— 
... 
... 
— 
... 
— 
... 
~ 
... 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
P 
21.81 
17.50 
16.90 
25.36 
23.17 
21.29 
22.74 
19.39 
22.99 
26.31 
18.41 
17.45 
27.53 
25.50 
22.74 
22.99 
3.32 
22.31 
17.69 
18.00 
19.00 
14.66 
20.56 
21.58 
12.95 
12.22 
24.22 
23.94 
18.83 
19.00 
4.19 
r 
15.15 
17.59 
15.35 
15.60 
16.89 
15.36 
19.44 
16.30 
17.67 
16.27 
12.40 
16.18 
16.27 
1.80 
DCF 
14.05 
8.51 
23.77 
14.92 
14.00 
18.04 
13.84 
14.02 
14.30 
15.19 
8.64 
7.79 
22.47 
26.42 
15.42 
14.30 
5.38 
12.09 
9.68 
12.89 
9.66 
7.78 
7.10 
8.58 
4.16 
4.56 
18.87 
20.28 
10.51 
9.66 
5.23 
11.49 
14.85 
18.90 
14.48 
38.96 
23.37 
23.93 
19.98 
10.72 
18.23 
23.70 
19.87 
18.90 
7.87 
DTV 
15.99 
9.57 
28.25 
16.16 
15.75 
19.50 
15.00 
16.31 
18.19 
16.72 
11.48 
9.29 
23.48 
28.40 
17.30 
16.31 
5.25 
13.07 
10.70 
13.68 
10.28 
8.88 
8.46 
9.31 
5,38 
5,24 
19.36 
21.23 
11.42 
10.28 
5.13 
12.69 
17.37 
20.54 
16.25 
46,26 
31.74 
26.28 
28,57 
13,19 
19,14 
26,05 
23,46 
20,54 
9.83 
DCF/P 
0.78 
0.49 
1.01 
0.76 
0.77 
1.02 
0.80 
0.94 
0.71 
0.66 
0.57 
0.62 
0.87 
1.09 
0.80 
0.79 
0.17 
0,52 
0,50 
0,72 
0.53 
0,51 
0,37 
0.46 
0.30 
0.38 
0.60 
0.87 
0.52 
0.52 
0.16 
0.96 
0.88 
1.24 
0.96 
1.34 
1.02 
0.69 
0.90 
0.82 
0.69 
0.88 
0.94 
0.92 
0.20 
DTV/P 
0.89 
0.55 
1.17 
0.84 
0.87 
1.10 
0.86 
1.08 
0.91 
0.72 
0.74 
0.73 
0,91 
1,17 
0.90 
0.89 
0.15 
0.55 
0.55 
0,77 
0,56 
0.57 
0,47 
0,49 
0,37 
0,45 
0.64 
0.89 
0.57 
0.56 
0.15 
1.10 
1.02 
1.34 
1.07 
1.53 
1.34 
0.75 
1.18 
0.98 
0.72 
1.00 
1.09 
1,08 
0,25 
R0% 
11 
9 
9 
7 
10 
7 
6 
12 
19 
8 
21 
14 
4 
5 
10 
8 
6 
5 
9 
6 
5 
11 
18 
6 
22 
10 
4 
2 
9 
6 
6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
7 
9 
4 
12 
8 
2 
6 
6 
4 
3 
SPE 
DCF DTV 
103 
60 
261 
99 
91 
124 
98 
134 
106 
77 
99 
90 
70 
89 
98 
98 
19 
54 
59 
47 
55 
64 
70 
59 
75 
68 
52 
30 
58 
59 
12 
265 
202 
359 
219 
339 
218 
150 
195 
206 
114 
191 
223 
206 
73 
117 
58 
298 
111 
103 
134 
108 
153 
135 
81 
121 
102 
72 
102 
111 
108 
24 
53 
57 
45 
54 
62 
66 
57 
70 
65 
50 
32 
56 
57 
11 
310 
238 
384 
250 
383 
295 
162 
252 
245 
118 
221 
260 
250 
81 
APE 
DCF DTV 
68 
60 
77 
61 
64 
65 
65 
79 
75 
61 
78 
68 
55 
49 
65 
65 
9 
54 
59 
47 
55 
64 
70 
59 
75 
68 
52 
30 
58 
59 
12 
78 
65 
106 
73 
108 
75 
48 
62 
59 
45 
74 
72 
73 
20 
71 
58 
93 
63 
66 
68 
67 
85 
82 
61 
81 
70 
55 
54 
68 
67 
10 
53 
57 
45 
54 
62 
66 
57 
70 
65 
50 
32 
56 
57 
11 
91 
79 
116 
84 
128 
107 
53 
90 
73 
47 
86 
87 
86 
24 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF 
20 
— 
— 
21 
20 
30 
19 
19 
15 
19 
9 
16 
24 
49 
22 
19 
10 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
... 
._ 
... 
„ . 
_-
... 
DTV 
22 
24 
22 
29 
21 
21 
17 
19 
12 
17 
24 
47 
23 
21 
9 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
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Panel B: Competitive advantage period = 20 years 
Industry sector 
Pooled summarv 
Mean (sum for n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means bv year 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Medians by year 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Standard deviations 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
N 
9427 
— 
— 
680 
901 
514 
868 
1662 
499 
1090 
1145 
1208 
148 
712 
857 
868 
414 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
by yea 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
P 
21.81 
17.50 
16.90 
25.36 
23.17 
21.29 
22.74 
19.39 
22,99 
26.31 
18.41 
17.45 
27.53 
25.50 
22.74 
22.99 
3.32 
22.31 
17.69 
18.00 
19.00 
14.66 
20.56 
21,58 
12,95 
12.22 
24.22 
23.94 
18.83 
19.00 
4.19 
r 
15.15 
17.59 
15.35 
15,60 
16.89 
15.36 
19.44 
16,30 
17,67 
16,27 
12,40 
16,18 
16,27 
1,80 
DCF 
15,06 
8,96 
27,00 
15,67 
15,03 
18,94 
14,56 
14,58 
16,18 
16.41 
9.69 
8.67 
23,11 
28.41 
16,48 
15,67 
5.56 
12.31 
10.01 
13,05 
10.35 
8.09 
7.70 
9.11 
4.77 
4.84 
18,66 
21,11 
10.91 
10.01 
5.17 
13.32 
19,05 
23,24 
15,50 
38.38 
34,18 
28,98 
22.93 
13,72 
19,88 
35,15 
24.03 
22.93 
8,92 
DTV 
21,61 
11,81 
47,82 
19,12 
20,56 
23,40 
17,82 
22,99 
29,60 
20,67 
20.86 
13.89 
26.52 
34.52 
22.72 
20.86 
5.73 
14.46 
12.61 
15.42 
11.54 
11.44 
12.71 
10.61 
8.59 
7.04 
20.07 
23.45 
13.45 
12.61 
4.80 
17.66 
31,04 
30,47 
20.90 
68.62 
85.62 
36.65 
59.27 
26.21 
23.57 
46,08 
40,55 
31,04 
21,93 
DCF/P 
0.84 
0.52 
1.16 
0.80 
0.82 
1.07 
0.84 
0.99 
0.81 
0.73 
0.65 
0.70 
0.91 
1.16 
0.86 
0.83 
0.16 
0.52 
0.51 
0.72 
0.54 
0.54 
0.39 
0.47 
0.33 
0.42 
0.61 
0.87 
0.54 
0.53 
0.15 
1.04 
0.98 
1,45 
1,00 
1.44 
1.33 
0.86 
1.12 
1.00 
0.80 
1,26 
1,12 
1,08 
0,22 
DTV/P 
1,22 
0,67 
1,88 
1.02 
1.13 
1.32 
1.04 
1.47 
1,51 
0,89 
1,36 
1,07 
1,04 
1,43 
1.21 
1.17 
0.22 
0.63 
0,65 
0.86 
0.63 
0.76 
0.67 
0.55 
0,55 
0,61 
0.67 
0.96 
0.69 
0.66 
0.13 
1.52 
1.57 
1.78 
1.36 
2.27 
2,69 
1.11 
2.45 
1.62 
0.94 
1.82 
1.74 
1.68 
0.54 
R0% 
24 
20 
18 
15 
22 
17 
14 
27 
38 
15 
42 
31 
10 
12 
22 
17 
11 
13 
21 
15 
12 
26 
37 
13 
46 
24 
11 
7 
20 
15 
12 
11 
11 
8 
10 
15 
18 
10 
23 
16 
6 
12 
13 
11 
5 
SPE 
DCF DTV 
117 
59 
320 
105 
99 
145 
101 
144 
134 
91 
118 
105 
80 
126 
114 
105 
22 
54 
58 
46 
54 
63 
70 
60 
72 
67 
53 
31 
57 
58 
12 
272 
222 
395 
219 
374 
348 
198 
305 
299 
150 
391 
288 
299 
84 
190 
56 
511 
152 
157 
181 
136 
232 
273 
111 
248 
162 
94 
187 
176 
162 
56 
51 
55 
49 
54 
60 
64 
57 
65 
62 
50 
33 
55 
55 
9 
419 
386 
474 
311 
575 
711 
248 
576 
473 
176 
547 
445 
473 
158 
APE 
DCF DTV 
71 
59 
94 
63 
67 
70 
65 
81 
82 
65 
80 
71 
58 
56 
69 
67 
9 
54 
58 
46 
54 
63 
70 
60 
72 
67 
53 
31 
57 
58 
12 
85 
74 
126 
78 
119 
107 
63 
86 
77 
55 
114 
89 
85 
24 
90 
56 
167 
73 
81 
83 
75 
109 
121 
71 
116 
85 
64 
76 
87 
81 
19 
51 
55 
49 
54 
60 
64 
57 
65 
62 
50 
33 
55 
55 
9 
134 
135 
161 
113 
204 
245 
86 
219 
139 
69 
172 
152 
139 
55 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF 
21 
— 
— 
23 
22 
30 
22 
20 
16 
19 
10 
18 
23 
47 
23 
22 
10 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
DTV 
24 
— 
— 
26 
23 
31 
23 
23 
20 
20 
16 
23 
23 
45 
25 
23 
8 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
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Panel C: Competitive 
Industry sector 
Pooled summary 
Mean (sum for n) 
Median 
StDev 
Means by year 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Medians by year 
Basic industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
Standard deviations 
Basic Industries 
Capital goods 
Consumer durables 
Consumer non-dur 
Consumer services 
Energy 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Technology 
Transport 
Utilities 
Mean 
Med 
Std 
advantage period - 30 
N 
9427 
— 
680 
901 
514 
868 
1662 
499 
1090 
1145 
1208 
148 
712 
857 
868 
414 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
._ 
by veai 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
„ _ 
... 
— 
— 
— 
... 
... 
P 
21.81 
17.50 
16.90 
25.36 
23.17 
21.29 
22.74 
19.39 
22.99 
26.31 
18.41 
17.45 
27.53 
25.50 
22.74 
22.99 
3.32 
22.31 
17.69 
18.00 
19.00 
14.66 
20.56 
21.58 
12.95 
12.22 
24.22 
23.94 
18.83 
19.00 
4.19 
r 
15.15 
17.59 
15.35 
15.60 
16.89 
15.36 
19.44 
16.30 
17.67 
16.27 
12,40 
16.18 
16.27 
1.80 
DCF 
16.60 
9.35 
36.19 
16.66 
16.77 
20.26 
15.42 
15.40 
19.30 
18.07 
11.31 
10.29 
23.83 
31.55 
18.1 
16.8 
5.9 
12.39 
10.20 
13.03 
11.05 
8.59 
8.28 
9.21 
5.39 
5.21 
18.67 
21.34 
11.22 
10.20 
5.03 
17.56 
29.03 
33.55 
18.06 
38.41 
58.39 
36.93 
27.81 
26.50 
22.24 
62.91 
33.76 
29.03 
14.97 
years 
DTV 
34.82 
15.03 
157.3 
25.11 
30.79 
29.61 
22.44 
42.80 
56.03 
27.37 
45.76 
24.83 
31.09 
46.07 
34.7 
30.8 
11.0 
16.53 
15.34 
17.73 
13.87 
15.07 
20.12 
12.21 
14.02 
10.11 
21.34 
26.02 
16.58 
15.34 
4.52 
39.63 
76.91 
54.13 
30.35 
283,8 
287,3 
58,72 
145,8 
98.01 
30.76 
110.8 
110.6 
76.91 
93.54 
DCF/P 
0.94 
0.54 
1.61 
0.85 
0.90 
1.15 
0.89 
1.08 
0.98 
0.82 
0.80 
0.83 
0.96 
1.28 
0.96 
0.93 
0.15 
0.53 
0.50 
0.73 
0.55 
0.58 
0.40 
0.49 
0.36 
0.44 
0.59 
0.88 
0,55 
0,54 
0,15 
1.31 
1,28 
1,84 
1.14 
1.76 
2.08 
1.17 
1.67 
1.51 
0.96 
2.34 
1.55 
1.53 
0.43 
DTV/P 
1.99 
0.85 
5.43 
1.44 
1.68 
1.69 
1.34 
2.40 
2.93 
1.19 
3.24 
1.85 
1.24 
1.98 
1.91 
1.77 
0.68 
0.70 
0.79 
1.00 
0.73 
1,03 
0,97 
0.65 
0,89 
0,84 
0,73 
1,04 
0,85 
0,85 
0,14 
3.59 
3.27 
2.77 
1.96 
7.81 
7.54 
1.88 
7.98 
4.00 
1.28 
5.63 
4.34 
3.80 
2.50 
RO% 
36 
32 
22 
25 
34 
28 
24 
40 
51 
24 
57 
46 
19 
19 
33 
28 
13 
23 
33 
26 
22 
41 
53 
22 
65 
40 
21 
14 
33 
26 
16 
15 
16 
12 
15 
19 
22 
15 
27 
18 
9 
16 
17 
16 
5 
SPE 
DCF 
161 
60 
580 
132 
128 
184 
115 
176 
207 
119 
168 
152 
96 
236 
156 
152 
43 
55 
59 
48 
54 
62 
70 
61 
71 
67 
54 
32 
57 
59 
11 
373 
294 
503 
260 
564 
624 
293 
522 
485 
212 
959 
463 
485 
214 
DTV 
552 
58 
2284 
361 
334 
285 
198 
793 
778 
189 
829 
409 
130 
571 
444 
361 
258 
52 
55 
51 
53 
63 
72 
59 
66 
62 
50 
35 
56 
55 
10 
1254 
885 
779 
454 
3270 
2359 
481 
2186 
1400 
278 
2215 
1415 
1254 
968 
APE 
DCF DTV 
79 
60 
93 
68 
74 
79 
68 
87 
96 
73 
89 
80 
64 
68 
77 
74 
10 
55 
59 
48 
54 
62 
70 
61 
71 
67 
54 
32 
57 
59 
11 
113 
104 
167 
92 
153 
184 
94 
143 
129 
72 
226 
134 
129 
46 
154 
58 
530 
106 
125 
113 
95 
189 
248 
92 
278 
142 
79 
126 
145 
125 
66 
52 
55 
51 
53 
63 
72 
59 
66 
62 
50 
35 
56 
55 
10 
345 
310 
262 
174 
770 
738 
165 
781 
384 
104 
558 
417 
345 
253 
% in 30% ofP 
DCF 
22 
— 
— 
23 
21 
30 
22 
22 
15 
18 
12 
18 
23 
46 
23 
22 
9 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
DTV 
24 
— 
26 
23 
31 
25 
21 
20 
22 
19 
23 
21 
44 
25 
23 
7 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
... 
— 
... 
.-
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
5 Results 
In this section, I evaluate the performance of investment portfolios formed on the basis of 
value relative to price, where value is estimated according to the DCF and Decision-tree 
valuation methods. The two research questions are (1) whether fiindamental valuation 
techniques can be used to identify mispriced securities, making them useful for portfolio 
formation; and (2) whether incorporating the volatility of revenue growth into equity 
valuation, via Decision-tree valuation, results in additional outperformance. Hence, an 
appropriate research method is the evaluation of portfolio performance. 
The results support the contention that fundamental equity analysis is useful in portfolio 
formation, and the magnitude of outperformance (close to 7 percent a year) is material to a 
portfolio manager. An additional advantage of this approach is that it allows me to assess the 
probability of reduced investment performance over a typical three-year investment horizon. I 
perform this analysis by re-sampling excess portfolio retums, under the assumption that 
retums are uncorrelated over time. Underperformance during years in which growth stocks 
outperformed means that there is a 20-30 percent probability that portfolio performance 
would have deteriorated by trading on the basis of value/price. 
With regard to this second research question, the uncertainty associated with additional 
parameter estimates - which increases with the assumed competitive advantage period -
means that any information content associated with the Decision-tree valuation model could 
be outweighed by this additional noise. If the Decision-tree valuation model provides superior 
information on fundamental values, relative to the DCF model, its application should result in 
better investment performance. In contrast, if the Decision-tree valuation model simply 
introduces noise, we should observe worse investment performance. 
I test this prediction by forming equally-weighted long-short portfolios each year, and 
determining whether mean retums are significantly different from zero. The advantage of the 
long-short portfolio evaluation technique is that sample firms are effectively being used as 
their own benchmark. I perform this test before and after controlling for factors shown to 
explain a substantial proportion of the variation in stock retums - size, the book-to-market 
equity ratio, and market returns (Fama and French, 1992, 1993), as well as momentum 
(Carhart, 1997). 
If portfolios formed on the basis of DCF or Decision-tree valuations achieve significant 
outperformance, this provides support for the fiindamental investment analysis typically 
performed by equity analysts and investors. In addition, if portfolios formed on the basis of 
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Decision-tree valuations outperform portfolios formed on the basis of DCF valuations, this 
provides support for incorporating the volatility of revenue growth into equity analysis, 
I analyse monthly portfolio retums over holding periods of up to one year. There is no 
theoretical basis for arguing that a 12-month holding period will be sufficient to detect 
outperformance. However, the premise of fundamental valuation is that if market prices 
diverge from fiindamental value they will revert to their intrinsic value at some (unspecified) 
time. This is likely to occur in response to information that resolves uncertainty, such as an 
eamings release. A 12-month period in which to detect outperformance appears reasonable, 
considering the investment horizons of active portfolio managers. 
The concem remains, though, as to why market prices should diverge from intrinsic value in 
the first place. In other words, what is the basis for the presumption that sample firms are 
mispriced? To address this concem, consider the parameters which underlie the models used 
to estimate intrinsic values for sample stocks. As much as possible, parameters underlying the 
model valuations are objectively determined, with other estimates - relating to growth and the 
competitive advantage period - being derived from market prices. Therefore, we should 
expect model prices to diverge from market prices. This divergence could happen for three 
reasons. First, the models are mis-specified, and are therefore not the appropriate way to 
determine intrinsic value; second, the parameters underlying the models are subject to 
estimation error; and third, market prices differ fi-om intrmsic value. The first two reasons for 
divergence imply that noise and/or bias is incorporated into model prices. The third reason 
would imply outperformance from model portfolios, as explained below. 
As a base case, assume that market prices ftilly reflect available information (that is, they are 
"correct") and consider long-short portfolios of sample stocks formed through random 
selection. These should achieve risk-adjusted retums insignificantly different from zero. 
Portfolios formed using noisy estimates of intrinsic value should fare no better, because this 
also amounts to a random selection. If intrinsic values are biased in some way, such as high-
beta stocks in the long portfolio and low-beta stocks in the short portfolio, the portfolio retum 
should be no different from zero, after controlling for factors shown to explain stock retums. 
Finally, if market prices are correct, then the third reason for divergence does not apply, so 
our prior expectation is that retums should be insignificantly different from zero. 
Now, consider the case where we assume that market prices are not correct. If we assume that, 
at some stage, prices will move closer to their intrinsic value we should expect abnormal 
returns over some holding period, so long as this is not outweighed by noise underlying the 
estimates of intrinsic value. So the issue is not whether we should expect abnormal retums; 
the issues are (1) whether the holding period will be long enough to detect outperformance; 
and (2) whether any actual outperformance remains undetected because of noise underlying 
the estimates of intrinsic value. 
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I measure portfolio performance using monthly retums and annual retums. Given that the 
period under study is only 18 years, evaluating monthly retums increases the power of 
significance tests due to the increase in the number of observations to 216. It also allows me 
to assess the volatility of monthly retums, to better assess whether any outperformance is 
associated with increased risk. However, all portfolios are formed using share price and 
accounting information as a 30 April of each year, which was selected as the date most likely 
to contain up-to-date eamings forecasts for the majority of the sample. The majority of 
companies report on a calendar-year basis, following which analysts typically update their 
eamings forecasts in the IBES database. Allowing a four-month lag between the calendar-year 
end and portfolio formation means that the eamings forecasts relied upon are likely to 
incorporate recent annual report data. 
I form three sets of equally-weighted long-short portfolios on the basis of value {DCF or 
Decision-tree) relative to price, where the long and short components each comprise 10 
percent, 20 percent or 30 percent of stocks in each year. The use of altemative portfolio 
partitions - deciles, quintiles or the 30/40/30 split - is to examine the sensitivity of portfolio 
performance to selecting stocks with extremely low or high prices. For the full sample this is 
not a great concem, as the least diversified portfolio contained 54 stocks. But for sub-samples 
formed on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio, the number of stocks in each decile 
is a quarter of this range. The portfolio with the largest number of stocks (565) is that 
comprising the top and bottom 30 percent of stocks, formed in 2003. 
Stock retums are computed on a continuously-compounded basis and include the 
reinvestment of dividends. When testing whether the mean retums to long-short portfolios are 
significantly different from zero, I perform one-sample ?-tests. When comparing performance 
between portfolios, I perform matched-pairs Mests. I compare the volatility of portfolio 
retums using F-tests. Allp-values refer to two-tailed significance tests. 
For the full sample, long-short portfolios of the top and bottom deciles of stocks had average 
monthly retums of close to 0.6 percent, which was significant at the 5 percent level, 
regardless of whether DCF or Decision-tree valuations were performed and the assumed 
competitive advantage period. Mean annual retums were around 7 percent, but were only 
significant at the 10 percent level when a competitive advantage period of 30 years was 
assumed. Monthly excess retums after controlling for factors which explain stock retums 
ranged from 0.4-0.6 percent, depending on the assumed competitive advantage period, while 
annual retums ranged fi-om 6-8 percent. In most cases, results were significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
When the sample was partitioned into four sub-samples on the basis of size and the market-to-
book ratio, the portfolios drawn from the set of small, high market-to-book stocks achieved 
the most consistent excess retums. This was also the case for the sub-sample of growth stocks, 
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where these were defined as those in the Technology, Healthcare and Consumer Services 
industries. 
In sum, there is evidence that fundamental valuation techniques are useful in achieving 
superior risk-adjusted performance, provided they incorporate assumptions regarding revenue 
growth and margins which are consistent with normal long-term returns on investment. 
5.1 Mean returns and volatility of investment portfolios 
In this section, I analyse the raw retums performance of long-short investment portfolios. This 
analysis is separated into sub-sections relating to the full sample, four sub-samples formed on 
the basis of size and market-to-book equity and two samples formed on industry groAvth 
characteristics. 
5.1.1 Full sample 
A number of important points emerge from analysis of investment performance. First, 
portfolios of stocks ranked in the top decile on the basis of value relative to price eamed 
higher average retums than stocks ranked in the bottom decile. Second, as stocks are 
partitioned into extreme deciles, the volatility of retums increases. My explanation for this is 
that volatile stocks are more likely to have equity prices which deviate from a theoretical 
value estimated from inputs obtained from publicly available information. Regardless of the 
reason for this volatility, controlling for portfolio risk is paramount. However, the third 
important result is that, even after controlling for the volatility of retums, there is evidence 
that investment portfolios formed using fundamental valuations achieve superior 
performance. Finally, there is marginal difference in portfolio performance, regardless of 
whether Decision-tree or DCF valuations are used, or the assumed competitive advantage 
period. This occurs because 60 percent of stocks are ranked in the same decile, regardless of 
the valuation technique used. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the mean annual stock retums over 18 years for each decile, assuming a 
competitive advantage period of 30 years. For portfolios formed using Decision-tree 
valuations the mean annual retum for decile 1 stocks was 15.4 percent, compared to 7.6 
percent for the mean for decile 10, a difference which was significant at the 10 percent level. 
A similar result holds for portfolios formed according to DCF valuations, with the mean 
annual retum declining from 15.1 percent to 7.6 percent, which had comparable significance. 
Hence, there is preliminary evidence that fundamental equity valuation has potential to result 
in outperformance. While the difference in retums is significant only for the top and bottom 
deciles of stocks, long-short portfolios formed on this basis contained between 54 and 188 
stocks, depending on the year in question. 
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Further, the magnitude of the difference in retums is economically meaningful, even if a 
portfolio manager is required to form a well-diversified, long-only portfolio. Say a naive 
investment manager formed an equally-weighted portfolio of all stocks in each year, and so 
eamed the average retum of 11.49 percent over the sample period. Now say that an additional 
10 percent of the portfolio is allocated to decile 1 stocks, and no investment is made in decile 
10 stocks. Aimual retums in this instance would have risen by 0.75 percent a year, which is 
economically significant, especially when we consider that the portfolio is only subject to 
annual re-balancing, so incremental transaction costs are minimal. 
Figure 2.6 
Mean annual retums for the full sample according to deciles formed on the basis of value/price assuming 
a competitive advantage period of 30 years 
Figure 2.6 presents mean annual retiuns to decile portfolios of US stocks ranked according to the ratio of 
value/price, where value is estimated using the Discounted Cash Flow and Decision-tree valuation models, and 
assuming a competitive advantage period of 10, 20 or 30 years. The valuations refer to 9427 fum-years from 
1987-2004 and are performed using information available at 30 April of each year. The subsequent retums are 
computed as In (P/Po) where P, = an estimate of price in t months that includes reinvestment of any dividends; 
and Po is the share price as at 30 April. 
Table 2.8 siraimarises the mean retums eamed by portfolios according to deciles, as well as 
the performance of long-short portfolios formed in three ways - according to the top and 
bottom deciles, the top and bottom quintiles, and a 30/40/30 split. On the left-hand side, I 
present the mean retums for each partition, while tests for differences amongst partitions 
appear on the right-hand side. Each row of the table refers to portfolios formed after assuming 
a competitive advantage period of 10,20 or 30 years. For example, the data appearing in the 
figure above is drawn fi-om the top left section of Panel B, in the rows labelled "30". 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Table 2.8 shows that the positive retums to long-short portfolios formed from the top and 
bottom deciles was consistent, regardless of the competitive advantage period assumed or the 
valuation technique. Monthly retums were typically 0.6 percent (with/?-values of 2 - 5 
percent), which corresponded to annual retums of 6.6 - 7.5 percent. There is a positive 
association between retums and the assumed competitive advantage period, and the annual 
retums are significant at the 10 percent level only when CAP = 30 years. However, the 
difference in mean estimates for the different valuation methods and CAP assumptions is not 
significant. The mean returns to long-short quintile portfolios are 0.3 - 0.4 percent per month, 
which corresponds to 3.5 - 4.5 percent a year, and monthly retums have/7-values of 9-14 
percent. 
Analysis of the variability of portfolio retums suggests that portfolios of stocks selected as 
most over- or under-valued, are also the most volatile. Figure 2.7 illustrates the standard 
deviation of annual and monthly retums to each decile portfolio, assuming CAP = 30 years, 
which appear in Table 2.9. In addition, Table 2.9 presents the results of the full set of 
significance tests which compare the standard deviation of the decile portfolios, assuming 
CAP = 30 years. In each case, comparisons with the minimum variance portfolio are 
highlighted. 
In reference to the annual retums to stocks allocated to deciles according to Decision-tree 
value/price, the decile 1 portfolio is significantly more volatile than the portfolios formed 
from deciles 7-9 (p-values from 1-6 percent). But the decile 10 portfolio is significantly more 
volatile than the decile 9 portfolio. For the portfolios formed from DCF valuations, there are 
no significant differences in the volatility of annual retums. 
However, when we consider the volatility of monthly retums, we observe this pattem of 
increased volatility at the extreme deciles, regardless of the valuation method selected. For 
DCF portfolios, the standard deviation of monthly retums to the portfolio of stocks in decile 
10 is 0.8 percent greater than the standard deviation of retums to the decile 1 portfolio {p-
value = 0.06). The portfolio of stocks in decile 4 has the lowest standard deviation at 4.4 
percent, which is significantly different from all portfolios except deciles 3-6. For Decision-
tree portfolios, the minimum variance portfolio is decile 5, which has a standard deviation of 
4.6 percent. This is significantly lower than the volatility of retums to portfolios 1-2 and 9-10. 
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Figure 2.7 
Standard deviation of retums to portfolios from the decile rankings of stocics according to value relative 
to price assuming a competitive advantage period of 30 years 
Figure 2.7 presents the standard deviation of 18 annual retums and 216 monthly retums to decile portfolios of 
US stocks ranked according to the ratio of value/price, where value is estimated using the Discounted Cash 
Flow and Decision-tree valuation models, and assimiing a competitive advantage period of 10, 20 or 30 years. 
The valuations refer to 9427 firm-years fi-om 1987-2004 and are performed using information available at 30 
April of each year. The subsequent retums are computed as In {P/Po) where P, = m estimate of price in / 
months that includes reinvestment of any dividends; and Po is the share price as at 30 April. 
DCF Valuations Decision-tree Valuations 
7% 
6% 
6,4% 
5.6% 5.7% 
6.0% 
i^  
DCF Valuations Decision-tree Valuations 
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Table 2.9 
Comparison of returns volatility 
Table 2.9 presents the results of F-tests for significant differences in the variance of returns to portfolios formed on the basis 
of value/price. The upper section of each panel refers to portfolios formed on the basis of DCF valuations, while the lower 
section of each panel refers to Decision-tree portfolios. Each section presents the standard deviation of retums to each decile 
and the two-tailed significance level associated with the ratio of variances. Panel A presents data on 18 cumulative annual 
retums and Panel B presents data on 216 monthly returns. In each case, comparisons with the minimum variance portfolio are 
highlighted. 
Panel A: Annual returns 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 
StDev 19.6 18.6 16.5 14.9 14.7 
DCF valuation Significance levels for F-tests of difference in variance 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Decile 
StDev 
0.82 0.47 
0.63 
0,27 
0,38 
0.69 
0.25 
0,35 
0,65 
0,96 
6 
14.2 
0,19 
0,28 
0,55 
0,84 
0,88 
7 
13.7 
0.15 
0.22 
0.46 
0.73 
0.77 
0.88 
8 
14.7 
0.24 
0.34 
0.64 
0.94 
0.99 
0,90 
0.78 
1 
21.7 
2 
16.8 
3 
17.8 
4 
15.1 
5 
15.8 
6 
15.4 
Decision-tree valuation - Significance levels for F-tests of difference in variance 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0,30 0,43 
0,81 
0,14 
0,65 
0,49 
0,20 
0.80 
0.62 
0.85 
0.17 
0.72 
0.55 
0.93 
0.92 
7 
13.6 
0.06 
0.39 
0.27 
0.68 
0,55 
0.62 
8 
13.7 
0.06 
0.40 
0.28 
0.69 
0.56 
0.63 
0.99 
Panel B: Monthly returns 
9 
15.8 
0.38 
0.52 
0.87 
0.82 
0.77 
0.66 
0.56 
0.76 
9 
11.6 
0.01 
0.14 
0.08 
0,29 
0,22 
0,25 
0,52 
0.51 
10 
17.5 
0.64 
0,81 
0,81 
0,52 
0.49 
0.40 
0.32 
0.48 
0.68 
10 
17.6 
0.39 
0.85 
0.95 
0.53 
0.66 
0.59 
0.30 
0.31 
0.10 
Decile 
St Dev 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5.65 5.07 4.73 4.43 4.72 4.75 
DCF valuation - Significance levels for F-tests of difference in variance 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Decile 
StDev 
Decision' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0.11 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
0.31 0.05 0.30 0.34 
0.34 0.98 0.95 
0.35 0.31 
0,93 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5.75 5.37 5.00 4.64 4.62 5.02 
tree valuation - Significance levels for F-tests of difference in variance 
0,32 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 
0,30 0.03 0.03 0.33 
0,27 0.24 0.95 
0.94 0.24 
0.21 
7 
5.00 
0.08 
0.85 
0.41 
0.07 
0.40 
0.44 
7 
4.78 
0.01 
0.09 
0.51 
0.66 
0.60 
0.47 
8 
5.12 
0.15 
0.89 
0.25 
0.04 
0.24 
0.28 
0.74 
8 
4.82 
0.01 
0,11 
0,58 
0,58 
0,53 
0,54 
0.91 
9 
5.43 
0.57 
0.31 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.05 
0.23 
0.38 
9 
5.21 
0.15 
0.66 
0.55 
0.09 
0.08 
0.60 
0.21 
0.25 
10 
6.41 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
10 
5.97 
0.58 
0.12 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
To this point, two conclusions can be reached. First, there is evidence that fundamental 
analysis which incorporates mean-reversion of revenue growth is associated with increased 
equity retums. Incorporating the volatility of revenue growth into valuations, via Decision-
tree analysis, results in mean estimates of value which are closer to market price. But this 
does not result in a significant change in investment performance. 
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Second, there is evidence that stocks selected as most over- or under-valued by these 
valuation techniques are the most volatile stocks. This is likely to occur because the 
valuations are performed using data which, by constmction, is less timely and less volatile 
than equity prices. The individual eamings forecasts which comprise consensus estimates 
enter the IBES database over a period of time, with each analyst updating their forecast at 
differing intervals. So the consensus eamings forecast places equal weight on each estimate, 
regardless of its timeliness. The resulting consensus forecast will be significantly smoother 
than equity prices, which react to new information instantaneously. Hence, when valuations 
are performed using consensus eamings forecasts, the most volatile stocks are most likely to 
be identified as the most over- or under-valued. 
I assessed the impact of risk variation in the investment portfolios in two ways. First, I 
computed a Sharpe ratio for each decile portfolio in each year, according to the following 
equation: 
''port ff Sharpe = -^ '- (2.66) 
where: 
rport = the continuously-compounded annual retum on the portfolio; 
ry = the continuously-compounded yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the start of the 
year; and 
t^port = the armualised standard deviation of the portfolio retums over 12 months. 
Sharpe ratios for each decile portfolio in each year are presented in Table 2.10, along with 
raw retums. 
Second, for long-short portfolios formed on the basis of the top and bottom deciles of stocks 
ranked according to value/price, I computed the information ratio. The information ratio is the 
ratio of excess portfolio returns relative to the standard deviation of portfolio retums, as 
presented below. For long-short portfolios the benchmark retum is zero, so the information 
ratio becomes the ratio of retums to the standard deviation of those retums. 
Information ratio = -^ ^-^ (2.67) 
where: 
fiong - fshort = the continuously-compoundcd annual return on a long-short investment 
portfolio formed on the basis of the top and bottom decile of stocks ranked according to 
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value/price; 
0M = the annualised standard deviation of monthly rehirns on the long-short portfolio. 
The information ratio is a measure of excess retum relative to the incremental risk of the 
investment portfolio and is commonly used by portfolio managers for portfolio evaluation. In 
Table 2.11,1 present the annual retums and information ratios to long-short portfolios formed 
from the top and bottom deciles under the three CAP assumptions and two valuation methods. 
Table 2.10 presents the annual retums in each year and their associated Sharpe ratios, for 
valuations which assumed that CAP = 30 years. Comparable results are achieved when I 
assume that CAP = 10 or 20 years. Panel A presents the results for Z)CF-based portfolios 
while Panel B presents results for Decision-tree portfolios. The lower section of each panel 
presents p-values for matched pairs Mests for differences in mean annual retums and Sharpe 
ratios. Stocks ranked in the top decile according to their DCF value relative to price had an 
annual Sharpe ratio of 0.79, compared to 0,39 for stocks ranked in the bottom decile {p-Yahie 
= 0.11). Of the 45 Mests for differences in mean Sharpe ratios, four are statistically significant 
in the expected direction - the Sharpe ratio for decile 1 portfolios is significantly greater than 
that for decile 3 and 8 portfolios; and the Sharpe ratio for decile 5 portfolios is significantly 
greater than that of decile 8 and 10 portfolios. If performance was random, the expected 
nimiber of significant differences in Sharpe ratios would be 4-5, but half of these would occur 
in the direction opposite to expectations. 
A similar resuh is obtained for stocks ranked according to Decision-tree value relative to 
price. The decile 1 portfolio had a mean Sharpe ratio of 0.76, compared to 0.37 for the decile 
10 portfolio (p-value = 0.13). In this case, there were five instances in which there was a 
significant difference in the expected direction. The decile 4 portfolio had a significantly 
higher mean Sharpe ratio than the mean ratio resulting from portfolios formed from deciles 6, 
8 and 10. And the decile 7 portfolio had a mean Sharpe ratio that was significantly higher than 
the mean ratio resulting from portfolios formed from deciles 8 and 10. 
In sum. Table 2.10 provides support for the use of fiindamental analysis in portfolio 
formation. There are significant differences in the Sharpe ratios of portfolios formed from 
decile rankings of value/price, which make a material difference to portfolio performance. If a 
portfolio manager can increase the Sharpe ratio of an investment portfolio by just 0.1, this 
corresponds to additional retums of 2 percent for a portfolio with a t3^ical standard deviation 
of around 20 percent. However, there is no evidence that the use of Decision-tree valuations 
would have resulted in additional outperformance. 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Table 2.11 summarises the aimual performance of long-short portfolios formed from the top 
and bottom deciles of stocks ranked according to value/price. The left-hand side presents the 
cumulative annual retums to these portfolios according to valuation method and CAP 
assumptions. The right-hand side presents the information ratio, which is the retum on the 
long-short portfolio relative to the annualised standard deviation of monthly retums. 
On average, long-short portfolios eamed retums of around 7 percent a year and the p-values 
for two-tailed ^tests range from 0.08 to 0.16. The mean information ratio is in the range of 
0.44 to 0.67, with/?-values which range from 0.09 to 0.22. The mean information ratio 
increases with an increase in the assumed competitive advantage period and when Decision-
tree valuations are performed instead of DCF valuations. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant. 
The risk-adjusted performance of long-short portfolios supports the evidence presented above, 
which suggests that fundamental equity valuation is useful in achieving abnormal portfolio 
retums. However, inspection of the performance over particular time periods reveals that 
short-term underperformance can be severely negative. For example, the portfolios achieved 
large, significant negative retums in 1998, a year in which the MSCI Growth index 
outperformed its value-based counterpart by 14 percent. This performance was reversed in 
2001, a year in which the MSCI Value Index outperformed the growth index by 39 percent. 
Table 2.11 
Returns to long-short portfolios by cohort year 
In each year, I ranked stocks according to value/price, where value is estimated using a DCF or Decision-tree valuation 
model, and share price is the closing price at 30 April. I formed long-short portfolios from the top and bottom deciles of 
stocks in each year and under each valuation method. The table presents the annual retums to these portfolios and the 
information ratio. The information ratio is the annual retum divided by the annualised standard deviation of retums. The 
valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, 
representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Annual returns 
CAP 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
StDev 
t 
P(t) 
Discounted cash flows 
10 
7.7 
10.0 *" 
-4.0 " 
-18.6 *" 
-4.7 
4.2 
1.7 
-1.5 
-3.8 
14.7 * " 
7.7 "* 
-26.1 *" 
-14.4 ** 
36.5 *** 
57.0 *** 
4.1 
26.4 *" 
29.8 *" 
7.0 
20.3 
1.47 
0.16 
20 
4.2 
9.1 "* 
-3.8 * 
-9.7 " 
-4.7 
1.5 
-1.7 
0.6 
-3.6 
•|2 4 *** 
10.4 *** 
-22.2 *" 
-15.1 " 
33.2 *" 
49.3 "* 
3.6 
31.5 *" 
24.0 *** 
6.6 
18.1 
1.55 
0.14 
30 
6.6 
7.7 * " 
-8.2 "* 
-7.3 ** 
-7.6 * 
3.1 
3.4 
3.3 " 
-4.0 
18,7 " * 
13.3 * " 
-20.1 "* 
-8.3 
30.2 " * 
41,6 * " 
7.5 * 
30.7 "* 
13.6 *** 
6.9 
15.9 
1.84 
0.08 
10 
7.7 
10.0 
-2.7 
-19.0 
-5.5 
2.2 
5.0 
-1.0 
-4.3 
12,7 
8.5 
-26,9 
-10,4 
36.0 
54.8 
2.0 
28.4 
25.6 
6.8 
19.7 
1.47 
0.16 
Decision-tree 
20 
5,6 
* * * p O * * * 
-4.1 * 
-10,5 *" 
-11.0 ** 
^.8 " 
0.1 
-0.5 
-3.9 
13.8 *** 
10.3 *" 
-23.8 "* 
-5.4 
* * * nn J * * * 
*** 48.9 *** 
4.9 
40.5 *** 
16.2 *** 
7.1 
18.4 
1.63 
0.12 
30 
5.6 
8.1 " * 
-3.4 
-6.7 * 
-12.9 *** 
6.1 " 
2.7 
2.4 
-0.8 
18.0 * " 
11.4 * " 
-26.1 *" 
3.7 
32.8 "* 
43.5 "* 
5.5 
39.8 * " 
5.6 * 
7.5 
17.3 
1.83 
0.08 
Information ratio 
Discounted cash 
flows 
10 
0.45 
1.42 
-0.75 
-1.43 
-0.30 
0.48 
0.28 
-0.23 
-0.41 
1.24 
0.95 
-2.31 
-0.83 
1.09 
3.12 
0.23 
2.52 
2.32 
0.44 
1.40 
1.32 
0.20 
20 
0.26 
1.23 
-0.55 
-0.82 
-0.32 
0.21 
-0.23 
0.09 
-0.33 
1,51 
1.18 
-2.92 
-0.79 
1.03 
3.14 
0.21 
3.01 
1.96 
0.44 
1.46 
1.27 
0.22 
30 
0.43 
1.01 
-1.30 
-0.69 
-0.58 
0.44 
0.50 
0.69 
-0.35 
2.59 
1.69 
-2.79 
-0.39 
0.99 
3.23 
0.60 
3.12 
1.16 
0.57 
1.52 
1.61 
0.13 
Decision-tree 
10 
0.45 
1.37 
-0.43 
-1.51 
-0.33 
0.24 
0.91 
-0.17 
-0.42 
1.05 
0.99 
-2.47 
-0.56 
1.08 
3.35 
0.11 
3.10 
2.12 
0.49 
1.46 
1.43 
0.17 
20 
0.31 
1.12 
-0.63 
-0.93 
-0.73 
0.72 
0.02 
-0.09 
-0.36 
1.89 
1.01 
-3.50 
-0.24 
1.06 
3.40 
0.34 
4.79 
1.65 
0.55 
1.78 
1.30 
0.21 
30 
0.35 
1.07 
-0.45 
-0.54 
-1.00 
0.72 
0.37 
0.51 
-0.08 
2.52 
0.95 
-2.68 
0.15 
1.37 
4.00 
0.43 
3.89 
0.57 
0.67 
1.60 
1.79 
0.09 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
The evidence presented above suggests that if portfolio managers are assessed on short-term 
performance, they bear substantial risk from implementing a value-based investment strategy. 
I assess this risk by measuring the probability of underperformance, and the expected retums 
in the event of that underperformance. Say we assume the distributions of retums from the 
long-short investment strategies is uncorrelated over time. Also assume that the portfolio 
manager is evaluated on three-year investment performance. I ran a simulation of 10,000 
long-short investment portfolios over three-year horizons from the distribution of portfolio 
retums presented in Table 2.11. The simulation results are presented in Table 2.12, 
This simulation reveals that the probability of negative retums over a three-year investment 
horizon ranges from 21-29 percent, with an expected annual loss of 4.3 to 5,9 percent. The 
expected retum in the event of a gain ranges from 10,2 to 21,1 percent. This leads to two 
conclusions regarding the full-sample performance. First, there is evidence of significant and 
material gains from investment strategies formed from fiindamental analysis. But there is also 
material risk of underperformance, due to correlation with value-growth investment strategies. 
Table 2.12 
Probability of negative returns to a long-short portfolio strategy over a three-year investment horizon 
In each year, I ranked stocks according to value/price, where value is estimated using a DCF or Decision-tree valuation 
model, and share price is the closing price at 30 April. I formed long-short portfolios firom the top and bottom deciles of 
stocks in each year and under each valuation method. The annual retums to each portfolio are presented in Table 2.11. For 
each investment portfolio, I performed 10,000 simulations of portfolio retums over a three year investment horizon, assuming 
each return in Table 2.11 had an equal probability of occurrence and retums were uncorrelated over time. Table 2.12 presents 
the percentage of simulations in which the long-short portfolio would have eamed positive or negative returns over a three-
year investment horizon. It also presents the mean retum to those portfolios, conditional upon the total return being positive 
or negative. The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.9 and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-
2004, representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Probability of loss (%) 
Expected loss in the event that loss 
occurs (%) 
Probability of gain (%) 
Expected gain in the event that gain 
occurs (%) 
Discounted cash flow portfolios 
CAP=10 
29 
5.8 
71 
12.1 
CAP=20 
29 
4.8 
71 
11.1 
CAP=30 
22 
4.3 
78 
10.2 
Decision-tree portfoli 
CAP=10 
28 
5.9 
72 
11.7 
CAP=20 
26 
4.8 
74 
11.3 
OS 
CAP=30 
21 
5.0 
79 
10.9 
As a further illustration of the impact of the value-growth bias on portfolio selection, I present 
a summary of the annual returns to long-short portfolios formed amongst stocks classified as 
high- or low-growth. Stocks in IBES industry sectors Technology, Healthcare and Consumer 
services formed part of the high-growth segment, while the remaining stocks formed part of 
the low-growth segment. Table 2.13 presents a summary of the performance of long-short 
portfolios formed according to deciles and quintiles from these two segments. 
Mean annual retums are positive throughout, but the minimum p-value achieved by any 
portfolio is 0.12. However, if we compute t-statistics based on the distribution of monthly 
retums, retums are significantly greater than zero in several instances. What is most striking is 
the variability in annual performance, especially from 1998 to 2001. Performance is 
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consistently negative for portfolios formed in 1998 and 1999, but these negative retums are 
more than recovered in the subsequent two years. 
There is some association between the CAP assumption and performance amongst the sub-
samples, but these differences are not significant. Specifically, performance of portfolios 
amongst low-growth stocks was highest when a short CAP was assumed. When using DCF 
valuations the mean annual retum for long-short portfolios formed according to deciles was 
4.9, 2.3 and 2.1 percent for CAP assumptions of 10, 20 and 30 years. But for portfolios 
formed from growth stocks we observe an increase in mean retums with an increase in the 
assumed CAP. Again referring to DCF valuations, the portfolios formed from deciles had 
mean retums of 7.7, 7.8 and 8.4 percent for CAP assumptions of 10, 20 and 30 years. Given 
the lack of significant differences in these retums, we cannot make a judgement as to an 
appropriate CAP assumption for growth or value stocks in the future. All we can conclude, is 
that during the period under study, it would have been worthwhile to value high-growth 
stocks using a long CAP assumption, and equally worthwhile to assume a short CAP to value 
low-growth stocks. 
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Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
I account for the value-growth preference in two ways. First, I measure the performance of 
investment portfolios formed within sub-samples partitioned on the basis of size and the 
market-to-book equity ratio, as well as sub-samples formed on the basis of industry growth 
expectations. Second, in Sub-section 5.2 I control for these factors by estimating the intercept 
term on regressions of retums on a four-factor model, where the explanatory factors are 
market retums, size, the book-to-market ratio and momentum. 
5.1.2 Four sub-samples partitioned on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio 
The year-by-year performance of investment portfolios formed on the basis of value relative 
to price suggests the valuations favour the purchase of value stocks. Analysis of portfolio 
characteristics supports this contention. Table 2.14 presents the mean market capitalisation 
and market-to-book ratio of stocks in each decile after ranking according to value/price. 
Table 2.14 
Mean market capitalisation and market-to-book ratio of stocks according to decile rankings of value/price 
In each year, I ranked stocks according to value/price, where value is estimated using a DCF or Decision-tree valuation 
model, and share price is the closing price at 30 April. I formed portfolios after grouping the stocks into deciles. Table 2.14 
shows the annual mean market capitalisation and market-to-book equity ratio for each decile portfolio formed under each 
valuation method, and each assumption regarding the competitive advantage period (10, 20 or 30 years). The final column 
shows the ratio of annual mean market capitalisation or market-to-book ratio for stocks ranked in the top and bottom decile. 
The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, 
representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Decile 1 
Mean market caoitalisation 
DCF(CAP=10) 2,8 
DCF(CAP=20) 2.8 
DCF(CAP=30) 2.7 
DT(CAP=10) 2.7 
DT (CAP=20) 2.9 
DT (CAP=30) 2.8 
2 
($b) 
3.7 
4.0 
4.2 
3.8 
3.7 
3.7 
3 
5.2 
4.9 
5.1 
5.1 
4.7 
4.5 
4 
6.9 
7.4 
7.3 
7.1 
6.1 
6.1 
5 
8.6 
8.6 
8.7 
8.5 
8.3 
7.5 
6 
11.3 
11.1 
10.7 
9.6 
8.9 
9.1 
7 
10.5 
10.9 
11.4 
10.7 
10.8 
10.0 
8 
12.1 
12.3 
13.4 
12.2 
11.7 
13.7 
9 
14.6 
15.1 
14.7 
15.0 
16.3 
15.6 
10 1 
16.9 
15.4 
14.3 
18.0 
19.2 
19.6 
1/10 
0.17 
0.18 
0.19 
0.15 
0.15 
0.14 
Mean market-to-book ratio 
DCF (CAP=10) 2.1 
DCF (CAP=20) 2.3 
DCF (CAP=30) 2.5 
DT(CAP=10) 2.1 
DT (CAP=20) 2.6 
DT (CAP=30) 2.8 
2.0 
2.1 
2.5 
2.1 
2.1 
2.6 
2.9 
2.9 
2.6 
2.8 
3.0 
2.7 
3.2 
3.4 
3.4 
3.1 
3.1 
3.4 
3.1 
3.3 
3.5 
3.3 
3.5 
3.4 
4.1 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.6 
3.8 
4.1 
4.3 
4.5 
4.3 
4.0 
4.0 
4.9 
5.1 
5.1 
5.0 
4.9 
5.3 
5.5 
5.4 
5.2 
5.7 
6.1 
5.3 
9.0 
8.3 
7.7 
8.8 
8.2 
7.8 
0.23 
0.28 
0.33 
0.24 
0.31 
0.36 1 
The data in Table 2.14 provides important information on two fronts. Clearly, the 
fundamental valuation models identify small stocks, and low market-to-book stocks as being 
undervalued. On average, stocks ranked in the top decile according to value/price are about 
one-sixth the size of stocks ranked in the bottom decile, and have market-to-book ratios 
roughly one-quarter of those in the bottom decile. However, the preference for low market-to-
book stocks declines as the assumed competitive advantage period increases. This occurs 
because, with a longer CAP, firms are assumed to maintain high revenue growth and margins 
for longer, thereby making growth stocks appear relatively more valuable. 
Given that the valuation models clearly identify small stocks and low market-to-book stocks 
as relatively undervalued, I address two issues. First, do we observe the comparable 
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investment performance across sub-samples partitioned according to size and the market-to-
book ratio; or do we only observe superior performance when we select stock at the extremes 
of the value/growth spectmm? Second, do we observe outperformance after accounting for 
the known explanatory power of size and the market-to-book ratio in explaining retums? I 
address the second question in Sub-section 5.2. Below, I assess the performance of four equal-
sized sub-samples formed on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio. In each year, I 
divided the sample in two, according to the median market-to-book ratio, and then split these 
samples in two according to their median market capitalisation. So, we have the following 
investment portfolios: 
1. Small, low market-to-book stocks; 
2. Large, low market-to-book stocks; 
3. Small, high market-to-book stocks; 
4. Large high market-to-book stocks. 
Table 2.15 summarises the investment performance of these portfolios, assuming a 
competitive advantage period of 30 years. Columns 2-11 present the mean annual retums and 
Sharpe ratios, and column 12 shows the number of times there was a significant difference {p-
value <= 0.10) between deciles in the expected direction. Recall that there are 45 comparisons 
and the/?-values refer to two-tailed significance tests. So we would expect to see no more than 
2-3 instances of significant t-statistics in the expected direction. Columns 13-16 show the 
performance of long-short portfolios formed on the basis of the top and bottom quintiles. I 
selected quintiles in this instance to ensure the portfolios were of a size somewhat comparable 
to those held by investment managers. Portfolio size ranges from 27 to 94 stocks. I show the 
mean annual retum and information ratio, as well as the/>-value of Mests of whether the mean 
is significantly different from zero. 
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Table 2.15 
Portfolio performance amongst sub-samples formed on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio 
assuming a competitive advantage period of 30 years 
In each year, I partitioned the sample into four equal-sized sub-samples according to size and the market-to-book equity ratio. 
First, in each year I formed two equal-sized groups after ranking stocks according to market-to-book equity. Second, within 
those groups, I ranked stocks according to market capitalisation. For each of the four sub-samples in each year, I ranked 
stocks according to value/price, where value is estimated using a DCF or Decision-tree valuation model, and share price is 
the closing price at 30 April. Valuations assumed a competitive advantage period of 30 years. The table presents the mean 
annual retums to stocks in each decile and the mean Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio in each year is the mean annual retum 
minus the risk-free rate, divided by the annualised standard deviation of monthly retums. The risk-free rate is the yield on 10-
year US Treasury bonds, computed on a continuously-compounded basis. I compared the mean annual retums and Sharpe 
ratios across deciles and tested for a significant difference in means. In each case, there are 45 tests for difference in means. 
Column 12 labelled "N/45" shows the number of cases in which (1) there was a difference in means that was statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level for a two-tailed test; and (2) this difference was in the expected direction (higher mean for 
stocks ranked in higher deciles according to the value/price ratio. I also formed long-short portfolios according to quintiles 
and computed the mean annual retums to these portfolios. Columns 13-14 present these mean retums and thep-value for a 
two-tailed test of significance. For these long-short portfolios, I computed the information ratio in each year, which is the 
annual retum divided by the standard deviation of monthly retums. I then computed the mean information ratio for the 18 
years of retums. Columns 15-16 present these mean information ratios and the p-value for a two-tailed test against an 
expected value of zero. The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years 
from 1987-2004, representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Mean annual returns (%) and mean Sharpe ratios 
(In each section, returns are in the upper two rows; Sharpe ratios 
Decile 1 2 3 
(1) Small, low market-to-book 
DCF 14.4 18.5 16.9 
DT 16.2 13.5 15.3 
DCF 0.81 0.83 0.79 
DT 0,75 0.64 0.75 
(2) Larae, low market-to-book 
DCF 12.5 10.9 10.9 
DT 13.2 9.7 10.6 
DCF 0,69 0,55 0.50 
DT 0.71 0,47 0.48 
(3) Small, hiah market-to-book 
DCF 14.0 14.7 17,8 
DT 13.1 18.1 13.7 
DCF 0.53 0,46 0.68 
DT 0.47 0.61 0.44 
(4) Larae, hiah market-to-book 
DCF 6.8 9.8 6.3 
DT 6.6 10.0 7.3 
DCF 0.18 0.32 0.13 
DT 0.19 0.32 0.25 
are in 
4 
11.7 
15.7 
0.65 
0.80 
9.5 
12.0 
0.43 
0.61 
11.7 
13.8 
0.39 
0.56 
10.5 
9.5 
0.49 
0,43 
the lower two 
5 
14,1 
13,3 
0.63 
0.55 
11.1 
9.5 
0.49 
0.35 
13.8 
12.1 
0.53 
0.48 
8.6 
8.9 
0.31 
0.44 
6 
12.3 
12.4 
0.61 
0.59 
10.1 
10.7 
0.46 
0.52 
14.3 
12.0 
0.51 
0.39 
7.7 
9.3 
0.40 
0.35 
rows) 
7 
13.7 
13.6 
0.56 
0.59 
10.7 
10.6 
0.53 
0.45 
7.8 
12.5 
0.25 
0.48 
8.5 
9.0 
0.39 
0.41 
8 
15.1 
14.3 
0.90 
0.74 
8.8 
8.7 
0.31 
0.33 
11.1 
15.0 
0.45 
0.69 
10.5 
10.2 
0.46 
0.38 
9 
12.0 
15,4 
0.54 
0.72 
11.7 
11.2 
0.40 
0.35 
14.1 
8.5 
0.42 
0.25 
9.6 
6.1 
0.41 
0.15 
10 
15.7 
14,1 
0.58 
0.59 
8,5 
8,8 
0,30 
0.28 
8,4 
8.7 
0.33 
0.32 
4.4 
5.9 
0.17 
0.19 
N/45 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
4 
4 
6 
7 
3 
4 
3 
0 
2 
1 
Return to 
long-short 
quintile 
Mean 
2.6 
0.1 
1.6 
1.5 
3.1 
6.9 
1.3 
2.2 
P 
0.42 
0.98 
0.55 
0.55 
0,55 
0.48 
0.70 
0.70 
Informaiion i 
ratio 
Mean 
0.11 
0.03 
0.34 
0.40 
0.18 
0.55 
0.00 
0.09 
P 
0.62 
0.93 
0.25 
0.19 
0.57 
0.06 
1.00 
0.74 
The results presented in Table 2.15 suggest that the fundamental investment strategies were 
most effective when used to select amongst small, growth stocks. If we compare the mean 
retums across deciles we see there were six or seven instances in which the mean retums were 
significantly greater for stocks ranked in higher deciles, compared to an expected number of 
2-3. This outperformance is mitigated to some degree when portfolio volatility is considered, 
as there were 3 or 4 instances in which the mean Sharpe ratio is significantly greater for a 
high-ranked decile. In addition, the mean information ratio for long-short quintile portfolios 
formed using Decision-tree valuations is 0.55, which is significantly greater than zero with a 
p-value of 0.06. 
The other sub-sample in which there is some evidence of outperformance is the portfolio of 
large, low market-to-book stocks. The primary benefit in this case appears to be risk-
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reduction, as there are no cases in which stocks ranked in a higher decile according to 
value/price have significantly higher mean retums than those ranked in a lower decile. 
However, for both the DCF and Decision-tree based portfolios, there are four instances in 
which the Sharpe ratio is higher for portfolios in a higher decile. The highest mean Sharpe 
ratios are 0.69 and 0.71, both achieved by stocks ranked in decile 1. 
These results are informative because the two sub-samples in which there is evidence of 
outperformance are not at the extremes of the standard value/growth dichotomy. For small, 
low market-to-book stocks, there is weak evidence of higher investment retums from a 
fundamental investment strategy (three significant mean retum comparisons) but there are no 
instances in which there was a significant difference in mean Sharpe ratios. For large, high 
market-to-book stocks we observe a comparable result, with the number of significant mean 
Sharpe ratio comparisons still below the threshold we would observe by chance. 
In sum, the results presented in Sub-section 5.1 suggest that risk-adjusted performance is 
achievable. This performance was most consistent amongst small, growth stocks. However, 
there was no evidence of outperformance amongst large growth stocks or small value stocks. 
Any additional retums from selecting stocks from these sub-samples appears attributable to 
their greater risk. In the following section I continue to examine the relationship between 
portfolio performance, size and the market-to-book ratio in a linear regression framework. 
5.2 Regression results 
In Sub-section 5.11 analysed the performance of investment portfolios on a raw returns and 
risk-adjusted basis, where is risk as measured as the volatility of monthly returns. In this 
section, I analyse portfolio performance from the perspective of a portfolio manager whose 
objective is to maximise "alpha" - the retums above the expected retum, given factors known 
to be associated with retums. The expected retums model I use incorporates four factors, 
market risk, size, the book-to-market ratio and retums momentum. The association between 
retums the first three factors was quantified by Fama and French (1992, 1993) and has 
become known in the literature as the Fama-French three factor-model. Carhart (1997) 
documented a positive association between mutual fiind retums and the retums of their 
underlying stocks over the previous 12 months. Controlling for momentum has now become 
standard in the literature, but the measurement of this factor varies. 
In this section my analysis is independent of whether these factors are measuring risk, or 
whether they simply capture characteristics of undervalued stocks. The issue here is simply to 
determine whether a fiindamental investment strategy is able to eam excess retums over that 
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of a trading strategy based on the four factors listed above. In Sub-section 5.3,1 discuss the 
issue of whether size and the book-to-market are likely to capture an equity risk factor, and 
the likely impact on the cost of capital. This discussion focuses on their association with 
credit ratings. 
As with the analysis summarised in Sub-section 5.1,1 formed long-short portfolios each year, 
after ranking stocks according to value/price using both the DCF and Decision-tree valuation 
methods, under three assumptions regarding the competitive advantage period (10, 20 or 30 
years). I then regressed these portfolios' 216 monthly retums on the four-factor model below: 
K. - Kt.. \ - Ru = « + M^ '" - ^/)- + '^^^^ + ^ ™ '^ + "^^^ '^ + ^ ' (2.68) 
where: 
R^-Rf = the retum to a value-weighted portfolio of all US-listed stocks minus the risk-free 
rate; 
SMB = the average retum on three equally-weighted portfolios of small stocks minus the 
average return to three equally-weighted portfolio of big stocks (the three portfolios in each 
case refer to those classed as value, neutral and growth based on their book-to-market ratios); 
HML = the average retum to two equally-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market equity 
stocks minus the average retum to two equally-weighted portfolios of low market-to-book 
equity stocks (the two portfolios in each case refer to those classified as small and large, based 
on their market capitalisation); and 
MOM = the average return to two portfolios with high cumulative retums from 12 to 2 
months prior to the retums month, minus the average returns to two equally-weighted 
portfolios of stocks with low cumulative returns for the same prior period (stocks classified as 
having high cumulative retums are above the 70 percentile of stock retums while stock 
classified as having low cumulative retums are below the 30* percentile; the two portfolios in 
each case refer to those classed as small and large according to market capitalisation). 
These factors are the same as those used in the studies by Fama and French and were 
downloaded from Ken French's website. I converted the retums to continuous time so they 
are measured on a comparable basis to the retums reported in Sub-section 5.1.1 also 
conducted the analysis with all retums measured in discrete time. This had no material impact 
on the results. I repeated the analysis by regressing the portfolios' 18 annual retums on annual 
factors. In this instance, I omitted the market retums variable, due to a general lack of 
significance of the beta coefficient and its negative impact on explanatory power, due to a 
reduction in degrees of freedom. I performed this analysis on the fiill sample, the four sub-
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samples based on size and the market-to-book ratio, and on two sub-samples formed on the 
basis of industry growth characteristics. 
The results provide evidence of outperformance, even after controlling for the four 
explanatory factors. For the fiill sample, the intercept term was in the range of 0.40 to 0.57 for 
portfolios formed on the basis of the top and bottom deciles of stocks. The magnitude of these 
coefficients increases with an increase in the assumed competitive advantage period, with 
statistical significance also improving. But there is no significant difference between the 
estimated intercept terms. Therefore, we cannot conclude that future portfolio performance is 
likely to be enhanced by assuming a longer CAP in valuations. All the results imply is that 
this assumption would have resulted in higher excess retums over the 18-year period under 
study. 
For the sub-samples formed on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio, the only 
significant intercept terms from the monthly retums regressions are drawn from the sub-
sample of small, high market-to-book stocks. This is consistent with the evidence presented in 
Sub-section 5.1.2. For the annual retums results there are also significant intercept terms 
amongst both low market-to-book sub-samples. Finally, there is no material difference in 
excess retums amongst the sub-samples formed according to revenue growth. 
5.2.1 Full sample 
Table 2.16 presents the regression results for the full sample. For portfolios formed on the 
basis of the top and bottom deciles according to value/price, we observe significant intercept 
teuns from the regressions of monthly retums. The highest intercept term of 0.57 percent is 
obtained when the Decision-tree valuation model is used, with a CAP assumption of 30 years. 
Intercept terms consistently increase with the CAP assumption, but remain insignificantly 
different from each other, and explanatory power decreases. We also observe a decrease in 
exposure to the HML factor. This is consistent with the evidence presented earlier that 
increasing the CAP assumption reduces the portfolio bias towards low market-to-book stocks. 
But there is no material change in exposure to the size factor. The negative beta coefficients 
mean that the valuation techniques typically identified stocks as relatively undervalued if they 
had less exposure to the market. The coefficients range from -0.09 to -0.19, which translates 
to a cost of equity differential of around 0.5 to 1.0 percent, when applied to an equity risk 
premium of 6 percent. 
Referring to the results of portfolios formed from the top and bottom quintiles, and the top 
and bottom 30 percent of stocks, we see intercept terms decrease and lose statistical 
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significance for most portfolios. Note that for consistency I have used two-tailed significance 
tests throughout the paper. So the/7-values of 0.15-0.23 for the portfolios formed from the 
30/40/30 split correspond to an estimated probability of around 8-12 percent that a 
fundamental investment strategy is actually detrimental to performance. 
The results from the regressions on annual retums are consistent with those from the monthly 
retums, but explanatory power increases. As the CAP assumption increases we see the same 
decreased exposure to the HML factor as well as some reduction in exposure to the size factor. 
5.2.2 Four sub-samples partitioned on the basis of size and the market-to-book ratio 
Tuming to the analysis of sub-samples formed on the basis of size and the market-to-book 
ratio, we observe significant alphas from the monthly regressions only from the sub-sample of 
small, high market-to-book stocks. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Sub-
section 5.1.2. In that section, I compared the annual retums and Sharpe ratios amongst deciles 
formed each year according to rankings of value/price. This analysis showed significantly 
higher raw and risk-adjusted performance amongst stocks ranked in higher deciles, primarily 
concentrated in this sub-sample. Further, this was the only sub-sample which had a 
significantly positive mean information ratio for a long-short portfolio formed on the basis of 
quintiles. 
In Table 2.17, we see that there are three significant intercept terms obtained from the long-
short portfolios formed from deciles, and one significant intercept term obtained from the 
long-short portfolios formed from quintiles. There are a fiirther three occasions in which the 
p-value associated with the intercept term is less than 0.2, which is consistent with there being 
a less than 10 percent chance that detrimental performance is likely to occur. We also see that 
the two high market-to-book portfolios have the most exposure to the HML factor. This 
implies that, within the broader class of high market-to-book stocks, there was a segment 
whose market values differed from theoretical values by a particularly large margin. 
The annual regression results are broadly consistent with those of the monthly regression 
results. However, we do observe some significant intercept terms amongst the two portfolios 
of low market-to-book stocks. However, once we consider the totality of the evidence - the 
mean retums and Sharpe ratios from Section 5.1.2, and the monthly and annual regression 
results - the most consistent performance of the investment strategy is found amongst the 
small, high market-to-book sub-sample. What is equally clear is the lack of evidence of 
outperformance amongst large, high market-to-book stocks, which are likely to comprise a 
substantial portion of investment portfolios. Amongst this sub-sample there were few 
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instances of significantly higher mean Sharpe ratios amongst higher-ranking deciles and no 
significant intercept terms amongst the regressions. 
5.2.3 Two sub-samples partitioned on the basis of high- and low-growth industries 
Finally, I conducted the same analysis on sub-samples formed on the basis of high- and low-
growth industries, where high-growth industries were defined to be those from the 
Technology, Healthcare and Consumer Services sectors. Amongst the high-growth industry 
sub-sample, there is a clear preference in the portfolios for small, low market-to-book stocks, 
as shown by the large coefficients on SMB and HML. There remains evidence of 
outperformance, as shown by several significant intercept terms on the monthly regressions. 
There is more consistent evidence of outperformance amongst portfolios formed from the 
high-growth portfolios. For stocks selected from this sub-sample, intercept terms are generally 
higher when compared to stocks selected from the low-growth sub-sample using the same 
methodology. For instance, when stocks were selected from the top and bottom deciles 
according to Decision-tree value/price, the intercept term from the monthly regression was 
0.69, compared to 0.36 for that obtained from the low-growth sub-sample using the same 
valuation method. This relationship is maintained for the majority of comparisons. But none 
of these comparisons are statistically significant. Thus, the relative outperformance amongst 
portfolios formed from growth stocks could simply be due to the volatile retums accming to 
these stocks from 1998-2001. All we can conclude is that, during a period in which retums to 
growth stocks were particularly volatile, a fundamental investment strategy would have 
achieved relatively better performance amongst high-growth rather than low-growth stocks. 
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Table 2.16 
Regression results - Full sample 
Table 2.16 presenU the results of regression analysis where the dependent variable is retums to long-short portfolios formed 
on the basis of value relative to price. These portfolios are equally-weighted and comprise either the top and bottom 10, 20 or 
30 percent of stocks ranked by value/price on 30 April each year from 1987-2004. The independent variables are R„ - /{y(the 
retxuTi to a value-weighted portfolio of all US-listed stocks minus the risk-free rate), SMB (the return to an equally-weighted 
portfolio of small slocks minus the return to an equally-weighted portfolio of big stocks), HML (the retum to an equally-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market equity stocks minus the return to a portfolio of low market-to-book equity stocks), 
and MOM (the retum to a an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks with high cumulative retums from 12 to 2 months prior to 
portfolio formation, minus the remrns to an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks with low cumulative retums). The 
regressions are conducted using both monthly and annual retums. Hence, the regression model is: 
[Kng - ^shor, ) - ^ / , = ^ + ^{^n, " ^f ); + sSMB^ "I" hHML. + mMOM. + £. where / refers to month 1 
to 216 or year 1 to 18. In the regressions on annual retums, the market retums variable is omitted due to a general lack of 
statistical significance and its negative impact on explanatory power. The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 
and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Panel A: Montlily returns 
e 
M 3 C 
1 
' -
e 
« 
inu
 
E 
2 
e 
flO 
w 
3 
e 1 
2 
CAP (yrs) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R' (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R' (%) 
DCF valuations 
10 20 
0,41 0,47 
(0.08) (0.04) 
-0.17 -0.19 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.36 0,33 
(0,00) (0.00) 
0.84 0,68 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.05 -0,09 
(0,30) (0,07) 
45 38 
0,28 0,26 
(0.09) (0,13) 
-0,15 -0,14 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.30 0.29 
(0.00) (0,00) 
0,67 0,61 
(0,00) (0,00) 
-0.08 -0.06 
(0.01) (0.09) 
50 45 
0.18 0.19 
(0.17) (0.15) 
-0.13 -0.10 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.26 0.25 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0,58 0.52 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.05 -0.04 
(0.04) (0.10) 
55 50 
30 
0.49 
(0.03) 
-0,14 
(0,01) 
0,32 
(0,00) 
0,60 
(0,00) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
32 
0.23 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.03) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.52 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
35 
0.17 
(0.18) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
42 
Decision-tree valuations 
10 20 
0.40 0.49 
(0.08) (0.04) 
-0.15 -0.15 
(0.01) (0.01) 
0.40 0.35 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.84 0.64 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.06 -0.05 
(0.18) (0.25) 
44 32 
0.28 0.23 
(0.09) (0.15) 
-0.14 -0.07 
(0.00) (0.06) 
0.34 0.33 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.67 0.58 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.07 -0.05 
(0.04) (0.10) 
52 42 
0.18 0.18 
(0.17) (0.17) 
-0.11 -0.06 
(0.00) (0.07) 
0.27 0.29 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.57 0.49 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.05 -0.03 
(0.06) (0.22) 
55 44 
30 
0,57 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0,13) 
0,37 
(0,00) 
0,51 
(0,00) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
22 
0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
(0.62) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.56) 
26 
0.16 
(0.23) 
0,00 
(0.90) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(041) 
30 
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Panel B: Annual 
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CAP (yrs) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R' (%) 
DCF valuations 
10 20 
5.92 7.14 
(0.15) (0.06) 
0.60 0.56 
(0.05) (0.04) 
0.86 0.66 
(0.00) (0.01) 
-0.20 -0.28 
(0.42) (0.22) 
66 67 
4.34 3.69 
(0.15) (0.22) 
0.58 0.50 
(0.01) (0.02) 
0.64 0.65 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.18 -0.16 
(0.33) (0.37) 
73 70 
3.52 3.42 
(0.18) (0.13) 
0.56 0.48 
(0.01) (0.01) 
0.53 0.52 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.16 -0.16 
(0.31) (0.24) 
74 77 
30 
7.28 
(0.04) 
0.44 
(0.07) 
0.60 
(0.01) 
-0.26 
(0.21) 
64 
4.36 
(0.08) 
0.35 
(0.05) 
0.54 
(0.00) 
-0.26 
(0.09) 
73 
2.97 
(0.13) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.26) 
77 
Decision-tree valuations 
10 20 
5.76 8.16 
(0.15) (0.04) 
0.60 0.52 
(0.04) (0.06) 
0.83 0.65 
(0.00) (0.01) 
-0.19 -0.34 
(0.44) (0.17) 
67 64 
4.51 4.60 
(0.14) (0.07) 
0.61 0.51 
(0.01) (0.01) 
0.63 0.57 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.18 -0.23 
(0.34) (0.13) 
73 78 
3.51 3.64 
(0.17) (0.08) 
0.55 0.44 
(0.01) (0.01) 
0.54 0.50 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.17 -0.19 
(0.28) (0.14) 
75 79 
30 
7.83 
(0.06) 
0.44 
(0.13) 
0.62 
(0.02) 
-0.27 
(0.29) 
54 
4.48 
(0.11) 
0.39 
(0.05) 
0.44 
(0.02) 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
64 
3.38 
(0.13) 
0.35 
(0.03) 
0.41 
(0.01) 
-0,18 
(0.20) 
68 
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Table 2.17 
Regression results - Sample partitioned into four sub-samples on the basis of size and the market-to-book 
ratio 
In each year, I partitioned the sample into four equal-sized sub-samples according to size and the market-to-book equity ratio. 
First, in each year I formed two equal-sized groups after ranking stocks according to market-to-book equity. Second, within 
those groups, I ranked stocks according to market capitalisation. For each of the four sub-samples in each year, I ranked 
stocks according to value/price, where value is estimated using a DCF or Decision-tree valuation model, and share price is 
the closing price at 30 April. Table 2.17 presents the results of regression analysis where the dependent variable is retums to 
long-short portfolios formed on the basis of value relative to price. These portfolios are equally-weighted and comprise either 
the top and bottom 10, 20 or 30 percent of stocks according to this ranking. The independent variables are R„ - /?y(the retum 
to a value-weighted portfolio of all US-listed stocks minus the risk-free rate), SMB (the retum to an equally-weighted 
portfolio of small stocks minus the retum to an equally-weighted portfolio of big stocks), HML (the retum to an equally-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market equity stocks minus the retum to a portfolio of low market-to-book equity stocks), 
and MOM (the retum to a an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks with high cumulative retums from 12 to 2 months prior to 
portfolio formation, minus the retums to an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks with low cumulative returns). The 
regressions are conducted using both monthly and annual retums. Hence, the regression model is: 
[R^^^ _ R^^^^ ) -R^,=a-\- P[R^ - Rf ) . + SSMB, -f- HHML, + mMOM^ + S, where i refers to month 1 
to 216 or year 1 to 18. In the regressions on annual retums, the market retums variable is omitted due to a general lack of 
statistical significance and its negative impact on explanatory power. The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 
and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Panel A: Monthly returns 
o 
(0 
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• 
00 
(0 
3 
C 
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T -
CAP 
Alpha(%) 
p-val 
Beta 
p-val 
SMB 
p-val 
HML 
p-val 
MOM 
p-val 
A-R^(%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-val 
Beta 
p-val 
SMB 
p-val 
HML 
p-val 
MOM 
p-val 
A-R^%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^(%) 
(1) Small, low market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
0.47 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
0,18 
(0.12) 
0,20 
(0.16) 
-0.07 
(0.39) 
3 
0.20 
(0.45) 
-0.15 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0,02) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
8 
0.26 
(0,24) 
-0.14 
(0,01) 
0.06 
(0.37) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0,84) 
6 
20 
0.28 
(0.46) 
-0,05 
(0.61) 
0.21 
(0,06) 
0.32 
(0,02) 
-0.06 
(0,44) 
3 
0.13 
(0.61) 
-0.10 
(0.12) 
0,07 
(0.37) 
0.20 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.75) 
4 
0.16 
(0.44) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.71) 
6 
30 
-0.09 
(0.81) 
-0.06 
(0.52) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
0.25 
(0.05) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
2 
0.15 
(0.56) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.20 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.70) 
3 
0.18 
(0.36) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.89) 
5 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
0.49 
(0.22) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
0.16 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
2 
0.18 
(0.47) 
-0.13 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
0.25 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.84) 
8 
0.24 
(0.26) 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
0,09 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.95) 
8 
20 
0.32 
(0.37) 
-0.03 
(0.76) 
0,22 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0,07) 
-0.09 
(0,24) 
2 
0.07 
(0.76) 
-0.03 
(0.66) 
0,08 
(0.25) 
0.21 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.67) 
2 
0.20 
(0,34) 
-0.08 
(0,12) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0,16 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.54) 
4 
30 
0.21 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.82) 
0.21 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.30) 
-0.07 
(0.33) 
1 
0.01 
(0.98) 
-0.01 
(0.89) 
0.10 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.29) 
0 
0.06 
(0.74) 
-0.02 
(0.69) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
2 
(2) Large, low market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
0.35 
(0.29) 
0.02 
(0.77) 
0.19 
(0.05) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.03) 
6 
0.12 
(0.60) 
-0.03 
(0.59) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
11 
0.15 
(0.38) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
13 
20 
0.23 
(0.46) 
-0.01 
(0.87) 
0.18 
(0.05) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.02) 
6 
0.16 
(0.46) 
-0.04 
(0.45) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0,06 
(0,13) 
10 
0.14 
(0.44) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.27 
(0,00) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
12 
30 
0.36 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
(0.30) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.26 
(0.01) 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
5 
0.10 
(0.63) 
-0.02 
(0.67) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
7 
0.13 
(0.48) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
10 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
0.40 
(0.20) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.03) 
7 
0.17 
(0,44) 
-0.01 
(0.80) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
10 
0.16 
(0,36) 
-0.04 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.14) 
14 
20 
0.26 
(0.35) 
-0.04 
(0.61) 
0.17 
(0.04) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.01) 
6 
0.12 
(0.59) 
0.02 
(0.71) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.02) 
8 
0.12 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
10 
30 
0.39 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.55) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
4 
0.14 
(0.54) 
0.05 
(0.31) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
7 
0.15 
(0.40) 
0.01 
(0.77) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0,19 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
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p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^(%) 
(3) Small, high market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
0.79 
(0.06) 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
0.76 
(0.00) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
23 
0.16 
(0.58) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
25 
0.24 
(0.28) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
29 
20 
0.51 
(0.23) 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
0.24 
(0.05) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.01) 
17 
0.31 
(0.28) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
21 
0.21 
(0.33) 
-0.12 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.01) 
21 
30 
0.50 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
0.21 
(0.07) 
0,52 
(0,00) 
-0.19 
(0.02) 
11 
0.27 
(0.35) 
-0.13 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
14 
0.34 
(0,12) 
-0,09 
(0,10) 
0,09 
(0.14) 
0,31 
(0,00) 
-0,09 
(0,05) 
12 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
0,76 
(0.06) 
-0,25 
(0.01) 
0,16 
(0.16) 
0.76 
(0.00) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
23 
0.25 
(0.36) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
23 
0.31 
(0.13) 
-0,17 
(0,00) 
0,12 
(0,04) 
0,45 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.01) 
30 
20 
0.67 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0,09) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
13 
0.38 
(0,16) 
-0.15 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.04) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
18 
0.24 
(0.24) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0,81) 
12 
30 
0.38 
(0.36) 
-0,05 
(0,60) 
0,21 
(0,08) 
0,43 
(0,00) 
-0,17 
(0,04) 
6 
0.52 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.45) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.64) 
4 
0.27 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0,02 
(0,70) 
2 
(4) Large, high market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
-0,22 
(0,46) 
-0,11 
(0,13) 
0,08 
(0,35) 
0,81 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.75) 
30 
-0.13 
(0.54) 
-0.06 
(0.25) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.62 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.29) 
32 
-0.06 
(0.72) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.38) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.86) 
34 
20 
-0,20 
(0,50) 
-0.04 
(0.58) 
0.02 
(0.77) 
0.63 
(0,00) 
0,04 
(0.54) 
19 
-0,11 
(0,60) 
-0,04 
(0,41) 
0,07 
(0,23) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.92) 
22 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.45) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0,76) 
27 
30 
-0,06 
(0.84) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.04 
(0.66) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.45) 
14 
-0.05 
(0.83) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.38) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.64) 
18 
-0.18 
(0,34) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.39) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.87) 
21 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
-0.30 
(0.34) 
-0.12 
(0,11) 
0.11 
(0,24) 
0.91 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0,31) 
32 
-0,23 
(0,29) 
-0,04 
(0.40) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
31 
-0,05 
(0,74) 
-0,09 
(0,03) 
0,05 
(0,29) 
0,48 
(0,00) 
0,01 
(0,72) 
35 
20 
-0,07 
(0,80) 
-0,02 
(0,82) 
0.03 
(0.75) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.56) 
17 
-0.15 
(0,51) 
-0,02 
(0,71) 
0,12 
(0.08) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.30) 
18 
-0.10 
(0,57) 
-0,05 
(0,20) 
0,05 
(0.34) 
0.39 
(0,00) 
0,00 
(0,98) 
23 
30 
-0,13 
(0,63) 
0.06 
(0.39) 
0.00 
(0.96) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.92) 
7 
0.06 
(0.77) 
-0.03 
(0.63) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
0 36 
ro.oo) 
-0,01 
(0.88) 
11 
-0.03 
(0.88) 
-0.02 
(0.58) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0,70) 
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Panel B: Annual returns 
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Alpha (%) 
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SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adi-R' (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MO^', 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
CAP (yrs) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
Alpha (%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
Adj-R^ (%) 
(1) Small, low market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
10,70 
(0.08) 
0,71 
(0,10) 
-0,64 
(0,10) 
-0.09 
(0.81) 
13 
2.77 
(0.52) 
0.78 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(0,66) 
0,26 
(0,35) 
20 
3,47 
(0,37) 
0,42 
(0,13) 
-0.01 
(0,97) 
0.05 
(0.83) 
1 
20 
8.81 
(0,12) 
1,02 
(0.01) 
-0,44 
(0,21) 
-0.03 
(0.93) 
29 
3.82 
(0.34) 
0.62 
(0,04) 
-0.24 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.76) 
15 
2.52 
(0.43) 
0.49 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.80) 
0.08 
(0.68) 
15 
30 
5.64 
(0.26) 
0.75 
(0.04) 
-0.56 
(0.08) 
-0.23 
(0.45) 
27 
4.43 
(0.31) 
0.66 
(0.04) 
-0.30 
(0.27) 
0.15 
(0.58) 
13 
2.60 
(0.40) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.97) 
0.11 
(0.56) 
18 
(3) Small, high 
DCF valuations 
10 
12.16 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0,77) 
0.84 
(0,11) 
-0,76 
(0.14) 
32 
3,11 
(0,61) 
0,09 
(0.83) 
0,81 
(0,05) 
-0.57 
(0,15) 
36 
3,66 
(0.47) 
0.15 
(0,67) 
0.55 
(0.09) 
-0.34 
(0.28) 
27 
20 
9.24 
(0.23) 
-0.31 
(0.55) 
0.83 
(0.09) 
-0.94 
(0.06) 
32 
5.53 
(0.26) 
-0.03 
(0.93) 
0.65 
(0.05) 
-0.60 
(0.06) 
42 
2.59 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.61 
(0.02) 
-0.30 
(0.22) 
40 
30 
7.52 
(0.19) 
-0.42 
(0.29) 
0.64 
(0.08) 
-0.67 
(0.07) 
27 
5.15 
(0,24) 
-0,06 
(0,83) 
0,71 
(0.02) 
-0.63 
(0.03) 
53 
4.07 
(0.24) 
-0.07 
(0.76) 
0.58 
(0.02) 
-0.31 
(0.16) 
40 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
10.69 
(0.09) 
0.74 
(0.09) 
-0.75 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.90) 
16 
3.14 
(0.44) 
0.71 
(0,02) 
-0,18 
(0.47) 
0,23 
(0,36) 
18 
3,39 
(0,34) 
0.41 
(0.11) 
0,11 
(0,63) 
0,01 
(0.98) 
13 
20 
8.97 
(0.06) 
0,81 
(0,02) 
-0,53 
(0,08) 
-0.06 
(0.84) 
29 
3.19 
(0.35) 
0.66 
(0.01) 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0,63) 
25 
3,43 
(0.28) 
0.54 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.86) 
0.04 
(0.85) 
24 
market-to-book 
Decision-tree 
10 
10.54 
(0.15) 
-0,02 
(0.97) 
0.98 
(0.04) 
-0.69 
(0.14) 
36 
4.09 
(0.44) 
-0.06 
(0.86) 
0.70 
(0.05) 
-0.55 
(0.11) 
35 
4.46 
(0.28) 
0.05 
(0.85) 
0.51 
(0.06) 
-0.33 
(0.20) 
32 
20 
9.22 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.56) 
0.81 
(0.01) 
-0.77 
(0.02) 
54 
5,99 
(0,12) 
0,03 
(0.91) 
0.57 
(0.02) 
-0.47 
(0.05) 
50 
3.49 
(0.24) 
-0.12 
(0.55) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
-0.28 
(0.14) 
40 
30 
5.16 
(0.33) 
0.46 
(0.22) 
-0.30 
(0.37) 
-0.03 
(0,93) 
-4 
4,91 
(0.20) 
0.56 
(0.05) 
-0.41 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.55) 
23 
2.66 
(0.27) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.36) 
-0.04 
(0.79) 
37 
valns 
30 
7.18 
(0.12) 
-0.23 
(0.45) 
0.74 
(0.02) 
-0.76 
(0.01) 
53 
8.02 
(0.02) 
-0.33 
(0.14) 
0.53 
(0.02) 
-0.50 
(0.02) 
47 
5.03 
(0.05) 
-0.20 
(0.23) 
0.31 
(0.05) 
-0.32 
(0.04) 
35 
(2) Large, low market-to-book 
DCF valuations 
10 
7.77 
(0.16) 
0.36 
(0,34) 
0,41 
(0,23) 
-0.47 
(0.18) 
32 
4.27 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
0.34 
(0.11) 
-0.32 
(0.13) 
45 
4.36 
(0.08) 
0.19 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
-0.29 
(0.07) 
45 
20 
5.80 
(0.23) 
0.32 
(0,34) 
0.43 
(0.16) 
-0.48 
(0.12) 
40 
4.32 
(0,14) 
0,23 
(0,25) 
0,31 
(0,10) 
-0,31 
(0,09) 
48 
4,05 
(0.09) 
0,13 
(0,41) 
0,19 
(0,21) 
-0,29 
(0,06) 
42 
30 
6.90 
(0.12) 
0.38 
(0.21) 
0.35 
(0.20) 
-0.41 
(0.14) 
41 
4.02 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
39 
3.94 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.57) 
0.17 
(0.23) 
-0.30 
(0.05) 
39 
(4) Large, high 
DCF valuations 
10 
-5.73 
(0.37) 
-0.10 
(0.82) 
1.22 
(0.01) 
0,00 
(0,99) 
33 
-3.27 
(0,43) 
-0,04 
(0.88) 
0.85 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.90) 
37 
-1.38 
(0.67) 
-0.05 
(0,83) 
0.53 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.86) 
24 
20 
-1,40 
(0.39) 
-0.53 
(0,15) 
1,14 
(0,00) 
-0.20 
(0.52) 
42 
-2.34 
(0.60) 
-0.19 
(0.55) 
0.67 
(0,03) 
-0,08 
(0,79) 
17 
-2,40 
(0,45) 
-0.04 
(0.85) 
0.53 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
24 
30 
-4.42 
(0.44) 
-0.43 
(0,28) 
1.05 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.94) 
27 
-2.78 
(0.53) 
-0.16 
(0.61) 
0.64 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
15 
-3.78 
(0.34) 
-0,12 
(0.65) 
0.54 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
12 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
8.50 
(0.10) 
0.35 
(0,31) 
0,32 
(0.30) 
-0.44 
(0.16) 
32 
5.08 
(0,14) 
0,21 
(0,38) 
0.35 
(0.11) 
-0.40 
(0.07) 
46 
4.72 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.33) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
-0.31 
(0.05) 
48 
20 
5.87 
(0,16) 
0.37 
(0,19) 
0,26 
(0,30) 
-0,38 
(0.14) 
39 
3,50 
(0,27) 
0,08 
(0,73) 
0.39 
(0.06) 
-0.37 
(0.07) 
43 
4.13 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.55) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.31 
(0.03) 
47 
market-to-book 
30 
6.16 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.47) 
0.36 
(0.19) 
-0.32 
(0.24) 
27 
3.76 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
0.27 
(0.15) 
-0.39 
(0.05) 
37 
4.20 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.61) 
0,17 
(0.18) 
-0.39 
(0.01) 
47 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
-6.72 
(0.29) 
-0.15 
(0.73) 
1.31 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.94) 
36 
-3.86 
(0.40) 
-0.19 
(0.56) 
0.86 
(0.01) 
-0,07 
(0,81) 
31 
-1.35 
(0.69) 
-0.07 
(0.76) 
0.58 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.82) 
27 
20 
-3.06 
(0.60) 
-0.55 
(0.19) 
1.11 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.60) 
32 
-3.32 
(0.49) 
-0.36 
(0.30) 
0.84 
(0.01) 
-0.12 
(0.70) 
26 
-1.77 
(0.60) 
-0.12 
(0.61) 
0.48 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.78) 
16 
30 
-4.59 
(0.43) 
-0.73 
(0.08) 
0.95 
(0.02) 
-0.16 
(0.66) 
26 
-1.50 
(0.73) 
-0.29 
(0.34) 
0.64 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.90) 
15 
-1.37 
(0,72) 
-0.28 
(0.31) 
0,39 
(0,12) 
-0,09 
(0,72) 
2 
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Table 2.18 
Regression results for high- and low-growth industries 
I partitioned the sample into two sub-samples based on initial growth rates for the stocks' IBES industry sectors. High-growth 
sectors are Technology, Healthcare and Consumer Services and low-growth sectors are Basic Industries, Capital goods. 
Consumer durables, Consumer non-durables. Energy, Finance, Transport and Utilities. Table 2.18 presents the results of 
regression analysis where the dependent variable is retums to long-short portfolios formed on the basis of value relative to 
price. These portfolios are equally-weighted and comprise either the top and bottom 10, 20 or 30 percent of stocks according 
to this ranking. The independent variables are /?„ - R/ (the retum to a value-weighted portfolio of all US-listed stocks minus 
the risk-free rate), SMB (the retum to an equally-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus the retum to an equally-weighted 
portfolio of big stocks), HML (the retum to an equally-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market equity stocks minus the 
retum to a portfolio of low market-to-book equity stocks), and MOM (the retum to a an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks 
with high cumulative retums from 12 to 2 months prior to portfolio formation, minus the retums to an equally-weighted 
portfolio of stocks with low cumulative retums). The regressions are conducted using both monthly and annual returns. 
Hence, the regression model is: 
(^/o/)g ~ Khort )i ~ Rf,i = <3f + P{R„ -Rf) + SSMB^ -I- hHMLi + mMOM, + £, where / refers to month 1 
to 216 or year 1 to 18. In the regressions on annual retums, the market retums variable is omitted due to a general lack of 
statistical significance and its negative impact on explanatory power. The valuation models are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 
and 2.9. The sample comprises 9427 firm-years from 1987-2004, representing 1049 individual stocks. 
Panel A: Monthly returns 
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CAP 
(yrs) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
Beta 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
(1) High growth industries 
DCF valuations 
10 
0.45 
(0.23) 
-0.19 
(0.03) 
0.53 
(0.00) 
1.08 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
33 
0.43 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.04) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
0.86 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
37 
0.19 
(0.38) 
-0.06 
(0.23) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.80 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
41 
20 
0.51 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.01) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.90 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.37) 
28 
0.26 
(0.35) 
-0.07 
(0.29) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.82 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
32 
0.16 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.76 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
38 
30 
0.57 
(0.11) 
-0.20 
(0.02) 
0.52 
(0.00) 
0.85 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.40) 
26 
0.31 
(0.25) 
-0.07 
(0.31) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.28) 
25 
0.17 
(0.43) 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.04) 
31 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
0.33 
(0.37) 
-0.16 
(0.07) 
0.59 
(0.00) 
1.15 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.51) 
35 
0.40 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
0.90 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.03) 
40 
0.15 
(0.50) 
-0.05 
(0.38) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
42 
20 
0.55 
(0.11) 
-0.19 
(0.02) 
0.54 
(0.00) 
0.84 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.67) 
27 
0.26 
(0.33) 
-0.07 
(0.26) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.20) 
32 
0.13 
(0.53) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.73 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
37 
30 
0.69 
(0.05) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
0.55 
(0.00) 
0.71 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.55) 
21 
0.22 
(0.43) 
-0.03 
(0.64) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.90) 
25 
0.17 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.49) 
27 
(2) Low-growth industries 
DCF valuations 
10 
0.46 
(0.04) 
-0,09 
(0.10) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
17 
0.26 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
22 
0.18 
(0.21) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
26 
20 
0.28 
(0.18) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
20 
0.25 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
21 
0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
22 
30 
0.24 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
20 
0.17 
(0.30) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
18 
0.12 
(0.39) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
20 
Decision-tree valns 
10 
0.41 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
19 
0.26 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
23 
0.18 
(0.20) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
27 
20 
0.30 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.05) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
19 
0.19 
(0.24) 
-0.05 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
22 
0.14 
(0.32) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
22 
30 
0.36 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
19 
0.11 
(0.52) 
-0.01 
(0.88) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.01) 
18 
0.11 
(0.43) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
19 
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Panel B: Annual returns 
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Alpha(%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^(%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
Alpha(%) 
p-value 
SMB 
p-value 
HML 
p-value 
MOM 
p-value 
A-R^ (%) 
7.01 
(0.23) 
0.81 
(0.05) 
1.03 
(0.01) 
-0.30 
(0.43) 
58 
5.44 
(0.22) 
1,10 
(0,00) 
0.80 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.94) 
69 
2.10 
(0.59) 
0.88 
(0.00) 
0.85 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.92) 
70 
8.37 
(0.16) 
0.75 
(0.07) 
0.90 
(0.03) 
-0.38 
(0.34) 
52 
2.32 
(0.57) 
0.90 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
-0,04 
(0.89) 
72 
1.40 
(0.71) 
0.76 
(0.01) 
0.86 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
68 
8.28 
(0.16) 
0.63 
(0.12) 
0.84 
(0.03) 
-0.30 
(0.44) 
46 
4,91 
(0.23) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
0.86 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.34) 
66 
1.69 
(0,66) 
0.78 
(0,01) 
0.70 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
63 
6.30 
(0.27) 
0.90 
(0.03) 
1.14 
(0.01) 
-0.32 
(0.41) 
63 
4.54 
(0.29) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.95 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.83) 
72 
1.93 
(0.61) 
0.88 
(0.00) 
0.89 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.82) 
72 
9.54 
(0.12) 
0.80 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.03) 
-0.45 
(0.26) 
55 
4.12 
(0,27) 
0.92 
(0.00) 
0.79 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.68) 
73 
2.27 
(0.49) 
0.90 
(0.00) 
0.77 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.81) 
77 
11.49 
(0.05) 
0.68 
(0.08) 
0.84 
(0.03) 
-0.52 
(0.17) 
55 
4.05 
(0.29) 
0.84 
(0,00) 
0.73 
(0.01) 
-0,13 
(0.61) 
69 
2.80 
(0.39) 
0,77 
(0,00) 
0,60 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.95) 
69 
1.97 
(0.57) 
0.54 
(0,04) 
0.30 
(0.19) 
0,31 
(0.20) 
32 
0.71 
(0.77) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
45 
0.47 
(0.84) 
0.51 
(0,01) 
0,20 
(0,20) 
0.17 
(0.29) 
46 
0.14 
(0.97) 
0.53 
(0.04) 
0.26 
(0.23) 
0.24 
(0.31) 
30 
1.57 
(0.55) 
0.44 
(0.03) 
0.20 
(0.23) 
0.11 
(0.52) 
35 
0.90 
(0.68) 
0.42 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.43) 
42 
0.03 
(0.99) 
0.41 
(0.10) 
0.34 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.54) 
25 
1.05 
(0.69) 
0.36 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.72) 
27 
0.56 
(0.78) 
0.32 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.85) 
33 
1.23 
(0.75) 
0.52 
(0.06) 
0.34 
(0.18) 
0.30 
(0.26) 
27 
0.88 
(0.74) 
0.48 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
40 
0.53 
(0.82) 
0,51 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
48 
0.31 
(0.93) 
0.44 
(0.10) 
0.36 
(0.14) 
0.23 
(0.38) 
25 
1.47 
(0.61) 
0.39 
(0.07) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
28 
0.54 
(0.82) 
0.34 
(0.06) 
0.25 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.74) 
34 
2.92 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.21) 
0.33 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(0.97) 
14 
0.64 
(0.83) 
0.30 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.82) 
14 
0.99 
(0.70) 
0.29 
(0.11) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.82) 
28 
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5.3 Association between credit ratings and firm characteristics 
In this section, I measure the association between credit ratings and firm characteristics which 
could explain the relatively high retums of small, low market-to-books stocks. Recall that the 
difference between the mean retums to decile 1 stocks, compared to decile 10 stocks, is 
around 6.9-7.5 percent, and the difference in mean Sharpe ratios is around 0.4, Say we assume 
that, for whatever reason, the regression analysis does not adequately control for risk. The 
issue remains, can we place some reasonable bounds on the incremental retums investors 
demand as compensation for the risk of these stocks? 
The analysis presented in this section provides some evidence that the incremental retums to 
small stocks are due to the increased risk of distress. But there is limited evidence that the 
market-to-book ratio captures the risk of distress. This evidence suggests that the 
outperformance of portfolios formed from fiindamental analysis cannot be attributed to the 
greater risk of these portfolios. 
To this point, the data is consistent with the following conclusions: 
1. An investment strategy which relies on valuations which assume revenue growth and 
profit margins revert to long-term sustainable levels is associated with above-average 
retums. 
2. The stocks selected as relatively undervalued are predominantly small, low-market-to-
book stocks, but the preference towards low market-to-book stocks is reduced once the 
assumed competitive advantage period is increased, 
3. Portfolios formed from this strategy have above-average volatility, but their reward-for-
risk remains significantly positive, as measured by the Sharpe ratio. 
4. There remains evidence of outperformance after controlling for factors associated with 
stocks retums - market risk, size, the book-to-market ratio and momentum. This evidence 
is in the form of significantly positive intercept terms from linear regressions of retums to 
long-short investment portfolios on four explanatory factors. 
5. Positive risk-adjusted performance is most consistent amongst small, high market-to-book 
stocks and there is no evidence of outperformance amongst large, high market-to-book 
stocks, which form the major component of investment manager portfolios. 
However, there remains the possibility that portfolios formed from stocks identified as being 
undervalued were indeed riskier than the rest of the market and that this has not been 
adequately controlled for. One reason this could occur is survivorship bias. The sample was 
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drawn from stocks which formed part of the S&P500 or NASDAQ Composite Index at 30 
April 2004. If there were a number of stocks identified as undervalued which went bankmpt 
during the sample period measured performance would have been substantially worse. By the 
same token, if there were a number of stocks identified as undervalued which were taken over 
during the sample period, measured performance would have been substantially better. In 
addition, I only investigated stocks in which analyst eamings forecasts were available. 
Analysts often cease coverage of stocks they expect to perform particularly badly. For 
example, the House Committee of Financial Services investigated the analyst research on 21 
poorly-performing companies covered by Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston and 
Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney during 1999-2000. None of the firms issued sell 
recommendations, but Goldman Sachs and Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney ceased coverage 
of most stocks (Oxley, 2002). Therefore, the database is likely to be biased towards stocks in 
which analysts have positive expectations. If these unobservable stocks were identified as 
undervalued by the models, under the assumption that their growth and margins would 
recover, and they performed particularly poorly during the sample period, measured 
performance would have declined. 
So, we know that the fiindamental valuation models identify small, low market-to-book stocks 
as relatively undervalued and portfoHos of these stocks eam higher retums. But there remains 
the possibility that this is due to some unspecified risk factor. The most plausible risk factor is 
the risk of financial distress. To assess the likely impact of this risk on required retums to 
equityholders I turn to the debt market, in which required retums are more readily observable. 
For the 5,557 firm-years in which a Standard and Poors credit rating was available, I measure 
the association between credit ratings and the following variables - probability of negative 
eamings, equity beta, market capitalisation and the market-to-book equity ratio. I estimated 
the mean probability of negative eamings as estimated by the Decision-tree valuation model, 
assuming a competitive advantage of 10 years. This is measured as the percentage of years in 
which simulated eamings were negative. The results of the 10-year CAP simulation were used 
in this case because the probability of negative eamings diminishes over later-year 
simulations, as simulated parameter values approach long-term estimates. I ignored '+' and '-' 
variations to the credit ratings to increase sample size within each rating. 
In Table 2.19 1 present the percentage of firms within each credit rating by cohort year and for 
the pooled sample. I also present the mean estimates of the four variables listed above and 
perform two-sample Mests for a difference in means as credit rating diminishes. Referring to 
the pooled data on negative eamings we see that 5.4 percent of simulated eamings were 
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negative. As a reference point, 7.0 percent of actual year 0 eamings were negative for the full 
sample. Considering that long-term margins are positive, to observe negative eamings in 5.4 
percent of cases in the first 10 years appears reasonable. We also see a consistent association 
between the probability of negative eamings and credit rating. Firms rated AA had a 4.2 
percent probability of negative eamings, which was significantly lower than the 4.9 percent 
probability for A-rated firms, and the 6.0 percent probability for BBB-rated firms. 
Investment-grade firms had a 5.1 percent probability of negative earnings, compared to 7.6 
percent for the 12-percent of firms rated as non-investment grade. 
Of the other firm characteristics, market capitalisation is the only variable which has a 
consistent association with credit ratings across all ratings classes. This association is also 
maintained in every year for almost all ratings classes. Thus, there is clear evidence that size 
is associated with increased default risk. But the association between credit ratings and the 
other variables - equity beta and the market-to-boo equity ratio - is not as strong. For the 
pooled sample, there is no significant difference between the mean market capitalisation 
amongst investment-grade and non-mvestment grade firms. Furthermore, the average market-
to-book ratio of BB-rated firms (4.6) is significantly larger than the average ratio for BBB-
rated firms (3.4). In general, there is an association between credit ratings and mean equity 
beta. Investment-grade firms have a mean beta estimate of 0.99, which is significantly lower 
than the mean estimate of 1.19 for non investment-grade firms. But there is one anomaly, in 
that BBB-rated firms had a significantly lower mean equity beta than A-rated firms. 
I also measured how well these variables predict credit ratings. In each year, I ranked firms 
according to the variables and assigned synthetic credit ratings based on the distribution of 
actual credit ratings in each year. Then, I computed the proportion of ratings that were correct 
and compared the proportion to what would be expected under random assignment. These 
results are presented in Table 2.20. Market capitalisation clearly has the highest predictive 
ability. For the fiill sample, ranking by size correctly predicted 44.7 percent of credit ratings, 
compared to a naive expectation of 28,0 percent. If we class a synthetic credit rating as 
'correct' if it is within one rating either side of the actual rating, 91.1 percent of ratings based 
on size are correct, compared to a naive expectation of 69.6 percent. In contrast, while the 
market-to-book equity ratio predicts significantly more credit ratings correctly than random 
assignment, the results are not nearly as strong. Just 34.9 percent of ratings are correctly 
predicted. 
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Table 2.19 
Association between credit ratings and firm characteristics associated with default risk 
Table 2.19 presents mean estimates of variables associated with long-term credit ratings assigned by Standard and Poors. The 
variables are: 1) the probability of negative eamings betw^een the end of the explicit forecast period and the end of the 
competitive advantage period, assumed to be 10 years; 2) the estimated equity beta; 3) market capitalisation; and 4) the 
market-to-book equity ratio. The sample comprises 5,557 firm-years in which credit ratings were available, which represents 
59 percent of the total sample. The proportion of the sample represented ranges from 50 percent in 2003 to 73 percent in 
1996, f-tesls have been conducted for the difference in means between adjacent ratings groups, e.g. A versus BBB, and 
between the sample of investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds (***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively). Investment-grade bonds are those rated BBB and above. The row labelled "S&P" 
presents the average number of defaults by ratings class over 15 years from the time of rating, as estimated by Standard and 
Poors using data from 1981-2004. For example, of the bonds rated AAA at the start of the 15-year period, 0.6 percent are 
expected to default at some point during that interval. A default is recorded upon the incidence of one missed or delayed 
payment to a debtholder, which does not necessarily represent bankruptcy. 
Rating AAA 
°^{ 0.6 prob 
Percentaae of firms within 
1987 6 
1988 7 
1989 7 
1990 7 
1991 6 
1992 6 
1993 5 
1994 5 
1995 4 
1996 5 
1997 3 
1998 3 
1999 3 
2000 3 
2001 2 
2002 3 
2003 2 
2004 2 
Pooled 4 
Mean orobabilitv of neaati 
1987 2.5 
1988 4.0 
1989 5.0 
1990 3.1 
1991 2.0 " * 
1992 3.8 
1993 4.6 
1994 7.4 * 
1995 2.8 
1996 2.9 
1997 2.4 
1998 1.8 " * 
1999 3.0 
2000 2.6 
2001 5.0 * 
2002 2.3 
2003 6.2 
2004 14.1 
Pooled 4.1 
AA 
1.4 
each ratinq 
31 
29 
26 
25 
23 
23 
23 
22 
20 
18 
18 
15 
13 
12 
10 
8 
6 
6 
16 
ve earninas 
2.8 
4.3 
5.5 
2.7 
2 4 *** 
5.3 ** 
4.3 * 
5.1 
4.3 
3.0 
2.5 
4.3 
4.3 
2,6 
3,3 
3,5 * 
7,2 
11,3 
4.2 * " 
A 
3.0 
class 
45 
45 
45 
43 
43 
44 
44 
45 
47 
48 
45 
46 
45 
41 
40 
36 
35 
34 
42 
BBB 
8.7 
12 
13 
15 
18 
20 
21 
22 
21 
22 
22 
24 
24 
27 
30 
32 
35 
36 
35 
26 
between the end of the 
2.8 
3.9 
5.6 
3.0 * 
2.7 
7.8 
5.9 
5.9 
3.6 * 
3.5 " 
3.2 
6.1 
6.6 
3.6 
3.0 
7.2 
7.7 
5,2 
4,6 
4,7 
2.7 * " 3.5 
4.0 4.0 
4.4 * " 6.9 
2.9 
3.8 " 
5.5 
7.0 
11.1 
3.0 
4.7 
6.8 
7.9 
10.3 
4.9 * " 6.0 
BB 
22.9 
5 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
7 
6 
7 
8 
7 
11 
11 
13 
14 
15 
9 
B 
38.6 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
7 
8 
3 
exDiicit forecast period anc 
4.5 
9.2 
12.1 
4.4 
3.6 
3,2 
3,6 
5,0 
4,2 
3.9 
12.9 " * 3.4 
3.8 
5.1 
4.9 
4.1 
3.9 
5.6 
5.4 
6.5 
3.3 ** 4.7 
4.2 
5.1 * 
»•• 4 1 
6.1 
8.1 
8.5 
14.3 
7.4 
4.7 
9.2 
3.2 
6.7 
5.4 
11.1 
13.5 
8.0 
Inv grade 
4.3 
94 
93 
94 
92 
93 
92 
94 
93 
93 
93 
91 
89 
89 
86 
85 
82 
79 
77 
88 
forecast vear 
2.8 * " 
4.4 
5.7 
3.0 ** 
2.7 * " 
6.8 * 
5.8 * " 
5.6 
4.0 
3.7 
2.9 " 
4.0 
5.1 
2.9 " * 
4.1 *** 
5.8 
7.4 ** 
10.8 * " 
5.1 *** 
Non-
inv 
27.2 
6 
7 
6 
8 
7 
8 
6 
7 
7 
7 
9 
11 
11 
14 
15 
18 
21 
23 
12 
10 
4.2 
7.2 
9.9 
4.4 
3.6 
11.3 
3.8 
5.1 
5.0 
4,6 
3,7 
4,4 
6,5 
3,9 
6,3 
7,3 
9,3 
14,0 
7.6 
All 
7.07 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
2,9 
4,6 
6,0 
3,1 
2,7 
7.2 
5.7 
5.6 
4.0 
3,7 
2.9 
4,0 
5.3 
3,0 
4,5 
6,0 
7.8 
11,5 
1 5.4 
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Table 2.19 
Association between credit ratings and firm characteristics associated with default risk 
(continued) 
Rating AAA 
°^I. 0.6 prob 
AA 
1.4 
A 
3.0 
BBB 
8.7 
BB 
22.9 
B 
38.6 
Inv grade 
4.3 
Non-
inv 
27.2 
All 
7.07 
Mean beta estimate 
1987 1.02 
1988 0,92 
1989 0.91 
1990 0.92 
1991 0.92 * 
1992 0.93 
1993 0.92 
1994 0.93 
1995 0.96 
1996 0.96 
1997 0.95 
1998 1.03 
1999 0.98 
2000 0.95 
2001 0.89 
2002 0.86 
2003 0.85 
2004 0.85 
Pooled 0.93 *** 
1.09 
0.96 " 
0.99 
1.01 
1.03 
1.01 ** 
1,00 " * 
1.01 ** 
1.01 
1.01 
0.99 
1.01 
0.98 
0.98 
0.97 
0.98 
0.91 
0.91 
1.00 " 
1.04 
1.08 
1.06 
1.08 
1.12 
1.11 
1.14 * 
1.11 
1.08 
1.05 
1.03 * 
1.03 ** 
1.02 
1.02 * 
0.93 
0.91 
0.96 
0.95 " 
0.96 
1.08 
1.11 * 
1.11 
1.12 " 
1.07 " 
1,04 
1,05 
1,03 
0,99 
0,94 
0.94 
0.97 * 
0.94 * 
0.88 ** 
0.88 ** 
1.19 
1.21 
1,25 
1,24 
1.37 
1.34 
1.22 
1.20 
1.11 
1.08 
1.03 
0.92 
1,12 
1,08 
1,05 
1,10 
0.90 *** 1.26 
0.85 * " 1.20 
1.03 *** 0.95 *** 1.15 
1.47 
1.50 
1.62 
1.58 
1.71 
1.49 
1.37 
1.33 
0.93 
1.14 
0.94 
0.72 
1.21 
1.02 
1,22 
1,23 
1,56 
1.37 
1.29 
1,04 
1,03 " * 
1,04 *** 
1,06 * " 
1,08 *** 
1.07 * " 
1.07 * 
1.06 
1.05 
1.02 
1.00 
1.00 * 
1.00 ** 
0.98 
0.92 " 
0.90 " * 
0.92 *** 
0.90 " * 
0.99 *** 
1.24 
1.31 
1.36 
1.32 
1.43 
1.37 
1.24 
1.21 
1.10 
1.09 
1.01 
0.86 
1.15 
1.07 
1.10 
1.14 
1.35 
1.26 
1.19 
1.06 
1.05 
1.06 
1.08 
1.11 
1.09 
1.08 
1.07 
1,05 
1,03 
1,00 
0.99 
1.02 
0.99 
0.95 
0.94 
1.01 
0.98 
1.02 
Mean market capitalisation 
1987 26.2 ** 
1988 20.8 " 
1989 22.7 * " 
1990 25.7 " * 
1991 33.1 * " 
1992 33.6 " * 
1993 33.0 * " 
1994 31.6 *** 
1995 40.9 *** 
1996 49.6 * " 
1997 75.2 *** 
1998 104.1 ** 
1999 118.3 " 
2000 147.1 " 
2001 182.3 " 
2002 140.0 " 
2003 132.5 ** 
2004 148.9 " 
Pooled 71.0 * " 
Mean market-to-book eq 
1987 3.6 
1988 3.3 
1989 3.4 * 
1990 3.6 * 
1991 4.4 * 
1992 4.5 * 
1993 4.6 " 
1994 4.0 * 
1995 4.6 
1996 5.4 * 
1997 6,7 * 
1998 9.6 * 
1999 9.3 
2000 8.4 
2001 8.2 
2002 6.3 
2003 5.1 
2004 4.2 
Pooled 5.4 * " 
6.1 * " 
5.6 *** 
6.3 *** 
7.0 *** 
8.3 *** 
9.6 " 
10.8 " * 
10.3 ** 
12.5 " 
15.1 " 
21.9 " 
34.8 * " 
45.5 ** 
44.2 * 
54.5 *** 
54.2 " * 
54.8 " * 
63.4 *** 
22.7 * " 
iiitv ratio 
2.9 
2.3 
2.4 * 
2.5 
2,7 
3,1 
3,2 
3.1 
3.4 
3.9 
4.7 
6.5 * 
7.5 * 
6.9 
6.1 
8.8 
7.6 
6.1 
4.4 ** 
3.1 
2.8 * 
3.2 ** 
3.7 ** 
2.5 *** 0.8 
2.1 
2.2 " 
1,5 
1,0 
2.2 * " 0,9 
4.5 *** 2.3 * 
5.6 * " 2.4 * 
1,5 
1,6 
5,7 *** 3,2 *** 1,7 
6.1 " 
6.9 " 
3.9 " 
4.0 " 
9.3 *** 4.9 *' 
11.1 " * 5.3 " 
1,8 
2,0 
2,6 
3,5 
15.6 " * 7.7 *** 4.0 
18,8 * " 9,8 * " 3,6 
23.2 " * 9.8 * 
20.9 " 
21.3 " 
18.4 " 
22.8 " 
9.0 *' 
9.7 *• 
5,1 
5,4 
3,6 
8.2 " * 2.7 
10.9 " 4.6 
13.0 *** 7.3 " * 3.4 
2.5 " 
2.0 ** 
2.1 
2.8 
2.5 
2.6 
2.9 
2.8 
2.9 
3.8 
3.7 
5.0 
5.6 
1.8 
1.5 * 
1.8 
1.7 * 
2.4 
2.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.6 
2.9 
3.7 
4.9 
5.2 
5.4 * " 3.4 
5.6 " * 3.1 
4.1 
4.0 * 
4.3 " 
3.8 
5.7 
2.7 
3.1 
3.4 " 
2.5 
2.6 
3.0 
3.3 
3.0 
8.6 
3,2 
3,1 
7.0 
3.8 
3,6 
4,5 
6,5 
4.8 
4.4 
6.3 
3.2 
4.4 
4.6 
0.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
1.2 
0.6 
0.7 
1.8 
0.8 
* * * A A 
1.5 
1.3 
1.6 
1.6 
1.8 
2.2 
*** 1.5 
3.8 
2.9 
2.6 
2.2 
3.0 
2.5 
4.8 
1.3 
3.7 
3.4 
2.0 
2.3 
3.4 
2.1 
4.6 
2.3 
1,7 
3,2 
*** 2.8 
5.6 *** 
4.8 * " 
5.4 *** 
5.8 *** 
6.7 *** 
7.6 " * 
7.9 *** 
8.0 * " 
9.1 " * 
11.4 * " 
14.2 " * 
19.7 *** 
24.1 * " 
25.8 * " 
25.0 *** 
23.3 * " 
19.8 * " 
23.9 *** 
15.7 " * 
2.6 
2.1 
2.2 
2.6 
2,6 
2.8 
3.1 
3.0 
3.0 
3.7 
4.0 
5.4 " 
5.9 
5.0 
4.8 
5.3 
3.7 * 
3.9 
3.9 
0,8 
1,1 
0,8 
0,8 
1,3 
1,5 
1,6 
1,7 
1.9 
2.5 
2.7 
3.1 
2.9 
4.3 
4.3 
3.0 
2.4 
3.8 
2.9 
2.7 
2.7 
2,9 
3,1 
3.0 
7.6 
3.5 
3.0 
6.7 
3.7 
3.1 
3.8 
5.5 
4.2 
4.4 
5.1 
2.7 
4.0 
4.1 
5.3 
4.6 
5.1 
5.5 
6.3 
7.2 
7.6 
7.6 
8.5 
10.7 
13.1 
17.9 
21.7 
22.8 
21.8 
19.7 
16.2 
19,3 
14.1 
2,6 
2.2 
2.3 
2.6 
2.7 
3.2 
3.1 
3.0 
3.3 
3.7 
4.0 
5.2 
5.9 
4.9 
4.8 
5.3 
3.5 
3.9 
3.9 1 
127 
Chapter 2 - Valuation of high-growth equities 
Now, the issue is whether this information is usefiil in estimating a reasonable range for the 
risk premium for small, low market-to-book stocks. The question is then whether the retums 
differential of 6.9-7.5 percent between decile 1 and 10 stocks exceeds these bounds. Table 
2.21 presents the yield spread between 10-year US Treasury Bonds and Lehman Brothers 
bond indices as at 30 April of each year from 1987-2004 (1990-2004 for the BB- and B-rated 
indices). The spread for the B-rated index is 4.48 percent, within a 90 percent confidence 
interval of 3.73 - 5.23 percent. This mean spread is 3.33 percent above the spread for the 
AAA-rated index and the confidence interval for this spread differential is 2.58 - 4.07 
percent, based upon the mean difference in spreads in each year from 1990-2004. So, in the 
absence of default and interest rate changes, investors in B-rated bonds are likely to eam 
retums around 2.5-4.0 percent higher than investors in AAA-rated bonds. 
Now consider equity investors to be the equivalent of bond investors who rank last in terms of 
distributions. Also assume that equity investors in small firms bear higher default risk than 
equity investors in large firms, which is supported by the evidence in Tables 2.19 and 2.20. 
Can it be the case that the mean excess retums from decile 1 portfolios are due to their greater 
risk of distress? If this were tme, the yield differential relative to AAA-rated bonds is twice 
that being eamed by B-rated bondholders. Survivorship bias cannot be completely mled out. 
But I have mitigated this risk by comparing actual equity retums with the debt premium 
which will be eamed in the absence of default. Could these additional retums be due to 
greater market risk? This is unlikely, given that the coefficients on market retums from the 
regression analysis were significantly negative. 
In conclusion, it seems unlikely that the excess retums of around 7 percent from a 
fimdamentals-based investment strategy are due entirely to the greater risk of portfolios 
formed from these stocks. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2,1 accounted for portfolio variance, 
systematic risk and the size and book-to-market factors. In this section, I address the issue of 
default risk. I show there is a strong association between credit ratings and size, and a 
significant but weaker association with the market-to-book ratio. However, the yield 
differential required by the debt market on B-rated issues relative to AAA-rated issues 
averaged just 3.3 percent during the sample period. The returns differential of around 7 
percent is twice that associated with B-rated bonds over AAA-rated bonds, making it unlikely 
that these excess retums are due to default risk. 
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Table 2.20 
Ability of firm characteristics to predict credit ratings 
Table 2.20 presents statistics which summarise the ability of firm characteristics to predict credit ratings. In each year from 
1987 to 2004, 5,557 stocks with credit ratings were ranked according to four firm characteristics: 1) the probability of 
negative eamings between the end of the explicit forecast period and the end of the competitive advantage period, assumed to 
be 10 years; 2) the estimated equity beta; 3) market capitalisation; and 4) the market-to-book equity ratio. For each of the four 
rankings, firms were assigned a synthetic credit rating, based on the distribution of actual credit ratings in that year. For 
example, in 1996, 5 percent of firms were rated AAA, 18 percent AA and 48 percent A. If a sample firm was ranked at the 
30' percentile by the probability of negative earnings, it was assigned a synthetic credit rating of A. The first panel shows the 
number of correct predictions by credit rating as a percentage of the firms in each ratings class. It also shows the proportion 
of firms correctly predicted as being either investment grade or non-investment grade, where investment-grade firms have 
credit ratings of BBB or better. Finally, it shows the proportion of correct predictions. The second panel shows the percentage 
of correct predictions which are within one ratings class. For example, if a firm was assigned a synthetic rating of BBB and 
had an actual rating of A, this rating was correct to within one rating class. In each case, the percentage of correct predictions 
can be compared to the expected percentage correct if synthetic ratings were assigned randomly. This difference is significant 
at a p-value of at least 2 percent in all cases except for BBB-rated bonds assigned ratings according to equity beta. The 
significance test conducted was the z-test for the difference between the sample proportion and an estimated population 
proportion according to the naive expectations model. 
Ranking variable 
Percentaae of correct predictions b 
Probability of negative eamings 
Beta 
Market capitalisation 
Market-to-book-equity 
Naive expectation 
Percentaae of predictions correct t 
Probability of negative eamings 
Beta 
Market capitalisation 
Market-to-book-equity 
Naive expectation 
AAA AA 
y credit ratlna 
10.1 
0,5 
45.0 
12.4 
3.9 
24.5 
19.7 
37.0 
25.7 
16.0 
o within one ratinas 
49,1 
28,9 
92,7 
55,5 
19.9 
76.5 
72.9 
86.9 
79.6 
61.9 
A 
46.5 
44.1 
53.3 
46.8 
42.0 
class eith 
87.1 
86.5 
94.7 
89.7 
83.9 
BBB 
30.0 
26.3 
39.9 
33.4 
25.9 
erside 
82.0 
74.5 
94.5 
85.4 
76.7 
BB 
12.5 
20,0 
30.3 
12,5 
8,8 
B 
12.9 
22.0 
47.3 
25.3 
3.3 
of the actual ratinq 
61,6 
55.8 
77.1 
50.5 
38.1 
26.9 
34.9 
76.3 
43.0 
12.1 
Inv 
grade 
89.5 
90.5 
93.7 
89.9 
87.9 
82.0 
77.9 
93.1 
85.1 
74.9 
Non-
inv 
24.1 
31.6 
54.5 
27.7 
12.1 
52.0 
50.1 
76.9 
48.4 
30.9 
Ali 
33.2 
31.0 
44.7 
34.9 
28.0 
78.3 
74.5 
91.1 
80.6 
69.6 
Table 2.21 
Yield spread over US Treasuries by Credit Rating 
Table 2.21 presents the yield spread between corporate bonds and 10-year US Treasury bonds for bonds of different credit 
ratings. The yields are estimates of the yield to maturity, including the reinvestment of coupon payments at the same rate. 
Yields on corporate bonds refer to Lehman Brothers corporate bond indices. All yields are measured as at the 30"* of April 
each year. 
Credit rating 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Mean 
Lower 5% 
Upper 5% 
Spread 
AAA 
1.24 
0.75 
0.74 
0.81 
0.75 
0,65 
1,02 
0,65 
0,81 
0,76 
0,71 
0,73 
1,13 
2,83 
1,62 
1,54 
1,84 
1,46 
1.15 
0,87 
1,44 
between Lehman Bros. Index 
AA A 
1,55 1.78 
1.20 1.29 
0.93 1.16 
0.98 1.26 
1,06 1,28 
0,96 1,17 
1,07 1,43 
0,80 1,05 
0.83 1.06 
0.94 1.12 
0.94 1.02 
0.99 1.18 
1.49 1.65 
1.80 2.07 
1.94 2.39 
1.83 2.11 
1.39 1.93 
1.31 1.63 
1.22 1.49 
1.04 1.28 
1.40 1.70 
Redemption Yield and 10-year 
BBB 
2.24 
1.88 
1.64 
1.80 
1.84 
1.53 
1.91 
1.62 
1.61 
1.61 
1.28 
1.42 
1.96 
2.59 
2.85 
3.10 
2.69 
2.19 
2.00 
1.74 
2.26 
BB 
— 
— 
— 
2.70 
3.36 
2,56 
3,26 
2,43 
2,42 
2,55 
2.07 
1.93 
2.95 
4,63 
4.84 
4.12 
4.84 
2.73 
3.16 
2.61 
3.71 
US Treasuries 
B 
— 
— 
— 
6.71 
6.56 
4.31 
4.77 
4.13 
3.61 
3.49 
3.83 
3,63 
4,36 
6,64 
2,90 
2,74 
6,00 
3,52 
4.48 
3,73 
5,23 
A A A - B 
— 
— 
— 
5,90 
5,81 
3.66 
3.75 
3.48 
2.80 
2.73 
3.12 
2.90 
3.23 
3.81 
1.28 
1.20 
4.16 
2.06 
3.33 
2.58 
4.07 
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6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to determine the merits of a ftindamentals-based investment 
strategy. The modelling assumes that long-term expected retums on firms' investments revert 
to a normal level over time, and implements this assumption via mean-reversion in revenue 
growth and profit margins. I also conduct analysis using Decision-tree valuations, which 
incorporate an estimated value of embedded options. Based on the evaluation of portfolio 
performance, I reach the following conclusions. 
First, above-average retums result from an investment strategy which relies on valuations that 
incorporate rational economic expectations. Under the assumption that revenue growth and 
profit margins are expected to revert to sustainable levels over time, portfolios formed on the 
basis of value/price achieve high retums. The difference in mean retums between the top and 
bottom deciles of stocks ranked on this basis is around 7 percent. However, incorporating the 
value of embedded options in the analysis did not improve investment performance. While 
median theoretical values are closer to market price when Decision-tree valuations are 
performed, the ranking of stocks is comparable. 60 percent of stocks are ranked in the same 
decile, regardless of the assumed competitive advantage period or valuation technique. 
However, equity analysts may benefit from performing Decision-tree valuations if it allows 
them to estimate target prices in a more sophisticated fashion. I speculate that the 
overwhelming use of price-eamings ratios to estimate target prices is due to the fact that 
average Z)CF valuations are consistently below share price. Hence, even if the analyst has 
superior stock-picking ability they will stmggle to justify a target price based on a DCF 
valuation. 
The superior investment performance of portfolios formed on the basis of value/price remains 
once risk is accounted for. Portfolios of stocks with very high or low value/price ratios are 
typically more volatile than stocks ranking in the middle of this range. I suggest this is due to 
the relative stability of eamings forecasts compared to share prices. That is, it is more likely 
that a volatile stock will be identified as relatively over- or under-valued by a theoretical 
model, when its parameters are estimated using data which is essentially a moving average. 
Nevertheless, portfolios formed from stocks with high value/price ratios had significantly 
higher mean Sharpe ratios than portfoUos formed from lower-ranked stocks. Hence, 
outperformance remains after accounting for portfolio volatility. 
The stocks selected as relatively undervalued are predominantly small low market-to-book 
stocks, but the preference towards low market-to-book stocks is reduced once the assumed 
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competitive advantage period is increased. However, there remains evidence of 
outperformance after controlling for factors associated with stock retums - market risk, size, 
the book-to-market ratio and momentum. This evidence is in the form of significantly positive 
intercept terms from linear regressions of returns to long-short investment portfolios on these 
four explanatory factors. 
The valuation models were unable to identify mispriced equities amongst large, high market-
to-book stocks. These stocks form the major component of mutual ftinds and are likely to be 
the most efficiently priced. Positive risk-adjusted performance is most consistent amongst 
small, high market-to-book stocks. 
Finally, I assessed the magnitude of outperformance against the yield on lower-rated 
corporate bonds. This assessment was motivated by the association between credit ratings and 
size. This means that the investment portfolios formed from highly-ranked stocks could have 
incurred above-average default risk. However, the magnitude of the excess retums eamed by 
long-short portfolios is significantly higher than the default risk premium required by 
debtholders. 
In conclusion, the results support the use of fundamental equity valuation as a portfolio 
management technique. This conclusion holds provided the analyst uses assumptions 
regarding long-term revenue growth and profit margin which are consistent with the 
reinvestment rate and the cost of capital. 
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IPO underpricing and the value of embedded options 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I explain the underpricing of initial public offers (IPOs) as a function of the 
proportion of equity value consisting of embedded options, which I label Real option%. 
Investors in firms whose value consists largely of real options face a relatively higher degree 
of information asymmetry, which is expected to result in lower offer prices and higher returns 
in the secondary market on the first day of trade. This underpricing is in addition to any 
retums which result from underwriter or issuer incentives, which I term 'strategic 
underpricing.' 
The results support this prediction. The analysis suggests that, in the absence of any strategic 
underpricing, the value of embedded options are discounted by 10 percent on average. 
However, in the absence of strategic underpricing the Discounted Cash Flow {DCF) 
component of value is fully priced in the IPO. For an IPO with mean Real option% of Al 
percent, this result predicts a 5 percent discount to market value. This discount is consistent 
with information asymmetry explanations for underpricing. 
There are two implications of this paper. For investment bankers, it implies that IPO proceeds 
can be enhanced with efforts to ensure their clients are well-informed about the value of the 
firm's strategic options. It also provides a technique for estimating this value using simulation 
analysis, the results of which can be used to ensure investors are flilly-informed. Underwriters 
have an incentive to engage in this activity. The potential increase in proceeds for the mean 
IPO is $11 million. This equates to increased underwriter fees of $1 million, assuming the 
typical underwriter fee of 7 percent. 
For academics. Real option% quantifies information asymmetry in a way which has direct 
economic meaning. Proxies used in prior literature, such as share allocations to retail 
investors, the volatility of stock retums, or issue size, provide useful support for information 
asymmetry arguments. But their relationship with IPO underpricing is not necessarily linear, 
as assumed in the typical analysis performed. Nor is there any technique which estimates the 
point at which information asymmetry is reduced. For example, at what point do we consider 
a client to be a sophisticated investor? What is the threshold issue size at which information 
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asymmetry is no longer material? In contrast, I show there is an approximate linear 
relationship between IPO underpricing and Real option% and quantify this relationship using 
linear regression. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I discuss recent evidence relating to the 
underpricing of IPOs, motivated by the substantial increase in initial retums observed during 
1999-2000, particularly in the technology sector. I also summarise the information asymmetry 
arguments. In Section 3 I model the linear relationship between IPO underpricing and Real 
option%, provide the economic rationale for its estimation, and summarise the modelling used 
to measure this variable. The comprehensive modelling of the equity valuation methods which 
underlie this variable are presented in Chapter 2. Sample data is summarised in Section 4, in 
which I provide supporting evidence for the interpretation of Real option% as a valid 
economic constmct. My intent here is to alleviate any concems that Real option% results from 
an artificial randomisation process, and therefore lacks economic meaning. I show that the 
measured relationship between this variable and the volatility of revenue growth will only 
hold if embedded options are valued by the market. In Sections 5 and 6,1 present the results 
and make concluding comments. 
2. IPO underpricing: Recent evidence 
Recent evidence on IPO underpricing suggests that IPO underpricing is a strategic decision of 
underwriters and issuers. For example, there is evidence that underwriters may issue stock at a 
discount to estimated market value to minimise the risk of holding large quantities of stock in 
a weak secondary market; or underwriters want to ensure investors are compensated with high 
initial retums for revealing information about demand for the stock; or, more recently, there is 
evidence that underwriters reward executives with 'hot stocks' in return for investment 
banking business (Oxley, 2002). Why issuers allow underpricing to occur is less clear, but 
there is evidence of greater underpricing when a smaller fraction in the firm is sold in the 
offer. Therefore, for whatever reason, there is greater underpricing when issuers have less 
incentives to prevent it. The variables which capture these strategic reasons for underpricing 
are outlined in Section 3. 
However, there is also recent evidence that technology IPOs are consistently underpriced, 
even after controlling for these factors. Thus, information asymmetry remains a viable 
explanation for IPO underpricing. In this section, I summarise this recent evidence and the 
information asymmetry theories of underpricing. It is my contention that the level of 
information asymmetry for an IPO can be measured as the proportion of firm value comprised 
of real options, and that this can partially explain IPO underpricing 
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lA. The hot issue market of 1999-2000 
Ljungqvist and Wilhebn (2003) report that IPO underpricing increased dramatically from 
1999-2000, with mean underpricing of 73 and 58 percent in those years for samples of 448 
and 366 firms. This compares with mean underpricing of 14-23 percent in the three preceding 
years. In attempting to explain this underpricing, they find a significant relationship between 
the level of underpricing and variables they argue act as a proxy for reduced incentives to 
control underpricing, such as ownership concentration and the level of insider sales. They 
were able to explain about 45 percent of the variation in first-day retums with these variables 
and indicator variables for firms classified as (1) high-technology; (2) intemet companies, and 
(3) for IPOs issued during 1999-2000. As fiirther evidence that investment bankers acted on 
incentives to underprice IPOs, Aggarawl, Pumanandam and Wu (2005) find an association 
between underpricing and whether the client was required to purchase stock in the secondary 
market, as part of a tie-in agreement. 
An altemative explanation of issuers' willingness to accept the low offer prices proposed by 
underwriters is what Loughran and Ritter (2004) refer to as the analyst lust hypothesis. This 
theory contends that firms will leave money on the table in retum for research coverage by 
high-profile analysts employed by prestigious underwriters. They contend that this coverage 
became more important in the 1990s - when a higher proportion of firm value consisted of 
growth opportunities, which required analyst research to support investment decisions - and 
that analyst recommendations became more visible. In support of their theory, they find that 
IPOs underwritten by top-tier underwriters were overpriced by an average 1.8 percent during 
the 1980s, and were underpriced by 3.3 percent and 21.2 percent during 1990-1998 and 1999-
2000, respectively, after controlling for firm characteristics. In addition, after controlling for 
underwriter reputation, initial retums for IPOs during 1999-2000 were insignificantly 
different from zero. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) were only able to explain 20 percent of the variation in returns to 
IPOs in 1999-2000, compared to 45 percent reported by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
However, they failed to include the revision of the offer price from the mid-point of the filing 
range as an explanatory variable, which was significantly positive in the earlier paper. Price 
revision can be interpreted as an indication of investor demand or a measure of the 
information revealed by investors about firm value, for which they are compensated by 
allocations of underpriced IPOs. 
While Loughran and Ritter (2004) find evidence consistent with an altemative explanation for 
increased underpricing in 1999-2000, their results are not inconsistent with those of 
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Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). For example, they find a significantly positive relationship 
between initial retums and share overhang, the ratio of retained shares to public float. The 
authors acknowledge that this is consistent with reduced incentives to control underpricing 
because the higher the share overhang, the lower the opportunity cost of underpricing. The 
coefficient on this variable is insignificantly different from zero for 1980-89, but rises to 2.76 
for 1990-1998 and 9.35 for 1999-2000, before falling back to 2.23 for 2001-2003. The 
coefficient of 9.35 for 1999-2000 implies that, if the firm sold just a quarter of its shares in the 
float (implying that share overhang = 3), expected underpricing would be 28 percent higher 
than if all shares were sold. But this also implies that the original owners are only leaving 7 
percent of equity value on the table. If just 10 percent of shares are sold in the float (implying 
that share overhang = 9), expected underpricing would be 84 percent higher than if the firm 
sold all its shares, but the firm has still left just 8 percent of equity value on the table, as the 
original owners retained 90 percent of the stock. 
The evidence of both Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) is 
consistent with management having an incentive to allow underwriters to price IPOs in 1999-
2000 at a deeper discount to the expected market price than previously observed. The authors 
of the first paper contend that management had less incentives to control underpricing due to 
pre-IPO ownership stmcture, while Loughran and Ritter argue that issuers were willing to 
accept lower issue prices if it resulted in increased analyst coverage from prestigious broking 
houses. Further evidence of additional, systematic underpricing is provided by Houston, 
James and Karceski (2004). For 65 IPOs from 1996-1998, they report that the average offer 
price was set at a 5 percent premium compared to a set of comparable firms identified in 
analyst reports. For 88 IPOs from 1999-2000, this price-setting reverses such that the average 
offer price was set at a 21 percent discount to the firm's peers. This evidence is consistent 
with the argument that underwriters systematically priced IPOs at less than the value implied 
by comparable firm analysis. 
Thus, there is evidence from at least four sources that underwriters had additional incentives 
to underprice IPOs during 1999-2000 and acted in accordance with these incentives. But of 
relevance for the present study, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
and Aggarawl et al (2005), report that, even after controlling for firm characteristics, the 
additional mean underpricing for high-tech and Intemet IPOs is significant. Retums to 
technology investments as a whole were staggering during this period, with the NASDAQ 
Composite Index rising by an average 70 percent a year in the two years prior to its peak on 
10 March 2000. 
136 
Chapter 3 - IPO underpricing and the value of embedded options 
Hence, despite the fact that the market was pricing listed technology stocks at never-before 
seen valuation multiples, it only incorporated the same expectations into the price of 
technology IPOs when they first began trading, and not in the final offer price. This can only 
be partially explained by ownership characteristics (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) and 
underwriter reputation (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Specifically, those papers report that 
firms classified as high-technology companies had, on average, additional first-day retums of 
about 6 percent. Firms classified as intemet companies had average additional first-day 
retums ranging from about 15 percent (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm) to about 35 percent 
(Loughran and Ritter). 
2.2. Information asymmetry and real options valuation 
Given the above results, this paper posits that IPO underpricing of technology stocks can be 
partially explained by the information asymmetry models of Rock (1986) and Beneviste and 
Spindt (1989), supported by the empirical evidence of Koh and Walter (1989) and Beatty and 
Ritter (1986). 
A potential explanation for this remaining underpricing is the level of information asymmetry 
between the firm and investors. It is arguable that information asymmetry will be positively 
associated with the proportion of firm value comprised of embedded options. Hence, we have 
the hypothesis that the level of underpricing should be positively associated with the 
proportion of firm value attributable to real options. 
2.2.1. Information asymmetry amongst investors 
If there is information asymmetry amongst investors, typically partitioned as informed versus 
uninformed investors, the winners' curse model developed by Rock (1986) implies that the 
average IPO should be underpriced. This model relies on the assumption that issuers require 
uninformed investors to participate in the offering in order to raise sufficient investment 
capital. As uninformed investors are expected to receive a disproportionate share of 
overpriced IPOs, the only way they will continue to participate in the IPO market is if the 
average IPO is underpriced, to the point where the expected retum to uninformed investors is 
zero. 
This model was formally tested in the Singapore market where detailed information on IPO 
allocations is available (Koh and Walter, 1989). A sample of 38 IPOs from 1973-1987 
showed significant negative correlation between the size of allocation and initial excess 
retums, consistent with the winners' curse prediction. Further empirical support is found in 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) who document an inverse relationship between underpricing and 
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issue size, and a direct relationship between underpricing and the number of uses of proceeds. 
Smaller issues are generally considered to be more speculative; and Beatty and Ritter argue 
that firms document the uses of proceeds in more detail in response to more stringent SEC 
regulation of these firms, compared to more established issuers. 
Also, a positive association between information asymmetry amongst investors and 
subsequent rettims is consistent with the derivation of the security market line under 
heterogeneous expectations developed by Williams (1977). In his model, there is a positive 
association between the dispersion of investors' expectations for future retums and the 
market's consensus estimate of required returns. This prediction was examined by Doukas, 
Kim and Pantzalis (2004) who found that the differential performance of value and growth 
stocks could be partially explained by the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Applying this 
argument to the IPO case, if information asymmetry amongst investors is reduced once the 
firm is listed, required rettims would be lower and positive initial retums would result. 
In this paper, I argue that an increase in the relative proportion of value comprised of real 
options increases the relative information advantage of sophisticated investors. They will be 
relatively better informed about the probability of technological success, given the 
information conveyed directly by management and indirectly by analysts, and will be better 
placed to value the stock, given this information set. Applying this argument to the 
informed/uninformed dichotomy, for stocks in which a higher proportion of value is 
comprised of real options, there will be a larger percentage of uninformed investors. Then, 
according to the winner's curse model of Rock (1986), it follows that there should be a 
positive relationship between underpricing and the proportion of value comprised of real 
options. 
The research question addressed in the present paper is analogous to that considered by Ritter 
(1984), who documented that the mean initial retum of 48 percent to IPOs, from January 1980 
to March 1981, was largely confined to speculative, natural resources issues. Compare this to 
the period 1999-2000, when the mean initial retum of 66 percent was largely confined to 
technology firms, and a sharp rise from the 17 percent initial retum of the prior three years 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). In addition, for the IPOs of 1980-81 the average market-to-
book equity ratio based on the offer price increased by just 15 percent, from 2.13 to 2.46, 
compared to the 45 percent increase in the market-to-book equity ratio of listed firms. We 
observed the same partial adjustment of offer prices in response to market expectations during 
the technology bubble, documented by Houston et al, 2004. They report that, in 1999-2000, 
138 
Chapter 3 - IPO underpricing and the value of embedded options 
the average offer price/sales ratio was 21 percent below that predicted by comparable firm 
analysis, compared to a premium of 5 percent for IPOs from 1996-98. 
2.2.2. Information asymmetry between issuers and investors 
The same prediction follows from the theory that underpricing is related to the information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors, as contended by Beneviste and Spindt (1989). In 
their model, issuers - via their investment bank - canvass market demand in order to set the 
offer price, typically with reference to an indicative range. While an individual investor is 
unlikely to have better information about firm prospects, relative to the issuer, the collective 
information set of investors who participate in the book-build is Itkely to result in an 
improved valuation. However, investors are unlikely to reveal the fiill extent of their 
information if this results in higher offer prices. Hence, the model predicts that underpricing is 
related to the degree of information production, typically proxied by offer price relative to the 
mean of the indicative range. 
Empirical support for this explanation is provided from a number of sources Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) argue that uncertainty amongst issuers and investors is positively associated with the 
number of intended uses of the capital raised, and inversely related to the size of the issue. 
They test this prediction by using weighted least squares regression, weighting the variables 
by In (1000 + sales). They find a positive association between IPO underpricing and In (1 + 
number of uses of proceeds), and the reciprocal of gross proceeds. There is also evidence of a 
positive association between initial retums and the standard deviation of retums in the after-
market (Ritter, 1984; Johnson and Miller, 1988). Finally, Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) find 
that increased disclosure in the pre-IPO period is associated with lower underpricing. 
3. Methodology 
This paper attempts to explain retums to technology IPOs as a function of the proportion of 
firm value consisting of real options. Investors in firms whose value consists largely of real 
options face a higher degree of information asymmetry, which is expected to result in lower 
offer prices and higher retums in the secondary market. Using post-listing market and 
accounting data, I estimate firm values from both real options and discounted cash flow 
models. I then test whether there is a positive relationship between the proportion of value 
consisting of real options and retums in the secondary market over various holding periods. 
Empirical evidence comparing DCF and multiples-based valuations to market values is 
consistent with the premise that real options comprise some proportion of value. In analysing 
51 highly-leveraged transactions from 1983-1989, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) found that DCF 
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valuations assuming a constant market-based estimate of systematic risk exceeded transaction 
values by a mean of just 3.1 percent. 
However, sensitivity analysis on the long-term growth rate assumption is consistent with 
transaction values incorporating a value for real options. The base case valuation estimates 
were based on the assumptions that the terminal growth rate equals 4 percent, assuming real 
growth of 0-1 percent and inflation of 3-4 percent, and that depreciation and amortisation is 
exactly offset by capital expenditure in the terminal state. These assumptions are inconsistent, 
as there must be some level of reinvestment in order to achieve zero real growth. Sunply, 
maintaining the asset base at a constant nominal amount is consistent with the assumption that 
cash flows will be maintained at the same level in nominal terms. So inflation is offset by 
negative real growth. 
Under the assumption that the terminal growth rate equals zero, DCF values were 11 percent 
below transaction values on average. This is entirely reasonable, given that DCF valuations 
ignore any price paid for control or the value of real options. It is also consistent with the 
large-sample evidence of Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) who report equity market values 
11.5 percent higher than the present value of fiiture cash flows for 7,102 firm years from 
1985-1990. The latter result is consistent with option values comprising 10 percent of equity 
value. That is, if the market value of equity exceeds Z)CF value by 11.5 percent, the 
percentage of market value comprised of DCF value is 89.7 percent (1.000/1.115 = 0.897). 
Recent evidence on IPO offer prices provides further support for the contention that DCF 
valuations underestimate market values. For example. Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) 
estimate three DCF values for 71 industrial IPOs in Australia from 1995-98, assuming the 
firm cams normal retums after 2, 5 and 12 years, respectively. Their median estimate of offer 
price/intrinsic value ranges from 1.15 to 1.40, compared to 1.03 an intrinsic value estimated 
using comparable firm price-eamings multiples. This evidence is consistent with option 
values comprising between 13-29 percent of value. If DCF value is $1.00 and offer price is 
$1.40, the proportion of value comprised of DCF value is $1.00/1.40 = 71.4 percent. 
In contrast, multiples-based valuation of IPOs provides valuation estimates close to observed 
offer prices. Kim and Ritter (1999) perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on 
offer price-eamings ratios against the median price-eamings ratio for comparable firms. For 
firms more than ten years old, they are able to explain 38 percent of the variation in offer 
price-eamings, a figure which falls to 15 percent for firms less than ten years old. However, 
for old firms, they report an intercept term of 6.00 and a coefficient on the comparable price-
eamings ratio of 0.45. This implies that, if the median comparable firm has a price-eamings 
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ratio above 10.9, offer prices will be below the value implied by comparable firm analysis. If 
the median comparable firm has a price-eamings ratio below 10.9, offer prices will be below 
the value implied by comparable firm analysis. This result is consistent with the evidence of 
Houston et al (2004) that underwriters priced IPOs at less than the value implied by 
comparable firm analysis during 1999-2000, a period in which price-eamings ratios were 
unusually high. 
The explanatory power of multiples-based valuation improves when the paper uses enterprise 
value/sales as its valuation metric, and includes independent variables for profitability and 
growth (an indicator variable). While profitability is directly related to enterprise value/sales, 
based on the offer price, the growth variable is only significant for the sub-sample of firms 
operating for less than 10 years, with a coefficient of 0.23. However, the intercept term in 
both cases remains significantly positive, which is consistent with offer prices of high growth 
firms remaining below those implied by comparable firm analysis, even after accounting for 
growth prospects. 
In sum, there is evidence that equity market values exceed DCF valuations, regardless of 
whether market values are based on offer or trading prices, which this paper contends can be 
considered the value of real options. Further, it contends that the higher proportion of value 
comprised of real options, the greater will be the information asymmetry, which should be 
positively related to underpricing. In Sub-section 3.1,1 explicitly model the relationship 
between IPO underpricing, which leads to the hypotheses that there is a positive relationship 
between underpricing and Real option%. In Sub-section 3.2,1 summarise the technique used 
to estimate this variable. The complete derivation of this variable is presented in Chapter 2. 
3.1. Operationalised hypotheses and regression models 
The theory and evidence cited above is consistent with the IPOs being undervalued by 
investment bankers due to information asymmetry, which increases with the proportion of 
equity value comprised of real options. In this section, 1 model the relationship between the 
initial retum and Real option%, which allows estimation of a linear relationship between these 
variables. This modelling has two important implications. First, the estimated coefficient on 
Real option% has an economic interpretation, which allows me to quantify the relationship 
between information asymmetry and underpricing. Second, the relationship between initial 
retum and Real option% can be estimated after controlling for the variables previously shown 
to be related to underpricing. This allows me to directly compare my results to previous 
studies and mitigates against the risk that Real option% simply represents a correlated omitted 
variable. 
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The market price of an IPO is related to its offer price via the following equation: 
Market prica = Jt IPO prica (3.1) 
where: 
Market prica = the share price of firm / upon listing; and 
IPOpricCi = the offer price of firm / set by the investment bank. 
The average coefficient on IPO price (y) for US IPOs has been about 1.18 (Ritter and Welch, 
2002) and potentially represents the IPO discount due to a lack of controls on underwriter 
incentives to minimise their exposure (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003), the trade-off between 
maximising offer proceeds and analyst coverage (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and information 
asymmetry (Rock, 1986; Beneviste and Spindt, 1989). The intent of this paper is to quantify 
the IPO price discount that is attributable to information asymmetry, as measured by the 
proportion of equity value comprised of real options. 
Assume that the investment banker prices the offer at some multiple of theoretical value, 6. In 
the absence of information asymmetry, and absent any underwriter incentives to underprice 
the issue - such as increased trade in the secondary market or reduced underwriter risk - this 
multiple should be equal to one. But in the presence of information asymmetry, or if these 
other incentives are present, 6 will be less than one. In the case of information asymmetry 
between the investment banker and investors, the model of Beneviste and Spindt (1989) 
predicts that 6 will be less than one to ensure that investors continue to reveal price-relevant 
information. In the case of information asymmetry amongst investors, the winner's curse 
model of Rock (1986) predicts that 9 will be less than one in order to ensure that uninformed 
investors eam expected retums of zero. Thus, we have the following equation: 
IPO pricci = Oi Theoretical valuci (3-2) 
At this stage, the appropriate technique for estimating theoretical value has not been specified. 
All that has been assumed so far, is that there is some technique for estimating a theoretical 
value which is equal to the price which equates supply and demand for the stock. Now 
incorporate the assumption that theoretical value is the sum of the stock's discounted cash 
flow value and the value of its embedded options. Further assume that the pricing discount 
applied to each of these two components is not necessarily the same. We can then relate IPO 
price to the proportion of value comprised of real options via the following equation (3.3): 
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IPO pricei = OijDCF value + 02jValue of real options, 
= Oij (l - Real option%j )x Theoretical value + 62iReal option%, x Theoretical value. 
- \Pu + (^ 2,i ~ ^ u j^^^l option%y^heoretical value 
where: 
9i,i and 62.1 = the pricing discounts applied to the discounted cash flow valuation and the value 
of real options due to information asymmetry; and 
Real option% = the proportion of equity value that is comprised of embedded options. 
We can rearrange the above equation, so that there is an approximately linear relationship 
between Real option% and the percentage difference between theoretical value and IPO price. 
First, the percentage difference between theoretical value and IPO price can be expressed as; 
Theoretical value, 1 
IPO price, 6^, + [O^, - 6',,. )Realoption% (3.4) 
Second, applying a Taylor series expansion to the first term on the right hand side of the 
equation, we have (3.5): 
Theoretical value, 1 
IPO price, ~ 9,, 
^2,i - ^ 1 , / 
Ol 
Real option%, + 
el 
Real option%,' 
-..,+ 
\Ou-o,)" 
C «+i 
Real option%" -1 
This equation presents an approximately linear relationship between the proportion of equity 
value comprised of real options and the percentage difference between theoretical value and 
IPO price. The relationship is approximately linear because the contribution of Real option% 
when an exponent is applied becomes small. Hence, the approximate linear relationship 
between Real option% and the percentage difference between theoretical value and IPO price 
is as follows: 
Theoretical value 
IPO price, 
^ - 1 = _1_ 
^ 
1 Real optionVo, (3.6) 
This equation allows me to test the hypothesis that IPO underpricing and information 
asymmetry are directly related, using the same methodology applied to in prior IPO 
underpricing studies. The assumption made in IPO underpricing studies related to information 
asymmetry is that the information asymmetry is resolved upon listed. This could occur 
because investors are able to observe the tme relationship between supply and demand for the 
stock, as conveyed by share prices. Prior to listing, investors have a limited information set. If 
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we assume that market prices, on average, reflect theoretical value, we have the following 
equation: 
Share price, _ 
IPO price, Ol 
Realoption%, (3.7) 
Equation 7 states that the initial retum is equal to a constant, plus a multiple of Real option%, 
which is a fiinction of the pricing discount applied to the DCF and real options components of 
equation value. I estimate these coefficients with the following ordinary least squares 
regression model: 
Initial returiti = a+fi Real option%i + EI 
where: 
Closing price on listing day , . , , . 
Initial return, = ^-^ — - -1 for stock /; 
Offer price 
Real option%i = the proportion of equity value comprised of real options for stock /; and 
Bi = the error term for stock / 
The coefficients estimated in this regression model have a direct economic interpretation, 
related to the discount factors applied to theoretical value(^; and 92). First, the intercept term 
can be used to estimate the discount factor applied to the DCF component of value, via the 
equation below: 
a = ^ - l ^ 9 , = - ^ (3.8) 
91 l + a 
Second, the coefficient on Real option% can be used to estimate the discount factor applied to 
the value of embedded options. The relationship between 9j, 92 and y5 can be expressed as 
follows: 
J3 = O2-O. 
V Ol J 
9, =9,-pel (3.9) 
Incorporating the estimate for 9i into the above equation, we have: 
(3.10) 02-- P 
l + a 
1 / 1 ^' 
vl + «y 
This sttidy essentially tests the joint hypotheses that (1) information asymmetry increases with 
the proportion of theoretical value comprised of real options; and (2) information asymmetry 
explains some component of IPO underpricing. Consistent with these hypotheses, I expect the 
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coefficient on Real option% to be greater than one. I also expect the intercept term to be 
positive, due to the component of IPO underpricing that is not due to information asymmetry. 
Further, incorporating the intercept term and the coefficient on Real option% into equations 9 
and 10 to compute 9i and 92,1 expect the estimate for 9j to exceed the estimate for 92. 
The next stage of analysis is to incorporate control variables previously shown to explain IPO 
underpricing. Incorporating these controls allows me to isolate the component of IPO 
underpricing that can be explained by Real option%, as opposed to underwriter incentives, hot 
IPO markets or some other underpricing explanation. The model relied upon in this paper 
incorporates eight control variables, which can be combined in the following equation. I 
document the estimation of these parameters in the text which follows. 
Initial return-, = a + KiPrice revision, + KiPrice revision^, + K^Overhangi + K^ize, + KsPre-
issue IPO returns; + K^Pre-issue market returnsi + K jTechnologyi + K Rubble-, + Si 
Price revision during the IPO allocation process is measured as the difference between the 
final offer price and the mid-point of the indicative offer range; and Price revision^ equals 
Price revision where this is positive and zero otherwise. These variables are expected to be 
positively associated with underpricing, consistent with the results of Bradley and Jordan 
(2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
Overhang is the ratio of common shares retained by the issuer relative to common shares sold 
in the IPO, as used by Loughran and Ritter (2004) as a measure of the incentives of the issuer 
to limit the extent of underpricing. That is, the greater the proportion of shares retained by the 
issuer, the less the issuer has an incentive to control underpricing. An alternative measure of 
this constmct is the ownership concentration of pre-IPO shares held by insiders as measured 
by the sum of the squared ownership interests of the CEO, venture-capital backers, investment 
bank and corporate shareholders (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). The text of Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) do not mention taking the squared root of the sum of the squared ownership 
interests, but the data presented in Table III of that paper and the regression coefficients 
presented in Tables V and VI is consistent with this interpretation. However, the data to 
estimate this variable was not available. 
I use two variables to capture any information content of recent market activity on IPO 
pricing, due to literature suggestive of there being hot issue markets (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 
1975; Ritter, 1984; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2002; and Ritter, 2002). I 
measure Pre-issue IPO returns as the average daily initial retum for all IPOs on calendar days 
-1 to -30 before the issue date and Pre-issue market returns as the cumulative retum on the 
NASDAQ index 15 trading days before the issue date. 
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Technology is an indicator variable for firms listed as "Technology" amongst 11 IBES 
industry sectors. The technology variable is estimated differently to its counterparts in 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Bradley and Jordan (2002). 
Those studies found a significant positive relationship between firms classified separately as 
high-technology or internet-related firms and IPO underpricing. However, there is no attempt 
to separately interpret the magnitude of these coefficients on these variables, as the authors 
acknowledge that there is some arbitrariness to the classification of firms into these two 
groups and a number of frnns will be classified in both groups. For the purposes of this sttidy, 
I have incorporated only one indicator variable for Technology firms which encompasses 
firms which the previous papers classified as high-technology or intemet-related firms. An 
altemative classification for technology firms is those firms classified under the GICS as 
Software and Services (4510), Technology Hardware and Equipment (4520), Semiconductors 
and Semiconductor equipment (4530), Telecommunication Services (5010), Intemet Retail 
(25502020) and Biotechnology (352010). This classification does not materially affect the 
results. 
Bubble is an indicator variable for firms which listed in the years 1999 and 2000. The 
evidence discussed above in relation to share allocation practices suggests that the 
significance of the coefficient on this variable diminishes if these controls are in place. I 
include size as a control, as estimated by the natural logarithm of issue proceeds, due to the 
inverse relationship with initial retums (Bradley and Jordan, 2002) but do not include age 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) as a control as this data is unavailable. 
I measure the relationship between initial retums and each of the nine individual explanatory 
variables, and four combinations of variables in a muhivariate analysis, which are 
summarised in Table 3.1. The first and third models are used to assess the explanatory power 
of the variables which prior research has shown to explain underpricing. The second and 
fourth models are used to measure the incremental explanatory power of Real option% in 
explaining underpricing. Model 4, which incorporates all nine explanatory variables is as 
follows: 
Initial returni = a + fiReal option% + KiPrice revision-, + KzPrice revision''i + KiOverhangi + 
K^ize, + KsPre-issue IPO returnsi + K^Pre-issue market returnsi + KiTechnology-, + K 
^Bubblei + £/ 
In subsequent analysis, I incorporate additional control variables: the cost of equity capital, 
initial revenue growth and the initial volatility of revenue growth. I perform this analysis 
because the magnitude of the association between Real option% and initial retum, as well as 
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explanatory power, varies within sub-samples partitioned according to these characteristics. I 
also examine the interaction of Real option% and these characteristics. This subsequent 
analysis is outlined in more detail in Section 5. 
Table 3.1 
Regression models and expected coefficients 
This table summarises the four OLS regression models reported in Table 3.6. Model 1 expresses initial retums as 
a function of variables previously identified in the IPO literature as being associated with initial retums and takes 
the form Initial return = a + KiPrice revision + KiPrice revision^ + KyOverhang + K 4Size + K ^Pre-issue IPO 
returns + K (fre-issue marlcet returns. The definitions of these control variables are: Price revision = IPO 
price/Mid-point of the filing range - 1; Price revision^ = Price revision where Price revision is positive, and 
zero otherwise; Overhang = Shares retained by the issuer divided by shares issued; Size is the natural logarithm 
is of issue proceeds; Pre-issue IPO returns is the average initial retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days 
prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue market returns is the cumulative retum on the S&P 1500 Index for the 15 trading 
days prior to the IPO. Model 3 introduces two additional control variables - Technology and Bubble. Technology 
is an indicator variable for finns listed as "Technology" amongst 11 IBES industry sectors; and Bubble is an 
indicator variable for IPOs occurring in 1999-2000. 
Models 2 and 4 incorporate the explanatory variable of interest, Real option%, which is an estimate of the 
proportion of equity value comprised of the firm's embedded options. It can be computed as 1 - Discounted 
Cash Flow Vciluation/Decision-tree valuation. The Decision-tree valuation is am estimate of total equity value, 
and is the mean estimate of 1,000 simulated equity values, in which there is uncertainty over revenue growth and 
profit margin. These simulated values assume that estimates of revenue growth, profit margin and the volatility 
of revenue growth revert to long-term expected values over a period referred to as the competitive advantage 
period, which can take on values from 4-60 year. The competitive advantage period assumed for each firm is that 
which minimises the percentage difference between the Decision-tree valuation and the initial market price. 
Hence, Decision-tree valuations are calibrated to initial market prices. The discounted cash flow valuation is an 
estimate of equity value which relies on the same competitive advantage period, but which assumes that revenue 
growth and profit margin revert to long-term expected values in a deterministic fashion. Hence, Real option% is 
an estimate of the proportion of equity value, embedded in market prices, which is not comprised of the DCF 
valuation. 
Model 
Real option% 
Revision (%) 
Revision+ (%) 
Overliang (Shares retained/issued) 
Size (In Proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO returns (mean last 30 days) 
Pre-issue market returns (15-day cumulative) 
Technology (1,0) 
Bubble (1999-2000=1,0) 
Model 1 
... 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
— 
— 
Model 2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
— 
— 
Model 3 
... 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Model 4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
3.2. Estimating the option component of equity value 
In this section, I provide the economic rationale behind the DCF and Decision-tree valuation 
models used, summarise the model derivation which is presented in fiill in Chapter 2, and 
outline the parameter estimation techniques. 
3.2.1. Economic rationale for the model 
The primary variable of interest in this paper is an estimate of the proportion of value 
comprising real options, where total equity value is assumed to comprise the discounted value 
of expected future dividend payments (the DCF valuation) plus the value of real options, 
presented as equation 11. 
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Total equity value = DCF value + Value of real options (3.11) 
In Chapter 2,1 derived Discounted Cash Flow and Decision-tree equity valuation models. 
These models rely on the assumption that revenue growth and profit margins are expected to 
revert to long-term expected values over an assumed competitive advantage period. Further, 
the estimate of long-term revenue growth is the product of the reinvestment rate and the cost 
of equity capital; and long-term profit margin is equal to the typical margin of established 
firms. The economic rationale for these assumptions is that abnormal retums on investment 
are likely to be eroded over time, such that the new investments are expected to eam just their 
cost of capital, once the competitive advantage period {CAP) is over. 
The Decision-tree valuation model includes the value of the firm's embedded options by 
incorporating company-specific eamings volatility and a dynamic reinvestment policy. I 
simulate eamings for each year of the competitive advantage period, by incorporating 
additional assumptions relating to the volatility of revenue growth and its relationship with 
profit margin. The Decision-tree valuation model incorporates the value of growth options, 
because states of high growth provide a positive signal to management to increase investment 
in high-growth markets. This response is incorporated into the model via the assumption of a 
constant payout ratio, which results in increased investment expenditure in high-growth states, 
and decreased investment expenditure in low-growth states. In the extreme low-growth state, 
the firm is bankmpt and exercises its abandonment option. 
This dynamic reinvestment policy is the fiindamental justification for valuation techniques 
which include the value of embedded options. The DCF valuation ignores the value that can 
be created via the firm's ability to change its investment policy in response to new 
information. This results in a lower valuation, because the growth in expected cash flows is 
independent of the firm's reinvestment policy. If management invests additional capital in 
projects generating high eamings growth, and reduces investment in low growth projects, the 
improved capital allocation amongst business units or products will result in realised growth 
exceeding expectations. 
This argument is consistent with the corporate finance literature on the diversification 
discount, which initial research estimated at about 15 percent (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Research in this area typically involves estimating theoretical value as the sum of the value of 
individual segments, where segment values are estimated using eamings multiples from 
comparable single-segment firms. Villalonga (2004) questions whether diversified firms 
really do trade at a discount to their break-up value. He argues that the firms previously 
reported as single-segment firms were acttially more diversified than first thought, relying on 
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a more detailed database. Once theoretical values are re-computed after taking this increased 
diversification into account, there is an average value premium for diversification. 
However, whether the average diversified firm trades at a discount is not pertinent for my 
study. What is relevant are the reasons why certain diversified firms trade at a discount. The 
research consistently finds that a greater discount for firms which overinvest in low-growth 
segments, relative to high growth segments (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Ahn and Denis, 2004). 
Improved capital allocation amongst high- and low-growth segments is analogous to 
increased investment in response to high revenue growth. That is, a dividend payment, as 
opposed to reinvestment, can be considered an investment in a zero growth segment. 
Note that it is not the theory of Discounted Cash Flow valuation itself that is the source of the 
under-estimation of value, but rather the implementation of the model. That is, the expected 
cash flows incorporated into the DCF valuation should, in theory, be the probability-weighted 
outcome of all possible investments, weighted according to their probability of occurrence. 
While this can be achieved via Monte Carlo simulation, this does not typically occur in 
practice. 
In sum, DCF valuations are typically implemented by assuming a particular portfolio of assets 
that generate a series of expected cash flows. That is, while a sophisticated analyst may assign 
probabilities to cash flows being higher or lower than expectations, and appropriately estimate 
the expected cash flows from an underlying distribution, the probability of making particular 
investments will be assigned a value of 100 percent or zero. In estimating Decision-tree 
valuations, I consider the investment base to be conditional on growth, so that firms make 
additional investments in response to the signal that they are in a high-growth state. 
3.2.2. Model derivation 
I estimate Real option% as the proportion of equity value attributable to the firm's embedded 
options, as opposed to its discounted cash flow valuation. With the Decision-tree valuation as 
an estimate of total equity value. Real option% is estimated as follows: 
r, , . n, . DCF valuation _ ,^^ 
Real option% = 1 (3.12) 
Decision - tree valuation 
In Chapter 2,1 derived models for the DCF and Decision-tree valuations under a set of 
assumptions consistent with economic theory. In Sub-section 3.2.1,1 outlined the economic 
rationale behind those models and present the models below, along with explanation of their 
components. For the full model derivation, and a detailed example involving the valuation of 
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Microsoft, readers should refer to Chapter 2. These models are summarised in Exhibits 1 and 
2, below. 
The DCF model is presented in Exhibit 1. Equity value is a function of revenue growth (g), 
profit margin (w), the dividend payout ratio {p), the cost of equity capital {re) and the length 
of the competitive advantage period {n + 7). Revenue growth and profit margin decline 
asymptotically to long-term expected values, while the cost of equity capital and the dividend 
payout ratio are held constant. The Decision-tree model is presented in exhibit 2. Equity value 
is the mean estimate of 1000 equity valuations which rely on simulated revenue growth and 
profit margins. 
The Decision-tree valuation model involves discounting expected fiiture cash flows at a 
constant, risk-adjusted discount rate, the cost of equity capital. Hence, it is not technically a 
real options valuation model, which requu-es the discounting of risk-adjusted cash flows at the 
risk-free rate. This decision was made in order to reduce the number of parameters required 
for estimation and to increase its potential usage of the model amongst practitioners who are 
more comfortable using risk-adjusted discount rates then risk-adjusted cash flows. 
Specifically, I estimate the cost of equity capital using the standard Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, which is widely accepted in practice, and which is estimated using standard 
techniques. Now while there is significant uncertainty over any firm's systematic risk, there is 
likely to be an equal amount of uncertainty associated with any risk adjustment to simulated 
cash flows. 
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Exhibit 3.1 
Discounted Cash Flow valuation summary 
DCF valuation 
The DCF valuation is the present value of expected future dividends, where dividends are the product 
of sales per share (5), profit margin (w) and the dividend payout ratio {p), but cannot be negative. The 
three terms of the model correspond to the explicit forecast period (« years), the remainder of the 
competitive advantage period (ryears), and the terminal growth period (after year n + T). 
DCF-X^'^^^''"''^"^Vi;' 
Max 
j = i ;=n+l 
pm,S„e'"*' ,0 
V J 
e'^ 
I«-
+ 
mS^e''"*' 
r^e 
'•An+T-l) 
Revenue growth 
Revenue growth (g) declines asymptotically to a 
long-term sustainable rate {g), estimated as the 
product of the reinvestment rate {\ -p) and the 
cost of equity capital (rJ. 
Si=e-'g,_,+{^-e-'')g 
= e-^'-"\g„-g)+g 
= ^""^ '^""'b„-(i-pK]+(i-pk 
Profit margin 
Profit margin {m) declines asjmiptotically to a 
long-term sustainable level {m ) , estimated with 
reference to established firms. 
m, = e m,_i + 
= e-"^''"^ 
[l-e'^yn 
(m„ -m)+m 
Variable definitions 
DCF = discounted cash fiow valuation of equity per share at time 0; 
Ej = eamings per share in year /; 
SiS„ = sales per share in years / and n, respectively; 
Pi = dividend payout ratio in year /; 
p = dividend payout ratio from years n + 1 onwards; 
gi = continuously-compounded sales growth in year;; 
g„ = continuously-compounded sales growth in year n (initial growth); 
g = long-term sustainable growth rate in sales; 
/n, = net profit margin (earnings/sales) in year /; 
/n„ = net profit margin in year n (initial margin); 
m = long-term sustainable net profit margin; 
re = continuously-compounded cost of equity capital; and 
K = speed of adjustment parameter for sales growth and profit margin. 
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Exhibit 3.2 
Decision-tree valuation summary 
Decision-tree valuation 
The Z)CF valuation is the present value of expected fiiture dividends, where dividends are the product 
of sales per share (S), profit margin (m) and the dividend payout ratio (p), but cannot be negative. The 
three terms of the model correspond to the explicit forecast period (« years), the remainder of the 
competitive advantage period (7 years), and the terminal growth period (after year n + T). 
pm,S„e'-"^' ,0 Max 
, ^Max{p,m,S,fS) "^' 
DCF' =Y. .,• + Z 
V 
1=1 (=«+i e'-' 
• + • 
mS.. I«. 
^e^ 
/•^(n+r-l) 
7=1 «• 
Revenue growth 
Revenue growth (g) is the sum of expected 
growth {j.i) and unexpected growth (ffe^ ). The 
standard deviation of unexpected growth declines 
asymptotically to a long-term estimate {cr) . 
g, =p,+a,s._ 
CT: - e 
• ^ , - 1 + ( l - . - > T 
Expected revenue growth is also uncertain. Its 
mean estimate and standard deviation both decUne 
asymptotically to long-term estimates (// and 0, 
respectively). 
Profit margin 
Profit margin (/n) is a weighted average of the 
margin on expected sales (w^) and the margin on 
unexpected sales (m ), plus a random component. 
The forecast margin declines asymptotically to its 
long-term estimate ( m ) and the random 
component is normally distributed with mean zero 
and standard deviation 8. 
, =m/(e^'-^')+m(l-e^'-^')+&3 
m,_, + (l - e " yn 
(m„ -m)+m 
m 
mi -e 
= e""^""^ 
Mi = e //,_ -I- (i--): r n-e 
-IK 
2K -ri,s i^\ 
7, ^ " V i 
Variable definitions 
DCF = the discounted cash flow valuation of equity under simulation j of k simulations; 
= the Decision-tree value of equity; 
= estimated eamings in year /'; 
= estimated sales per share in year «; 
= dividend payout ratio in year /; and dividend payout ratio from years n + 1 onwards; 
= expected revenue growth in period / and its long-term sustainable level; 
rj, = standard deviation of expected revenue growth in period /; 
cr,,CT = standard deviation of revenue growth in period / and long-term sustainable level; 
Si' Sn- S ^ simulated sales growth in period /; continuously-compounded sales growth in year n (initial 
growth); and long-term sustainable growth rate in sales; 
mi, mf, m , m = simulated net profit margin in period /; forecast net profit margin in period /, 
assuming reversion to the long-term margin; long-term net profit margin; and net profit margin on 
unexpected sales growth; 
d = standard deviation of the random component of profit margin, due to uncertainty over costs; 
SI, El. f-i = standard normal variates. 
r^ = continuously-compounded cost of equity capital 
K = speed of adjustment parameter for sales growth and profit margin. 
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3.2.3. Parameter estimation 
The parameter estimation techniques relied upon in this study are the same as those used in 
the analysis of portfolio performance, presented in Chapter 2. However, there is one 
significant variation and some minor amendments, which I discuss below. 
The significant variation is that I select the competitive advantage period as that which 
provides the closest match between the Decision-tree valuation and the first-day closing price. 
The theoretical modelling and model fit analysis presented in Chapter 3 showed that the 
assumed CAP has a direct and material impact on Real option%. Without information as to 
market value, estimating the appropriate CAP for computing Real option% is difficult. If a 
constant CAP is assumed for all firms, Real option% will be understated for those firms with a 
tme (unobservable) CAP that is longer than assumed. By the same token, Real option% will 
be overstated for firms whose tme CAP is less than assumed. First, I performed valuations of 
all IPOs, assuming CAP takes on integer values from 4 to 60 years. Second, I selected the 
Decision-tree valuation which minimised absolute percentage error when compared to market 
,„,., DTV - 1st day close ^^ . , . . , . , , . , 
pnce APE = . Usmg the competitive advantage period which was 
1st day close 
assumed in this valuation, I estimated the DCF valuation and Real option%. 
Of course, investors in an IPO carmot replicate this analysis because they are unable to 
observe the market price prior to making their investment. But the purpose of the study is not 
to determine a trading strategy for IPO investing. The clear evidence of the IPO literature is, 
to eam abnormal first-day returns from IPO investing, enter into arrangements which ensure 
large IPO allocations. In other words, even if an equity investor has a vastly superior model 
to determine which IPOs would be most underpriced, there is no guarantee that they could 
actually purchase those IPOs. 
The purpose of the study is to provide fiirther evidence of underpricing that is unrelated to 
investment banker choice. IPO underpricing arises from two sources. First, investment 
bankers make an unbiased assessment of market value, but strategically issue stock at a lower 
price to this estimate. Explanations for this behaviour include minimising underwriter risk, 
providing abnormal returns to preferred clients (Oxley, 2002) and publicity generation 
(Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004 in relation to intemet firms). Second, despite their best efforts, 
underwriters may be unable to persuade investors to purchase stock at this unbiased 
assessment of value. And it is this second explanation which is likely to be caused by 
information asymmetry, which I measure as Real option%. 
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Further, there are several examples in the IPO literature in which IPO underpricing is 
explained by variables which are unobservable prior to listing. For example, uncertainty has 
been measured using the standard deviation of retums in the after-market (Rock, 1984; 
Johnson and Miller, 1988; Finn and Higham, 1988). Houston et al (2004) explain offer prices 
using analyst target prices obtained from research reports up to 115 days after the stock is 
listed. 
This means that a variable very close to the first-day closing price appears on the right-hand 
side of the equation. But this does not induce a mechanical relationship between initial rettims 
and Real option%. This relationship does not exist, because Real option% is a function of 
both the Decision-tree valuation and the DCF valuation. And the DCF valuation has not been 
calibrated in any way to the first-day closing price, or to the IPO price. In sum, the variable 
Real option% is simply capttiring the economic value of uncertainty, in a way that previous 
measures cannot. That is, while other information asymmetry proxies, such as share 
allocations amongst retail investors, size, the number of uses of proceeds, or retums volatility, 
they do not directly measure the economic impact of uncertainty on value. In contrast. Real 
option% is a direct measure of the proportion of equity value attributable to the volatility of 
expected cash flows. It can be calculated by investment bankers, given their superior 
information as to the firm's prospects, and they can act on this information. If there is an 
association between Real option% and underpricing, underwriters can devote additional 
resources to mitigate uncertainty in an attempt to increase the offer price. If there is no 
association between Real option% and underpricing, these efforts are unlikely to lead to 
higher issue proceeds. 
To alleviate any residual concems that this calibration is inappropriate, I repeated my analysis 
by incorporating all 57 estimates of Real option% in the regression equation. These estimates 
of Real option% are made without any reference to the offer price or the first-day closing 
price. Because these estimates are highly correlated, the regression coefficients cannot be 
interpreted in an economic sense. Hence, their coefficients cannot be used to estimate 92, 
which is the proportion of embedded options which are incorporated into the offer price. 
However, I am able to show that the regression coefficients are jointly different from zero, 
and there is a further increase in explanatory power. This means that, even estimating Real 
option% using information unrelated to market price, there is an association between IPO 
underpricing and Real option%. 
The other relevant information regarding parameter estimation can be summarised as follows: 
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• I estimated the cost of equity capital {re) using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, where the 
risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing date and the 
market risk premium is 6 percent. Beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 
is computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums 
of the equity against the S&P 1500 Super Index; stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 
and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment made by Bloomberg); and stage 3 is 
constraining all beta estimates within the range of 0 to 4. This technique minimises the 
impact of extreme beta estimates. 
• In estimating the parameters which rely on analyst forecasts (initial growth and margins), 
I used the first available set of forecast information which is available in the IBES 
database. 
• In estimating other valuation parameters, I used the long-term parameter estimates relied 
upon in the portfolio performance study, presented in Chapter 2.1 match firms on the 
basis of year and IBES industry sector and compute median estimates. For example, in 
valuing a 1999 Technology IPO, I use the median estimates for Technology stocks in 
1999 for long-term growth, long-term margin, the margin on unexpected sales, initial 
volatility and long-term volatility. 
4. Data and valuation metrics 
In this section, I conduct a preliminary analysis of the data to establish the external and 
intemal validity of the study, and provide initial evidence that embedded options are likely to 
be usefiil in explaining IPO underpricing. In Sub-section 4.1,1 present summary data relating 
to the sample, which shows has comparable characteristics to the population of US IPOs from 
1997-2004.1 also analyse the relationship between valuation parameters and the resulting 
valuations, to ensure that valuations are consistent with the theory discussed in Section 3. In 
Sub-section 4,2,1 analyse the relationship between the price-eamings ratios which result from 
the Discounted Cash Flow and Decision-tree valuations. 
This analysis shows that price-eamings ratios which result from DCF valuations exhibit the 
expected inverse relationship with the cost of equity, and a positive relationship with revenue 
growth. In contrast, the price-eamings ratios which result from Decision-tree valuations -
which have been calibrated to market prices - exhibit a positive relationship with the cost of 
equity and the volatility of initial revenue growth. Apart from an association with the level of 
growth, there is no theory underlying DCF valuations which predicts a positive association 
between price-eamings ratios and the volatility. Indeed, if volatility of revenue growth is part 
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of risk which is priced by the market, we would observe an inverse relationship between 
price-eamings ratios and volatility. This provides preliminary evidence that, for the IPO 
sample, a proportion of equity value is comprised of embedded options. For additional 
evidence of this supporting argument in relation to the broader class of equities, readers are 
referred to Chapter 2. 
4.1. Sample 
For this sttidy to be relied upon in explaining IPO underpricing, the sample must be 
representative of the population of US IPOs and theoretical valuations must exhibit the 
expected association with the valuation parameters outlined in Section 3. In this section, I 
describe the sample, addressing these two issues. 
From 1 January 1997 to 31 August 2004, 2454 IPOs were priced in the US, according to 
NASDAQ. The sample comprises 790 of these issues for which the full set of required data 
was available. I obtained IPO pricing information from NASDAQ, retums data from 
Datastream and mean EPS and sales forecasts from IBES (via Datastream). Descriptive 
statistics on underpricing, market prices, valuation parameters and valuation metrics are 
presented in Table 3.2 by cohort year, and in Table 3.3 by IBES industry sector. 
Comparing the sample with those analysed by Ljunqvist and Wilhelm (2003), and Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), provides evidence that the sample is representative of the population of 
IPOs occurring during the eight-year period. Mean initial retums are 33 percent for the 
sample, which is consistent with the results of the two prior studies. For the sub-sample of 
1531 IPOs from 1997-2000, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm report mean initial retums of 43 percent, 
compared to 44 percent for the 537 IPOs in the present study. For the sub-sample of 1718 
IPOs from 1997-2003, Loughran and Ritter report mean initial retums of 39 percent, 
compared to 37 percent for the 678 IPOs in the present study. 
Mean initial retums notably increase to 59 percent during 1999-2000, the years in which there 
was the highest proportion of technology firms listed (46 percent of IPOs during those years). 
Again, this is consistent with mean estimates of 66 and 65 percent reported by Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, despite samples sizes twice those of the 349 IPOs in the present study. Technology 
firms comprise 33 percent of the sample in the present shidy, compared to 41 percent for the 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm sample. 
Summary statistics relating to valuation metrics, valuation parameters and explanatory 
variables for IPO underpricing are also presented in Tables 2 and 3. Valuation metrics are 
DCF and Decision-tree valuations {DCF and DTV), the ratio of these values to offer price 
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{DCF/price and DTV/price), the absolute value of the percentage difference between the 
Decision-tree valuation and the first day closing price {Var), the percentage of theoretical 
value attributed to real options {Real option%) and the competitive advantage period {CAP). 
Recall that the assumed competitive advantage period for each firm has been selected so as to 
minimise the absolute difference between the Decision-tree valuation and market price. In 
other words, the assumed competitive advantage period represents the required length of time 
over which valuation parameters revert to long-term values in order to justify initial share 
prices. The DCF valuation is then performed using the same competitive advantage period, 
but with the assumption that revenue growth and profit margin, revert to long-term expected 
values with no uncertainty. The proportion of the Decision-tree value which is not attributable 
to the DCF valuation is the estimate of Real option%. 
The key variable of interest is Real option%, which has a mean estimate of 47 percent for the 
full sample and which is highest for Technology and Healthcare stocks, at 50 and 66 percent, 
respectively. These sectors are characterised by high, volatile revenue growth, and low initial 
margins. Consider the median estimates of these parameters, as the mean parameters 
estimates are affected by skewness, especially for loss-making firms with little sales, whose 
profit margins can be substantially negative. The typical Healthcare stock was expected to be 
incurring losses upon listing, as shown by the median initial margin of-72 percent. But with a 
median initial revenue growth of 38 percent, a firm of this nature could be profitable within a 
short space of time, provided it survives. The typical Technology stock had comparable initial 
revenue growth, but was expected to be marginally profitable. Both sectors had high initial 
volatility of revenue growth: 22 percent for Technology and 33 percent for Healthcare. This 
combination of high growth, low margins and high volatility results in the high proportion of 
equity value attributable to embedded options. 
These sectors also have the longest median estimates of competitive advantage period, at 32 
years for Technology stocks and 28 years for Healthcare stocks. In contrast, firms in the 
Finance sector had a median CAP estimate of 21 years. This difference in CAP can be 
attributed to the relationship between initial and long-term estimates of revenue growth and 
profit margin. The typical Finance firm had initial revenue growth of 15 percent, which was 
expected to revert to a long-term estimate of 9 percent (the product of reinvestment rate and 
the cost of equity capital); and its initial profit margin of 10.8 percent is close to its long-term 
margin of 10.4 percent. So, under the assumption that revenue growth and margin revert to 
these long-term values over 21 years, the Decision-tree valuation will approximate share price 
for this finance firm. In contrast, for the median Technology or Healthcare stock, the 
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theoretical value estimate only approximates share price if high revenue growth can be 
sustained for a longer period. While this also means that the expected profit margins of these 
firms take longer to reach their long-term estimates, the high revenue growth means that 
eamings are significantly enhanced via the margin on unexpected sales. For example, the 
median margin on unexpected sales is 17.7 percent. Now consider a firm in a state where its 
expected margin is 5.0 percent. If sales are 10 percent above expectations, eamings will be 
r 0.05-h 0.10x0.177 > 
35.4 percent above expectations 0.05 
= 0.354 . And the longer the 
y 
competitive advantage period, the more years in which the firm is characterised by high, 
volatile revenue growth. 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive statistics by cohort year 
Panel A: Underpricing statistics and valuation metrics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on valuation metrics relating to underpricing, market prices and theoretical 
valuations. Return is the percentage difference between the IPO price and its closing price on the first day's 
trade. Money left on the table (MLOTT) is retum multiplied by the number of shares issued, and represents the 
difference between the market value and cash received for shares sold in the IPO. IPO price is the fmal price 
listed in the prospectus and 1st close is the last closing price on the IPO date as reported by Datastream. 
Variables relating to theoretical valuation are DCF (the present value of expected fijture cash flows), DTV (a 
Decision-tree valuation estimated using the simulation technique described in Chapter 2), Var (the absolute 
percentage difference between the Decision-tree valuation and the first-day closing price), Real Option% {R0% 
- the percentage of theoretical value attributed to real options), and the competitive advantage period {CAP - the 
forecast period which minimises the absolute percentage difference between the first-day closing price and the 
Decision-tree valuation). 
Year N Return 
(%) 
Underpricinq 
MLOTT 
($m) 
IPO 
price 
1" 
close 
DCF DTV 
Valuation metrics 
DCF 
/price 
DTV 
/price 
Var 
(%) 
RO% CAP 
Means bv cohort vear 
1997 105 
1998 83 
1999 165 
2000 184 
2001 44 
2002 47 
2003 50 
2004 112 
All 790 
12.7 
18.5 
64.2 
53.9 
13.0 
8.7 
12.9 
10.2 
33.1 
7 
61 
107 
77 
47 
15 
19 
17 
55 
12.30 
13.80 
15.90 
15.19 
15.31 
16.13 
15.20 
14.09 
14.72 
13.79 
16.81 
29.73 
27,40 
17,51 
17,80 
17.25 
15,74 
21.55 
12.70 
23.38 
17.50 
11.18 
12.15 
20.30 
10.16 
11.01 
14.49 
16.60 
20.25 
30.97 
26.11 
19.20 
26.04 
18.77 
18.24 
23.27 
1.01 
1.52 
1.09 
0.70 
0.77 
1.20 
0.66 
0.66 
0.93 
1.30 
1.47 
1.85 
1.55 
1.25 
1.55 
1.24 
1.21 
1.49 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
39 
36 
47 
56 
48 
35 
51 
52 
47 
30 
28 
32 
33 
27 
21 
26 
25 
29 
Medians bv cohort vear 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
All 
11.1 
12.5 
36.3 
25.0 
11.2 
5.3 
10.0 
5,6 
13.6 
4 
5 
28 
24 
12 
8 
11 
4 
9 
12.00 
13.00 
14.00 
14.63 
14.00 
16.00 
14.25 
13,00 
14.00 
12.38 
15,69 
20,00 
19,15 
16,30 
16,80 
17,48 
14.01 
16.33 
7.31 
10.90 
11.28 
7.42 
6.51 
11.90 
6.74 
5.42 
8.23 
12.84 
16.62 
21.88 
17.58 
16.17 
20.53 
18.22 
14.25 
17.06 
0.66 
0.74 
0.76 
0.56 
0.53 
0.79 
0.49 
0.40 
0.61 
1.10 
1.15 
1.42 
1.25 
1.18 
1.12 
1.13 
1.08 
1.16 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
35 
33 
49 
57 
53 
26 
55 
63 
49 
26 
26 
32 
33 
26 
16 
26 
24 
27 
Standard deviation bv cohort vear 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
All ~ 
18.4 
24.8 
71.7 
66.6 
17.0 
14.9 
14.3 
14.4 
53.1 
24 
429 
248 
135 
104 
44 
26 
42 
196 
4.56 
4.49 
8.41 
5.70 
6.00 
5.53 
3.42 
8.34 
6.54 
6.51 
8.14 
27.25 
27.26 
7.82 
7.51 
4.59 
10.21 
20.05 
19.76 
57.77 
23.04 
11.69 
14.28 
23.83 
9.55 
22.62 
26.09 
16.70 
16.17 
29.09 
26.28 
12.41 
21.61 
6.70 
20.41 
22.90 
1.24 
2.78 
1.27 
0.60 
0.84 
1.22 
0.62 
0.68 
1.31 
0.96 
1.06 
1.24 
0.88 
0.63 
1.01 
0.38 
0.46 
0.95 
268 
83 
81 
25 
60 
84 
38 
42 
114 
32 
32 
28 
28 
33 
33 
32 
31 
31 
19 
18 
16 
16 
15 
14 
14 
13 
16 
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Table 3.2 (contd.) 
Descriptive statistics by cohort year 
Panel B: First-day retums, money left on the table, valuation parameters and other regression variables 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics on valuation parameters and independent variables previously identified in 
the IPO literature as being associated with initial retums. Initial volatility of revenue growth (Vol) is estimated as 
the average standard deviation of revenue growth from firms in the same IBES industry sector using historical 
financial statement information from 1985 to the year of the IPO; Long-term volatility of revenue growth {Long-
term vol) is estimated in the same way as initial volatility of revenue growth, but uses data drawn from a sample 
of fums with at least a five-year reporting history; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean 
revenue growth derived from the first three years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO 
(fewer forecast years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Initial profit margin (Mgn) is 
estimated as the mean NPAT/Sales margin obtained from the first three years of available IBES consensus 
forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Long-
term margin (Long-term mgn) is estimated as the historical sales-weighted profit margin for firms in the same 
IBES industry sector using financial statement information from 1985 to the year of the IPO, drawn from a 
sample of firms with at least a five-year reporting history; Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, where the risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing date; the 
market risk premium is assumed to be 6 percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is 
computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the 
S&P 1500 Super Index, stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment 
made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4; Price revision = IPO 
price/M id-point of the filing range - 1; Tech is an indicator variable for firms in the IBES industry sector 
Technology; Overhang = Shares retained by the issuer divided by shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price 
muhiplied by issued shares; Pre-issue IPO returns is the average initial retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 
calendar days prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue market returns is the cumulative retum on the S&P 1500 Index for 
the 15 trading days prior to the IPO. 
Year 
Valuation parameters (%) 
"-""S" Growrt Vol term ^ ^ ° * ^ 
vol 
Long-
term 
growrt 
h 
Mgn 
Long-
term 
mgn 
Mgn 
on 
un-
exp 
sales 
r. 
IPO 
Rev 
underpricinq explanatory variables (%) 
Rev* O/Ha 
ng 
Proce 
eds 
($m) 
Pre-
issue 
IPO 
ret 
Pre-
' ^ T Tech mkt 
ret 
Means bv cohort vear 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Ail 
Media 
"iggT 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
All 
18 17 
18 18 
21 18 
25 21 
26 22 
29 25 
30 27 
32 29 
24 21 
22 
23 
45 
54 
24 
15 
19 
28 
35 
13 
13 
17 
17 
13 
11 
11 
13 
15 
-39 
-10 
-93 
-272 
-90 
-11 
-246 
-68 
-120 
7.1 
7.5 
7.6 
7.5 
7.1 
7.3 
7.6 
7.2 
7.4 
9.8 
11.4 
13.5 
16.9 
15.2 
14.2 
16.1 
32.3 
16.5 
13.7 
13.7 
16.9 
17.5 
13.1 
10.9 
11.8 
13.8 
14.9 
-9.2 
-6.8 
-2.3 
-4.7 
-7.7 
-9.2 
-3.7 
-12.0 
-6.4 
1.2 
1.6 
3.5 
3.4 
1.4 
0.7 
1.9 
0.9 
2.2 
4.9 
5.0 
6.4 
4.8 
4.3 
3.3 
2.6 
2.8 
4.6 
61 
153 
210 
129 
496 
310 
177 
170 
179 
10 
19 
151 
177 
17 
9 
15 
20 
81 
1.7 
1.2 
0.7 
-0,3 
0,0 
-1,0 
0,6 
-0.5 
0.3 
27 
27 
48 
45 
23 
19 
22 
20 
33 
is bv cohort year 
14 18 
18 17 
21 17 
22 18 
24 21 
29 26 
28 26 
30 29 
22 19 
Standard deviations bv 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
All 
6 3 
4 4 
3 3 
6 6 
7 5 
7 6 
8 6 
9 6 
8 6 
15 
20 
41 
51 
17 
13 
15 
21 
25 
13 
13 
17 
17 
11 
11 
11 
13 
14 
cohort vear 
28 
24 
35 
34 
35 
23 
17 
25 
33 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
6 
7 
6 
4.0 
3.6 
-6.2 
-46 
3.8 
3.9 
5.5 
6.2 
2.7 
168 
77 
273 
657 
407 
73 
948 
337 
459 
7.4 
7.7 
9.1 
6.5 
5.9 
6.2 
8.1 
5.8 
7.2 
1.6 
1.8 
2.0 
1.6 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
1.9 
9.8 
8.3 
8.8 
11.0 
15.2 
11.8 
15.3 
27.7 
14.0 
4.8 
9.9 
6.1 
10.0 
6.5 
11.6 
13.3 
16.8 
12.3 
13.3 
12.9 
16.8 
17.1 
11.5 
10.6 
11.5 
13.1 
14.1 
3.1 
4.4 
5.5 
5.2 
4.9 
2.9 
4.9 
6.3 
5.4 
-7.1 
-5.6 
0.0 
0.0 
-7.0 
-7.1 
-3.0 
-12.5 
-5.0 
13.1 
11.5 
13.4 
14.8 
11.5 
11.3 
9.5 
13.4 
13.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
4.0 
7.1 
6.1 
3.8 
2.2 
4.4 
3.1 
5.2 
3.1 
3.5 
4.4 
4.0 
3.5 
2.9 
2.5 
2.7 
3.4 
7.3 
5.3 
7.0 
4.6 
4.0 
2.6 
1.7 
2.0 
5.3 
33 
46 
68 
76 
128 
115 
114 
89 
72 
98 
520 
627 
235 
1357 
734 
167 
272 
526 
11 
14 
163 
135 
15 
8 
14 
20 
25 
10 
19 
65 
151 
9 
6 
8 
9 
109 
2.4 
1.2 
0.2 
-1,1 
-0,8 
-0,7 
0,4 
-0.3 
0.1 
3.2 
3.7 
3.9 
4.1 
4.2 
5.0 
2.3 
2.3 
3.7 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
... 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
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Table 3.3 
Descriptive statistics by IBES industry sector 
Panel A: First-day returns, money left on the table and valuation metrics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on valuation metrics relating to underpricing, market prices and theoretical 
valuations. Return is the percentage difference between the IPO price and its closing price on the first day's 
trade. Money left on the table {MLOTT) is retum multiplied by the number of shares issued, and represents the 
difference between the market value and cash received for shares sold in the IPO. IPO price is the final price 
listed in the prospectus and 1st close is the last closing price on the IPO date as reported by Datastream. 
Variables relating to theoretical valuation are DCF (the present value of expected future cash flows), DTV (a 
Decision-tree valuation estimated using the simulation technique described in Chapter 2), Var (the absolute 
percentage difference between the Decision-tree valuation and the first-day closing price), Real Option% {R0% 
- the percentage of theoretical value attributed to real options), and the competitive advantage period {CAP - the 
forecast period which minimises the absolute percentage difference between the first-day closing price and the 
Decision-tree valuation). 
IBES industry sectors are Basic Industries (BAS), Capital Goods (CAP), Consumer Durables (CD), Consumer 
Non-durables (CND), Consumer Services (CSV), Energy (ENE), Finance (FIN), Healthcare (HTH), Technology 
(TCH), Transport (TRA) and Utilities (UTI). 
Year N 
UnderDricinq 
Return MLOTT 
(%) ($m) 
IPO 
price 
1 -
close 
DCF DTV 
Valuation metrics 
DCF 
/price 
DTV 
/price 
Var 
(%) 
RO% CAP 
Means bv IBES industry sector 
BAS 13 
CAP 28 
CD 16 
CND 25 
CSV 155 
ENE 28 
FIN 87 
HTH 149 
TCH 264 
TRA 15 
UTI 10 
All 790 
7.0 -3 
15.7 24 
10.1 15 
14.4 18 
29.5 35 
14.6 154 
10.8 32 
21.0 26 
59.1 86 
11.7 147 
26.8 62 
33.1 55 
Medians bv IBES industry sector 
BAS 
CAP 
CD 
CND 
CSV 
ENE 
FIN 
HTH — 
TCH 
TRA 
UTI 
All 
1,0 1 
7.1 4 
3.9 2 
15.9 12 
13.3 12 
9.8 6 
7.3 3 
9.1 5 
30.7 23 
7.2 11 
16.2 39 
13.6 9 
Standard deviation bv IBES industry 
BAS 
CAP 
CD 
CND 
CSV 
ENE 
FIN 
HTH 
TCH 
TRA 
UTI 
All — 
19.8 62 
38.1 59 
16.9 41 
14.4 47 
49.3 75 
20.4 737 
21.4 136 
41.1 85 
67.2 167 
19.1 509 
25.6 68 
53.1 196 
16.22 
15.03 
13.92 
15.36 
14.49 
16.06 
15.62 
13.35 
14.70 
18.82 
18.15 
14.72 
15.00 
14.50 
13.00 
14.00 
14.00 
15.00 
14.00 
13.00 
14.00 
17.00 
16.75 
14.00 
sector 
6.43 
4.92 
5.28 
6.36 
4.34 
5.04 
5.89 
7.62 
7.18 
9.70 
5.74 
6.54 
15.55 
17,81 
15,30 
17,55 
19.69 
18.92 
17.45 
17.05 
28.18 
22.06 
22.83 
21.55 
15.03 
16.35 
16.16 
16.50 
17.31 
16.14 
15.88 
14.03 
18.23 
17.44 
21.64 
16.33 
6.49 
9,08 
5.68 
7.09 
12.31 
8.69 
8.07 
14.60 
29.42 
15.27 
7.53 
20.05 
18.91 
17.56 
17.13 
17.48 
16.03 
15.09 
16.05 
6.79 
15.90 
23.03 
14.19 
14.49 
12.40 
14.63 
10.00 
12.10 
9.05 
9.27 
9.51 
3.89 
8.71 
10.51 
11.82 
8.23 
20.51 
17.93 
17.17 
16.73 
23.77 
20.87 
18.30 
12.65 
35.31 
37.57 
11.55 
26.09 
24.34 
22.14 
20.61 
21.91 
23.46 
22,48 
21.36 
16.80 
27.74 
28.14 
20.01 
23.27 
21.30 
19.12 
17.00 
19.48 
18.66 
16.09 
16.53 
14,04 
17,60 
17,51 
20,41 
17.06 
18,50 
16,98 
15,27 
14.31 
18.94 
19.90 
17.59 
13.31 
30.40 
36.12 
9.88 
22.90 
1.18 
1.22 
1.09 
1.14 
1.14 
0.87 
1.02 
0.52 
0.96 
0.95 
0.77 
0.93 
0.75 
0.74 
0.82 
0.84 
0.66 
0.62 
0.70 
0.30 
0.67 
0.79 
0.93 
0.61 
1.28 
1.15 
0.75 
1.04 
1.60 
0.91 
1.06 
0.92 
1.48 
0.70 
0.46 
1.31 
1.53 
1.49 
1.36 
1.42 
1.59 
1.32 
1.33 
1.24 
1.67 
1.24 
1.10 
1.49 
1.11 
1.16 
1.19 
1.20 
1.22 
1.12 
1.10 
1.08 
1.33 
1.08 
1.10 
1.16 
1.14 
0.87 
0.52 
0.80 
1.13 
0.74 
0.92 
0.64 
1.04 
0.58 
0.43 
0.95 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
2 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
4 
3 
1 
5 
3 
128 
74 
52 
52 
134 
59 
82 
198 
39 
34 
25 
114 
31 
31 
28 
29 
44 
41 
35 
66 
50 
27 
36 
47 
26 
32 
14 
13 
44 
45 
27 
75 
50 
29 
23 
49 
28 
28 
31 
31 
31 
32 
31 
28 
27 
24 
33 
31 
25 
23 
25 
26 
28 
24 
26 
29 
33 
27 
27 
29 
25 
22 
21 
24 
26 
23 
21 
28 
32 
26 
22 
27 
17 
17 
18 
18 
17 
16 
18 
14 
16 
18 
20 
16 
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Table 3.3 (contd.) 
Descriptive statistics by IBES industry sector 
Panel B: First-day returns, money left on the table, valuation parameters and other regression variables 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics on valuation parameters and independent variables previously identified in 
the IPO literature as being associated with initial retums. Initial volatility of revenue growth (Vol) is estimated as 
the average standard deviation of revenue growth from firms in the same IBES industry sector using historical 
financial statement information from 1985 to the year of the IPO; Long-term volatility of revenue growth {Long-
term vol) is estimated in the same way as initial volatility of revenue growth, but uses data drawn from a sample 
of firms with at least a five-year reporting history; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean 
revenue growth derived from the first three years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO 
(fewer forecast years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Initial profit margin (Mgn) is 
estimated as the mean NPAT/Sales margin obtained from the first three years of available IBES consensus 
forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Long-
term margin (Long-term mgn) is estimated as the historical sales-weighted profit margin for firms in the same 
IBES industry sector using financial statement information from 1985 to the year of the IPO, drawn from a 
sample of fums with at least a five-year reporting history; Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, where the risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing date; the 
market risk premium is assumed to be 6 percent; and beta is estunated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is 
computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the 
S&P 1500 Super Index, stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment 
made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4; Price revision = IPO 
price/Mid-point of the filing range - 1; Bubble is an indicator variable for IPOs from 1999-2000; Overhang = 
Shares retained by the issuer divided by shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price multiplied by issued shares; Pre-
issue IPO returns is the average initial retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days prior to the IPO; and 
Pre-issue market retums is the cumulative return on the S&P 1500 Index for the 15 trading days prior to the IPO. 
Valuation parameters (%) 
Year 
„ , ':*'"9- Growt Vol term . 
vol ^ 
Long-
term 
growt 
h 
Mgn 
Long-
term 
mgn 
Mgn 
on 
un-
exp 
sales 
r. 
IPO underpricinq explanatory variables {%) 
Rev Rev* O/Ha ng 
Proce 
eds 
($m) 
Pre-
issue 
IPO 
ret 
Pre-
issue Bubb 
mkt le 
ret 
Means by cohort year 
BAS 21 16 
CAP 20 19 
CD 16 15 
CND 16 13 
CSV 21 21 
ENE 29 27 
FIN 22 20 
HTH 36 29 
TCH 22 19 
TRA 14 14 
UTI 17 15 
All 24 21 
24 
23 
13 
15 
33 
27 
16 
44 
44 
13 
34 
35 
12 
11 
12 
11 
14 
10 
10 
14 
18 
12 
17 
15 
-51 
2.5 
6.2 
-190 
-114 
-16 
5.9 
-384 
-49 
11 
-163 
-120 
5.7 
5.1 
5.1 
6.2 
5.3 
5.8 
10.4 
6.3 
9.0 
6.2 
10.6 
7.4 
13.1 
7.4 
21.1 
18.3 
11.2 
11.4 
26.0 
13.9 
19.5 
20.6 
5.6 
16.5 
13.1 
11.9 
12.2 
11.7 
14.5 
11.3 
11.3 
13.8 
18.3 
13.1 
19.0 
14.9 
-9,0 
-9.1 
-9,6 
-7.9 
-5.1 
-6.5 
-7.7 
-11.3 
-3.5 
-6.2 
-0.9 
-6.4 
1.4 
1.0 
0.0 
1.5 
2.6 
1.5 
0.6 
1.1 
3.7 
1.5 
1.8 
2.2 
2.7 
3.2 
3.4 
3.6 
4.4 
3.2 
3.0 
4.2 
6.1 
3.3 
5.2 
4.6 
318 
144 
206 
580 
140 
271 
337 
97 
118 
545 
335 
179 
61 
45 
40 
33 
89 
40 
31 
70 
119 
36 
82 
81 
0.7 
-0.5 
1.7 
0.7 
0.2 
0.8 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
1.4 
1.0 
0.3 
38 
21 
19 
28 
45 
32 
17 
44 
61 
13 
50 
44 
Medians by cohort vear 
BAS 20 17 
CAP 20 18 
CD 13 12 
CND 14 12 
CSV 21 21 
ENE 28 26 
FIN 26 21 
HTH 33 29 
TCH 22 18 
TRA 15 15 
UTI 16 14 
All 22 19 
Standard deviations bv 
BAS 2 3 
CAP 3 2 
CD 5 4 
CND 2 3 
CSV 5 3 
ENE 5 5 
FIN 5 4 
HTH 6 6 
TCH 5 5 
TRA 1 1 
UTI 4 5 
All 8 6 
7 
17 
10 
12 
22 
18 
15 
38 
36 
5 
30 
25 
cohort 
38 
28 
13 
24 
32 
26 
28 
32 
32 
18 
54 
33 
11 
10 
11 
11 
13 
10 
9 
14 
18 
12 
20 
14 
year 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
9 
6 
2.9 
4.6 
6.0 
2.7 
1.6 
6.0 
10.8 
-72 
2.6 
5.3 
-10 
2.7 
182 
19 
5 
949 
432 
83 
41 
796 
156 
17 
290 
459 
5.6 
5.3 
5.1 
6.5 
5.2 
5.6 
10.4 
6.5 
9.0 
6.2 
10.6 
7.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.6 
0,4 
1.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.2 
0.4 
0.1 
1.9 
8.3 
7.3 
16.4 
16.6 
8.8 
12.5 
15.8 
11.0 
17.7 
11.8 
6.3 
14.0 
16.8 
2.9 
12.7 
15.2 
7.9 
6.3 
15.8 
7.1 
12.7 
18.7 
1.8 
12.3 
12.2 
11.2 
11.1 
11.5 
13.1 
10.6 
10.6 
13.5 
18.4 
13.2 
20.3 
14.1 
4.2 
3.4 
4.4 
2.3 
5.2 
3.1 
3.5 
4.6 
5.3 
3.8 
6.3 
5.4 
-11.1 
-8.0 
-6,1 
-3,6 
0.0 
-5.0 
-7,1 
-10,0 
0,0 
-5.3 
0.0 
-5.0 
10.1 
10.7 
9.3 
13,1 
14,0 
10,6 
8,5 
14.4 
14.2 
11.8 
10.0 
13.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
4.9 
2.9 
0.0 
2.9 
6.6 
3.8 
2.1 
3.2 
6.1 
4.9 
4.3 
5.2 
1.3 
2.6 
3.3 
2.6 
3.2 
2.6 
2.4 
3.4 
4.3 
2.3 
5.4 
3.4 
2.5 
2.6 
1.7 
4.2 
5.1 
2.1 
2.8 
4.9 
6.8 
4.1 
2.7 
5.3 
171 
85 
72 
77 
77 
87 
115 
59 
62 
147 
143 
72 
388 
243 
429 
1756 
286 
818 
724 
233 
241 
1370 
459 
526 
15 
22 
14 
19 
26 
17 
18 
26 
73 
23 
41 
25 
76 
55 
67 
44 
120 
57 
43 
86 
131 
58 
107 
109 
-0.2 
-1.0 
1,2 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.1 
0.3 
0.0 
1.4 
-1.3 
0.1 
4.3 
3.8 
3.6 
3.8 
3.7 
4.2 
3.4 
3.6 
3.8 
3.5 
4.8 
3.7 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
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4.2. Valuation, risk and growth 
In this section, I provide preliminary evidence that market prices exceed DCF valuations. 
That evidence motivates the hypothesis that Real option% is associated with underpricing, on 
the basis that there is less information asymmetry associated with the DCF component of 
value, compared to the real option component. The preliminary evidence involves comparing 
DCF value/price ratios with those of prior research, and examining of theoretical price-
eamings ratios. I analyse the relationship between the price the relationship between price-
eamings ratios implied by the Decision-tree valuations and three value drivers: the cost of 
equity capital, initial revenue growth and the initial volatility of revenue growth. 
4.2.1. DCF valuations, Real option%, risk and growth 
Real option% is determined by the difference between the Decision-tree and DCF valuations, 
under the same competitive advantage period. The assumed CAP for each issue is that which 
minimises the difference between the Decision-tree valuation and the first-day closing price. 
Referring to Tables 2 and 3, we see that the median ratio of DCF value to IPO price is 0.61, 
while the median ratio of Decision-tree value to price is 1.16. This leads to an issue of intemal 
validity. What if the calibration of Decision-tree values to market prices was spurious, and 
DCF values are a more appropriate estimate of theoretical value? The evidence of Bradshaw 
(2004) provides support for the case that market values typically exceed DCF valuations. 
Further, initial revenue growth and the volatility of this growth explain a large proportion of 
the variation in Real option%. I present this evidence to allay any concems that this parameter 
estimate is simply an artificial result of calibrating the Decision-tree value to market price. In 
other words, the data supports my contention that Real option% is likely to proxy for 
information asymmetry, and therefore is expected to be positively associated with IPO 
underpricing. 
Based on 46,209 valuations from 1994-1998, Bradshaw (2004) estimated a median 
value/price ratio of 0.59 using a residual income valuation model. He assumes that residual 
income declines to a long-term estimate of zero. This assumption relies on the same economic 
theory which justifies my assumption that revenue growth and margins approach long-term 
estimates consistent with abnormal investment retums being eroded over time. Further, 
Bradshaw's mean assumption about the rate at which residual income declines is comparable 
to my median CAP assumption of 27 years. Even assuming residual income can continue into 
perpetuity after forecast year 5, his median value/price ratio is just 0.77. 
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The median Real option% is 49 percent and is highest for the Healthcare and Technology 
sectors, at 75 and 50 percent, respectively. In Table 3.4,1 present data which shows the 
association between Real option% and the key determinants of this estimate - volatility, 
growth and the cost of equity. First, I partitioned the sample into nine groups, based on the 
33^ ** and 67* percentiles according to a sort on the cost of equity and initial revenue growth. In 
Panel A, I show the correlation between the volatility of revenue growth and Real option% for 
the full sample and the nine sub-samples. For the fiill sample, this correlation is 0.29, and 
increases with the initial growth estimate. Therefore, firms with high, volatile revenue growth 
have high Real option%. 
In panel B, I present the mean Real option% for 27 sub-samples formed from the 33'^ '^  and 67'** 
percentiles of initial volatility, initial revenue growth and the cost of equity. Consistent with 
the correlations shown in Panel A, Real option% increases with an increase in volatility, 
risuig from 38 percent for the low volatility sample, to 57 percent for the high volatility 
sample. This relationship is most apparent for high-growth firms. For this sub-sample, the 
mean Real option% increases from 32 percent for low-volatility firms to 63 percent for high-
volatiUty firms. 
This information supports my contention that Real option% proxies for information 
asymmetry. Recall that the CAP assumption is selected so as to minimise the difference 
between the Decision-tree value and the first-day closing price. My contention is that, when a 
DCF valuation is estimated under the same CAP, the difference between the two valuations is 
the value of embedded options. Now consider an altemative hypothesis. Say that embedded 
options were valued at zero by the market, and that the estimate of Real option% was simply 
an artifact of a simulation model involving the randomisation of parameters unrelated to 
value. In this instance, the estimated Real option% would be associated with Real option% in 
a way contrary to expectations. 
Consider two comparable IPOs whose only difference is the volatility of revenue growth. If, 
in reality, market price is unrelated to volatility, they will have the same market price. Now, 
when I compute Decision-tree values, the high volatility stock will have the lower CAP. This 
occurs because the Decision-tree value will reach market price using less forecast years. What 
this means is that I will estimate Real option% for the lower volatility stock using a long CAP, 
and I will estimate Real option% for the higher volatility stock using a shorter CAP. Further, 
we know from the analysis presented in Chapter 2 that there is a positive relationship between 
the assumed CAP and Real option%. So, for two IPOs which are comparable except for 
volatility: 
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If market prices are unrelated to volatility, the estimated Real option%for the low volatility 
stock will be greater, than the estimated Real option%for the high volatility stock. This 
occurs because the lower volatility stock will have a longer estimated CAP. 
This is not what we observe in Table 3.4. We observe a positive association between Real 
option% and volatility. In conclusion, the valuations summarised in Tables 2-4 support the 
interpretation of Real option% as the proportion of value attributed to embedded options. The 
data shows that: 
• DCF valuations are materially below market prices, but are comparable to a large-sample 
study which relied on similar economic assumptions; 
• Real option% is positively associated with the volatility of revenue growth, which would 
not be expected to occur if volatility was not factored into market prices. 
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Table 3.4 
Relationship between initial volatility and the proportion of equity value attributable to real options 
In Table 3.4, I summarise the relationship between the initial volatility of revenue growth and the proportion of 
equity value attributable to real options {Real option%). This the percentage difference between a Decision-tree 
and DCF valuation of equity, whose models are summarised in Exhibits 1 and 2. The sample comprises 790 US 
IPOs which were issued from 1997-2004. Panel A shows the Pearson correlation coefficients which measure the 
association between initial volatility of revenue growth and Real option%. This data is presented for the flill 
sample, for sub-samples based on the 33'^ '' and 67"" percentiles of initial growth and the cost of equity, and for 
nine sub-samples based on the intersection of those cut-offs. Panel B shows the mean Real option% for the full 
sample and for sub-samples based on he 33"" and 67"' percentile of initial revenue growth, initial volatility of 
revenue growth and the cost of equity capital. 
Initial volatility of revenue growth (Vol) is estimated as the average standard deviation of revenue growth from 
firms in the same IBES industry sector using historical financial statement information from 1985 to the year of 
the IPO; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean revenue growth derived from the first three 
years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast years are used if three years 
of forecasts are not available); Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, where the 
risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing date; the market risk premium is 6 
percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is computing the coefficient from an 
ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the S<&P1500 Super Index, stage 2 is 
multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 
is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4. 
Panel A: Correlation between initial volatility of revenue growth and the proportion of value attributable to real 
options 
Cost of equity 
Low 
Med 
High 
All cost of 
equity 
Initial Growth 
Low Med High 
0.19 0.52 0.46 
(0,04) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.11 0.51 0.62 
(0.31) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.22 0.46 0.56 
(0.15) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.10 0.41 0.51 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
All growth 
0.35 
(<0.01) 
0.34 
(<0.01) 
0.38 
(<0.01) 
0.29 
(<0.01) 
Panel B: Mean Real option% 
Cost of 
equity 
partition 
Low cost of 
equity 
Medium cost 
of equity 
High cost of 
equity 
All cost of 
equity 
Initial growth 
partition 
Low growth 
Med growth 
High growth 
Low growth 
Med growth 
High growth 
Low growth 
Med growth 
High growth 
Low growth 
Med growth 
High growth 
All cost of equity and growth 
Initial volatility partition 
Low volatility 
27 
19 
23 
58 
35 
28 
73 
43 
38 
45 
32 
32 
38 
Medium 
volatility 
40 
29 
13 
52 
50 
36 
80 
68 
44 
58 
51 
41 
48 
High volatility 
39 
41 
51 
66 
65 
61 
85 
76 
72 
52 
57 
63 
57 
All volatility 
34 
32 
33 
50 
59 
44 
79 
63 
48 
50 
47 
44 
All growth 
and volatility 
33 
51 
57 
47 
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4.2.2. Relationship between price-earnings ratios, risk and growth 
In the previous section, I provided supporting evidence for my interpretation of Real option% 
as the estimated proportion of equity value attributable to embedded options. As fiirther 
support, I analyse the relationship between price-earnings ratios, systematic risk, revenue 
growth and the volatility of that growth. As a whole, there is a positive association between 
price-eamings ratios, systematic risk and the volatility of revenue growth. This association is 
contrary to expectations fi-om DCF valuations. 
All else being equal, Discounted Cash Flow valuations imply that the price-eamings ratio has 
an inverse relationship with the cost of equity capital, a positive relationship with eamings 
growth, and no relationship with the volatility of revenue or eamings growth. Of course, these 
variables can interact so that this relationship does not hold. For instance, if reinvested 
earnings are expected to eam the cost of equity capital, there is no relationship between the 
price-eamings ratio and growth; and if volatility is correlated with the cost of equity capital, 
there will be an inverse relationship between volatility and the price-eamings ratio. In 
contrast, a real options valuation implies a positive relationship between the price-eamings 
ratio and the volatility of eamings growth. This occurs because the volatility of eamings gives 
rise to growth and abandonment options, which increase equity value if exercised in an 
optimal way. 
I examine whether these expected relationships are evident in the data, when theoretical price-
eamings ratios are computed. I consider a sub-sample of 454 firms whose theoretical price-
earnings ratios for year three are between 0 and 100, and illustrate the relationship between 
these ratios and three value drivers: the cost of equity capital, initial revenue growth and the 
initial volatility of revenue growth. 
Figure 1 presents the graphs of mean price-earnings ratios for firms grouped according to the 
cost of equity capital, initial revenue growth and the initial volatility of revenue growth. On 
average, DCF valuations result in the expected inverse relationship between price-eamings 
ratios and the cost of equity, a direct relationship with initial revenue growth, and no 
relationship with the volatility of revenue growth. In contrast, Decision-tree valuations result 
in a direct relationship between price-eamings ratios the cost of equity capital and volatility. 
Of course, the Decision-tree valuations have been calibrated to approximate market prices. So 
Figure 1 illustrates that ac/Ma/price-eamings ratios from 1997-2004 were highest for IPOs 
stocks with high cost of equity and high volatility of revenue growth, the direct opposite of 
what we would expect if market prices reflected simply discounted cash flow valuations. 
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Thus, the gap between the lines in each panel can be interpreted as the price-eamings 
premium of market prices over discounted cash flow valuation. 
This positive relationship between the price-eamings ratio, the cost of equity and revenue 
volatility, is even more apparent after controlling for interactions amongst these value drivers. 
I partition the full sample of 790 firms into 27 sub-samples based on the 33'^ '^  the 67"^  
percentiles of the cost of equity, initial revenue growth and the volatility of initial revenue 
growth. This allows me to present the relationship between price-eamings ratios and one 
value driver, for sub-samples whose values for the other two value drivers are roughly 
comparable. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2, for 12 sub-samples. 
The four panels of Panel A present the mean price-eamings ratio for groups with low, 
medium and high cost of equity capital, for groups whose initial revenue growth and volatility 
are comparable. For example, the panel in the top left is for the sub-sample of firms with 
medium initial revenue growth and volatility. The other panels relate to high-growth, high-
volatility firms; low-growth, low-volatility firms; and high-growth, high-volatility firms. In 
general, DCF valuations result in an inverse relationship between the mean price-eamings 
ratio and the cost of equity capital. This relationship is most apparent for low volatihty firms, 
whose DCF valuations are closest to Decision-tree valuations and, of course, market prices. 
Compare this result to the price-eamings ratios which result from Decision-tree valuations. 
These valuations typically exhibit a positive relationship with the cost of equity capital, and 
only trend downwards for high-growth, low volatility firms. Hence, despite selecting firms 
with comparable revenue growth and volatility, there remains a positive relationship between 
price-eamings ratios and the cost of equity capital. 
There is also a positive relationship between the initial volatility of revenue growth, and the 
price-eamings ratios, as shown in Panel C. Under DCF valuations, this relationship only holds 
if volatility of revenue growth is positively associated with the magnitude of growth, or 
inversely related to the cost of equity capital. For sub-samples in which these factors are 
comparable, price-eamings ratios which result from DCF valuations should be comparable. 
Hence, the positive association between price-eamings ratios and volatility is consistent with 
market prices taking account of some source of value in addition to the DCF valuation. Note 
that the price-eamings ratios derived from DCF valuations also exhibit the same, positive 
relationship with volatility. But this only occurs because they are derived under the same 
competitive advantage period which underlies the Decision-tree valuations, and the 
competitive advantage period increases for firms with high price-eamings ratios. 
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5. Results 
In a series of ordinary least regressions, I measure the association between Real option% and 
the initial retum on a sample of IPOs. This analysis shows that Real option% is significantly 
and positively related to underpricing. The estimated coefficients range from 0.10 to 0.25 and 
the intercept term is insignificantly different from zero. These two results imply that, after 
controlling for underwriter and issuer incentives to engage in strategic underpricing, investors 
discount the value of embedded options by 10-25 percent when bidding for IPOs. For a firm 
with average Real option% of 47 percent, this predicts that investment bankers will price the 
IPO at a 5-12 percent discount to market value, in addition to any strategic underpricing. This 
discount can be attributed to information asymmetry between the issuer and investors, or 
amongst investors. 
5.1. Primary results: Real option% and IPO underpricing 
In Section 2,1 documented the association between IPO underpricing and eight explanatory 
variables used by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). They were 
able to explain 45 and 29 percent of IPO underpricing respectively. In Table 3.5,1 present the 
results of tests of association between those variables and the imtial retum. Panel A contains 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, while Panel B presents the results of simple 
linear regression in which the initial retum is the dependent variable. The correlation matrix 
also contains data referring to variables which are used in later analysis. 
The data in Panel B shows that Real option% can explain 3.0 percent of the variation in IPO 
underpricing. The coefficient of 0.30 on Real option% and the intercept term of 0.19 suggest 
that a typical IPO will have initial retums of 19-49 percent, depending on the proportion of 
equity value comprised of real options. Relying on equation 10, this implies that the DCF 
component of equity value is discounted by 16 percent (9j = 0.84), while the value of 
embedded options is discounted by 37 percent (92 = 0.63). This estimated discount can be 
attributed to both strategic and non-strategic underpricing, because the univariate analysis 
does not include controls for issuer and underwriter incentives. The univariate relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
Heteroskedasticity was present in all regressions, so I performed significance tests on 
coefficients using White's adjusted ^statistics (White, 1980). The modelling presented in 
Section 4 shows an approximate linear relationship between Real option% and initial retums. 
For other variables in the regression equations, there is no theoretical linear relationship, but 
the use of these variables is standard practice in the literature. Initial retums were windsorized 
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at the 1*' and 95'*' percentiles, which mitigated the impact of a handfiil of extreme initial 
retums. This ensured that initial returns were approximately normally distributed, as were 
residuals. Throughout, there were no cases in which the Cook's D influence statistic was 
greater than 1, which implies that the results are not driven by outliers. 
The other explanatory variables all exhibit a significant association with IPO underpricing, in 
the expected direction. Price revision has the highest explanatory power at 25.9 percent, 
which suggests that issue prices do not fully reflect investor demand for IPOs. This is 
consistent with the argument that underpricing is compensation for investors who reveal 
information by bidding higher prices for shares. Stocks issued during hot markets were 
relatively underpriced. The initial retum of recent IPOs and the indicator variable for 1999-
2000 IPOs were able to explain 19.2 and 18.4 percent of the variation in initial retums. 
Figure 3.3 
Relationship between RealopUon% and IPO underpricing 
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To measure the incremental explanatory power of Real option%, I ran several multivariate 
regressions, the first series of which is presented In Table 3.6. By incorporating controls for 
strategic underpricing, I am able to interpret the intercept term and the coefficient on Real 
option% as underpricing due to information asymmetry. Using equations 10 and 11,1 can 
estimate the pricing discount on the DCF and Real option component of equity value. Models 
1 and 3 include only the explanatory variables previously used in the literature, with model I 
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excluding the Technology and Bubble indicator variables. Models 2 and 4 incorporate Real 
option% as a variable, so I its incremental explanatory power can be assessed. 
Comparing models I and 2, there is evidence that underpricing is significantly associated with 
Real option%, with the coefficient of 0.10 significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
level. In addition, the intercept term fell to 0.21 and is no longer significantly different from 
zero. These coefficients can be interpreted as the embedded option component of equity value 
being discounted by 10 percent by underwriters, in addition to any strategic underpricing (9i 
= 1.00; 92 = 0.90). 
This coefficient is economically significant. The mean issue size was $179 million and the 
mean initial retum was 33.1 percent, which means that, on average $59 million was left on the 
table. Discounted Cash Flows contributed 53 percent to market value, and embedded options 
47 percent. If the embedded option component of equity value is discounted by 10 percent, 
and the DCF component is fiilly valued, this implies that, on average, $ 11 million was left on 
the table for non-strategic reasons. Of course, this is just 19 percent of underpricing, but still 
equates to a difference in underwriter fees of nearly $1 million, assuming the typical 7 percent 
underwriting fee. This implies there are potentially material benefits to issuers and 
underwriters to efforts to reduce information asymmetry. This breakdown of offer price 
relative to market price is represented in Exhibit 3, where figures are expressed relative to a 
market price of $100. 
Discounted cash flows 
Embedded options 
Total equity value 
Strategic discount 
IPO price 
Exliibit 3.3 
Representative breakdown of IPO 
Market value 
$53 
47 
100 
underpricing 
Multiple 
1.00 
0.90 
0.95 
IPO value 
$53 
42 
95 
20 
m 
However, the incremental explanatory power of the regression analysis is minimal. The 
addition of Real option% to models 3 and 4 increase he adjusted-R^ by just 0.4 and 0.3 
percent, respectively. This supports the view of Ritter and Welch (2002) that research into 
IPO allocation practices are most likely to result in improved understanding of IPO 
underpricing. Nevertheless, the information asymmetry explanation remains usefiil. 
As a robustness check, I repeated the analysis after partitioning the sample into sub-samples, 
based on whether they were Technology stocks, and/or whether they were issued in 1999-
2000. This is an altemative control for the indicator variables used in the fiill-sample 
regression. These results are presented in Table 3.7. Panel A presents results based on the 
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Technology/Non-technology and Bubble/Non-bubble partition. Panel B presents results 
derived from four sub-samples obtained after combining the two groups. 
The results of Table 3.7 show that the coefficient on Real option% is not statistically 
significant for Technology stocks, but remains significant for IPOs issued during the hot issue 
market of 1999-2000. In contrast, the coefficient on the variable Overhang is largest and most 
significant for Technology stocks issued during this period. Overhang can be interpreted as a 
measure of issuer incentives to control underpricing. large, positive coefficient on overhang 
implies that issues in which only a small percentage of the firm was floated were severely 
underpriced. Perhaps the insignificant coefficient on Real option% for Technology stocks is 
due to the overwhehning strategic underpricing of these stocks. The large explanatory power 
of the regression on the Technology/Bubble sub-sample (43.8 percent) supports this 
explanation. Altematively, there is no real association between Real option% and initial 
retums for technology stocks, or Real option% is measured with greatest uncertainty for these 
stocks. 
The lack of statistical significance means that these competing explanations cannot be 
distinguished. But, it does raise the question as to whether i?e<3/ option% is capturing a 
correlated omitted variable, and therefore caimot be interpreted in the way I have intended. In 
Sub-section 5.2,1 address this issue. 
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Table 3.6 
Regressions of percentage first-day returns on several variables 
In Table 3.6, 1 present the results of the least squares regression of initial retums on several explanatory 
variables. The sample comprises 790 US IPOs which were issued from 1997-2004. The variables are defined as 
follows: Initial retum is the discrete percentage difference between the offer price and the l"-day closing price 
on the equity market; Real option% is the percentage difference between a Decision-tree and DCF valuation of 
equity, whose models are summarised in Exhibits 1 and 2; Price revision = IPO price/Mid-point of the filing 
range - 1; Price revision^ = Maximum {Price revision, 0); Overhang = Shares retained by the issuer divided by 
shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price multiplied by issued shares; Pre-issue IPO returns is the average initial 
retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue market returns is the 
cumulative retum on the S&P 1500 Index for the 15 trading days prior to the IPO; Technology is an indicator 
variable for stocks in the IBES Industry Sector "Technology"; Bubble is an indicator variable for IPOs from 
1999-2000; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean revenue growth derived from the first three 
years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast years are used if three years 
of forecasts are not available); Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, where the 
risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing date; the market risk premium is 6 
percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is computing the coefficient from an 
ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the S&P 1500 Super Index, stage 2 is 
multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 
is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4. 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option % 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overtiang (Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue mari<et retums 
Technology ("Technology" = 1) 
Bubble (1999 or 2000 = 1) 
Adjusted-R"" 
N 
Model 1 
0.60 
(0.01) 
—• 
1.21 
(<0.01) 
1.82 
(<0.01) 
0.02 
(<0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(<0.01) 
0.43 
(0.31) 
__-
—_ 
40.0 
790 
Coefficients (o-values) 
Model 2 
0.52 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
1.20 
(<0.01) 
1.77 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(<0.01) 
-0.02 
(0,08) 
0.14 
(<0.01) 
0.43 
(0.31) 
* " • 
40.4 
790 
Model 3 
0.28 
(0.21) 
— 
— 
1.19 
(<0.01) 
1.57 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0,01 
(0.43) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.60 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(<0.01) 
0.21 
(<0.01) 
44.7 
790 
Model 4 
0.21 
(0.33) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
1.18 
(<0.01) 
1.53 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.50) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.60 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(<0.01) 
0.20 
(<0.01) 
45.0 
790 
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Table 3.7 
Sub-sample analysis: Technology issues and hot markets 
I partitioned the sample into three sets of sub-samples, based on whether a stock was a Technology stock, whether it 
was issued during 1999-2000, and the four combinations of those groupings. I then repeated the analysis presented as 
model 4 in Table 3.6, removing indicator variables where appropriate. The sample comprises 790 US IPOs from 1997-
2004. 
The variables are defined as follows: Initial return is the discrete percentage difference between the offer price and the 
l^'-day closing price on the equity market; Real option% is the percentage difference between a Decision-tree and 
DCF valuation of equity, whose models are summarised in Exhibits 1 and 2; Price revision = IPO price/Mid-point of 
the filing range - \; Price revision^ = Maximum {Price revision, 0); Overhang = Shares retained by the issuer divided 
by shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price multiplied by issued shares; Pre-issue IPO returns is the average initial return 
for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue market returns is the cumulative return on 
the S<&P1500 Index for the 15 trading days prior to the IPO; Technology is an indicator variable for stocks in the IBES 
Industry Sector "Technology"; Bubble is an indicator variable for IPOs from 1999-2000; Initial growth revenue 
(Growth) is estimated as the mean revenue growth derived from the first three years of available IBES consensus 
forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Cost of 
equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model; where the risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-
year Treasury bonds at the listing date; the market risk premium is 6 percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage 
process where stage 1 is computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly returns of the 
equity against the S(&P1500 Super Index, stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an 
adjustment made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4. 
Panel A: Sample partitioned into two groups according to whether they were technology versus non-technology 
stocks or 1999-2000 issues versus 1997-98, 2001-04 issues 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option % 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overhang (Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue market retums 
Technology ("Technology" = 1) 
Bubble (1999 or 2000 = 1) 
Adjusted-R'^  
N 
Technology 
IPOs 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
1.93 
(<0.01) 
0.81 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
1.54 
(0.04) 
— 
0.41 
(<0.01) 
51.6 
264 
Coefficients (o-values) 
Non-tech 1999-2000 
IPOs IPOs 
0.43 0.79 
(0.02) (0.13) 
0.11 0.17 
(0.01) (0.07) 
0.88 2.21 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
1.34 0.64 
(<0.01) (0.32) 
0.01 0.02 
(0.33) (0.01) 
-0.02 -0.03 
(0.08) (0.30) 
0.03 0.04 
(0.55) (0.19) 
0.05 0.78 
(0.91) (0.26) 
0.33 
(<0.01) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
27.2 41.8 
526 349 
1997-98, 
2001-04 IPOs 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.52 
(<0.01) 
0.82 
(0.07) 
0,00 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.97) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
0.55 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
... 
25.6 
441 
Panel B: Sample partitioned into four groups according to whether they were technology versus non-technology 
stocks and 1999-2000 issues versus 1997-98, 2001-04 issues 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option % 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overhang (Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue mari<et retums 
Adjusted-R' 
N 
1999-2000 
Technology IPOs 
0.00 
(1.00) 
0.12 
(0.52) 
2.63 
(<0.01) 
0.28 
(0.78) 
0.03 
(<0.01) 
0.03 
(0.68) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
1.46 
(0.14) 
43.8 
162 
Coefficients 
1999-2000 
Non-tech IPOs 
1.25 
(<0.01) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
1.80 
(<0.01) 
0.64 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
•0.05 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
23.5 
187 
(D-values) 
1997-98, 20014)4 
Technology IPOs 
0.34 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
0.69 
(<0.01) 
0.97 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(0.61) 
0.02 
(0.81) 
1.53 
(0.01) 
31.3 
102 
1997-98, 2001-04 
Non-tech IPOs 
0.08 
(0,67) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.48 
(<0.01) 
0.39 
(0.38) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.78) 
-0.09 
(0,22) 
0,34 
(0.22L 
19.2 
339j 
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5.2. Interaction with cost of capital, revenue growth and volatility 
Real option% is primarily a function of the cost of equity, initial revenue growth and the 
initial volatility of revenue growth. These variables on their own have the potential to explain 
IPO underpricing, because they arguably proxy for information asymmetry. But Real option% 
combines these variables in economically meaningful way. As I established in Section 3, there 
is an approximately linear relationship between IPO imderpricing and Real option%. But there 
is not necessarily a linear relationship between IPO underpricing and other proxies for 
information asymmetry. 
Nevertheless, there is the potential for these parameters to capture some undefined economic 
construct which has contaminated the result. I control for this potential in two ways. First, I 
repeat my analysis after partitioning the sample into sub-samples, based on initial revenue 
growth, the cost of equity and the initial volatility of revenue growth. Second, I use these 
variables as controls in the regression analysis, and also include interaction terms. The results 
generally support those presented in Tables 6 and 7, but increase the explanatory power to 
51.2 percent. This supports the primary conclusion of this study - that IPO offer prices 
incorporate a 10 percent discount on the value of embedded options, in addition to any 
strategic underpricing. 
Table 3.8, Panel A presents the results for three sub-samples formed for equally-sized sub-
samples formed on the basis of revenue growth, the cost of equity and volatility of revenue 
growth. The results for initial growth partition suggests that Real option% is most important 
for high-growth firms, although its coefficient remains significant throughout. For high-
growth firms, its coefficient of 0.35 is significantiy greater than the coefficients for the other 
groups. There are also stronger relationships between underpricing and other explanatory 
variables and a significantly negative intercept term. Note that the negative intercept term 
does not imply that mean predicted underpricing is negative for this period. Its impact is 
countered by the significantly positive intercept term on size. It is also attributable to the fact 
that the high-growth sub-sample is predominantly drawn from the hot issue market of 1999-
2000. IPOs fi-om this period had mean initial growth estimates of 50 percent, compared to 23 
percent for the rest of the sample. During this period, the regression variables were very large, 
compared to the other periods. So, when they are applied to the model coefficients, predicted 
underpricing is positive. 
In contrast, when I partitioned the sample of the basis of initial volatility, the coefficient on 
Real option% is highest for the low-volatility group. It is not significantly different from zero 
for the other groups, and it produces the largest increase in explanatory power for the low 
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volatility group (an increase of 1.7 percent). However, for the medium-volatility group, note 
the magnitude of the coefficients on Price revision. Overhang and Pre-issue market returns, 
and the adjusted-R^ of 54.1 percent. It is likely that any explanatory power of Real optionX is 
swamped by large strategic underpricing for this sample. In other words, for this sub-sample 
there is evidence of large, strategic underpricing where a fraction of the firm is sold (as 
measured by Overhang) or during hot markets (as captured by Pre-issue market returns). This 
strategic underpricing is likely to have a far greater impact on initial retums than information 
asymmetry. 
My primary concem is the insignificant coefficient for the high-volatility sub-sample. 1 
consider the most likely explanation to be due to measurement error. High-volatility firms 
have a higher Real option%, but that does not imply that the value of their embedded options 
will be priced differently by underwriters. Hence, there is no theoretical reason to expect a 
relationship between volatility of growth and the coefficient on Real option%. However, the 
estimation error inherent in this variable will be largest for the high-volatility group. 
In sum, the sub-sample analysis suggests that the coefficient on Real option% is directly 
related to the magnitude of revenue growth, and inversely related to the volatility of revenue 
growth. However, it is inconclusive whether this is due to firm characteristics, or simply due 
to a change in strategic underpricing that occurred in the hot issue market of 1999-2000. 
Regardless, the coefficient on Real option% was significantly positive in five of the nine 
partitions, and had the expected sign throughout. 
I also repeated the analysis after directly including revenue growth, the cost of equity and 
initial volatility as explanatory variables. My intent is to determine whether Real option% is 
remains associated with IPO underpricing, even if its underlying parameters - cost of equity, 
revenue growth and volatility - capture some other economic constmct. The results of this 
analysis, presented as the first model in Panel B, show that explanatory power is enhanced by 
including these variables. The adjusted-R increases to 48.4 percent, which is a 3.7 percent 
improvement on the results presented in Table 3.6 (model 3). However, once Real option% is 
included as an explanatory variable, explanatory power increases by a further 0.6. percent. 
This improvement is small, but of the same magnitude as observed in earlier results. This 
implies that Real option% is still associated with IPO underpricing, even if its underlying 
parameters represent a correlated omitted variable. 
The coefficient on initial volatility is significantly negative, which is unlikely to result from 
multicollinearity (its correlation with Real option% is 0.31). This implies that, for two firms 
with the same volatility of revenue growth, the firm with the higher proportion of value 
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comprised of embedded options was priced at the deepest discount. By the same token, for 
two firms with the same proportion of value comprised of embedded options, the firm with 
the higher volatility of revenue growth was priced at a premium. We are unable to say with 
any certainty what volatility is actually capturing, and regardless of its economic 
interpretation, the primary result of this paper remains valid. However, the modelling which 
underlies Real option% provides one interpretation, based on the competitive advantage 
period. 
In order for two firms to have the same Real option%, but different initial volatility of revenue 
growth, one of their other parameters must be different. After volatility, the next most 
influential parameter which determines Real option% is the competitive advantage period. So, 
all else being equal, the lower volatility firm has the higher assumed CAP and less 
underpricing. In other words, firms whose market value factors in a longer period of above-
average revenue growth and profitability are more fully-priced. This explanation is not 
conclusive by any means. In the modelling used here, CAP carmot be determined 
independently from Real option%, and we cannot completely eliminate the multicollinearity 
explanation. It is simply a potential explanation which can be explored in further work, and 
which in no way diminishes the primary result. 
The remaining models presented in Table 3.8 assess the impact of interaction terms. Real 
option% interacts with indicator variables which take on a values of one if the firm is in the 
high-growth, high-cost of equity or high-volatility third of the sample. It also interacts with 
the indicator variables for Technology and 1999-2000 IPOs. We observe further 
improvements in explanatory power in these models and the coefficient on Real option% 
remains significantly positive. I do not separately interpret the coefficients on the interaction 
terms in these models, as their correlation coefficients against Real option% approach 0.5. 
However, the interaction terms and Real option% were jointly different from zero at less than 
the one percent significance level. 
I also note that the highest explanatory power is achieved when Real option% interacts with 
the Technology and Bubble indicator variables (adjusted-R^ = 51.2 percent compared to 50.4 
percent). This provides further support for the use of Real option% as an economic constmct. 
In model (3) of Panel B, the coefficients on Technology and Bubble are 0.13 and 0.08, which 
are consistent with prior research and represent the non-strategic component of underpricing 
of these stocks. But explanatory power of those variables increases when they interact with 
Real option%. This suggests that the non-strategic IPO underpricing which occurred in the 
tech bubble can be partially attributed to an increase in the option component of equity value. 
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Finally, I performed the following analysis to alleviate any residual concems that the results 
are driven by a mechanical association between initial retum and Real option%. Recall that 
Real option% is estimated after calibrating the Decision-tree valuation to market price. Using 
the same competitive advantage period which minimises the difference between Decision-tree 
value and market price, I estimate the DCF value. I attribute the difference between the 
Decision-tree and DCF values to the value of embedded options. So, there are two close 
parameters {f-day close and Decision-tree value) which appear on both sides of the 
regression equation. However, Real option% is estimated completely independently of the 
offer price, so there is no mechanical association. The calibration is simply used to determine 
the appropriate competitive advantage period assumption for the DCF valuation. This is 
entirely appropriate for the research question at hand, just as it would have been entirely 
inappropriate for the study presented in Chapter 2. In an evaluation of portfolio performance, 
it was important to use only information available to form investment portfolios. 
Nevertheless, I repeated the analysis after including all 57 estimates of Real option%, after 
assuming their competitive advantage period ranges from 4 to 60 years. To simply use the 
same CAP assumption for all firms reduces the dispersion of Real option% across firms. It 
will overstate Real option% for firms whose revenue growth and profit margin are already 
close to long-term values; and understate Real option% for less mature firms. 
The multicollinearity resulting from the inclusion of all 57 estimates of Real option% means 
that the coefficients cannot be separately interpreted. But they were jointly different from zero 
at less than the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the adjusted-R^ increased to 46.9 percent, from 
the 45.0 percent reported as model 4 in Table 3.6. These results are presented in Table 3.9. 
The second model shown in that table is the regression model with the highest adjusted-R^. 
That model includes all 57 estimates of Real option%, as well as their interaction with high 
revenue growth and high-volatility firms. The highest adjusted-R^ achieved was 52.5 percent. 
5.3. Results conclusion and comparison of coefficients 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the embedded option component of equity 
value is discounted by about 10 percent when setting offer prices, in addition to any strategic 
underpricing. I conclude this section with a comparison of my results to those of Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). These studies were able to explain up to 
46.0 and 29.0 percent of underpricing, respectively. I report higher adjusted-R^ figures than 
these authors, but the difference in explanatory power could simply be due to sample 
differences. What is more relevant is a comparison of the coefficients which are common to 
my study and those of previous studies. The coefficients I refer to are drawn from Table 3.6 
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and the first two models of Table 3.8. The comparison coefficients are drawn from Table 3.6 
of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm and Table 3.5 of Loughran and Ritter. That comparison can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Technology: Results are consistent between my paper and prior research and there remains 
some imexplained underpricing of technology stocks. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm report a 
coefficient of 0.05-0.06 on high-tech stocks and 0.15-0.23 on intemet stocks, while 
Loughran and Ritter corresponding coefficients of 0.06 and 0.34-0.35. I report a 
coefficient of 0.13-0.19 on Technology. Hence, there remains some imderpricing of 
Technology stocks which is unexplained. However, explanatory power increases when 
this variable interacts with Real option%. 
Bubble (1999-2000 IPOs): Results are consistent between my paper and prior research and 
there remains some unexplained underpricing of IPOs during 1999-2000. My results 
include a coefficient on Bubble of 0.10-0.21, which spans the range of 0.14-0.15 reported 
by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm but exceeds the 0.07 reported by Loughran and Ritter (which 
was not significant). 
Overhang: My coefficient on overhang of 0.01 is well below the 0.04 reported by 
Loughran and Ritter. I can only attribute this to sampling differences or the windsorizing 
of retums at the 95* percentile. The results hold even when these retums are included. 
Price revision and Price revision^: Results are consistent between my paper and prior 
research, although my estimated coefficients are larger. Specifically, Price revision is the 
dominant predictor of IPO underpricing. I report coefficients of 1.14-1.19 on Price 
Revision and 1.29-L57 on Price revision^ These are well above the estimates of 0.42-0.43 
and 0,89 reported by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm . This is potentially due to a difference in 
the date at which the indicative filing range was recorded. I used the indicative range 
provided to the SEC closest to the offer date and report mean revisions of-6.4 percent, 
while Ljungqvist and Wilhelm report mean revisions of 5.8 percent. This difference is 
especially prominent for 1999-2000 IPOs. 
S/ze.- There is further evidence to fhaXReal option% measures information asymmetry. 
When Real option% is included as an explanatory variable, there is no longer any 
relationship between size and IPO underpricing. In contrast, Loughran and Ritter report 
and negative relationship between hi (Assets) and underpricing. These results provide 
further support for the interpretation of Real option% as a measure of information 
asymmetry. 
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Table 3.8 
Interaction of Real option% with risk, growth and volatility 
I partitioned the sample into three sets of sub-samples, based on the 33'''' and 67* percentiles of estimates for 
initial revenue growth, the initial volatility of revenue growth and the cost of equity capital. I then repeated the 
analysis presented as model 4 in Table 3.6. These results are presented in Panel A. In Panel B, I include terms 
which interact with Real option%. High-volatility, high-cost of equity and high-growth fums are those at the 67* 
percentile or above of the sample distribution. I also allow the Technology and Bubble indicator variables to 
interact with Real option%. These results are presented in Panel B. The sample comprises 790 US IPOs fix)m 
1997-2004. 
The variables are defined as follows: Initial return is the discrete percentage difference between the offer price 
and the l^-day closing price on the equity market; Real option% is the percentage difference between a 
Decision-tree and DCF valuation of equity, whose models are summarised in Exhibits 1 and 2; Price revision = 
IPO price/Mid-point of the filing range - 1; Price revision' = Maximum {Price revision, 0); Overhang = Shares 
retained by the issuer divided by shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price multiplied by issued shares; Pre-issue IPO 
returns is the average initial retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue 
market returns is the cumulative retum on the S&P 1500 Index for the 15 trading days prior to the IPO; 
Technology is an indicator variable for stocks in the IBES Industry Sector "Technology"; Bubble is an indicator 
variable for IPOs fi-om 1999-2000; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean revenue growth 
derived fi-om the first three years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast 
years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model; where the risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing 
date; the market risk premium is 6 percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is 
computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the 
S&P 1500 Super Index, stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment 
made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4. 
Panel A: Sample partitioned on the basis of cost of equity capital, initial revenue growth and the imtial volatility 
of revenue growth 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option% 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overhang 
(Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue mari<et 
retums 
Technology 
("Technology" = 1) 
Bubble 
(1999 or 2000 = 1) 
Adjusted-R^ 
Adj-R"^  excluding Real 
optionVo 
N 
Coefficients (p-values) 
Initial arowth Dartition 
Low 
growth 
0,24 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
0.59 
(<0.01) 
1.05 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
1.33 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
29.8 
28.9 
261 
Medium 
growth 
0.48 
(0.18) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(<0.01) 
1.03 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.26) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
0.35 
(0.53) 
0.13 
(<0.01) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
43.0 
42.1 
268 
High 
growth 
-2.16 
(0.01) 
0.35 
(0.01) 
1.57 
(<0.01) 
1.16 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.59 
(0.46) 
0.29 
(<0.01) 
0.22 
(<0.01) 
47.3 
46.2 
261 
Cost of eauitv partition 
Lowr, 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.01 
(0.77) 
0.75 
(<0.01) 
0.37 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.74) 
-0.07 
(0.37) 
-0.23 
(0.61) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.07) 
19.0 
19.3 
261 
Medium High r. 
r. 
0.33 0.94 
(0.28) (0.13) 
0.20 0.04 
(0.10) (0.74) 
0.88 1.86 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
2.64 0.43 
(0.01) (0.49) 
0.01 0.01 
(0.05) (0.03) 
-0.02 -0.05 
(0.26) (0.18) 
0.12 0.06 
(0.01) (0.15) 
0.49 1.86 
(0.41) (0.03) 
006 0.19 
(0.25) (<0.01) 
0.07 0.33 
(0.33) (<0.01) 
44.5 42.0 
43.1 42.2 
268 261 
Initial 
Low 
vol 
0.78 
(<0.01) 
0.19 
(<0.01) 
1.19 
(<0.01) 
1.10 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.45) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
0.16 
(0.79) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
29.1 
27.4 
281 
volatilitv Dartition 
Medium 
vol 
-0.54 
(0.43) 
0.09 
(0.45) 
2.19 
(<0.01) 
0.74 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(<0.01) 
0,04 
(0,29) 
0,05 
(0.16) 
1.40 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.70) 
0.34 
(0.01) 
54.1 
54.2 
239 
High 
vol 
0.21 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
0.55 
(<0.01) 
1.22 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0,13) 
-0,01 
(0.66) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
-0,31 
(0,54) 
0,00 
(0.87) 
0,08 
(0,40) 
27.8 
28.1 
270 
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Table 3.8 
Interaction oi Real option% with risk, growth and volatility 
(continued) 
Panel B: Interaction of growth, risk and volatility with Real option% 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option % 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overhang (Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue mari<et retums 
Technology ("Technology" = 1) 
Bubble (1999 or 2000 = 1) 
Initial revenue growth 
Cost of equity capital 
Initial volatility of rev growth 
High revenue growrth x Real 
optionVo 
High re x Real optionVo 
High volatility x Real optionVo 
Technology x Real optionVo 
Bubble X Real optionVo 
Adjusted-R^ 
N 
Coefficients (p-values) 
Risk, growth 
and 
volatility 
-0.12 
(0.64) 
— 
1.19 
(<0.01) 
1.29 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.82) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.64 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(<0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.28 
(<0.01) 
1.10 
(<0.01) 
0.02 
(0.93) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
48.4 
790 
Real 
optionVo 
-0.21 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(<0.01) 
1.14 
(<0.01) 
1.32 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.57 
(0,15) 
0.14 
(<0.01) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(<0.01) 
0.70 
(0.05) 
-0.30 
(0.10) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
49,0 
790 
Interaction 
of Real 
optionVo 
with risk, 
growth and 
vol 
-0,31 
(0,26) 
0.25 
(<0.01) 
1.14 
(<0.01) 
1.22 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0,01 
(0,60) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.59 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(<0.01) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(<0.01) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.45 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.26) 
-0.29 
(<0.01) 
— 
— 
50.4 
790 
Interaction 
of Real 
optionVo 
with Tech 
and Bubble 
-0.24 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
1.15 
(<0.01) 
1.11 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0,00 
(0,72) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.58 
(0.13) 
_. 
— 
0.25 
(<0.01) 
1.21 
(0.01) 
0.44 
(0.05) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.25 
(<0.01) 
0.27 
(<0.01) 
0.20 
(<0.01) 
51.2 
790 
All variables 
-0.24 
(0.36) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
1.14 
(<0.01) 
1.10 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.69) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.58 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
-0.04 
(0.51) 
0.26 
(<0.01) 
1.22 
(0.01) 
0.43 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.26 
(<0.01) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
0.25 
(<0.01) 
51.1 
790 
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Table 3.9 
Inclusion of Real option% under competitive advantage period assumptions from 4 to 60 years 
For all firms, I made 57 estimates of Real option% under the assumption that the competitive advantage period 
takes on integer values from 4 to 60 years. I then included all estimates for Real option% in the regression 
model, whose results are presented in the first model below. The coefficients on the estimates for Real option% 
cannot be separately interpreted, due to multicollinearity, but were jointly different from zero. I also incorporated 
the interaction of all estimates of Real option% with indicator variables for high-growth and high-volatility 
firms. These firms are those ranked at the 67"" percentile or above of the sample distribution. These regression 
results are presented in Panel B. The sample comprises 790 US IPOs from 1997-2004. 
The variables are defined as follows: Initial return is the discrete percentage difference between the offer price 
and the f-day closing price on the equity market; Real option% is the percentage difference between a 
Decision-tree and DCF valuation of equity, whose models are summarised in Exhibits I and 2; Price revision = 
IPO price/Mid-point of the fiUng range - 1; Price revision' = Maximum {Price revision, 0); Overhang = Shares 
retained by the issuer divided by shares issued; Proceeds is IPO price multiplied by issued shares; Pre-issue IPO 
returns is the average initial retum for IPOs occurring in the 30 calendar days prior to the IPO; and Pre-issue 
market returns is the cumulative retum on the S&P 1500 Index for the 15 trading days prior to the IPO; 
Technology is an indicator variable for stocks in the IBES Industry Sector "Technology"; Bubble is an indicator 
variable for IPOs from 1999-2000; Initial growth revenue (Growth) is estimated as the mean revenue growth 
derived from the first three years of available IBES consensus forecasts subsequent to the IPO (fewer forecast 
years are used if three years of forecasts are not available); Cost of equity (rJ is estimated using the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model; where the risk-free rate is the annualised yield on 10-year Treasury bonds at the listing 
date; the market risk premium is 6 percent; and beta is estimated in a three-stage process where stage 1 is 
computing the coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of monthly retums of the equity against the 
S&P1500 Super Index, stage 2 is multiplying this estimate by 2/3 and adding 1/3 (consistent with an adjustment 
made by Bloomberg) and stage 3 is constraining all beta estimates in the range 0 to 4. 
Explanatory variable 
Intercept 
Real option % 
Price revision 
Price revision* 
Overhang (Retained/issued) 
Size (In proceeds) 
Pre-issue IPO retums 
Pre-issue market retums 
Technology ("Technology" = 1) 
Bubble (1999 or 2000 = 1) 
High revenue growth x Real optionVo 
High volatility x Real optionVo 
Technology x Real optionVo 
Bubble X Real optionVo 
Adjusted-R^ 
Comparable adj-R^ with one estimate of 
Real optionVo 
N 
Coefficients 
Inclusion of all Real optlon% 
0.05 
(0.87) 
All Real option % 
1.20 
(<0.01) 
1.53 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(<0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.65 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(<0.01) 
0.17 
(<0.01) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
46.9 
45.0 
(from Model 4; Table 3.6) 
790 
(p-values) 
Maximum adj-R^ regression 
-0.17 
(0.65) 
All Real optlon% 
0.80 
(<0.01) 
1.72 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(<0.01) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.85 
(0.03) 
... 
... 
All Real optionVo x High revenue 
growth 
All Real optionVo x High volatility 
0.31 
(<0.01) 
0.32 
(<0.01) 
52.5 
51.2 
(from Model 5; Table 3.8) 
790 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argue that IPO underpricing is partially attributable to information asymmetry, 
in addition to strategic decisions made by issuers and underwriters. One reason strategic 
underpricing may occur is that underwriters trade off the benefits of higher fees (from higher 
issue proceeds) against the risk of holding large quantities of stock in a weak secondary 
market. Altematively, underwriters may leave money on the table to ensure a continued 
information flow from investors about the market value of new issues. I argue that 
underpricing is not completely attributable to strategic 'incentive-based' underpricing. 
Information asymmetry theories imply a positive relationship between underpricing and the 
proportion of equity value comprised of embedded options. This implies that underpricing 
will persist, even if underwriters make genuine efforts to maximise offer proceeds. 
I explicitly model the proportion of value comprised of embedded options - Real option% - by 
simulating revenue growth and profit margin over time. The analysis suggests that the value 
of embedded options is discounted by around 10 percent on average, in addition to any 
strategic underpricing. This is economically significant. For the mean IPO, it implies that $ 11 
million of proceeds is left on the table (or $1 million in fees) due to information asymmetry. 
Reducing this asymmetry could therefore yield tangible benefits. 
However, the increase in explanatory power is marginal, compared to what can be attributed 
to strategic decisions. The revision of offer price from the mid-point of the filing range 
remains the dominant predictor of underpricing and is the variable that is directly in control of 
the underwriter. In conclusion, there is evidence that information asymmetry remains one 
explanation for IPO underpricing, but is clearly dominated by underwriter or issuer incentives 
to underprice the stoc 
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Chapter 4 
Research & development expenditure and the value of embedded 
options 
1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 relies on equity valuations using Discounted Cash 
Flow and Decision-tree valuation models. I attribute the difference between these valuations 
to the value of embedded options and label this Real optionVo when computed as a percentage 
of total equity value. The economic rationale for this interpretation is that volatility of the 
revenue stream gives rise to growth and abandonment options, which management can 
exercise by altering reinvestment policy. In response to a high growth signal, management can 
respond by increasing investment and take the opposite action in a low growth state. 
This management action is modelled through the assumption of a constant dividend payout 
ratio, which necessarily results in increased investment when eamings are high and decreased 
investment when earnings are low. However, perhaps what I compute as Real option% is 
measuring some other (unspecified) economic construct which is also associated with the 
volatility of revenue growth. If this is the case, I cannot necessarily interpret this variable as 
the proportion of value comprised of embedded options. 
In this chapter, I provide corroborating evidence to support the argument that Real option% 
can be interpreted in this way. First, I show that Real option% is positively correlated with 
research and development {R&D) expenditure, which can be interpreted as the purchase of an 
option to proceed to commercialisation. Second, I replicate prior research which documents 
the association between retums and R&D expenditure (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, 
Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 2001). I show that Real option% and i?cS:Z)-intensity have 
comparable association with stock prices, retums and volatility. This is consistent with the 
market considering Real option% to have the same value-relevance as /?c&Z)-intensity. 
This evidence provides support for the use of simulation models to value firms which make 
investments giving rise to embedded options. The implication for managers is that these 
techniques are useful for capital allocation. The implication for equity analysts and investors 
is that accuracy of their estimates of the value of/?c8:D-intensive firms can be improved by 
incorporating the value of embedded options. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the association 
between R&D expenditure and equity value, retums and volatility; Section 3 presents the 
results; and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 /?<feZ)-intensity and its association with value, returns and volatility 
The accounting literature has documented a positive association between the capitalized value 
of R&D spending and the market value of equities and between R&D-intensity and the 
volatility of stock retums. But there is conflicting evidence of an association between R&D-
intensity and subsequent stock retums. This paper addresses two research questions: (1) 
whether measures of ^c$:D-intensity are positively correlated with the value of the firm's 
embedded options, as estimated by a simulation model; and (2) whether there is an association 
between Real option% and market value of equity, volatility of stock retums and the level of 
future retums. In this section, I summarise the relevant literature upon which this analysis is 
based. 
The accounting literature has documented a positive association between the capitalized value 
of R&D spending and equity market value, implying that the market considers R&D expenses 
to be investments expected to yield positive future cash flows. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
find that equity prices are positively associated with the theoretical increase in book value of 
equity if R&D expenditures are capitalised rather than immediately expensed. This 
relationship is even stronger for very i?c§:D-intensive firms. For firms with R&D expenditure 
in the upper quartile of sample firms, the ability to explain the variation in equity prices 
increases by 9 percent compared to the fiill sample. Using Australian data, Abrahams and 
Sidhu (1998) document a comparable association between market value and capitalised R&D. 
These results are consistent with the prior evidence of Sougiannis (1994). 
There is also an association between /?<§:D-intensity and the volatility of stock returns and 
eamings. Chan et al (2001) estimate a linear relationship between R&Dlsa^Q^ and the standard 
deviation of retums and report an average coefficient of 0.096. The average firm involved in 
R&D has an /JcfeD/Sales ratio of 23 percent, implying that this activity increases the volatility 
of their retums by 2.2 percent. The volatility of future eamings is also positively associated 
with R&D spending as shown by Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2002). 
Support for these results is found in literature which measures the association between 
intangible assets, equity value and uncertainty. For software firms, the capitalised value of 
software development costs are positively associated with stock prices and the change in this 
value is associated with stock retums (Aboody and Lev, 1998). However, the authors also 
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present evidence that the intensity of sofhvare capitalisation is positively associated with 
analysts' earnings forecast errors. In addition, there is evidence that of a negative association 
between the level of intangible assets and (1) the consensus in analysts' forecasts; and (2) the 
degree to which the mean forecast error is superior to individual forecasts, in terms of having 
less mean squared error (Barron, Byard, Kile and Riedl, 2002). These results suggest that 
firms a high level of intangible assets have greater uncertainty over their value. Seeing as 
these results were primarily due to the R&D expenditures of high-technology manufacturing 
firms, (such as electronics, dmg and software companies) we can surmise that R&D 
expenditure is valuable, but its benefits are uncertain. 
In contrast to the evidence on stock prices and volatility, there is conflicting evidence over 
whether R&D spending results in abnormal mean stock retums. Chan et al (2001) find that the 
average stock retum on 7?cfeD-intensive firms is comparable to the average retum for firms 
with no R&D. However, they do report an association between i?c8:D-intensity and subsequent 
stock retums when they measure ^cfeD-intensity as capitalised R&D relative to market value 
of equity. These firms are classed as J?c6;Z)-intensive largely because their market value of 
equity has fallen significantly in the previous 12 months. Thus, R&D spending is only 
associated with subsequent abnormal retums for firms with prior negative retums who 
subsequently maintain their R&D spending. 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) also report an association between stock retums and capitalised 
R&D scaled by market value of equity. They state that this relationship was maintained even 
when they scaled by book value of assets or equity, but do not explicitly control for past share 
price performance. In sum, this research is consistent with an association between R&D-
intensity and subsequent retums, but it is an unresolved question as to whether this is due to 
the economic benefits of R&D spending or simply reflects long-term stock price reversals. 
As a whole this literature supports the notion that i?<S:D-intensive firms have relatively volatile 
retums and eamings, but which eam average stock retums that are at least commensurate with 
risk. The model I put forward in Chapters 2 and 3 is that firms with high, volatile growth 
prospects have a greater proportion of their value consisting of embedded options. These 
firms are expected to be /?<feZ)-intensive firms. So consistent with the prior evidence, I test for 
a positive association between the option component of equity value {Real option%) and (1) 
i?<S:D-intensity; (2) the market value of equity; (3) the volatility of stock retums; and (4) 
average stock retums. 
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3 Results 
In this section, I present evidence that Real option% is positively associated with ^cS:D-
intensity. I also replicate research into the relationship between i?cS:D-intensity and stock 
retums values and volatility. This analysis shows that Real option% and i?cS:D-intensity have 
a similar association with stock market values. As a whole, the evidence supports my view 
that Real option% can be interpreted as equity value attributable to embedded options. 
The sample comprises the 44 percent of firm-years used in the Chapter 2 portfolio 
performance study which reported positive R&D expenditure. I consider only firms who 
report positive R&D expenditure. I do not attempt to analyse firms with zero R&D 
expenditure, because it is highly uncertain as to whether a zero value in the database actually 
represents zero expenditure or a missing value. In each part of the analysis there are minor 
restrictions imposed which reduces sample size. These restrictions are detailed in their 
respective sub-sections. Unless stated otherwise, the estimation techniques used are the same 
as those detailed in Chapter 2. 
3.1 Association between the Real option% and /fifeD-intensity 
In this section I present evidence that /?<S:D-intensity is positively associated with Real 
option%. I measure ^c&Z)-intensity in a similar way to Chan et al (2001) and Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996). First, I compute R&D expenditure relative to Sales, Eamings, Dividends 
or Book Value of Equity. Second, 1 estimate the capitalised value of R&D expenditure, given 
prior evidence of an association between capitalised R&D and equity market values. 
1 measure the capitalised value of R&D expenditure for firm / in year t according to the 
equations below, which are modified versions of the equation used by Chan et al (2001) who 
rely on the empirical support of Lev and Sougiarmis (1996). The first equation, the same as 
that used by Chan et al, implicitly assumes that the value of R&D expenditure is amortised 
over a five-year life and incorporates R&D expenditure that has been both amortised and 
capitalised. It is used when there is current R&D expenditure available, as well as a four-year 
history of R&D expenditure. The equation is: 
Capitalised R&D it = R&D Expenditureu + 0.8 R&D Expenditurei_t.i + 0.6 R&D Expenditurei^t-
2 + 0.4 R&D Expenditureij.3 + 0.2 R&D Expenditureij.4 (4.1) 
For firms whose R&D expenditure for the past five years is unavailable, I modify the above 
equation be re-weighting the coefficients applicable to the available data history. This is to 
ensure that the estimate of capitalised R&D is not upwardly biased towards firms with a long 
reported history of R&D expenditure. That is, the adjustment is made to correct for a lack of 
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reported R&D expenditure, primarily due to a short listing period, as opposed to the lack of 
actual R&D expenditure. 
The above equation is consistent with R&D expenditure in year 0 being 25 percent more 
valuable than R&D expenditure last year, 67 percent more valuable than that incurred two 
years ago, and so on, I estimate capitalised R&D using the following equations, which 
maintain these relative weightings, and whose weights also sum to 3, The equations are: 
Capitalised R&Dt, (4-year history) = 1,07 R&D Expenditureu + 0.86 R&D Expenditurei,t.i + 
0.64 R&D Expenditurei,t.2 + 0.43 R&D Expendituretj.s (4.2a) 
CapitalisedR&Du (3-year history) = 1.25 R&D Expenditureu + 1.00 R&D Expenditureit.i + 
0.75 R&D Expenditureij.2 (4.2b) 
Capitalised R&Du (2-year history) = 1.67 R&D Expenditureu +1.33 R&D Expenditureit.i 
(4.2c) 
Capitalised R&Du {1 -year history) = 3.0 R&D Expenditureu (4.2d) 
I analyse the association between R&D-intQnsity and Real option% for the full sample, by 
cohort year and by IBES industries, I use more detailed industry classifications than those 
relied upon in the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3, In the earlier analysis, parameter estimates 
relating to volatility of revenue growth and margins were made on the basis of 11 IBES 
Industry Sectors over 18 years (198 Sector-year partitions). To make parameter estimates 
based on the more detailed industry grouping would materially decrease the size of those 
groups, and likely increase the standard error of those estimates. 
In Panels A and B of Table 4.1,1 compare the iJc&D-intensity of my sample to that used by 
Chan et al (2001). I report the aggregate i?c§:£)-intensity for the year and the IBES industry, 
and the aggregate Real option%. This minimises the impact of extreme values for 
denominators, which can be very low (in the case of Book value of equity) or very high (when 
sales are consolidated). Chan et al (2001) compute their figures in an identical manner. 
The aggregate measures of ^cfeD-intensity are 3.8 percent for i?<§:Z)/Sales, 54 percent for 
./?<S;D/Eamings, 10.3 percent for R&D/Book value of equity and 146 percent for 
i?cS:D/Dividends. The aggregate value of capitalised R&D is 30 percent of book value of 
equity. These figures are comparable to those reported by Chan et al. For my sample, the 
mean R&D/Sales estimate is 3,7 percent in 1990 and 3.5 percent in 1995. These figures are 
close to the estunates of 3.4 and 3.8 percent recorded by Chan et al. 
193 
Chapter 4 - Research & development expenditure and the value of embedded options 
Table 4.1 
Intensity of research and development activity and estimated value of embedded options 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for on R&D-intensity for 4155 who reported positive R&D expenditure 
during 1987-2004. The variables summarised are: R&D/Sales; R&D/Net profit (NPAT) where NPAT > 0; 
R&D/Book value of equity; R&D/Dividends; (5) Capitalised R&D/Book value of equity; and Real option% 
under the assumption that the competitive advantage period takes on values of 10, 20 or 30 years. Capitalised 
R&D is estimated according to equations 4.2a to 4.2d. Real option% is equal to I - DCF \a\ndDecision-tree 
value The valuation models underlying these valuations are summarised in Exhibits 2.2 and 2.9 of Chapter 2. 
Panel B presents the correlation coefficients amongst these variables. ***, ** and * refer to significance levels 
for two-tailed tests at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A: R&D-intensity by cohori year 
R&D as a percent of: 
Year N Sales NPAT BV DIv 
Cap 
RD/ 
BV 
Real optionVo by CAP 
10 20 30 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
123 
117 
113 
129 
135 
143 
153 
157 
165 
167 
242 
262 
286 
319 
342 
394 
457 
451 
3.9 
3.7 
3.6 
3.7 
3.6 
3.6 
3.9 
3.8 
3.5 
3.6 
3.4 
4.2 
4.1 
3.8 
3.9 
4.2 
3.7 
3.5 
77 
64 
55 
61 
69 
86 
76 
65 
51 
45 
42 
49 
51 
46 
42 
60 
59 
51 
10.7 
10.0 
10.5 
12.0 
11.2 
10.9 
13.4 
12.5 
10.3 
10.4 
9.5 
11.8 
11.9 
10.4 
9.6 
10.0 
9.5 
8.2 
155 
147 
148 
148 
149 
139 
160 
145 
124 
130 
120 
151 
150 
143 
151 
166 
153 
143 
32 
17 
36 
42 
36 
35 
40 
39 
32 
31 
28 
32 
31 
29 
26 
27 
29 
24 
5 
9 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
10 
13 
17 
20 
19 
13 
18 
17 
13 
14 
11 
13 
12 
12 
15 
13 
16 
16 
19 
29 
35 
40 
39 
24 
28 
29 
22 
23 
20 
23 
21 
24 
27 
24 
29 
28 
32 
45 
52 
58 
57 
Pooled 4155 3.8 54 10.3 146 30 12 25 40 
Chan. LakonishoK and Sougiannis (2001) 
1985 
1990 
1995 
3.0 
3.4 
3.8 
84 
79 
65 
8.1 
9.6 
10.9 
146 
149 
165 
21 
26 
29 
Panel B: R&D-intensity by IBES industry 
IBES industry 
Building materials 
Svcs to medical profession 
Office products 
Software & EDP services 
Electrical systems/devices 
Electrical goods 
Precious metals 
Photo-Optical equip 
Leisure product 
Containers 
Undesignated energy 
Electronics 
Clothing 
Auto part manufacturing 
Building & related 
Drugs 
Nonferrous metals 
Medical supplies 
Hospital care 
Savings & Loans 
Pooled 
N 
150 
176 
111 
226 
208 
153 
89 
115 
65 
73 
47 
110 
187 
35 
20 
117 
450 
255 
104 
31 
4155 
Chan. Lakonishok and Souaiannis (2001) 
Computer prog, software & services 
Drugs and pharmaceuticals 
Computers and office equipment 
Measuring instruments 
Electrical equip excluding computers 
Communications 
Transportation equipment 
R&D as a percent of: 
Sales 
27.7 
11.7 
11.4 
11.0 
10.2 
9.7 
9.4 
7.5 
6.1 
5.9 
5.4 
4.5 
4.4 
4.3 
3.1 
3.1 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.6 
3.8 
NPAT 
145 
51 
212 
87 
55 
185 
122 
125 
81 
90 
54 
80 
65 
213 
45 
75 
47 
55 
31 
93 
54 
- SIC Industries 
16.6 
11.9 
7.1 
5.6 
4.9 
3,7 
3.6 
207 
92 
159 
90 
58 
98 
126 
BV 
18.7 
10.9 
21.5 
12.6 
17.9 
10.5 
9.4 
15.2 
18.3 
16.1 
12.5 
12.5 
11.2 
34.7 
7.1 
10.1 
8.6 
9.1 
8.2 
11.8 
10.3 
28 
21 
21 
13 
10 
13 
17 
Div 
5343 
954 
1814 
1209 
119 
3057 
7518 
1386 
205 
386 
109 
176 
132 
596 
141 
238 
232 
184 
71 
287 
146 
2833 
192 
1242 
277 
242 
80 
298 
Cap 
R&DI 
BV 
50 
28 
53 
33 
48 
44 
25 
57 
54 
44 
35 
41 
33 
89 
44 
27 
33 
39 
27 
32 
30 
55 
53 
56 
37 
26 
36 
46 
Real optionVo by 
10 
23 
16 
14 
14 
13 
18 
17 
16 
6 
12 
8 
8 
6 
8 
8 
11 
26 
9 
6 
8 
12 
20 
54 
34 
32 
32 
21 
38 
38 
35 
12 
28 
13 
17 
12 
20 
16 
26 
53 
19 
12 
23 
25 
CAP 
30 
77 
49 
49 
50 
34 
58 
56 
52 
20 
45 
20 
28 
20 
32 
27 
40 
72 
31 
20 
36 
40 
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Table 4.1 
Intensity of researcli and development activity and estimated value of embedded options (continued) 
Panel C: Correlation between measures of R&D-intensity and Real option% (Pearson correlation coefficients 
reported in tlie bottom left: Spearman coefficients reported in the top right) 
R&D/Sales 
R(SD/Eamings 
R&D/Book value 
R&D/Dividends 
Cap R&D/Book value 
Rea/opfcn% (CAP=10) 
Real optionVo (CAP=20) 
Real optionVo (CAP=30) 
Sales 
— 
63*** 
57*** 
70*** 
46*** 
54*** 
56*** 
59*** 
R&D as a Dercent of... 
Eam-
ings 
88*** 
— 
83*** 
56*** 
72*** 
34** 
43*** 
46*** 
Book 
value 
89*** 
89*** 
— 
28* 
84*** 
14 
19 
21 
Divlden 
ds 
79*** 
90*** 
74*** 
... 
22 
51*** 
57*** 
59*** 
Cap 
R&DI 
BV 
76*** 
75*** 
84*** 
63*** 
— 
11 
16 
19 
Real option% bv CAP 
10 20 30 
40*** 31** 33** 
44*** 46*** 47*** 
24 21 22 
62*** 68*** 69*** 
24 18 20 
89*** 89*** 
97*** — 99*** 
95*** 100*** 
Industry analysis provides evidence that Real option% is positively associated with R&D-
intensity. In Panel B 1 present data on the 20 industries with the highest mean i?c6:iD/Sales 
ratios, and compare those estimates with data presented by Chan et al (2001). The industry 
analysis shows that Real option% is positively associated with /?<S:D-intensity. For the 41 
IBES industries with at least 20 observations, I measured the association between R&D-
intensity and Real option% using Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. This 
represents 4000 of the 4155 observations in the R&D sub-sample (96 percent). These 
coefficients are presented in Panel C. 
There is a significant positive association between Real option% and R&DISSXQS, 
/JcfeD/Eamings and i?<&Z)/Dividends, and about 30 percent of the variation in Real option% 
can be explained by /?cS;i)/Sales. Furthermore, of the 41 industries represented, six were 
jointly ranked in the top 10 by both i?<feZ)/Sales and Real option% and 13 were jointly ranked 
in the top 20. These numbers hold for Real option% estimated under all three assumptions for 
the competitive advantage period. 
Thus, there is evidence that /?c&Z)-intensive firms have higher estimated values for Real 
option%, which is largely a function of the volatility of revenue growth. It is likely that a 
major proportion of R&D expenditure is incurred to create options to proceed to 
commercialisation. However, the value of these investments is xmlikely to be incorporated in 
near-term eamings forecasts or analysts' forecast cash flows into perpetuity. Therefore, a 
DCF valuation based on those forecasts understates the value of embedded options. In 
contrast, a Decision-tree valuation can incorporate the value of optimal exercise and the 
difference between the DCF and Decision-tree valuations can be attributed to the value of 
embedded options. The association between Real option% and .^cfeD-intensity provides 
support for this hypothesis. In the remainder of this chapter I examine whether Real option% 
and /?(§:Z)-intensity have the same association with retums volatility, market values and 
average retums. 
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3.2 Association between volatility of stock returns and Realoption% 
Chan et al (2001) provide evidence that /Jc&D-intensity is associated with stock retums. They 
estimate the coefficients of the following model, using ordinary least squares regression, for 
each year from 1975-1995: 
0-, =ro, +ruLNSIZE + r2,LNAGE + r„RDS,+f^t/>jJND^j, +£, (4,3) 
7=1 
where: 
au = the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12 months following the 
measurement of R&D; 
LNSIZEu = the natural logarithm of market capitalisation; 
LNAGEu = the natural logarithm of the firm's age; 
RDSu = research and development expenditure relative to sales; 
INDu = indicator variables for industries based on 2-digit SIC codes (or 3-digit codes in the 
case of selected technology industries); and 
the subscripts / and t refer to firm / and year t. 
Chan et al (2001) report an average coefficient on RDS of 0.096 and state that the average 
R&D/Saies for firms reporting any R&D is 23 percent. This is consistent with the average 
^cfeD-intensive firm having volatility of stock retums 2.2 percent higher than a firm with no 
R&D. 
I repeat this analysis using my data set and a number of measures of i?c§:Z)-intensity. I exclude 
the age variable as this data is not available. I also use 40 IBES industry classifications for the 
indicator variables and present the results both including and excluding these variables. I then 
conduct the same analysis using Real option% instead of/?cS:Z)-intensity. The regression 
results are summarised in Table 4.2. 
The results show that both i?c8:D-intensity and Real option% are positively associated the 
volatility of stock retums and that Real option% has greater explanatory power. These results 
hold even after including indicator variables for the 41 IBES industries. In that case, the 
coefficient on Real option% assuming CAP=30 is 0.102. This implies that for every 10 
percent of value which is comprised of embedded options, the monthly volafility of its stock 
retums increases by about 1 percent (an increase in annualised volatility of 3.5 percent). This 
result is consistent with the modelling of Schwartz and Moon (2000) who predict a positive 
association between the volatility of revenue growth and stock price volatility. 
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Table 4.2 
Explaining the volatility of returns 
Table 4.2 presents the results of seven ordinary least squares regressions of the volatility of retums on several 
explanatory variables. The volatility of retums is computed each year as the standard deviation of 12 monthly 
retums. These retums are the continuously-compounded retums on the stock, assuming reinvestment of 
dividends. AU regression models include the natural logarithm of market capitaUsation as an explanatory 
variable. Regressions in Panel B include 40 indicator variables for IBES industries where the number of firm-
years in the sample is at least 20. The variable of interest in the seven models are: (1) R&DIS&Xss; (2) 
/?clD/Eamings, where eamings > 0, (3) R&DIBooV. value of equity; (4) Capitalised /?cfeZ)/Book value of equity, 
where capitalised R&D is estimated using equations 2a-2d; and (5-7) Real option% is estimated under the 
assumption that the competitive advantage period is 10, 20 or 30 years, respectively. The coefficients presented 
are the average coefficients from 18 regressions run on annual data starting at 30 April each year from 1987-
2004. Significance levels for the coefficients are estimated using t-statistics computed from the standard error of 
these 18 coefficient estimates. The adjusted-R^ presented is the mean estimate of the 18 individual adjusted R^  
estimates. There are 3680 firm-years for which all data is available, which represents an average sample size in 
each regression of 204. The minimum number of observations in any given year is 111 and the maximum is 359. 
p-values for two-tailed tests of significance are presented in brackets. 
Panel A: Regressions excluding indictor variables for IBES industries 
Variable of interest 
Intercept 
In Mktcap 
Variable of interest 
Adjusted-R^ (%) 
Coefficients (p-values) 
R&D 
Sales 
0.158 
(<0.01) 
-0.009 
(<0.01) 
0.223 
(<0.01) 
26.5 
as a percent of. 
Eamings 
0.162 
(<0.01) 
-0.009 
(<0.01) 
0.007 
(<0.01) 
18.8 
Book 
value 
0.168 
(<0.01) 
-0.009 
(<0.01) 
0.046 
(<0.01) 
17.8 
Cap 
R&D/BV 
0.170 
(<0.01) 
-0.009 
(<0.01) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
16.1 
Real optionVo by CAP 
10 
0.150 
(<0.01) 
-0.008 
(<0.01) 
0.169 
(<0.01) 
18.1 
20 
0.136 
(<0.01) 
-0.007 
(<0.01) 
0.101 
(<0.01) 
20.5 
30 
0.120 
(<0.01) 
-0.006 
(<0.01) 
0.092 
(<0.01) 
23.4 
Panel B: Regressions 
Intercept 
In Mktcap 
Variable of interest 
Adjusted-R^ 
including indictor variables for IBES industries 
Coefficients (p-values) 
R&D as a percent of.. 
Sales Eamings 
0.163 0.164 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
-0.009 -0.009 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.176 0.004 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
31.8 28.6 
Cap 
Book R&D/BV 
value 
0.168 0.169 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
-0.009 -0.009 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
0.029 0.003 
(<0.01) (0.03) 
27.4 27.2 
Real 
10 
0.139 
(<0.01) 
-0.008 
(<0.01) 
0.295 
(<0.01) 
30.4 
optionVo by CAP 
20 
0.130 
(<0.01) 
-0.007 
(<0.01) 
0.128 
(<0.01) 
31.9 
30 
0.119 
(<0.01) 
-0.006 
(<0.01) 
0.102 
(<0.01) 
33.4 
Panel C: Mean estimates of descriptive statistics for each of IS regressions 
Volatility of monthly returns (%) 
R&D/Sales (%) 
R<SD/Eamings (%) 
R<SD/Book value (%) 
Capitalised R<SD/Book value (%) 
Real optionVo 
CAP = 10 years 
CAP = 20 years 
CAP = 30 years 
Mean 
10 
8 
97 
14 
97 
10 
21 
32 
Median 
9 
3 
4S 
8 
25 
9 
20 
32 
Standard deviation 
5 
27 
265 
47 
867 
5 
11 
15 
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3.3 Association between market values and Realoption% 
There is evidence that R&D expenditure is positively associated with the market value of 
equity. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimated the value of capitalised R&D as a weighted sum 
of R&D expenditures, and report the following mean result from 16 ordinary least squares 
regressions on annual data from 1976-1991. 
P = 9.025 + 5.mX' +0.96(X'' -X')+2.37(BV'^ -BV') (4.4) 
where: 
P = share price; 
X^ = reported eamings per share; 
^f^ = estimated eamings per share assuming R&D expenditure is capitalised; 
5{^ = reported book value of equity per share; and 
BV^ = estimated book value per share assuming R&D expenditure is capitalised. 
The mean coefficients on reported eamings (J^) and the capitalisation increase to book value 
{BV^-BV^) are statistically significant. The mean and standard error of the coefficient on 
{BV^ -BV^) are consistent with every dollar of capitalised R&D having a market value of 
about $2.00 - $2.60. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimated the capitalised value of R&D 
assuming an amortisation rate which approximates 20 percent a year, a rate which is relied 
upon by Chan et al (2001). In Australia, the prescribed accounting treatment of R&D 
expenditure allows management more discretion to account for this as capital expenditure. 
This allowed Abrahams and Sidhu (1998) to perform a comparable analysis on a sample of 
firms who capitalise R&D. From a pooled regression on 114 firm-years they report the 
following result. All coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
MVE = 0.368 +1.40\TALRD -1.749ri -\- 2.47SRD (4.5) 
where: 
MVE - market value of equity per share; 
TALRD = total assets, less balance sheet research and development, per share; 
TL = total liabilities per share; and 
RD = balance sheet research and development per share. 
As with Lev and Sougiannis, the mean esdmate of the market value of capitalised R&D is 
over $2.00 for every dollar of capitalised R&D. But the higher standard error of this estimate 
imphes that every dollar of capitalised R&D has a market value of around $0.50 - $4.50. In 
the spirit of this prior research, I estimate share price as a linear function of book value of 
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equity and two measures of/?c&D-intensity - capitalised R&D per share and R&D expenditure 
per share. I then repeat the analysis after replacing the dependent variable with an estimate of 
the option component of equity value, expressed on a dollars per share basis. Thus, I estimate 
the coefficients to the following regressions models, the results of which are presented in 
Table 4.3. 
Price = a+ fiyBVPS + ^^Capitalised R&Dor R&D expenditure per share (4.6a); and 
Price = a + P^BVPS + p^Per share value of embedded options (4.6b) 
where: 
Capitalised R&D is estimated via equations 2a-2d; and 
Value of embedded options = the difference between equity values estimated under the DCF 
and Decision-tree valuation methods, assuming competitive advantage periods of 10, 20 and 
30 years. 
Table 4.3 
Market value of equity and value of embedded options 
Table 4.3 presents the results of six ordinary least squares regressions of share price on several explanatory 
variables. All regressions models include the book value of equity per share as an explanatory variable. The 
variable of interest in the remaining five models is (1) capitalised R&D per share; (2) R&D expenditure per 
share; and (3-5) estimated dollar value of embedded options, as estimated under the assumption that the 
competitive advantage period is 10, 20 or 30 years. The coefficients presented are the average coefficients from 
18 regressions mn on annual data starting at 30 April each year from 1987-2004. Significance levels for the 
coefficients are estimated using t-statistics computed from the standard error of these 18 coefficient estimates. 
The adjusted-R^ presented is the mean estimate of the 18 individual adjusted R^  estimates. There are 3908 firm-
years for which all data is available, which represents an average sample size in each regression of 214. The 
minimum number of observations in any given year is 105 and the maximum is 430. p-values for two-tailed tests 
of significance are presented in brackets. 
Panel A: Regression results 
Variable of interest 
Intercept 
BVPS 
Variable of interest 
Adjusted-R^ (%) 
n/a 
1039 
(<O01) 
1.29 
(<0.01) 
47.5 
Cap 
R&D/per 
share 
10.10 
(<0.01) 
1.27 
(<O01) 
0.23 
(0.03) 
48.9 
R&D/per 
share 
9.60 
(<0.01) 
1.20 
(<0.01) 
2.17 
(<0.01) 
49.8 
Dollar value of embedded options 
by CAP 
10 20 
9.95 10.13 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
1.16 1.24 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
1.05 013 
(0.00) (0.07) 
48.9 48.3 
per share 
30 
10.16 
(<0.01) 
1.26 
(<0.01) 
0.05 
(011) 
48.2 
Panel B: Mean estimates of descriptive statistics for each of 18 regressions 
Share price 
Book value per share 
Capitalised RW per share 
R8£) per share 
Dollar value of embedded options: 
CAP =10 years 
CAP = 20 years 
CAP = 30 vears 
Mean 
19.87 
7.40 
2.77 
0.67 
1.14 
3.31 
7.39 
Median 
16.69 
5.25 
1.15 
0.33 
0.68 
1.85 
3.91 
Standard deviation 
14.29 
7.05 
5.80 
1.07 
1.50 
4.47 
10.61 
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The coefficients and adjusted-R presented in Table 4.3 are the mean estimates from 18 
regressions mn on armual data from 1987-2004. Consistent with prior research, there is a 
positive association between capitalised R&D expenditure and share price. But the mean 
coefficient of 0.23 is significantly lower than the estimated values of around 2.50 reported by 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Abrahams and Sidhu (1998). This coefficient estimate has a 
standard error or 0.10, implying that one dollar of capitalised R&D has a market value of just 
$0.06 - 0.40 per share, based on a 90 percent confidence interval. The coefficient on 
R&D/salQS of 2.17 and its standard error of 0.48 are consistent with every dollar of annual 
R&D expenditure increasing market value by about $1.21 - 3.01 per share. 
These estimated coefficients can be interpreted in the following way. For the 18 years of data 
on which the regression analysis is performed, the mean estimate of capitalised R&D per 
share is $2.77. According to the estimated regression coefficient, this has a market value of 
just $0.64 per share. The mean estimate of R&D expenditure per share is $0.67, which has an 
estimated market value of $ 1.45. 
Now consider the coefficients on the per share dollar of embedded options. These coefficients 
decrease from 1.05 to 0.05 as the assumed competitive advantage period increases from 10 to 
30 years. But the mean estimate of embedded options per share increases with an increase in 
CAP, from $1.14 to $7.39 per share. If the mean estimated market value of embedded options 
is comparable for all five measures (two measures of ./?c§:Z)-intensity and three estimates of 
embedded option value) this provides further evidence that they capture the same constmct. I 
performed this comparison by taking the mean estimate of each measure of embedded options 
from the 18 regression samples, and estimated a 90 percent confidence interval for its market 
value. The results of this comparison are: 
• The theoretical value of capitalised R&D is $2.77 per share, which has an estimated 
market value of $0.18- 1.12. 
• The annual R&D expenditure is $0.67, which has an estimated market value of $0.89 -
2.02. 
• If CAP is assumed to be 10 years, the theoretical value of embedded options is $ 1.14 per 
share, which has an estimated market value of $0.78 - 1.61. 
• If CAP is assumed to be 20 years, the theoretical value of embedded options is $3.31 per 
share, which has a market value of $0.04 - 0.83. 
• If CAP is assumed to be 30 years, the theoretical value of embedded options is $7.39 per 
share, which has a market value of $-0.01 - 0.74. 
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Under CAP assumptions of 20 or 30 years, the estimated market value of embedded options 
has upper bounds of $0.83 and $0.74, which are less then the lower bound of the confidence 
interval drawn from the R&D expenditure proxy. However, the confidence interval drawn 
from the CAP assumption of 10 years is very comparable to that drawn from R&D 
expenditure. In addition, the confidence intervals estimated under CAP assumptions of 20 and 
30 years are comparable to those drawn from the capitalised R&D analysis. Thus, the 
evidence provides broad support for the contention that theoretical value of embedded options 
has the same market value as investments in R&D. 
3.4 Association between stock returns and Real option% 
In Section 2,1 highlighted the limited evidence of an association between i?cS:Z)-intensity and 
subsequent stock retums. Recall that Chan et al (2001) were only able to find evidence of a 
positive association between /?c§:D-intensity and stock retums for firms whose recent share 
market returns were poor, and thus had high ratios of ./?cS:£)/market value. They also note the 
association between i?<feZ)-intensity and volatility of retums, so any remaining outperformance 
may simply be due to risk. 
Whether we should expect /?c§:Z)-intensive stocks to eam above-average returns is unclear. As 
shown in Section 3.2, there is an association between i?cS:D-intensity and the volatility of 
retums. If this additional volatility is driven by a risk factor that is priced by the equity 
market, we should expect these stocks to eam higher average retums. However, R&D-
intensive stocks can also be characterised as glamour stocks, given their relatively low book-
to-market equity ratios and high eamings growth. Given that glamour stocks typically eam 
lower retums than value stocks, we could observe /JcfeD-intensive stocks eaming low average 
retums. 
In this section I present the results of a comparison of the retums to portfolios formed on the 
basis of R&D relative to sales, and Real option%. For each of the 18 years from 1987-2004,1 
formed two sets of quintile portfolios after ranking stocks on i?c6;D/Sales, and Real option%, 
assuming a competitive advantage period of 10, 20 or 30 years. I then analysed the 
characteristics of these portfolios and their subsequent retums performance. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 4.4, which can be directly compared to the results of Chan et 
al(2001). 
The results presented in Table 4.4 confirm that portfolios formed on the basis of Real option% 
have comparable performance to those formed on the basis of i?cS:Z)-intensity. Stocks ranked 
in the top quintile by /?cS;D-intensity had average annual retums of 12.9 percent, which was 
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2.6 percent higher than those in the bottom quintile. For stocks ranked according to Real 
optionVo, there was a comparable difference in performance of 2.4 percent. However, these 
differences in retums were not statistically significant. In addition, the higher volatility of 
retums in top quintile portfolios meant that their Sharpe ratios were slightly lower than those 
in the bottom quintile. I computed the Sharpe ratio as the annual retum minus the risk-free 
rate, relative to the annualised standard deviation of the 12 monthly retums. 
However, there is one important difference between the portfolios formed on the basis of 
^c&D-intensity and Real option%. The data confirms that i?c6D-intensive stocks can be 
considered glamour stocks. As /?c&D-intensity increases there is a systematic decline in the 
book-to-market equity ratio, the eamings-to-price rafio and the dividend yield. However, for 
portfolios formed on the basis of Real option%, this trend is not apparent. In fact, firms in the 
top quintile based on Real option% have a significantly higher average book-to-market equity 
ratio than firms in the bottom quintile (0.45 versus 0.33; p-value <0.01). This is likely to 
occur because Real option% is driven primarily by the volatility of revenue growth, with the 
level of revenue growth having less importance. Thus, firms with low, volatile revenue 
growth will have a higher Real option% than those firms with high, stable revenue growth. 
However, this data remains consistent with Real option% being a valid estimate of its 
intended constmct - the proportion of equity value comprised of embedded options. This is 
because the book-to-market equity ratio has a greater association with past revenue growth 
than fiiture revenue growth, as demonstrated by Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003). They 
showed a systematic relationship between the book-to-market equity ratio and realised 
growth over the previous five years. However, they failed to find an association between the 
book-to-market equity ratio and growth over the subsequent five years. If the book-to-market 
equity ratio is largely a fiinction of historical growth, the data presented in Table 4.4 is 
consistent with the following summation: 
• .R{§:Z)-intensive firms can be considered glamour stocks, characterised by low book-to-
market equity ratios, eamings-to-price ratios and dividend yield. But these financial ratios 
do not necessarily mean that a higher proportion of equity value is comprised of 
embedded options. These financial ratios may simply reflect the market's expectation that 
expected growth will be high, not necessarily that the volatility of growth will be high. 
• In contrast, firms with high estimated Real option% have a high volatility of expected 
revenue growth and this association will be stronger the lower the level of current growth. 
This evidence remains consistent with the interpretation of Real option% as the proportion 
of equity value comprising embedded options. 
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Table 4.4 
Retums and characteristics of portfolios classified by R&D relative to sales or by Real option% 
At the end of April each year from 1987 to 2004, all stocks are ranked by their R&D expenditure relative to sales 
or by Real option% and assigned to one of five equally-sized portfolios. Real option% is estimated according to 
the procedure detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, and assumes a competitive advantage period of 30 years. The sample 
is drawn from stocks which had reported R&D expenditure, were part of the S&P500 and the NASDAQ 
Composite Index as at 30 April 2005, and for which IBES consensus EPS forecasts were available for at least 
two forecast years. The table reports mean estimates for the following variables: (1) the annual stock retum, 
assuming continuous compounding; (2) the Sharpe rafio, estimated as the annual stock retum minus the yield on 
10-year Govemment bonds, divided by the annualised standard deviation of monthly stock returns; (3) R&D 
divided by sales; (4) R&D divided by market value of equity; (5) book value of equity divided by market value 
of equity; (6) sales divided by the market value of equity; (7) eamings-to-price, computed as last year's earnings 
per share, divided by share price; (8) dividend yield, computed as last year's dividend relative to share price; (9) 
return on equity, computed as the last annual eamings divided by book value of equity; and (10) the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation. The annual retums reported in the Chan et al (2001) panel assume discrete 
period compounding. 
Quintiles formed accordinq to R&DISa\es 
Annual reftjrn (%) 
Sharpe ratio 
R&D/Sa\es (%) 
R&D/Market value of equity (%) 
Book-to-market equity 
Sales-to-market equity 
Earnings-to-price (%) 
Dividend yield (%) 
Return on equity (%) 
Natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
1 (Low) 
10.34 
0.41 
0.61 
0.84 
0.54 
1.68 
6.79 
2.77 
17.51 
7.89 
Quintiles formed accordina to Real ootionVe (CAP = 30 vears) 
Annual return (%) 
Sharpe ratio 
H<SD/Saies (%) 
R<SD/Market value of equity (%) 
Book-to-market equity 
Sales-to-market equity 
Eamings-to-price 
Dividend yield (%) 
Return on equity (%) 
Natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
Quintiles formed accordina to R&DISa\es (Chan, 
Annual return (%) 
mo/Sales (%) 
fliSD/Market value of equity (%) 
Book-to-market equity 
Sales-to-market equity 
Earnings-to-price (%) 
Dividend yield (%) 
Retum on equity (%) 
Natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
9.63 
0.38 
4.08 
2.43 
0.33 
0.79 
5.68 
2.79 
28.65 
8.92 
2 
10.97 
0.50 
1.93 
2.46 
0.43 
1.40 
6.45 
2.33 
25.28 
7.81 
10.05 
0.39 
3.53 
3.47 
0.42 
1.32 
6.75 
2.23 
21.66 
8.09 
Lakonishok and Souaiannis 
19.11 
0.46 
1.30 
0.90 
3.18 
8.00 
2.58 
10.88 
4.69 
20.68 
1.36 
3.21 
0.85 
2.59 
7.59 
2.43 
10.99 
4.65 
Quintiles 
3 
9.05 
0.33 
3.92 
5.04 
0.41 
1.40 
6.80 
2.27 
17.97 
7.98 
11.23 
0.51 
4.89 
4.17 
0.48 
1.37 
6.33 
1.87 
14.77 
7.71 
2001) 
21.14 
2.89 
5.69 
0.80 
2.30 
6.84 
2.08 
10.69 
4.60 
4 
10.37 
0.37 
7.34 
6.48 
0.39 
1.00 
5.95 
2.06 
7.59 
7.80 
10.74 
0.37 
8.68 
6.51 
0.43 
1.39 
6.15 
1.73 
15.10 
7.46 
21.67 
5.71 
8.07 
0.70 
1.71 
5.37 
1.53 
9.83 
4.54 
5 (High) 
12.93 
0.40 
30.14 
8.05 
0.33 
0.51 
4.31 
1.51 
2.72 
7.61 
12.00 
0.34 
22.72 
6.26 
0.45 
1.15 
5.55 
2.18 
-9.42 
6.89 
18.15 
22.62 
10.88 
0.54 
1.03 
0.58 
0.57 
1.83 
4.23 
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4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I provide corroborating evidence that Real option% is a measure of the 
proportion of equity value comprised of embedded options. First, I show that Real option% is 
positively correlated with /?<S:D-intensity and that around 30 percent of the variation in Real 
option% can be explained by /?<feD-intensity. Second, I show that Real option% and /?cfeD-
intensity have comparable association with the volatility of stock retums. Third, I estimate the 
market value of embedded options on a per share basis. When the market value of embedded 
options is estimated using capitalised R&D, the confidence interval around this value is 
comparable to that implied by Real option% under an assumed competitive advantage period 
of 20 or 30 years. When this confidence interval is estimated using R&D/Sales, it is 
comparable to that implied by Real option% under an assumed competitive advantage period 
of 10 years. Finally, quintile portfolios formed on the basis of Real option% had comparable 
investment performance to those formed on the basis of /?<5:Z)-intensity. Sharpe ratios for the 
top and bottom quintiles formed on Real option% were 0.40 and 0.41. For portfolios formed 
on the basis of R&DlSaUt^, Sharpe ratios were 0.34 and 0.38 for the top and bottom quintiles. 
In conclusion, this analysis provides support for Real option% as a valid economic constmct -
the proportion of equity value comprised of embedded options. 
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